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Abstract  
The main purpose of my thesis is to examine the processes and problems of risk 
governance within the functioning of a socio-technical system in a hierarchical 
organization. I explore the actual problems of operators of the Campus Security Report 
System and the solutions they deploy as different groups of people. The thesis examines 
the governance of risk-related events as found within people‘s daily life drawing on 
culture theory, risk society and risk management approaches, and attempts to evaluate 
the relationships between risk, risk management and organisational culture. The 
research starts from the exposition of risk management ideas, focused on the daily risks 
happening in schools precisely because they are ‗everyday‘, often quite mundane, yet 
potentially posing as much organisational challenge as major disasters which can, quite 
literally, cause organisational collapse. 
The thesis focuses not only on the concept of culture theory to explore the interaction of 
risk management existing across an organisational culture but also relies on the ideas of 
the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach to explore the dynamic of 
managing daily risks in a hierarchical organisation. The main areas to focus on are: 
 Explore how unpredictable risks are managed 
 Examine the ways in which systems are modified in response to changing risk 
 Examine the ways in which managers and users interact and how hierarchical 
and local cultural practices work together or in different directions 
 Examine what are seen as hard to control risks and how these are reported 
 Examine the play of groups and their interests in shaping the system and how 
problems are dealt with 
 Examine the relationship between leaders/designers and users of the system and 
how this shapes the acceptability of risk. 
My thesis suggests that if managers ignore the factor of culture to manage risk, even 
with the help of technology, they may not only experience the reduplication of risk but 
also create new risks for an organisation or managers once again. In order to avoid such 
unacceptable phenomena when governing risk one of the possible ways may be to rely 
on the functioning of SCOT as a process, this would probably effectively empower the 
socio-technical system‘s ability to manage risk in a more socially robust way in risk 
society.  
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Risk and Socio-technical Systems: 
A Study of the Taiwanese Campus Accident Reporting System 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
From ancient to modern technological society, human history is closely related to risk. 
Risk situations are like a catalyst in chemistry, a virus in a computer or bacteria in 
medicine. Sometimes they cause a negative influence for processes of experiment, 
undermine system functions or harm bodies. However, they may have a positive 
function in enabling a stable reaction of an experiment, an anti-virus for a defense 
system or antibiotics for the protection of health. From a historical point of view, 
sometimes risk may mark a new milestone for society. In ancient society people 
accumulated knowledge from life experience. The ancient Chinese, for example, used to 
deploy astronomy to do the weather forecasts and develop twenty four solar terms in 
accordance with cultivation practices to predict the harm to crops from adverse weather. 
In ancient Egypt, people built a foundation for civilization in the Nile valley where 
flooding happened every year for thousands of years. Flooding was one of the threats to 
residents‘ lives and property caused by the Nile River but it provided fertile mud for 
cultivation. Such natural disasters not only bring losses for human society, but also 
provide an opportunity for society to learn from the experience and lessons of history.  
Sometimes risks may appear repeatedly. Although people have learned how to reduce 
the loss coming from risks by learning from history, the possible disaster coming after 
risks cannot be eradicated. How to efficiently predict risks to prevent disaster is of vital 
importance. For example, there is a paragon story about an event that happened 
thousands of years ago in ancient China. A man called Yu was assigned by the Emperor 
to harness the flooding of the Yellow River in the middle of China. He worked too hard 
to go home and even passed by his home three times. No matter how industrious he was, 
the flooding caused by the Yellow River still remained from far ancient time to present 
days. A similar situation also appears in the UK, there were 37 flood events in Yorkshire, 
from 1315 to 1968 (Radley & Simms 1970:10). Though science and technological 
research has the highest reputation and achievement in the UK, the flood could not be 
eradicated, completely. From a historical point of view, risks with similar characteristics 
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may cause the same problems in any societies, whether in east or west. Therefore, if 
people cannot avoid the risk around them, one of the best ways to cope with risk may be 
to combine knowledge from historical records or to rely on the calculation abilities of 
modern technologies to alleviate some potential harm from risks. 
Nowadays most governments or organisations rely on technology to manage or prevent 
risks including natural and man-made ones, such as typhoons, hurricanes and tsunami 
forecasts, the control of global warming, management of nuclear power plants and 
earthquakes, terrorist identification and monitoring systems, infectious disease 
prevention and rail track management. However, technology may itself be the source of 
some risks for society, such as the 911 event in the USA, in which the planes hijacked 
by terrorists became their weapons. It was a similar situation in regard to the terrorist 
attack in India in 2008, where terrorists aimed at their target through the use of ‗Google 
Earth‘. In addition, when bureaucratic organizations rely on some technologies such as 
Closed Circuit Television CCTV to govern risk, while government may save on 
manpower and other costs in making risk-prevention policies (Pollock and Williams 
2009: 20) at the same time they may face a dilemma in regard to compromising human 
rights through surveillance. Another example may be worth noting: the massive 8.9 
magnitude earthquake struck off Japan on 11 March 2011 and the Japanese government 
notified its citizens on mobile phones through a message system which gave an extra 
fifteen to thirty seconds for citizens to escape. On the one hand, technology here 
provided a highly effective function to warn people about risks providing a bridge 
between government and public (Loader 1998: 6). On the other hand, this powerful 
earthquake not only caused huge damage and loss to citizens and property but also 
created another disaster (a tsunami); as a result, the tsunami destroyed the Fukushima 
Nuclear Power Plant which has caused new socio-technical risks to government, the 
private corporations involved and to citizens in risk society.  
Significantly, each risk-related event may bring or be followed by some hazards or harm 
for societies. On the one hand, if people ignore the hazards coming from those events, 
they may cause new risks for individuals, organization or society. Moreover, if the 
damage from risks cannot be reduced or prevented, they may create a negative condition 
which may be a potential risk at the end of the event itself. On the other hand, any 
disaster may cause some risks, and every risk also could create some hazards for 
organisations or societies as well. Therefore, how to govern risk-related events and 
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identify the relationships between risks, risk management and organisational culture are 
the major purposes of this doctoral thesis. The next section will describe how and why 
the researcher developed the concept of the thesis. 
1.2 The concept of the thesis 
Risk pervades daily life and social science research at the end of the twentieth century 
and beyond has become increasingly focused upon it. The nature, sources and impact of 
risks are seen to vary and different perspectives provide different analyses of risk and its 
meaning. Some focus on more psychological, others cultural, yet others organisational 
processes that can be linked to risk. My research is not interested in major global issues 
such as climate change that require international collaboration to manage them; rather, 
my thesis is more concerned with the exploration of the actual risks which happen in 
people‘s daily life primarily among young people, regarded by some governments as 
‗risky‘, as potential sources of ‗danger‘ or ‗trouble‘ and so in need of some forms of 
social regulation and oversight (Mitchell et al 2004: 1). The thesis focuses on the risks 
associated with actual or potential campus security events that have caused harm to 
individuals (student or staff), schools (the loss or damage of property) or wider society 
(e.g. the potential threats from infectious disease on campus) in Taiwan. Such events at 
high school are considered to carry the status of chronic, frequent and regular risk, 
because they may happen in every day, each week or month or potential threats that 
need to be prevented. What is sociologically interesting is that they still happen at any 
time even under formal governance regimes.  
I explore the viewpoints of the designers and operators of an IT-based system known as 
the Campus Security Reporting System (CSRS), which are collected from respondents 
found in different levels of the system based upon the importance of seeing different 
interests and perspectives in defining risk and using the system, as suggested by the 
social construction of technology (SCOT) approach. Bijker et al (1989: 28) highlight 
‗the developmental process of a technological artifact is described as an alternation of 
variation and selection‘. The structure of the CSRS is built on an information 
technology (IT) system which relies on the creation and use of a national 
digital-database to link the relationships between the system designers/managers and 
operators/users. I explore the actual problems of operators of the CSRS and the 
solutions they deploy as different groups of staff, which included the system designers, 
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government managers, policy practitioners and regional/local operators. The CSRS was 
built by the educational system which I argue can be characterised as a hierarchical 
organisation which expresses a high grid/group culture, a concept I draw from Mary 
Douglas‘ work. There are four management levels among the government, local 
government and school. My thesis therefore not only explores the dynamic between the 
designers/managers and operators/users, but also seeks to understand the possible 
problems that they experience and the solutions they find to deal with them.  
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
My thesis tries to find out what are the different perceptions among those handling the 
campus security events and in operating the CSRS between local school managers who 
are the system operators and governmental managers who are the system 
designers/managers. The research adopts a mixed-methods approach, including the use 
of a case study, quantitative research, qualitative research, longitudinal research (in 
relation to reviewing and assessing long-term secondary data sources) and interviews. 
This thesis compares the opinions and experiences of operators who manage or operate 
the technological system with a three part case study which includes the analysis of the 
database of the CSRS in Taiwan, a questionnaire survey with operators‘ about the CSRS 
and face to face interviews with the system operators and managers.  
Research concentrated on the management function of risks in a hierarchical 
organization which handles all security events that happen at schools around the country. 
The first part of the case study focuses on access I secured to the five year database of 
the CSRS from 2004 to 2008. The second part of the case study addresses on the staff 
attitudes operating the CSRS. The purpose of this part of the research is to explore the 
attitudes of school managers in risk management, and to discover the relationship 
between formal procedures they are expected to follow and what actual practice takes 
place when dealing with risk events at school. Finally, the third dimension of my case 
study moves onto analysing more specific opinions from the local operators or 
managers at schools in some cities in Taiwan, as well as the system designers and more 
senior managers within government departments. The research in this part focuses on 
the personal knowledge of governing risk events and the function of the CSRS. The 
research tries to distinguish differences between the local and government managers in 
using or managing the Campus Security Report Centre CSRC. My thesis attempts to 
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understand the dynamics of risk management through comparative research. Also, it 
hopes to explore the relationship between organizational culture and personal attitudes 
in dealing with risks; and to discover what, using a phrase from Nowotny‘ (2000: 117) 
one might call a ‗socially robust‘ approach towards effective risk governance.  
1.4 The purpose of research  
Different organisations, cultures, societies and countries may develop multiple systems 
and skills to monitor or manage both visible and invisible risks. As Nowotny (ibid) 
points out, however, scientists design possible ways to deal with any potential or real 
risks, but need to develop a form of reliable knowledge about risk that fits the needs of 
citizens, their cultures and the customs of society. If the need is secured, a form of risk 
governance based on ―socially robust knowledge‖ can be achieved. The aim of my 
thesis is not to judge the moral issues of risk management, but to explore how such a 
system works in a modern technological society; and within this context a society that 
regards technology as providing a means through which social ordering and the 
management of risk can be enabled. Therefore, I focus on a socio-technical management 
system, which is designed by a governmental agency, relying on modern technology to 
identify, integrate and manage the phenomena of risks and ‗accidents‘ occurring in 
everyday life on schools and colleges in Taiwan. Campus security events may appear 
frequently on every day; some are likely to appear randomly over few weeks or months; 
most of them cause slight injury for students or staff on or off the campus; however, 
sometimes they may cause serious harm to them or loss of campus property in the 
school.  
Thus, in the thesis I will examine the governance of risk-related events as found within 
people‘s daily life drawing on culture theory, risk society and risk management 
approaches; and attempt to evaluate the relationships between risk, risk management 
and organisational culture. The campus reporting system was developed by the 
educational institutions in Taiwan, though the operational function and experience of the 
system may provide many useful information and examples for similar regimes which 
seek to govern risks in the socio-technical society. Therefore, this thesis tries to examine 
and critique risk management practice and works towards a model that can be used to 
integrate more effectively functions to improve the governance of socio-technical risk. 
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1.5 Overview of the thesis 
This first chapter describes how I built the concept of the thesis and how I have created 
the structure of thesis through the linking of three case studies. Also, it describes the 
purpose of the research. Chapter 2 (the Literature Review) will consider the literature 
relating to the meaning of risk and explore why people adopt different management 
procedures but also rely on standard processes in risk governance in different cultural 
contexts. Also, it will describe how socio-technology influences the governance of 
risk – whether it is possible to build a standardisation model for risk governance or not. 
Thus it may be more possible to discriminate between risk governance, as a legitimate 
form of management and surveillance, which raises deeper questions about 
accountability. 
In Chapter 3 (Methodology), the main objective will be to describe the research 
approach, the methodology and the chosen framework for analyses. It will provide a 
discussion of the methods used to secure data from the CSRC in Taiwan, and explain 
the design for my fieldwork involving the interviews with managers who operate the 
campus security report system, and explains the quantitative and qualitative methods 
used in this thesis. Then, in order to distinguish and contrast the different opinions 
existing within the local organizational culture, both the survey results will be examined 
and integrated using a triangulation method. 
Chapter 4 (Case Study I) illustrates the functioning of the Campus Security Report 
System, and explores the background behind the design and establishment of the system 
in Taiwan. Also, the thesis will describe how the system works and what the regulation 
and functional features the system has. For the purpose of finding the possible trend of 
risks from the historical data, this chapter explores the CSRS, and analyses the database, 
from 2004 to 2008, recorded in the governance system in Taiwan. 
In Chapter 5 (the second stage of my case study) I will consider the operator‘s personal 
attitude in operating the CSRS. The research tries to discover answers to the three 
questions below. Did the CSRS provide a good communication channel between high 
schools and the Ministry of Education in reporting campus emergency events? Is there 
any impact on managers in risk governance at school caused by the organizational 
culture? What kind of attitude do people learn from managers who have operated the 
CSRS when facing risks in a socio-technical society? 
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In Chapter 6 (the third part of my case study) the goal is to collect the more specific 
opinion of operators in managing the CSRS. The data collection will rely on face to face 
interviews. I tried to explore more specific opinions drawn from different groups of 
people including operators of the CSRS. The research design in this case focuses on 
three issues. How does the governmental agency record data of campus security events 
to monitor potential risk that may happen in the future? What is the main relationship 
between organisational culture and risk governance in campus security events? Are 
there any significant differences in using or operating the technological system of risk 
governance between local operators and high level managers? 
The final Chapter (Discussion and Conclusion) will summarize the findings and 
hopefully can contribute these findings to the social science field. I develop there the 
modeling of risk management according to the results of my survey which integrated 
the process of risk management, culture theory and the process of SCOT within what I 
argue are four possible stages of risks within risk society. The thesis will consider the 
implications of the findings for the risk governance of individuals, organizations, 
societies and government levels, and make some recommendations for the 
implementation of socio-technologies in enabling risk governance. This chapter will 
also draw on the results to develop an overall model for risk governance which though 
derived from the Taiwanese case, should have wider utility. This chapter will finish with 
suggestions for further research for those who are interested in this issue. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The phenomenon of risk has been associated with the evolution of culture and society 
from the past to the present as well as the future since risk is always about the 
possibility of something (unwanted) happening. The Oxford Advanced Learner‘s 
dictionary defines risk as ―the possibility of something bad happening at some time in 
the future, or a situation that could be dangerous or have a bad result‖ (Wehmeier et al 
2005: 1313). From this point of view, risk is said to relate to a potential danger within a 
specific social context. 
However, what are risks? Is there a stable meaning of risk applicable to every culture or 
society, and if not, how may this vary? This chapter explores the perception of risk in 
regard to some key factors: its meaning, scope, standard, and evaluation, and the 
theoretical approaches towards risk and its governance in socio-technical society: in 
regard to the latter, I also discuss the tension between the governance of risk and 
processes of surveillance. 
2.2 The meaning of risk 
Each organisation or society may develop some utility functions or unique cultures to 
transfer some empirical or theoretical knowledge for later generations. Some of such 
experiential inheritances may be recorded as language or word. Others are likely to 
evolve as customer or lifestyle existing in people‘s daily life. The following section 
explores two key aspects of risk: its meaning and how it has evolved over time.  
2.2.1 The perception of risk 
Words are parts of civilization. Risk in Chinese is called ‗危機‘ (wei ji), which 
combines two meanings : 危險 (wei xian), which means danger, and 機會 (ji hui), 
which means opportunity. According to this definition, it can be inferred that risk is 
something which may actually cause danger or harm as well as something that creates 
the conditions for a risk-laden event at the same time. However, what is uncertain is 
whether the possibility of risk follows danger or danger comes from opportunity. What 
about the meaning of risk in Western society? What is the evolution of the meaning of 
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risk? Here I examine the variations of the meaning of risk with regard to three elements: 
historical background, social activity and social science itself.  
Marjolein (2000: 147) indicates that the concept of risk may be retraced to the thirteenth 
century. ‗Risk‘ was derived from the Greek notion ‗rhiza‘ which means ‗root‘ or ‗cliff‘; 
then Italian speech used the word ‗rischiare‘ with the same meaning, which relates to 
‗danger‘ as well. We can say that risk was originally used to describe a scenario 
associated with standing on the edge of a cliff, which thereby symbolized danger, what 
someone feels as danger. It indicates those kinds of situation which may cause harm for 
humans in dangerous surroundings. Therefore, in this sense risk is seen as a materially 
and physically dangerous situation that people can sense or feel. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word of ‗risk‘ was originally written as 
‗risco’ in Italian and ‗rischio’ which is related to the meaning of ‗uncertain‘ in 1661 
(James et al: 1991: 987). In addition, Luhmann (1993: 9) explains that ‗riscum‘ may 
come from the renaissance Latin, which appeared in German in the mid sixteenth 
century, and then to English in the second half of the seventeenth century.  
Luhmann (ibid) points out that in medieval documents the idea of risk was related to the 
fields of navigation and trade in the Middle Ages. Risk could also be found used in 
many societal contexts at the end of the seventeenth century (Murray 1933; Simpson & 
Weiner 1989; Zinn 2008: 7). Subsequently, risk changed its meaning to become a 
measure or calculation standard for insurance purposes associated with trade or 
navigation. Risk was specific to the potential for hazards to occur. It was a measurement 
for calculating the hazards for business, with which traders could then determine and 
negotiate an insurance fee, and in this way a new insurance profession and industry 
based on risk-calculation began. For example, a trader might need to calculate the 
uncertain (damage from hurricane/ attack from pirate) or invisible (run a reef/ scurvy 
cause crew ill) risks to determine (and perhaps increase) the insurance fee for shipping 
goods from continental countries to or from China. In this way risk has been redefined 
to include not merely real dangers but also the technical calculation of potential dangers. 
When both uncertain and invisible subjective perceptions have been integrated to 
measure a level of commercial risk, it then becomes different from a simple concern 
with material or physical phenomena and is modified to relate to a potential and 
uncertain event. Thus, a more abstract sense of the word ‗Risiko‘ had become a part of 
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German in the nineteenth century (Grimm & Grimm 1854; Zinn 2008: 7) going beyond 
merely its application to commercial activities, risk became more widely used in culture, 
such as in people‘s customary language. As can be seen, in most of the English- 
language literature the explanations of the words, risk, hazard and danger, are similar 
and usually regarded almost synonymously (Renn 1985; Luhmann 2005: 22). 
Furthermore, Hillson and Murray-Webster (2007) highlight the fact that risk has not 
only become a prevalent term in everyday vocabulary but also been used in the social 
science field to analyze both personal and wider collective circumstances in modern 
society, such as pensions, insurance, and investments in regard to health. For example, 
most health insurance companies take customers‘ health examination reports as one of 
the markers for deciding their insurance fee. Here risk measurement for an individual‘s 
health includes personal age and prior periods of medical illness, here moving from the 
concern of risk from commercial activities to those associated with individual risks and 
benefits. 
Moreover, the concept of risk may be extended to business and consumer behaviour, 
such as, corporate governance, strategy or wider activity in the business community. In 
modern society, risk is then not only used for assessing the insurance of trade but also 
extended to the measurement of investment, the evaluation of the environment or the 
relation between employer and employee. It may also inform the licensing of new 
products coming to market. 
More widely, it may be applied to a society and its livelihood — its economic 
performance, matters of social security, and environmental protection issues and food 
safety. There are new types of risk in the twentieth century, which people did not 
anticipate before. Some typical examples include global warming caused by the 
emission of carbon dioxide from human activity, or the Chernobyl nuclear reactor 
disaster, in 1986. 
However, Beck (1992: 21) claims that we are living in the ‗risk society‘ now; that is to 
say, nowadays everyone is living in a society that appears riddled with risks of one form 
or another. He argues that risk may be created when people try to develop new 
technologies to solve existing problems, because new inventions may be accompanied 
by new risks for societies. Risk resulting from new inventions increases the important of 
the management of risk and measures of control and security. For the needs of security, 
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for example, CCTVs are everywhere in our surroundings, which means people are 
monitored by the police or other agencies though this creates new risks inasmuch as 
some people are deemed to be potentially ‗high-risk‘ based on specific security 
algorithms (Graham, 2010). In addition, finger prints are required when people enter 
particular nations, which put people under the surveillance of the immigration agency. 
Are these legitimate forms of governance or intrusive forms of surveillance, protections 
or infringements? This question is taken up later on. 
In short, tracking the historical background of the word risk, one can find that it has 
changed from its original meaning of a real danger to a potential or possible danger in 
terms of commercial relationships, daily life, business relationships, diverse social 
activities and matters of individual and collective security within and between countries. 
Inevitably, such changes have made risk a prime area of interest for the social sciences. 
2.2.2 The concept of risk 
The historical account above shows risk move from real dangers to uncertainties and so 
to the emergence of new forms of regulation in culture (Luhmann 1993; Zinn 2008: 9). 
Such social activities likely have removed the concepts of risk from influence the safety 
at individual level to assess the commercial activities at social level. From the 
eighteenth century onwards the concept of risk had been embraced by a form of 
scientism, illustrated by the growth of probability theory in mathematics (Lupton 1999: 
6). 
Douglas (1992: 46) indicates that ―as risk enters as a concept in political debate it 
becomes a menacing thing, like a flood, an earthquake, or a thrown brick‖. She also 
explains that risk is not a thing; it may be like an imagination or thinking coming from 
the human mind. This is the same as the examination of risk by Lupton (1999: 11), who 
also argues risk is not only a natural production, but also a highly artificial contrivance 
associated with social behaviour in modern society, such as traffic accidents and 
terrorism.  
Meanwhile, if comparing the above concepts of risk, we can find an element in 
common — ―the distinction between possible and chosen action, some philosophers call 
this contingency‖ (Renn 1992; Renn 2008: 1). From the philosophical point of view, 
risks may be the direct result of natural events or human activities, which tend to occur 
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in the potential of unpleasant circumstances. Despite its unpredictable characteristic, 
people tend to make causal connections between the events and their actions (ibid) in 
search for the possible ways to control risks.  
In spite of the different types of risk events, Hillson and Murray-Webster (2007: 5) 
highlight two common characteristics of risk found in all societies, which are 
uncertainty and the consequences of the risk itself. Risks are uncertain because of their 
variable characteristics. In the past, traders forecast risks during maritime trade, but no 
one could predict the exact time and place because of unpredictable factors such as 
weather and human error. The second characteristic, the consequences of the risk itself, 
is noticed because it may have causal impacts on society. Consequently, if people ignore 
early warnings that are the precursor to risks, they may amplify their harm and impact 
on society. Some commentators call the latter ‗social shocks‘ (Lawless 1977; Pidgeon, 
Kasperson and Slovic 2003: 23) that may cause concern for those who seek to manage 
risk. 
However, some highly attenuated risk is a ‗hidden hazard‘, such risks are normally 
unnoticed and unintended, but they do not disappear and often continue growing their 
effects until a disaster occurs (Kasperson and Kasperson 1991; Pidgeon, Kasperson and 
Slovic 2003: 23). According to Kasperson and Kasperson (1991), there are five hidden 
hazards: Global elusive hazards, Ideological hazards, Marginal hazards, 
Amplification-driven hazards and Value-threatening hazards. 
Firstly, Global elusive hazards, which involve serious complex problems, such as 
regional interactions, slow accumulation, lengthy time lags and diffuse effects, have 
related to countries in conflict or political tension such as between Western and Eastern 
societies. Secondly, Ideological hazards are caused by values and assumptions that 
people have or are embedded in a societal web, such as religious beliefs, local customs 
and cultures. The religious war between Israel and Arabic countries, for example, seem 
to be caused by different religious beliefs. Moreover, the Second World War in Europe 
was caused by Nazism because Hitler persuaded Germany to join the war by means of 
ideology. Thirdly, Marginal hazards relate to risks people face at the ‗edge‘ of cultures, 
societies, or economies. Such hazards especially happen in modern society because 
technology itself might be the source of hazard; The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster 
is a good example, where astronauts explore extra-terrestrial risks on our behalf. One of 
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the factors that caused the accident was created by a failure in the ‗O-rings‘ on the 
booster rocket. Although a high degree of potential risk was accepted by the astronauts, 
such work circumstances are particularly dangerous if the hazard becomes out of control. 
Fourth, Amplification-driven hazards refer to the situation where people neglect the 
conventional type of risk assessment and environmental impact analysis, and as a result 
require societal intervention and create secondary harms to organizations or society. For 
instance, if a government prepares to build a nuclear power plant without proper safety 
evaluation and environmental assessment, it may cause major concern among members 
of the local society and even create a new hazard for government. Lastly, 
Value-threatening hazards may lead to the change of organizations/institutions, 
lifestyles and basic values. Such threats may influence the abilities of institutions to 
respond and adapt to the potential impact from hazards. The development of 
technologies outstrips the anticipation of both political and regulatory systems, which 
may not effectively respond to new hazards from technologies. For example, the 
development of biotechnology has created a new milestone for human health, but the 
policy makers may not have adequate enough knowledge for monitoring relevant 
innovation. As a result, the public may experience anxiety and confusion when they are 
treated with new medical innovation or offered GM crops based on such developments. 
In addition to these hidden hazards, there are other general concepts about the meaning 
of risk offered by social scientists. As noted above, in terms of ―risk society‖ Beck 
argues that risks could be defined as ―the probabilities of physical harm due to a given 
technological or other process‖ (Beck 1992: 4). He demonstrates that ―the concept of 
risk is directly bound to the concept of reflexive modernization‖. In modern society, risk 
analysis may be one of the systematic ways to treat hazards and insecurities; in contrast 
to older dangers, the consequence may relate to the results of modernity itself and the 
accompanying globalization of doubt (ibid: 21). However, Douglas, from a more 
cultural theory point of view, argues that in the past ‗risk in itself was neutral; it took 
account of the probability of losses and gains―, here a concept of risk originally linked 
to the context of gambling (Douglas 1992: 23). And Lupton argues risk is only used to 
refer to negative or undesirable outcomes instead of positive ones and also relates to 
threat, hazard, danger or harm in people‘s everyday language (Lupton 1999: 8). 
Integrating the views above, it can be argued that the concept of risk may be regarded as 
a systematic way to describe the potential physical harm, or to explain the threat to 
property and person within a specific cultural context, and the associated negative 
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outcomes of events, outcomes that are unacceptable to a society. 
Lupton and Tulloch (2003: 37) develop their concept of risk through the diverse 
response they received in their empirical studies. Many participants think risk is 
negative, frightening and involves taking a step into the unknown. Therefore, most 
people will associate the concept of risk with potential danger and an unknown situation 
which may cause harm for their bodies and ‗spirits‘, even in modern society. The 
concept of risk has permeated through daily life in modern Western societies. There is 
considerable research and discussion in this field (ibid: 1); for instance, the research in 
the field of science, medicine, law, the social sciences and economics may involve the 
exploration of the natural risk.  
Literally speaking, risks refer to those uncertain factors that have not happened yet. If 
they become real, they may create a catastrophe, such as the September 11 attack. In 
practice, risks have already moved from the abstract possibility to the anticipation of 
further attacks, economic decline or worldwide war (Loon 2002: 2). Zinn argues that 
even though control over the occurrence of events is difficult, it is likely that people can 
make some provisions for the aftermath of these events (Zinn 2008: 4). By doing this, 
the future can be modified or at least can be subject to ongoing monitoring through 
human agency.  
Renn (2008) suggests that there are five characteristics relating to the role and meaning 
of risk within society. Firstly, most governments or private institutions should 
understand they may face risks at any moment. Secondly, risk plays an important role in 
most contemporary theories of modern and post-modern societies. Third, risk is not just 
a phenomenon limited to a specific field of science, but has to be understood as an 
interdisciplinary subject. Moreover, risk is not only an important academic subject but 
also influences human daily life. Finally, risk is a concept developed by the change of 
life experience or environment and professional science knowledge (Renn 2008: XIII). 
He argues that these diverse notions of risk have affected people‘s lives, from the 
twentieth century to the present. 
Indeed, several discussions on the concept of risk have been discussed in the social 
science field. Some scholars argue that risk is not a thing; it is a kind of thinking coming 
from the human mind. Some suggest that risk is not only a natural output, but also is an 
artificial production which may be associated with some uncertainy. People are worried 
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about the consequence of risk itself, which may be the side effect created by risk. Others 
are concerned with ―social shocks‘ which are caused by risk, and such shocks may hide 
some potential hazards for people or society. In short, risk is related to negative 
unknowns and potential dangers for society. 
2.2.3 The evolution of risk as a social phenomenon 
The above sections first discussed the origin of risk, which shows it originally was 
associated with business activity within maritime trade in the sixteenth to seventeenth 
century, and the formal concept of risk, which has been modified by the development of 
civilizations and technologies.  
The concept of risk has its own evolution from pre-industrial to industrial and then to 
post-industrial society. Such an evolution is caused by the changes within societies 
themselves. Significant changes in social styles and culture make people think they are 
―living in new times‖, especially in term of economy and politics, from the early 
twentieth century to the World War II (Smart 1993: Lupton 1999: 10-11). Such changes 
may be at the international/national level such as the end of the Cold War or the 
breakdown of the socialism and communism. Others may relate to societal changes: for 
instance, the development of communication technology which overcomes the 
limitation of space and time, economic decline or growth, the modification of familial 
relationships and the feminist movement (ibid: 10).  
A number of sociologists argue that risk may relate to the constant flux, cultural fission 
and the breakdown of traditions (Giddens 1990; Massumi 1993; Lash and Urry 1994; 
Featherstone 1995; Lupton 1999: 11). They argue that risk may be not only be created 
by government strategy at a national level, such as the construction of nuclear weapons 
or power plants, but also influenced by national political changes, such as the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the East and West Germany merged. Such 
national evolutions have significantly influenced the meaning of risk today 
2.2.3.1 Risk in the pre-industrial society 
In pre-industrial societies risks were mainly caused by natural disasters or diseases such 
as flood and plague. People at that time, focused on their capacity to tame powerful 
natural resources for economic purposes and how to reduce the concomitant risks of 
potential side effects to human health and the natural environment (Habermas 1991; 
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Leiss 1996; Jager et al 2001; Renn 2008: 205). Uncertainty was a significant symbolic 
measure of risk. People might find such disasters unpredictable so they were considered 
as punishment from gods or demons (Beck 1992; Zinn 2008: 23). Therefore, religious 
ceremony might be one of the possible ways of reducing risks for the public as well as 
the powerful in pre-industrial society.  
However, when marine business played a key role in western society, a more codified 
and less superstitious-based risk analysis created a secure indemnification for trade 
activities on the ocean. Many unpredictable risks had accompanied trade activities in 
society. Consequently, a more modernist meaning of risk began to emerge to include the 
evaluation of business, and risk itself evolved from being an invisible threat to more 
visible financial affairs, this especially so in the period that industrial society emerged, 
as I now discuss.  
2.2.3.2 Risk in the industrial society  
In the past, risks were kinds of uncertain phenomena influenced by nature. However, 
social changes created new types of risk to mankind and society. Zinn (2008: 23) points 
out that ―the new risks are understood as man-made side-effects of modernization, even 
though unexpected or ignored‖. After the industrial revolution, risks became more 
tangible, not least through potentially hazardous machines being deployed in factories, 
which in turn prompted various governments to introduce legislation and social reform 
to control such risks. However, it is more difficult to calculate the scales and influences 
of risk because they are more significant than those in the past. Although the 
development of science and technology might minimize the impact of risks, they still 
could not be entirely removed. 
During the 1960s expert discourses on risk proliferated as did new institutions and 
regulatory agencies dealing with the phenomena, conceptualised in terms of probability 
statistics and often managed through the use of computer technologies. Commentaries 
have suggested that people pay more attention to the incorporation of the causes, effects 
and value of risk (Short 1984; Douglas 1985; Skolbekken 1995; Lupton 1999: 10). Such 
causes are more complicated than those in the past and appear therefore more difficult 
to solve, but therefore in more need of being codified. 
People often rely on scientific measures, calculation and control to identify the risks 
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which they may confront in nature or around them (ibid: 18). However, some 
psychometric researchers argue that while real risks may actually exist they are just 
interpreted as perceptions. Others argue that some risks can be defined and categorised. 
Some may combine both conceptions of risk in their work interchangeably, which can 
lead to considerable confusion (Bradbury 1989; Lupton 1999: 22). Moreover, the 
discussion and interpretation of risks may be even more complex, inasmuch as risks 
reflect powerful regional and cultural differences, 
Risks today are also viewed as caused by humans, and thus responsibility and blame is 
generally leveled at everyone in the society for the production of risks (Beck 1990; 
Tulloch and Lupton 2003: 3). New types of risk might be created by modernization 
which includes scientific development and human behavior/activities such as the 
development of nuclear power and weapons, from the legacies of the colonial period 
and the confrontation between state communist and western democratic states. 
This has led to the argument that society has become more risky in the more recent 
period because of the endlessness of unpredictable and uncertain risks especially at a 
global level. Beck (1999: 2) argues that ―the risk society is understood as a world risk 
society, increasingly influenced by the management of transnational risks and processes 
of societal globalization‖. The more benefits from the development of technologies that 
people and society obtain, the more certain and uncertain risks people and the society 
may have to accept in such a ‗world risk society‘. 
2.2.3.3 Risk in the post-industrial society  
Social development, cultural changes and technological invention have challenged the 
ways in which social order is secured, while society itself has become increasingly 
individualistic. For example, globalization brings wider and more various cultures for 
local society and the invention of the internet has changed the concept of space and 
communication across it. Beck argues that ―new and future social developments cannot 
be conceptualized properly with the categories of past and present society‖ (Beck 1998, 
2000; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Zinn 2008: 18). Therefore, in post-industrial 
society such elements may create a variety of new types of risks for individuals, 
societies, environments or countries.  
Risks may be controlled by new technological measures; however, most potential risks 
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are still uncertain and unpredictable, appearing anytime and anywhere. Therefore, the 
developments of new technologies tend to intervene in nature and affect many aspects 
of modern social life. Controlling a variety of irregular or unpredictable factors, 
especially in terms of ecological and natural protection, is an important endeavour in 
post-industrial society (Giddens 1991: 135). However, sometimes the new technologies 
introduced into social contexts may be thwarted by both unintended effects and regional 
institutional structures, if their boundaries are more or less permeable to socio-technical 
innovation (Webster 2007: 144).  
In post-industrial society, social science is not only concerned with the new risks from 
technical production and their impact on society but also focuses on societal 
self-transformation through the processes of individualization or institutionalized 
individualism (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Zinn 2002; Zinn 2008: 21). Sociologists, 
such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, have presented theoretical accounts of the 
‗risk society‘ in which risk itself has become a force of social change. Both of them 
agree that new types of risk challenge the order of post-industrial society, and they also 
emphasise that the socio-political order generates new social problems, especially those 
caused by the development of technologies that create ecological problems (Lupton 
1999; Loon: 2002: 2). They believe that risks in the post-industrial society not only 
cause threats for single societies but also pervade global society.  
In sum, the evolution of risks has been influenced by the various developments of 
technologies and the changes of society. In the past, the hazards could be ascribed to 
natural disaster or an undersupply of hygienic technology. Today they may be created 
by various forms of industrial production and products. The essence of risks have 
evolved from the more limited concept of danger in the Middle Ages through to the 
modern causes which are influenced by the growth of global society and the 
development of high technologies as both visible and invisible threats (Beck 1992: 21). 
The world risk society may adequately describe the situation in modern society. More 
unpredictable threats will be influenced by the side production of technologies and be 
created by some invisible risks which may bring major disasters for modern society. The 
next section discusses the boundary and harm of risks in the world risk society. 
2.3 The scope of risk 
The above exploration of risk discussed the historical background with social 
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phenomena and the evolution of risk associated with a change in social culture. This 
section explores debates over how risk is to be assessed. It seems that the pervasion of 
new types of risks in the socio-technical society is unavoidable. Therefore, both the 
scale and potential impact of technological developments and the increased awareness 
to people‘s health and to environmental quality hazards have risen to the top of the 
political agenda as key concerns in Western industrial nations (Dunlop 1991; Dunlap et 
al 1992, 1993; Schultz 2001; Eurobarometer 2006; Renn 2008: 205).  
However, the scale and significance of the relationship between health, technology and 
societal risk is neither the same across different societies, nor stable within any one 
society (Webster 2007: 49). Consequently, the more sophisticated and diverse the range 
of technologies there are to manage risk, the more complicated the measurement of the 
scope of risk may become. 
2.3.1 The boundary of risk 
The evolution of civilization was built on the multiple activities of societies. Regarded 
as the potential threats caused by natural disasters or disease around domestic life in the 
pre-industrial society, the boundary of risks has been limited by the characteristic of 
geography. In modern society, the scopes of risks have been gradually extended by the 
development in industry and innovation in technology, from visible borders to invisible 
frontiers. Indeed, the advancement of culture has made a barrier between the present 
and the past. People believe that the development of science may empower human 
abilities to control and to predicate most risks. The boundary of risks has evolved into a 
more complicated one because it tends to involve natural events, economic, social and 
technological development, and policy-driven actions, and has been accompanied by a 
move in significance from the domestic to the international level (Renn 2008: 5). 
Despite the fact that all potential risks will affect society, if people ignore them their 
effects may be too late to manage (Zinn 2008: 25). In addition, notions of human 
superiority may create an illusion for people to think that there is nothing they can be 
learned from their own origins and from other cultures (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983: 
33), which may increase the impact of invisible risks on people and society. Normally, 
the distribution of life chances through any society is unequal. Risks accepted by some 
people may be regarded as unwelcome by others. Some people tend to take greater risks 
or to accept a greater degree of danger. For example, the boundary of risk to a pilot in 
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the air show may be greater than that of the audiences (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 
18), which shows that the boundaries of risk vary according to the attitudes people take 
when facing risks. However, individuals do not exist as isolated social atoms 
(Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990: 179); everyone is a part of the culture and 
society. When the boundaries of risk have been expanded by the development of 
technologies, it is highly likely that citizens are not able to isolate themselves from the 
events that happen in society. 
The consequence of the development of science and industry may include a set of risks 
or hazards, creating events that society has never faced. New types of risks can no 
longer be limited in time and may affect future generations. Unlike those of the earlier 
society, nowadays everyone is affected by the risks in this the risk society (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1983; Beck 1992: 2) as there is no specific boundary to world risk events 
such as nuclear, chemical, ecological, and genetic engineering risks (Zinn 2008: 23). 
The measurement of the boundary of risk may also be influenced by gender. Discussing 
the individualization of risk from the characteristic of gender, Beck is aware that there is 
a gender difference in the perception of risks boundaries and the decisions made in face 
of risks (Beck 1992: 104-106). Indeed, the concepts of the risk boundary vary across 
different individual, social and scientific points of view. Economists tend to use a 
modernist conceptualization of rational action to tackle risk. Psychologists approach 
risks at an individual level. Sociologists tend to adopt a different position such as 
examining the background, social action, institutions and culture, rather than focusing 
on rational planning or individual emotional influences (Taylor-Gooby 2006: 8). Risks 
have become more and more difficult to calculate and to control because the 
globalization expends the boundaries of risk crossing nations and socioeconomic 
systems (Beck 1992; Tulloch & Lupton (2003: 2). Therefore, it is hard to define the 
boundary of risks by inducting the multiple causes of risk, which may be influenced by 
the characteristic of individuals such as gender or the ‗edge worker‘ (risk takers), and 
the development of social change through globalization. 
2.3.2 The harms of risk 
Most social activities aim at improving living conditions and serving human needs and 
they may transform nature into a cultural form (Renn 2008: 5), and this process of 
transformation may bring potential risks to society as well. Therefore, some risks are 
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passively incurred by people‘s activities. In the pre-industrial society most risks were 
caused by direct hazards from nature and people had little choice but to accept the loss 
of their life or property. However, modern society seems to refuse the notion that risks 
are linked to fate or destiny (Lübbe 1993; Marjolein 2000: 156). As a result, risk issues 
have gained enormous importance and have become foregrounded phenomenon (Vlek 
1996; Marjolein 2000: 156), because while potential risks may be huge, they might be 
controlled. 
The possible harms from risk might be assessed or evaluated by their visible damage to 
property or physical injury in pre-industrial society; for the evaluation and assessment 
of the harm from risk it is possible to build statistical standards for the measurement of 
risks, because their spatial and temporal scope may be measureable in modern society. 
Lyng identifies some boundaries that define the edge of physical and psychological 
harm in various ways: the boundary between sanity and insanity, consciousness and 
unconsciousness, and the line separating life and death (Lyng 2005: 4). On the one hand, 
he thinks risk not only causes visible harm to the micro-system of society such as the 
physical injury or loss of property for citizens but also may create invisible scares and 
psychological trauma to the human mind. On the other hand, risks may cause damage to 
the macro-system of society such as a nation or continent, for example, through global 
warming, environmental pollution, nuclear waste pollution and new threats from 
terrorists that all create significant impact on a large scale. Paying attention to the 
enormous harm caused by nature or human action is a responsibility for government, so 
to protect citizens who cannot otherwise protect themselves (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1982: 58). For instance, in order to protect the safety of the citizens, the government 
tries to diminish the potential risks from terrorists by keeping them under surveillance. 
Zinn (2008: 34) highlights that the citizens who are liberated from socio-cultural 
structures ―have to choose between social group affiliation, lifestyle, and identities with 
all the side-effects, and have to take the responsibility for themselves‘. In other words, 
people living in modern society are also living in risk society. The more modern 
technologies people invents, the more potential harm the next generation will encounter. 
With the modernization of civilization, it is hard to prevent this process.  
2.4 The standards of risk 
In order to understand and analyze risks sociologists have developed various models 
22 
 
that examine risk as either acceptable or unacceptable. 
2.4.1 Acceptable and unacceptable risks 
As noted the perception of risks varies from person to person. The choice of the risks 
that people worry about depends on ―Risk taking and risk aversion, shared confidence 
and shared fears, [that] are parts of the dialogue on how best to organize social relations‖ 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 8). Indeed, it is hard to classify risky phenomena in 
some standardized value because people live or work in different regions and 
organisations which may have different concern about risks (Morgan et al 2000: 52). So, 
although Beck argues that risks are objective phenomena which have prolifated out of 
control, their meaning is a reflection of mediation through social and cultural processes 
(Beck 1995; Lupton 1999: 5). Social science may try to identify why people ignore 
some potential dangers surrounding them and concentrate only on selected aspects of 
the risks the culture and society in which individual live. 
Talking about acceptable and unacceptable risks reflects justified aversion with regard 
to the idea of irreversible damage, because the smallest probability of a disaster 
overwhelms all other considerations (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 21). Risk is not 
only broadly discussed in academic research or policy contexts, but pervades people‘s 
daily lives. Harris surveyed various groups of people, including the general public, 
corporate executives and federal regulators, about their attitudes toward facing risk and 
found that most of them thought that there were more risks in society today than in the 
past (Harris 1979; Douglas and Wildavsky 1983: 2). This view is also supported by 
Beck‘s argument that risks or hazards are created by man-made hybrids which are 
produced by risk societies (Beck 1999; Zinn 2008: 26), such as bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE). On one hand, society does not accept the potential risks which 
may cause threats to them. On the other hand, people may ignore the more complicated 
and more serious hazards which may be more predictable. Therefore, determining the 
standard between acceptable and unacceptable risks is highly problematic. 
Often, policy for risk management is based on a standard of public justice, and the 
perception of risk is directed to the justice and fairness of risk that citizens can accept. 
Society will not accept the coercion strategies for imposition of risks from governmental 
institutions, if they ignore the commitment to some form of public accountability. 
However, if such schemes demonstrate such a public commitment, society will then 
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accept the explicitness and fairness of risk monitoring procedures, (Douglas 1985: 5). 
Diverse cultures and periods may create different risks because of the dynamics of 
changing social structures. Some risks are acceptable to some societies because of the 
benefits accompanying them, but are unacceptable to others due to possible property 
loss or threat to life. Both acceptable and unacceptable man-made risks exist at the same 
time in the world risk society. The boundary of what are acceptable and unacceptable 
risks remains a controversial issue. 
According to Douglas (1985:10), whether citizens in a society accept risks depends on 
two factors — freedom and justice. For example, individuals make their own judgment 
about what kinds of risk they want to take. In organisations risk seeking members may 
encourage each other to take greater risks, even if they are of high uncertainty (Ibid, 
1985: 75). So, the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable risks may be based 
on different places, interests and scope at the individual and wider level.  
2.4.2 Standardisation and individualisation 
Risk is understood as one of the complicated strategies to manage disciplinary power 
which achieves the goals of monitoring and managing both population and individuals 
(Lupton 1999: 4); however, if an individual has to determine the best way to solve risks, 
one of the effective ways may be a standardisation process which is established by 
government and seen as generally applicable. Gourvish (2003: 220) highlights that the 
understanding both the possibilities for and limitations of risk management through 
standardization is important as it may empower the government to cope with risk more 
efficiently. 
Risk-taking is a contested issue between society and individual. Some researchers argue 
that risks are shared within cultures or communities rather than being the products of 
individual knowledge and perception (Douglas 1992; Tulloch and Lupton 2003: 6). 
Although they are cumulative and complex phenomena, each risk may have a rational 
aetiology and can be reasonably explained and acted upon. As risk becomes 
omnipresent in risk society, there are only three possible responses: denial, apathy and 
transformation (Loon 2002: 1). The individualisation of risk-taking not only involves 
various influences which may be caused by personal behaviour, work experience and 
economic factors, but also may be formed through the dynamics of family, childhood 
and gender. For example, Jackson and Scott (1999: 102) discuss ‗Risk anxiety and the 
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social construction of childhood‘, and point out that risk anxiety has material effects and 
that parental fears may limit children‘s lives and experience which will simply serve to 
increase their dependence on adults in the future. They find that what is terrifying for a 
city child may be trivial for a rural child and vice versa. Therefore, the context through 
which the individualisation of risk occurs may be key to determining what risks are 
acceptable and what are not.. 
Beck (1992: 128) argues that ―individualization was understood as a sociological 
category, located in the tradition of research into biographies and life situation‖. Both 
peoples‘ behavior and beliefs were assumed to be the key factors to distinguish what 
happens to people and how they dealt with problems. He believes that the concept of the 
individual lies at the centre of the modern society and the essential component of both 
democracy and markets (Beck 1992; Loon 2002: 29). Indeed, the foundation of society 
is assembled by the multiple individual activities. Parts of the standards of risk in the 
society are also built on the interaction of individuals. However, making judgment about 
risk can never solely be based individualistic belief, for some form of social order to be 
maintained (Tulloch and Lupton 2003: 7). The standardisation of risk is a key part of 
this social ordering. 
Social conditions and individual experiences have a great influence on the establishment 
of the social or individual standards of risks. The individual‘s expectation of risk may be 
affected by their assessment of its endurance and harm (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 
86-87). The social standardisation of risks reflects the assessment of risk at a wider level, 
by those in positions of power – government, corporations, professional bodies etc. - 
and will require compromise because the limitations of risky standardisation need to be 
negotiated by different social groups in society.  
2.5 The evaluation of risk 
The standards of risk for individuals and society vary in terms of the scope, level and 
personal or social attitude to risks, depending on the acceptability of risk. Technology 
assessment may be one of the approaches to the evaluation of risk and contributes to 
various achievements such as risk analysis. This may improve people‘s understanding of 
their relationship with their social context and may enable the acceptable level of risk 
from a cultural viewpoint (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 81). However, the 
globalization of risk has influenced the calculation of risk at the local level, which has 
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made it more and more difficult to control risks, and new type of risks crossing natural 
and socioeconomic boundaries evidently exist in modern societies (Beck 1992; Tulloch 
and Lupton 2003: 2). Beck points out that the concern of new risks may create new 
political subjects which include different class members of occupational groups, 
generations, and civic action groups (Beck 1992: 62). As a result, the more interests that 
are concerned in the evaluation of risk, the greater there is a move towards its evaluation 
and control. 
2.5.1 Predictable and unpredictable 
Through analysing the components of risk, we may find it assembled by practices, 
techniques and rationalities which help humans or organisations to govern potential 
threats. From the perspective of sociology, risk is then an ongoing process that society 
experiences and seeks to control. It is a calculative rationality that guides the regulation 
and management of risk, and shapes government-citizen relations (Dean 1999: 132). 
In modern society technologies not only support human life but also produce risks: the 
more novel technologies we introduce now, the more concerns about the potential 
threats we have to evaluate from the past to the future. And technologies (of risk 
management) themselves advance the statistical/technical ability to enable us to 
calculate the potential threats which accompany the development of technologies 
(Douglas and Wildavsky (1982: 29).  
Early risk assessment was focused on identifying, measuring and evaluating the 
consequences from both natural and technological hazards. The science of risk 
calculation is concerned with estimations of the probability of the occurrence rate of 
risks and their likely effects (Tierney 1999; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006: 206). Lupton 
(1999: 68-69) highlights the introduction of new technologies for determining 
‗normality‘ in people‘s daily lives, which forces people to make decisions with 
reference to risk statistics; for example, women in Australia over thirty-five are offered 
amniocentesis or Chorionic Villus Test CVS to check for chromosomal abnormalities in 
the foetus. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982: 50) argue that the finding of new dangers 
through advanced technologies has overtaken people‘s ability to discriminate between 
such dangers. 
The prerequisite of predicting risk seems to presume the possibility of defining the 
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essence of risk itself and so to identify risk, assess its significance and determine 
appropriate responses (Hillson and Murray-Webster 2007: 5). The limitation of risk 
assessment and the management of risk uncertainty have been improved by the 
advanced quality of calculation and assessment from technologies – algorithms of risk 
management – which seeks to make uncertainty predictable (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 
2006: 57). Therefore, technology seems to be a kind of catalyst, not only affecting the 
new risks to society but also improving people‘s ability to predict the possibility of 
risks.  
However, new types of risk may cause damage bigger than that in human‘s prediction or 
unpredictable due to people‘s limited knowledge. New large-scale risks may exceed the 
acceptability for the society and be difficult to control by a single institution or even a 
country. The hurricane Katrina in American, the tsunami in South Asia, the financial 
crisis or climate changes around the world are unpredictable risks influenced by various 
factors. If the potential risks never come to reality or the process of risk goes beyond 
people‘s prediction, it is hard to distinguish the boundary between predictable and 
unpredictable risks. Therefore, this has caused the evaluation of risk to be more 
complicated. 
2.5.2 Certainty and uncertainty 
To improve the standard or environment living standards or the wider environment and 
achieving meet human wants/needs, the social activities may transform nature into 
cultural environment goods and services, which is one of the factors that people creates 
the new risks (Turner et al 1990; Hillson and Murray-Webster 2007: 5). Risks are 
passively then indirectly made by the specific social activities. Science and technology 
cannot determine threats with regard to moral or cultural issues because it is society 
itself that makes the decision of what risk is (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 81). For 
example, the introduction of new medical technologies in the British health service has 
encountered ongoing problems that are both social and technical in nature. This is 
because people find it difficult to accept the uncertainties of risk associated with 
medical innovation (such as in fields such as genetics) (Webster 2007: 25-28).  
Certainty and uncertainty of risks have different definitions, which may be influenced 
by region, race, religion, culture or moral values, even technology itself. This 
uncertainty has been enhanced by more and more complex threats (Beck 1986; 
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Marjolein 2000: 82), which are increased by the interaction of regional scale and the 
globalization of technological development. Marjolein (ibid: 83-85) concludes that there 
are two major varieties of uncertainty: ‗objective and subjective uncertainty‘. The 
objective one also relates to stochastic, primary, external, and random uncertainty which 
may be influenced by outside factors, while subjective uncertainty may have no 
standard form because it relates to personal knowledge or judgment. 
Lupton (1999: 9) argues that ―risk and uncertainty tend to be treated as conceptually the 
same thing‖. The discussion of risk in social science has contributed to a sense of 
studies, such as risk analysis, risk assessment, risk communication and risk management, 
all of which may improve measuring the ability to identify risks and monitor them. 
Beck suggests that uncertainty is non-probabilistic so that the government cannot expect 
to calculate for the future; however, this is a feature of the modernization risks (Beck 
1992; Zinn 2008: 72). Luhmann (2005: 41) suggests that when looking back into the 
past we at least know what has happened, even if causal relationships remain unclear. 
Although we may lack information of potential risks when looking forward into the 
future, from a practical point of view, social actors will try to control uncertainty. At the 
same time, defining what these uncertainties and risks are relates to power. Tierney 
(1999: 236) argues that  
―Political and economic power determine the ability to impose risks on 
other, shape public discourse about risks, sponsor and conduct research 
that presents risks in particular ways, and lobby for particular positions 
on the acceptability of risk‖. 
At the same time, the ability to ‗impose‘ definitions of risks is influenced by cultural 
factors and the particular context of risk management in everyday life, as will be seen 
later in the thesis when I discuss my case study in Taiwan. 
2.6 The theoretical approach to risk 
Nowadays, society is likely to be increasingly dependent on technology to manage risk. 
In order to improve and protect human life, scientists rely on technology to measure, 
evaluate and analyze the data collected from nature or society, such as weather 
forecasting, the warning system for a tsunami, global temperature monitoring, and the 
investigation and assessment of crime. Even though the functions of technology today 
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are more advanced than those at any previous period of human history, paradoxically no 
one can assure whether danger is predictable or if a risk is certain in such a 
high-technology society. 
Renn (2008: 2) integrates three elements in defining risk. The first one is the outcomes 
of risk which may have an impact on people‘s values. Each risk may cause different 
influences on people or their environments. Although some aspects of the impact may 
be accepted by some people, they still influence their behaviour and attitude, especially 
those who are directly involved. The second element is the uncertainty of the possibility 
of occurrence. Although there are various types of risk, we can still find some 
similarities between them. Little predictability may be the most obvious one. The last 
one is the combination of both elements above. 
Indeed, risk is uncertain at both an individual and societal level. The development and 
construction of risk theory has been extensively discussed in the social science field 
since the end of the nineteenth century. My thesis focuses here on the discussion of 
three main social theories below: ‗cultural theory‘ by Mary Douglas (1966, 1978, 1986, 
1992) and Aaron Wildavsky (1982), ‗risk society‘ by Ulrich Beck (1986) and ‗risk 
governance‘ by Michel Foucault (1991).  
2.6.1 Risk governance  
As noted before, risks may be created or produced by the uncertainty of natural 
phenomena, the development and innovation of technologies, and human action itself. 
The meaning of risk and the background of the evolution of risk have been described in 
the section above. Checking the meaning of management individually, we may find 
important causality between risk and management. The standard of risks also may be 
influenced by individual personality or values, the characteristics of culture or some 
unpredictable changes of globalisation in the contemporary society. Therefore, risk 
management/governance may raise a deeply concerned issue about who should take 
responsibility for risk in the public or political field. Foucault (1991: 87) points out that 
the problem of government referred to the personal characteristic in the sixteenth 
century Stoic revival, and also related to the governance of the souls and lives in the 
entire theme of Catholic and protestant pastoral doctrine. Consequently, government 
was defined as a right manner of distributing things, which may ensure the greatest 
possible quantity of wealth to produce/provide people with sufficient means of 
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subsistence (ibid: 95). 
In his essay ―Governmentality‖, 1978, Foucault indicates that the initial ideas of 
governmentality emerged in the seventeenth-century in Europe. The term relates to the 
notion of self-governing, and that governance acts to ensure a self-regulating order of 
things. There are three fundamental types of government which relate to particular 
disciplines among morality, economy and politics. Firstly, the art of self-government 
concerns morality and focuses on individual desires set against moral norms. Second, 
the art of the governance of property addresses that a person has to not only manage 
oneself but also govern his/her property such as goods or patrimony. Finally, the science 
of ruling the country which concerns politics may involve the management of 
demography, economy and state policies (Foucault 1978: 206).  
Moreover, research on governance has widely featured in political science, policy 
studies, sociology of environment and technology and international relations literature, 
as well as risk research more generally in the last decade (Ortwin 2008: 64). Also, 
governance has been described as the kinds of structures and processes in decision 
making which involve governmental and nongovernmental actions, on a national scale 
(Nye and Donahue 2000; Ortwin 2008: 64) as well as at the global level among 
governmental institutions, economic forces and civil society actors such as NGOs or 
NPOs. For example, in Australia, the roles of the Department of Contract and 
Management Services (CAMS) provide services for government business designed to 
improve the governmental agencies‘ ability to manage contracts and procurement risks 
(Baccariani & Archer 2001: 139). In addition, an NGO report on ‗the global road safety 
crisis‘ discussed the main risk factors and solutions for different regions, such as Asia, 
Africa, Latin American, Europe and Central Asia as well as the Middle East and North 
Africa from a global viewpoint (Global Road Safety Partnership, 2008); and the ‗world 
report on child injury prevention‘ published by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
discussed the main factors which cause child injuries from road traffic (Margie et al 
2008). Both of the latter present the question of risk management among different 
regions from a global viewpoint. 
Renn (2008: 173) highlights that risk management consists of both risk assessment and 
concern assessment, which may relate to risk perception studies, economic impact 
assessments and the scientific characterization of social response to the risk source, 
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particularly from combining all relevant information for risk appraisal. The 
International Risk Government Council defines risk governance as  
―risk governance deficits are deficiencies or failures in the identification, 
assessment, management or communication of risks……it is important to 
understand how deficits arise, what their consequences are……or their 
potential negative impact can be minimized……the causes of failure in risk 
governance processes……They may occur in the past, occur now and will 
probably recur in the future‖ (IRGC 2009: 9).  
Accurate knowledge and understanding are essential for effective risk governance 
which helps people reduce the complexity, uncertainty and potential of risks coming 
from physical, social and economic areas. IRGC concludes two types of knowledge for 
risk governance: scientific knowledge and knowledge of risk perceptions. The former 
has association with the physical properties of a risk such as the probability of the risk 
occurring, the potential impacts and the consequences; the latter includes their 
underlying determinants and consequences such as the interests and values of risk with 
people, recent risk in the mass media and the consequences of conflict among social, 
economic and political areas between experts‘, decision-makers‘ and lay-peoples‘ 
perceptions of risk (ibid: 11). 
Effective uncertainty management requires effective understanding of uncertainty, 
which may rely on an effective process for sorting out the uncertain problems. Making 
this process efficient is also a direct concern to the governing and the governed 
(Chapman and Ward 2002: ix). However, in any given decision situation both threats 
and opportunities are usually involved, and both should be managed. Sometimes both 
elements may be treated separately, but they are seldom independent (ibid: 1). Chapman 
and Ward argue that it is rarely advisable to concentrate on reducing risk without 
considering associated opportunities because the more resources we spend on risk 
management, the less effort we make for the pursuit of opportunities (ibid: 2). In other 
words, the task of risk management is not only to prevent the potential threats but also 
to obtain the benefits on the other side of the balance. Thus, it is likely to improve the 
effective management ability in understanding the nature and significance of this 
uncertainty. 
Renn (2008: 173) concludes with three potential outcomes of managing risks. Firstly, in 
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the situation which is unacceptable for societies or organizations, the risk source needs 
to be abandoned or replaced and the managing strategies need to be designed to reduce 
and expose the vulnerabilities. Secondly, when the situation is acceptable and can be 
managed or governed by the organisations or societies, risks may be reduced or handled 
by some limited and reasonable resource, by means of facility or financial investments. 
Finally, in the acceptable situation, which is a negligible risk, the investment in reducing 
harm is unnecessary. Both organisations and societies may ignore such risks. Moreover, 
Ortwin (2008: 63) points out that risk management may be adjusted by manager‘s 
strategies, which may create some opportunities or reduce potential threats for most 
populations. Sometimes managers may suggest other substitute or alternative 
procedures to replace the routine tasks to solve the unpredictable risks. He believes that  
―risk treatment refers to the creation and evaluation of options for initiating 
or changing human activities or (natural and artificial) structures with the 
objective being to increase the net benefit to human society and prevent 
harm to humans and what they value‖ (ibid).  
Indeed, societies may select what is worth considering and what can be ignored. For 
example, risk managers tend to search for the most efficient strategy to deal with risks 
in industrial areas; risk regulators often use pre-screening activities to allocate risks to 
different agencies or to pre-define procedures in public issues (Thompson et al. 1990, 
Douglas 1990, Beck 1994; Ortwin 2008: 66-67). The operational process of risk 
governance covers various stages from preventing and warning the possible risks to 
assess, manage and communicate risks. Both underestimation and over-estimation need 
to be avoided in risk assessment because they may cause under-reaction or over-reaction 
in risk management. However, risk governance is not only influenced by some human 
factors, such as an individual‘s values, personal interests and beliefs, intellectual 
capabilities, the prevailing regulations or incentives but also may through the irrational 
or ill-informed behaviour (IRGC 2009: 9-10). 
Risk governance cannot, therefore, be isolated or separated from the standpoint or 
position of organisations, societies and cultures within the socio-technological society 
(Renn 2008: 353). The knowledge of risk management is not only concerned with 
everyday life but also relies on scientific knowledge to calculate the uncertainty and to 
achieve the possible precaution (Zinn; Taylor-Gooby 2006: 56). Technologies improve 
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the quality of perceiving and managing the risks by narrowing down the scope of 
uncertainty (ibid: 57). Taylor-Gooby (2006: 210) highlights an important aspect in 
technical society which is to understand the limitations of risk management, involving 
analysis of the helpful situations, the various impacts, possible management tools and to 
undertake comparative work across different types of organizations and domains in the 
private and public sectors. For example, Florig et al have developed a five-step risk 
ranking method which involved decision theory, risk analysis and the psychology of risk 
communication to categorise risks within schools. They argued that risk ranking can be 
linked to risk management interventions and provide a way to translate analysis into 
policy decisions (Florig et al 2001: 914-915). Waring and Glendon (1998: 4-5) 
presenting four key dimensions envisioned in the scope of risk management (see Figure 
2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, a variety of management strategies has been produced to reduce the 
possible mistakes from man-made failures, the potential threats from nature and the 
interactional risks from both of these. For example, the International Organization for 
Standarization has provided principles and generic guidelines (ISO-31000) on risk 
management in commercial and organisational territories (Purdy 2010: 881-886) such as 
the Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P) has developed a standard procedure to reduce 
mistakes in the engineering field. Those standard procedures are built on the basis of 
 
Source: Managing Risk (Warning and Glendon 1998:5) 
Figure 2.1 Four dimensions of risk management 
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accumulated experience and knowledge from daily life. Furthermore, Morgan et al 
(2000: 54) highlight that four factors should be considered when reflecting risk 
management objects, such factors include ―an ideal risk-categorization scheme [that] 
should be logically consistent, compatible with administrative systems, equitable, and 
compatible with human cognitive limitations‖. 
In practice, the development of socio-technical systems and the innovation of new 
technologies have achieved the new territories in risk management; such achievement 
supports some safety warning systems and security protection functions for human. In 
theory, risk management is a kind of controlling power, which may affect the freedom 
of individuals in society. Initially, the institution of power was developed from the 
monarchy in the Middle Ages. The principle of regulations and laws were established 
and proclaimed by the monarch who had to establish a peaceful environment for rulers 
to control and protect the power (Foucault 1976: 86-87). In order to lead a safer life, 
citizens might accept some sacrifice on privacy and endure some limitations on freedom. 
Therefore, in technical societies citizens are monitored and controlled by the 
government. Some scholars argue that people nowadays live in a ‗surveillance society‘ 
(Staldar 2002: 120; Lyon 2002: 26). Consequently, the controversial issue of 
surveillance and governance has been debated in recent times. 
Dandeker (1990: 38) highlights that surveillance is a kind of rule established in 
administrative bases within organisations or societies. It shows that the organisations 
control available power resources to monitor their administrative staff or citizens and 
those in power have the right to view private information. From a sociological point of 
view, a surveillance system or culture is a kind of power which provides an alternative 
eye for government to monitor and scrutinize the information of a population in a 
socio-technical society. The problem is that surveillance systems have made people 
attempt to strengthen individual privacy which may work against wider social 
relationships (Lyon 2002: 26). Lyon argues, however, that the question of heightened 
surveillance is not merely a problem for personal justice or freedom, it may mean that 
certain groups or individuals are being discriminated against by society (ibid: 17). 
Although lots of surveillance systems have been extensively applied to the social 
security protection strategies such as CCTV on the streets or x-ray for checking luggage 
at the airport, there are many debates on the issues of governmental power or individual 
privacy, and governance right or surveillance. Such strategies are often applied by the 
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government to manage poor and vulnerable minorities (Kemshall 2002; Taylor-Gooby 
2006: 282).  
As Foucault argues, risk management is a form of power that has affected people‘s 
freedom; this situation has remained similar from the Middle ages to the modern society. 
At the same time, different societies and cultures have different views on risk. The 
acceptability or tolerability of risks may be influenced by people‘s knowledge, 
experience, organizational culture or social custom. The following section, from a 
cultural theory point of view, explores various concepts of risk in different cultures. 
2.6.2 Cultural theory 
What is culture? From the sociological point of view, Williams argues that culture has 
four meanings.  
It came to mean, first, ‗a general state or habit of the mind‘, having close 
relations with the idea of human perfection. Second, it came to mean ‗the 
general state of intellectual development, in a society as a whole‘. Third, it 
came to mean ‗the general body of the art‘. Fourth, it came to mean ‗a 
whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual‘ (Williams 1958: xvi). 
Storey (1994: 32-33) points out that there are three general categories in the definition 
of culture. Firstly, ideally, culture may be defined as an expression or mode of human 
perfection, in terms of certain absolute or universal values which may in fact reflect 
powerful religious or political ideologies. The second is a ‗documentary‘ approach, in 
which culture is the collection of intellectual and imaginative work, through which 
human experiences are variously recorded. Thirdly, in terms of a ‗social style‘, culture is 
described as a particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values in a 
particular culture.  
Therefore, the analysis of culture is essentially one of discovery and description, which 
may provide permanent reference to the universal human condition. It is also an activity 
of revealing, which discovers local experience and convention through exploring the 
detail of social activity and language. Normally, the analysis may contain historical 
criticism. It is a highly intellectual and imaginative work which is not only related to 
particular broad traditions and societies, but also helps us to understand specific 
subcultures, such as the characteristics of an organisation, the structure of the family 
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and other social institutions. This may provide us with a chance to distinguish the 
pattern and detail of the culture, including any possible threats or risks that it has to 
confront. Such risks are then risks to the culture (or subculture) itself. 
The sociological discussion of risk provides a rich understanding of the ways in which 
culture and the perception of risk are linked. Douglas (1966: XIX) demonstrates that 
risk perception depends on shared culture, rather than individual psychology. She argues 
that risk is like a taboo; it may be a dilemmatic issue in both moral and political 
domains in society. The ways people treat risks might vary from culture to culture, 
because some risks accepted by one culture may be regarded as terrifying hazards by 
another. There is an interesting case that rats may be regarded with revulsion in the West 
and associated with potential disease by most people, but they are regarded as sacred in 
the Karni Mata temple in India. Despite its importance, many areas of social science 
outside of sociology and social anthropology have neglected to examine the role or 
meaning of risk. Douglas points out that 
Many economists leave it severely alone……most Philosophers ignored 
it; ……Marxists treat it obliquely as ideology……Psychologists avoid it, 
and only concentrated on child subjects. Historians bend it any way they 
like (Douglas 1978: 1). 
Douglas thinks that some taboos may reinforce redistributive policies and others may 
prevent governments or individuals from accumulating power (1966: XX). The 
perception of risk depends on a shared culture in society; some cognitive divergence of 
risk from those taboos may impact on people with in different cultures. Approaching 
risk through cultural theory, we may find risk a menacing thing, such as a flood or 
pollution. In fact, it is not a real thing but a way of thinking (Douglas 1992: 46), and it 
is a highly artificial contrivance based on human ―value attitudes‖ (Douglas 1978: 1). In 
other words, people‘s values may be influenced by a variety of factors, such as 
individual experience, family tradition, community ideology and even government 
policy; those elements are parts of the culture. 
Examining the strength and direction of social concerns about risk with a cultural 
approach, we can perceive that public concern may identify potential or real dangers in 
society. Risks also can be discovered through a cultural approach to how a community 
consensus relates some natural dangers to what are in effect seen as moral defects. A 
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good example is that the water problem which was a persistent problem in the 
fourteenth century became a public issue only when it was related to the Jews (Douglas 
and Wlidavsky 1982: 7). When community connects the natural dangers with the moral 
issues a cultural approach may be the best viewpoint to explore the social definition of 
risk. 
Douglas (1992: 36) suggests that cultural analysis may help us with two things: to 
categorize what kinds of culture are most likely to be at risk and to count who will be 
the culprit exposing others to risk. She also points out that the weak carry the blame for 
what happens to them in an individualist culture; whereas the leader may avoid the 
accusation in a hierarchical culture (ibid: 36). Therefore, she argues that the debate over 
risk is shaped by social institutions and patterns of authority and power that they 
support. 
Consequently, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982: 5) believe that ―risk should be seen as a 
joint product of knowledge about the future and consent about the most desired 
prospects‖. They integrate two factors – knowledge and consent – and build four kinds 
of problems associated with certain or uncertain knowledge, as well as contested or 
complete consent (see Figure 2.2). 
It can be seen from the situation shown at the top left of the Figure that when we are in a 
situation where knowledge is certain and consent is complete, the problem will be 
technical and can be solved by calculation. Whereas the bottom left shows the consent 
changes to be contested where the knowledge remains certain disagreement will rise and 
the solution may be coercion or discussion. However, when the knowledge turns out to 
be uncertain and the consent is complete, the problem comes from information and 
should be solved by research; this shows on the top right. Finally, the bottom right 
indicates that when we are in the situation that knowledge is uncertain and consent is 
contested, both knowledge and consent will be problems without solution. 
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Understanding the internal problems of the culture may be one of best ways to alleviate 
risk. For instance, in order to avoid tragedy from nuclear toxic wastes, Douglas (1986: 
22-28) demonstrates three different approaches to risks in the nuclear community. 
Firstly, the engineering approach assumes that people normally consider they ought to 
know all the details of the hazard or risk as engineers. Although people have rights to 
understand the facts, the speed of development of new types of technological risks 
seems to be too fast to inform people. Such kinds of knowledge are highly professional, 
not like the basic training education. Engineers have an obligation to calculate the 
possibility of risk and to avoid the risk of injuring citizens who may be surrounded by 
the risk. 
Secondly, the ecological approach is focused on distinguishing hazard from risk. It is a 
bridge between plant ecology and human ecology. Technology itself sometimes also 
causes new risks for the environment, not only benefits. The demarcation between 
natural causes of risk and man-made ones may be debated according to culture. The rat 
example is a good case. People may associate the rat with potential risks for the 
environment or for the health of residents in most countries, because it is a source of 
infection that causes diseases. Technologies in such countries are developed to reduce 
the reproduction of rats and to kill them. Whereas, rats are the spiritual symbol for 
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Figure 2.2 Four types of problem risk  
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believers in India, who seem to believe that they may communicate with their ancestors 
and spirits through the rats. The monks rely on technologies to protect rats and to avoid 
them being killed by cats or other animals in the Karni Mata temple. 
Finally, cognitive science tends to dominate risk perception. It signifies that not only 
should the engineers educate people in risk perception to reassure them about risks, but 
they should understand local culture as well to make their explanation acceptable to 
them. In this case, risk is not only the probability of an event but also the probability of 
its outcome, which is the main factor influencing human value judgment about risk 
(Douglas 1992: 31). Cultural theory provides a powerful explanation of risk. Each 
culture may be constructed by local lifestyle, custom, religion and environment, and 
different types of culture select different kinds of function to maintain their safety and to 
solve their problems (ibid: 46).  
Therefore, Douglas (1978: 7) describes four types of social environments to measure the 
different social contexts (see Figure 2.3). As can be seen, the low grid/ low group (A) 
culture is individualist. There is no corporate solidarity within this group. The boundary 
and definition of group (A) are based on the individual him/her self in which individuals 
are not constrained by powerful institutions norms or bureaucratic rules. Then the high 
grid/ low group culture (B) comprises isolated and alienated individuals – artists and 
adventurers, for example. The third is high grid/ high group (C) culture which is more 
likely to be regarded as traditional capitalist and bureaucratic institutions. There are 
many regulations and conventions in this system; the hierarchical rank is a typical 
variety. Finally, the low grid/ high group (D) culture is an egalitarian or collective 
organizational type, such as a religious cult or non-profit organization. They may focus 
on a common faith and have a flat organizational profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cultural Bias (Douglas 1978: 7)  
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Each culture may create its own ideas of what is normal or natural as a basic value 
embedded in people‘s belief through processes of socialisation, which can also be 
understood as the expression of a shared subculture. Although such shared cultures may 
be threatened by the emergence of new technologies that may have a great impact on 
the original culture, they also produce new social responsibilities and generate cultural 
reassessment (Douglas and Wlidavsky 1982: 35). Therefore, risk analysis can help find 
out the possible impact of an event or more general development that may happen in 
this culture, and the sort of response it is likely to produce. From a more practical 
perspective, analyzing similar risks may reduce the costs of the potential repetition of 
specific incidents (Douglas 1992: 30). Indeed, every society is unique, which attaches to 
the culture many visible and invisible risks coming from technologies. Such risks 
gradually corrode or bring about change in the society and culture. Cultural theory 
assumes that culture is a system and one that generates shared responsibilities. One 
living in this system has a responsibility to help others who are in the same position, 
making the culture fulfill the political role of mutual accountability (ibid: 31). 
Society is always focused on acceptable risks which political systems and politicians are 
more willing to take responsibility for. Most politicians would like to conceal a risk 
longer, when it is just a potential problem. This issue has been discussed in books by 
Ulrich Beck. In his Risikogesellschaft he examines hidden, intangible risks and the 
‗manufacture‘ of risk in the ‗risk society‘. Unlike Douglas, he does not relate risk to 
different types of social groupings/order but to more general processes he believes are at 
work across society. 
2.6.3 Risk society 
Beck‘s writings on risk society are underpinned by the concept of reflexive modernity. 
He argues that in a risk society the democratically structured institutions not only deal 
with risks but also continue to produce new risks (see also, Lash 2000: 50). Risks are 
caused by the technological production and unpredictable side effects from the very 
management of risk itself (Lupton 1999: 4). Beck (and Giddens, 2009) believe that the 
uncertainty of risks is not caused by risks themselves, but by the side-effects created by 
technologies and risk management in modern society. 
From a sociological and anthropological point of view, Beck (1992b: 4) presents three 
observations on risk, firstly, parts of physical risks are created and affected by the social 
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system itself; therefore, both the monitoring and control of risk is one of the important 
tasks for organisations. Secondly, in dealing with physical risks the constitution of 
social relations and processes perform a direct function. Finally, most risks may come 
from the social dependency upon institutions, including some technically intensive 
activities. Therefore, the responsibilities of controlling risks in social systems are not 
only to deal with the risks they face, but also to prevent the new risks they may create in 
the future. 
However, features of daily life and risk may change quickly in a modern society, and 
many factors in risk society need to be taken into consideration such as the extent type 
of hazard, the elements of the threat, the population concerned, and delayed effects. The 
focus of scientific research on such factors becomes narrower and narrower, and more 
specialist (Beck 1992: 54). At the same time, risk society emphasises that modernity is 
‗contingent, ambivalent and susceptible to political rearrangement‘ (Beck, 1992, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 2000: 222).  
Consequently, Beck presents eight major points on the sociological concepts of risk and 
risk society. First, risks are not the same as destruction; they do not refer to damages 
incurred but to the threat of damage or destruction. Second, the concept of risk reverses 
the relationship of the past, present and future, the interaction and causality among the 
three phases relating to each other. Third, risks are related directly and indirectly to 
cultural definitions and the standards of a tolerable or intolerable life. Following this, 
from a political and sociological point of view, risks and risk perception are unintended 
consequences of the logic of the role of the nation state in modern society. Next, the 
contemporary concept of risk is associated with manufactured uncertainty and 
indeterminacy. Then the new types of risks are simultaneously local and global, they are 
universal and may be caused by the air, the wind, water or food chains, with no 
boundaries. Lastly, the concept of a world risk society is connected with a world which 
can be characterized by the loss of significant contradistinction between nature and 
culture. The loss of boundaries between these realms is not only brought by the 
industrialisation of nature and culture but also by the hazards that endanger humans, 
animals and plants alike (ibid: 212). 
Indeed, science and technology are not only inevitably concerned with the prediction of 
risks, but also contributed to the new discoveries of threats to society (Giddens 2002: 3). 
41 
 
Giddens suggests that the best way to understand the problem is to make a distinction 
between two types of risk: external and manufactured risk, especially in a global society. 
External risk is the experience of risk coming from the outside of a society, such as the 
traditions, cultures of other societies or nature. Manufactured risk refers to risk 
situations within systems. For instance, the genetic engineering may increase a crop‘s 
resistance to pests; but if this kind of resistance spreads to other plants, it may be a 
threat to biodiversity in the environment (ibid: 33).  
Beck (1992c: 2) suggests three senses to describe how the global society understands 
itself. First, risk has become a public issue, especially in term of some potential threats 
to global society. Second, more and more international organisations, particularly in the 
policy field, have built co-operational mechanisms to deal with the dangers 
accompanying the development of global systems (and their potential risks – such as in 
financial systems). Third, the conventional boundary of politics has been eroded, 
because it becomes more difficult to deal with both visible and invisible risks locally in 
a world risk society. For example, ecological problems have caused many disputes and 
conflicts among European countries as well as in the developing countries (ibid: 3). 
In the risk society, the present is determined by the consequences of the past. Moreover, 
the causes of present experience and action are the foundation of the future. Talking 
about risks, some people pay little attention to them, if they do not create any immediate 
threats to society. Nevertheless, some people believe that in order to deal with risks, 
scientists should develop advanced technologies, which makes risks essential factors to 
stimulate technology development. The more efforts people make to prevent risks today, 
the more threats brought by risks can be alleviated in the future, but new risks created 
too (Beck 2001:100).  
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the historical background of risk and offered some 
arguments about the meaning, scale, standard and evaluation of risk. Risk evolved from 
an abstract concept to one referring to both visible and invisible threats, from the highly 
localised societies of the Middle Ages to the world risk society of today. In practice, the 
acceptability of risks may vary from person to person. The scope of risk tolerability may 
range across different levels: it may be influenced by one‘s personality at the individual 
level; local cultures have their own customs and traditions reflecting ethnic or religious 
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beliefs, while countries have societal-wide discourses of risk that are enshrined in their 
regulations and established by the rules or laws enforced and controlled by 
organisations at the national level. 
Foucault argued that individuals govern themselves when risks occur in their daily lives. 
The endurance of scale, harm and influence of risk may vary and the presupposition is 
of risk at the individual level that may not extend to the wider organization or society. 
However, Foucault argues that there is a direct relationship between self-governance of 
perceived risks and the wider societal disciplining of populations as a whole. 
Douglas argues that each culture may have its unique characteristics or traditions from 
the accumulation of life experience, the tradition of religion or the characteristic of a 
particular society so it is unfair to judge or criticize the ways used to deal with risks in 
different cultures. Each culture may develop their unique characteristics, regulations, 
skills, or laws to control or handle risks in their territory, reflecting the ways in which 
what Douglas calls their ‗solidarity‘ is expressed. This she represents in her grid-group 
model. 
Beck highlights that the new types of risk which have been created by innovative 
technologies are typically outside our experience in the past. It is hard to resolve such 
risks by counting on our life experience or by analysing historical records. One of the 
possible ways may be to rely on technologies to prevent or evaluate the potential and 
invisible threats even to monitor the human activities around the world, although new 
risks may accompany the use of such technologies. For risk governance, it is 
unavoidable that citizens may have to accept a degree of intrusion on their privacy or 
freedom through the surveillance required for preventing potential threats. 
Indeed, different organisations, cultures, societies and countries have developed 
multiple systems and skills to monitor or manage both visible and invisible risks. As 
Nowotny points out, however, scientists design possible ways to deal with any potential 
or real risks, but need to develop a form of reliable knowledge about risk that fits the 
needs of citizens, their cultures and the customs of society. If the need is secured, a form 
of risk governance based on ―socially robust knowledge‖ can be achieved. The aim of 
my thesis is not to judge the moral issues of risk management, but to explore how such 
a system works in a modern technological society (Taiwan), and within this context a 
society that regards technology as providing a means through which social ordering and 
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the management of risk can be enabled. Therefore, I focus on a risk management system, 
which is designed by a governmental agency, relying on modern technology to identify, 
integrate and manage the phenomena of risks and ‗accidents‘ occurring in everyday life 
in schools and colleges in Taiwan. There are therefore some key questions which my 
thesis tries to explore:  
．What is the scope of risk which is created by these everyday events and how are risks 
organized or sorted (Bowker and Starr, 1999) through a process of classification?  
．How, as a result of this, is the severity or seriousness of the risks calculated and 
standardized by the organization?  
．How far does the personal perception of the risks by managers conform to or modify 
the formal meanings of risk as set down by the system?  
．How does the management of risk reflect the wider context within these hierarchical 
organisations?  
In answering these questions, while the ideas of Foucault are helpful especially in 
regard to understanding the role of surveillance in managing risk, and Beck‘s in terms of 
the way technologies both manage yet create new risks, I will draw my main conceptual 
framing of risk from Douglas as her work enables me to explore the structures (both 
organisational and cultural) through which risk is managed. This is a key to help 
understand my case study. The next chapter discusses the methodology I use and 
explains how I chose a specific system for my case study and how I designed my 
fieldwork to collect the data I needed to answer my research questions. 
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
The previous chapter presented an overview of the literature on risk culture, society and 
governance, and discussed their relationships within technological society. This chapter 
introduces the research methods and illustrates how I chose the case studies from an 
empirical perspective.  
3.1 Introduction 
In a technological society culture, knowledge and technology play significant roles in 
shaping risk governance. Such factors not only enable people to deal with some 
potential hazards or risks that may come from different corners of society but also help 
scientists analyse and collect more data and information about the technical 
management of risk. The operational abilities and practical databases generated for risk 
governance could be improved, if people integrated and understood the relationship 
between those factors. Sometimes risks may be the side products of the process of social 
change, which make them unpredictable and unavoidable. Also there are no perfect and 
universal methods for social science research. Sometimes social scientists in different 
fields may choose various research tools or kits, use them in different ways, and 
interpret the results as the effects of using them differently (Gomm 2008: 1). 
The literature review chapter has identified four questions which form the focus of my 
thesis. How is risk defined and classified and how do organisations attempt to manage it? 
How are risks calculated and standardized by an organization? How far does the 
personal perception of the risks by managers conform to or modify the formal meanings 
of risk as set down by the system? How is the context of a hierarchical organization 
shape risk? However, to find a practical case to answer these questions and how to 
choose events as an exemplification of these processes means that a specific case study 
will have to be chosen that illustrates these processes at work. My thesis tried to answer 
those questions through the collection and analysis of a socio-technical system, within a 
particular organization. The following section discusses how I developed the 
methodology and chose the methods for my thesis. 
3.2 Methodology 
The purpose of my thesis is to explore the connection between diverse threats and actual 
perceived risks, and explore the socio-technical processes through which this occurs, 
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and to discover the possible trends of risk events and to identify the potential threats 
coming from risk. My thesis focuses on a management system, in which the cultural 
frame is characterized as being a high grid/ high group pattern, as Douglas (1978: 7) 
describes. This type of organization is likely to have many regulations and conventions 
that are designed to oversee and monitor the behavior of its members and to foster the 
effective coordination of activities within it. 
This social ordering is reflected in the very structure of the IT system which is ordered 
in terms of a strong hierarchical structure and process. The system is called the ‗Campus 
Security Report System‘ (CSRS), which has relied on technology to help the 
government agency manage risk events at the national level. The fieldwork for my 
research focuses on the data relating to risk events which has been recorded by this 
system, and draws on the concept of risk which the managers are expected to deploy, 
and the actual situation of the actors involved in managing risk in different positions 
across the system. I try, therefore, to understand the context of the system and the 
dynamics of the different social groups which are involved in this organization. To do 
this methodologically I will also draw on the Social Construction of Technological 
Systems (SCOT) (Bijker, Hughes & Pinch 1989: 28) perspective in Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) to explore the CSRS in my fieldwork. 
3.2.1 The context of the CSRS 
The Campus Security Report System (CSRS) was built to serve the education system in 
Taiwan but as such is shaped according to the existing educational structure itself. The 
function and data management of the system is illustrated in the following section and 
discussed more fully in chapter 4. The concept of the CSRS was constructed on the 
basis of a command and control relationship between the education system and the 
Central Disaster Response Centre (see Figure 3.1). 
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According to the structure, there are three management levels among the system from 
government to local government then to schools. The purpose of the system is to 
identify and thereby to control/reduce any risk-related security events which may 
happen at different levels of the school system in the country and record such events for 
policy makers. My thesis not only focuses on the system data but is also interested in 
the opinions and practices of operators of the system. Therefore, my thesis focuses on 
that hierarchical management structure represented by right hand side of the system (see 
Figure 3.2) and is interested in four groups of manager found at these different levels. 
Firstly, I focus on the system designer and government manager at the government level. 
Then the focus moves onto the middle government policy practitioner and regional/local 
managers at the local government level. Finally, the research explores the 
operators/users at the school level. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Campus Security Report Centre http://csrc.edu.tw/ 20/03/2009 
 
Figure 3.1 The structure of the Campus Security Report System  
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3.2.2 The social actors /groups in the CSRS 
My thesis explores the view point of operators across the CSRS which are collected 
from different levels of the system based upon the importance of seeing different 
interests and perspectives, as suggested by the SCOT approach. Bijker et al (1989: 28) 
highlight ‗the developmental process of a technological artifact is described as an 
alternation of variation and selection‘. The structure of the CSRS is built on an 
information technology (IT) system which relied on the IT system to link the 
relationships between the system designers/managers and operators/users. I explore the 
actual problems of operators of the CSRS and the solutions they deploy as different 
groups of people, which included the system designers, government managers, policy 
practitioners and regional/local operators (see Figure 3.3). SCOT is used here to help 
model social practices, while Douglas, to which I return later, helps provide a 
theorization of organizational structure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Principal respondents from within the CSRC management  
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As discussed above, cultural theory may provide us with some conceptual tools to help 
us to understand how organisations understand and deal with risk. As Douglas argues, 
there is a significant difference in the management of risk between individualistic and 
hierarchical organizational structures, which are in turn influenced by two factors, 
knowledge and consent.  
The CSRS was built by the educational system which could be classified as a 
hierarchical organisation which expresses a high grid/group culture. According to 
Figure 3.1, there are four management levels among the government, local government 
and school. Culture theory tends to presume that the characteristic of hierarchical 
solidarity may generate a strong degree of social cohesion within organizations. 
However, while Douglas‘ model is useful in point us towards the broad patterms of 
integration that we should be looking for in organisations, it says little about the sort of 
interpretive processes that can be found therein and which reflect a range of localized 
concerns among their members. This latter issue can, it is suggested, be explored by 
drawing on the SCOT approach.  
The SCOT perspective may provide a useful methodology for us to understand actual 
processes within the CSRC among different levels of managers. Combining both culture 
 
Figure 3.3 Framing the CSRS according to the SCOT approach 
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theory and the SCOT approach to analyse the CSRC should help reveal the multiple 
view points and strategies we need to understand within the hierarchical organisation. 
My thesis therefore not only explores the dynamic between the designers/managers and 
operators/users, but also seeks to understand the possible problems which they 
experience and the solutions they find to deal with them. The role of managers at 
different levels is described below, according to their position within the system (see 
Table 3.1).  
 
Job status  Principal role within the system 
System 
designer 
Design and develop the system according to government requirements. 
Maintenance and modification of the system 
Government 
manager 
Manage and monitor the system. 
Identify and update emergency events, control the following situation and provide 
possible support/resources for user. 
Report the event to the director of department. 
Policy 
practitioner 
Transmit the system management strategy. 
Provide guidelines for regional and local operators. 
Formulate the training plan for new operators and assess their skill to operate the 
system. 
Monitor the emergency event and provide any immediate support. 
Regional/local 
operator 
Establish the regional/local management role. 
Monitor the emergency event and report to policy practitioner and government 
manager. 
Provide possible support to user. 
Operator/user 
Establish the organizational plan for managing emergency events. 
Report the emergency event to system and regional operators as they occur. 
 
My thesis focuses on three concerns: the identification and management of similar risks 
across different regions, the personal attitude of individuals responsible for dealing with 
risk within different organisational cultures (in the educational system) and the risk 
governance that can be seen in what are effectively hierarchical organisations. The 
research tries to compare similar events that have happened in different cities collected 
over a period of time through the use of an IT system designed by an official agency. 
Firstly, this thesis attempts to explore the relationship between each risk around people‘s 
daily lives and tries to find out the trend of risk by analysing the historical record. 
Secondly, the focus of research will move onto the attitude of managers, who are the 
key persons facing and managing the risks and whose attitude may be influenced by the 
organisational culture. Finally, the research will focus on the opinions of risk managers 
Table 3.1 The role of managers within the CSRS 
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who deal with risks at dissimilar positions of work in hierarchical organizations. The 
following section explains how I chose the methods for my case studies. 
3.3 Choice of approach and empirical subject matter 
Good research data should cover as many variables as possible. Jasanoff (2005) 
compares in her ―Designs on Nature – Science and Democracy in Europe and the 
United States‖, the new phenomena and the concerns generated by biotechnology 
between the United States and Europe. Moreover, Ö ɀerden & Jacoby (2006) in 
―Disaster management and Civil Society‖ highlight the different vulnerabilities in 
natural disaster of earthquake among three counties. Both studies adopted different 
research methods for similar research from social phenomena. 
From the phenomenological point of view, some risks may be like an accident in 
people‘s daily life, happening at any time in any day just like a traffic accident. Some 
could occur randomly, once a week or once a month or even never happen at all for 
instance diseases. Some may be like chronic disasters which derive from natural change 
and happen in special regions or seasons with frequency of once a year or every ten 
years, for example, floods and earthquakes. Such events may not appear at the same 
time, but they have a common characteristic which is uncertainty. Although lots of high 
technological instruments today help with the improvement in the management of risk, 
no one can predict when risk events will happen. 
Clough and Nutbrown (2002: 17) suggest that ‗the selection of methods for research 
studies can only be made in the light of specific situations and particular phenomena‘. 
Therefore, if a thesis tries to track the trend of risk events, one of the best ways may be 
to compare two or more different events at the same time. Such events may come from 
people‘s work experiences, their daily events or historical records from society. The 
following section introduces how my thesis approached the research methods and how I 
chose the suitable case studies for research. 
3.3.1 Selecting the appropriate research method 
Each risk has a special or unique characteristic, which may be influenced by specific 
factors, such as the characteristic of a region, the prevailing organisational culture or the 
experience accumulated from prior historical events. Most people believe that all the 
factors are closely connected and inseparable. No single factor can be picked out as the 
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major cause of risks. 
However, there is an element that might be found in socio-technical risk, because in 
technological society many events are monitored by technology, especially computer 
systems. Consequently, technology is an essential element in modern society. After the 
invention of the computer, most governmental agencies rely on computers to manage 
enormous databases, because the managers at such organizations not only used 
computers to save general information about organisational performance but also 
analyzed the historical database to prevent or reduce risks.  
In modern society, risks may be recorded by governmental or non-governmental 
agencies after they have happened. For risk management, parts of organisations might 
analyze the recorded figures, collect them in databases or exploit the data in shaping 
future policies. My thesis tries to integrate an analysis of recorded risk events with 
different regional and organisational culture factors, and to highlight the meaning of risk 
governance. Although organisations may have their own cultures or characters, it is 
possible to find out some correlation within them after comparing or contrasting two or 
more organisations with the same factors. Comparative research design is a kind of 
survey which compares two or more cases, and sometimes involves cross-cultural 
research (Bryman 2004: 53). Therefore, the research not only investigates the factors 
associated with risk in the technological society but also tries to find out the possible 
trend associated with a variety of events. 
Yin (2009: 8) argues that both experiment and case study methods contain similar 
features or elements, after comparing five types of these techniques. The research 
questions of both methods are concerned with the complexity and particular nature of 
the case in question. Therefore, my thesis intends to use the case study approach to 
explore the contemporary events around peoples‘ daily life with similar characteristics. 
My thesis compares three kinds of data from a risk governance system which relies on 
technology to manage a large database, provide a good communication channel for 
managers in hierarchal organizations and an extensive historical record all of which is 
designed to prevent future possible risks. 
3.3.2 Choice of empirical subject matter 
Based on the approach outlined above, the case study in my thesis was chosen from 
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people‘s daily events around them. Often, such events are ignored at the level of the 
individual; however, where an event creates a risk for the individual, then it may cause a 
chain effect that affects families, organisations and societies more generally. Risk 
management may not be avoided in industrial society and one possible way for 
managing risks may be by building a central coordinating headquarters that takes full 
charge of collecting and receiving information from varied sources in the field (Barton 
1969: 171). However, there is a dilemma for a hierarchical and rigid culture when 
facing an extreme crisis, because some dominant carrier cultures might be incompatible 
with the immediate needs and requirements for decision-making during periods of crisis 
(Rousseau 1989; Pidgeon 1997: 7).  
My thesis concentrated on the management function of risks in a hierarchical 
organization which handles all security events that happen in schools around the country 
(R.O.C Taiwan). The mix methods are applied to analyse the campus security events 
over a period of time and to evaluate the opinions of system operators and designers. 
The first part of the case study focuses on the Campus Security Reporting System 
(CSRS). This system is a channel for school managers to report campus security events 
involving students and staff to the Campus Security Report Centre (CSRC) in the 
Ministry of Education in Taiwan. The actual role of risk management in this case is 
located at a national level, and is monitored by the Taiwanese governmental agency.   
The second part of the case study addresses the attitude of the staff that operates the 
CSRS. For any level of school, it is imperative for them to understand as many risks in 
their surroundings as possible, because safety may be an important issue for students at 
school. Therefore, school managers not only have responsibility to provide a safe 
learning space for students, but also to assess potential risks for the staff and students at 
school. The research focus of this aspect of my case is to understand the attitude of the 
staff when they operate this system at school, and to collect their experiences in dealing 
with or facing the emergency event which was caused by students or staff at school. The 
purpose of this research is to explore the attitude of school managers in risk 
management, and to discover the relationship between formal procedures they are 
expected to follow and what actual practice takes place when dealing with risk events at 
school. 
Finally, the third dimension of my case study moves onto analysing more specific 
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opinions from the local operators or managers at schools in some cities in Taiwan, as 
well as the system designers and more senior managers within government departments. 
The research in this case focuses on the personal knowledge of governing risk events 
and the function of the CSRS. The research tries to distinguish differences between the 
local and government managers in using or managing the CSRC. Therefore, the 
research design in this thesis focuses on three parts of cases: the analysis of a database 
from the CSRS, the survey of operator opinion through a questionnaire and the 
semi-structured interviews with local operators, system designers and managers within 
the government department.  
My thesis attempts to understand the dynamics of risk management through 
comparative research. Also, it hopes to explore the relationship between organizational 
culture and personal attitudes in dealing with risks, and to discover what, using a phrase 
from Nowotny (2000: 117) one might call a ‗socially robust‘ approach towards effective 
risk governance. The following section describes the details of the research methods and 
the source of data for each case. 
3.3.2.1 The Campus Security Report System (CSRS) in Taiwan 
Exploring the CSRS is the first part of the case study in my thesis. This system was 
designed by the CSRC in the Ministry of Education in Taiwan in July 2001 and used to 
integrate risk-related information when specific events happened at school around the 
country. It provides an official channel for administrative agency to monitor every 
accident and disaster event, including both man-made and natural disasters (CSRC 
2003). The system was built on a directive from the Ministry of Education in Taiwan. 
According to the directive, every institution including private and public schools, should 
establish a secure place and procedure for recording, managing and controlling any 
campus security events and the possibility of a major disaster.  
The instruction within the directive asked every educational institution to maintain a 
room with fax machine, telephone, internet and other support facilities for dealing with 
risk or controlling disasters. Schools not only should prepare a campus disaster 
management plan but also have to evaluate the potential risks within the school‘s 
property such as aged buildings or dangerous intersections. Also, every administrational 
department has to provide one or more persons standing by for emergency contact. If 
any security event or disaster referring to the student or staff happen, no matter on or off 
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campus, those staff who stand by in this command centre should report the condition to 
the CSRS immediately and continually report the latest development. 
In Taiwan, there is a group of special staff from the Ministry of National Defense 
working in the educational system. They are actually appointed by the military to be 
responsible for the security management on campus and the teaching in a general sense 
about military and national security. According to the Ministry of Education, there were 
1062 military staff at 161 Universities (including Colleges) and 2726 military staff at 
487 high schools around the country in 2009. Therefore, if there is any campus accident 
tallying with the events listing on the Category of Campus Security Event List (see 
Appendix I), all the information about this accident should be reported to the Ministry 
of Education via the CSRS and recorded in the database. My thesis will analyse the 
database, to which I managed to secure full access, collected in this system over past 
five years. The research design in the first part of the case study will discuss three 
questions about this system.  
．Can we find any trend in risk events and their reporting (and classification) by 
analysing the CSRS database?  
．Is there any difference in risk governance between urban and rural areas? 
．Can we find any change through analysing the historical record data? 
The CSRS has been running for eight years up till 2008, and has accumulated abundant 
data in the system. In the early period, the system may have experienced some failures 
or needed retesting caused by the unfamiliarity of the operating system during the initial 
period. Therefore, the analysis of data focuses on the middle five years, from 2004 to 
2008. 
3.3.2.2 Personal attitudes of operators with the CSRS 
The second part of the case study moves onto the opinion of those operators who are 
responsible for operating this system. My research focuses on parts of the staff working 
at high school who have experience in operating this system. According to the Ministry 
of Education, there are 487 high schools in the country. My thesis focuses on 393 high 
schools managed by the Taiwan Province, because nearly eighty percent of high schools 
are managed by this administration system in Taiwan. I chose this bureaucratic system, 
because it has a more integrated and developed command structure (see right framing of 
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Figure 3.1) within the whole educational administrational system. Therefore, the 
research will ignore the other ninety-four high schools managed by the two other 
municipalities (Taipei and Kaohsiung). 
The samples of this survey collected from 393 high schools in Taiwan Province. There 
are approximately 2,013 staff assigned to manage and operate this system at these high 
schools. I designed a questionnaire for the pilot test, and collected the opinions during 
this pilot stage from twenty respondents from 1
st
 April to 30
th
 April (see Appendix II). 
The questionnaire includes five parts of the issues, and they are broken down into forty 
questions, in total. The first section relates to the candidate job background. Then the 
second part of questions are concerned with their personal experience; after that, 
questions focus on their opinions on operating this system. Following this, the questions 
address their personal opinions about the organisational culture which relates to their 
work place. Finally, the questions will move onto the personal experience about how to 
face and to deal with the campus security events. The research tries to explore the actual 
situation and process of risk management from the experience of the staff. Therefore, 
my research tries to discover answers to the three questions below:  
．Did the CSRS provide a good communication channel between high schools and the 
Ministry of Education in reporting campus emergency events? 
．Is there any impact on managers on the risk governance at school caused by the 
organizational culture ? 
. What kind of attitude can people learn for facing risks in a socio-technical society from 
risk managers? 
3.3.2.3 Interviews with local operators and the system designer 
After accumulating wide opinions from some school staff collected by the quantitative 
survey during the second part of research, the semi-structured interview is applied in the 
qualitative data assembled during the third part of my study. The research design in this 
case explores and seeks to understand the personal experience of those in the CSRS 
from operator to manager level. Therefore, the interviewee respondents include junior 
staff (working for less than one year), senior staff (working for over five years), head of 
the department at high school, local and centre managers at city or county, system 
designers and system managers. 
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In order to understand the variation of the staff experiences between city and 
countryside, five cities or counties have been chosen in my thesis to compare the 
diversity. The samples were determined by three factors: the location of the city (the 
north or south of the country), the category of the school (public or private), and the 
regional location of the city (urban or rural). Also, my research tries to examine and 
compare any differences between local and centre managers. Therefore, the samples 
include city/county managers and directors, system designers and managers at 
governmental department.  
The goal of this part of the interview was to collect thirty to thirty-five samples. The 
interview questions contain four main issues: personal background, operator experience, 
personal attitude to the system function and risk management. Each part of the point 
would be separated into several questions. There is a slight difference between questions 
for operators and for system designers or managers. The first part focuses on the 
operators; there are twelve questions for them (see Appendix III). Then the candidate for 
interviewee will move onto the system designers and managers. Questions for them are 
also designed with four parts and are separated into twelve questions (see Appendix IV). 
These parts of case study are used not only to discover operators‘ personal experience 
but also to explore the diversity between system designers, managers and operators. 
Campus security events may appear once or many times a day, a week or a month; most 
of them cause slight injury for people; however, sometimes they may cause a serious 
harm for students, staff or loss of campus property to school. I tried to explore the more 
specific opinion from different groups of people including operators of the CSRS. The 
research design in this case focuses on three issues. 
．How does the governmental agency record data of campus security events to monitor 
potential risk that may happen in the future? 
．What is the main relationship between organisational culture and campus risk in risk 
governance? 
．Are there any significant differences in using or operating the technological system of 
risk governance between local operators and high level managers? 
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3.4 Methods 
The last section shows how I chose the specific case for my thesis, and the following 
section will delineate how I approach the research methods in this thesis. If a thesis tries 
to explore a phenomenon, normally data will be the kernel of the research. Although 
people are surrounded by information and are bombarded with it every day from the 
media and elsewhere, usually, most data are ignored by us and it is hard to collect 
correct data straightforwardly. If people misunderstand the importance of the data for 
society, they may need some plans with actions which could identify and use the most 
effective and appropriate method of data collection (Walliman 2006). The nucleus of my 
research addressed the performance of the campus security management system which 
provides a function for hierarchical organizations to manage and handle risks. 
Risk is uncertain and hard to be predicted, there is no absolute answer to explain the 
reason risk happen, but through the explore of organizational culture may find their way 
when encountering it. In addition, good research may involve the study of naturally 
occurring settings or associate with studying artificial setting of social movement which 
are established by people activities or culture shaping (Bryman 2001; Seale 2004: 294). 
Social and cultural research often emphasizes the differences between qualitative and 
quantitative methods; qualitative methods tend to link with interpretivism and 
postmodernism, and the interpretivism may help research explain the context of events. 
While quantitative methods tend to link to positivism which may help achieve the 
support of research finding (ibid).  
However, some people may argue that the assumptions behind qualitative and 
quantitative methods for the nature of the social world are fundamentally different (ibid). 
My thesis tries to find out what are the different perceptions among those in handling 
the campus security events and in operating the CSRS between local (primary) school 
managers and governmental (senior) organization managers. This thesis adopts a 
mix-methods approach, including the case study, quantitative research, qualitative 
research, long-term research and interviews. The following section will illustrate how I 
use those methods in the research design for the thesis. 
3.4.1 Case study research 
Case study acts as a key pivot of the thesis. This research tries to discuss some issue in 
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three cases: similar risks at different regions is the main focus in first part of case, 
personal attitudes with the organisational culture is integrated in the second part of case 
and the risk governance in hierarchical organisation will be the focus for analysis in the 
third part of case. Normally, a case study may be concerned with the complexity and 
particular nature of an area of society. Therefore, the samples for the case may be from a 
single community, school, family, organization, person or event (Stake 1995; Bryman 
2004: 48). 
The case study may involve both single and multiple parts of case studies. It is not only 
a form of qualitative research but also may admit among an array qualitative research 
choices (Creswell, 2007; Yin 2009: 19), for example, both participant observation and 
unstructured interviewing research designs are favoured qualitative methods because 
these methods are viewed as particularly helpful in the generation of an intensive, 
detailed examination of a case (Bryman 2004: 49). Some case studies go beyond being a 
type of qualitative research, inasmuch as they could combine both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence for research (Yin 2009: 19). 
However, there is a variety of applications in the case study. Firstly, it may illustrate that 
the assumptive causality relates to real-life interventions, normally, which is too 
complex for the survey or experimental strategies. Secondly, it can describe interference 
and the real-life context in which it occurred. After that, if research design needs to 
evaluate or to describe certain mode, the result of the case study may provide adequate 
evidences. Then, when the situations are influenced by some intervention which causes 
the evaluation unclear or confuses the outcome, the case study may enlighten this 
problem. Finally, many different motives may be conducted and be written by the case 
study. Such motives may be from the individual case that provides simple presentation 
to the broad generalisation; it depends on the evidence of the case study, respectively 
(ibid). 
My thesis compares some opinions and experiences from operators who manage or 
operate the technological system on risk governance. This research will link the 
relationships among three elements with region, organisational culture and risk 
governance. The three parts of data sources are the database analyses of the Campus 
Security Report System (CSRS) in Taiwan, the questionnaire survey with operators‘ 
opinions about the CSRS and the face to face interview with primary and senior 
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managers. Quantitative method is applied for analysing the data of the CSRS in the first 
part of case study, the questionnaires data in the second part of case study and 
qualitative method for collecting the personal opinion from face to face interview in the 
third part of case study. 
3.4.2 Quantitative research 
If a researcher tries to provide wide evidence for the discovery of result, more specific 
opinions from wider range of participators are needed. Quantitative research may be a 
good choice to generate additional data in case study in that it may cover some 
behaviors or events that researcher is trying to explain. Also, the data related to an 
embedded unit of analysis may be critical in explaining the key proposition (Yin 2009: 
133). 
Although most quantitative researchers rely on a positivist approach in social science 
research, they may use a technocratic perspective, apply reconstructed logic and follow 
a linear research path. And they may try to explain some general causality which 
depends on measuring variables and testing hypotheses (Neuman2003: 139). Therefore, 
there are some advantages of using quantitative research for example it may provide 
more complete relationships between variables and dependent variables. Also, the 
research results may be influenced by the choice of samples as well as the comparison 
and contrast of the variables. Then the results depend on the classification system which 
may form group studies or homogeneity. Finally, quantitative research informs strategic 
plans for future research and shows the social science findings which may be compared 
with the natural science (Krathwohl 2004: 562). 
In addition, there are some functions of quantitative research. Firstly, it may help us test 
the hypothesis that research begins with. Secondly, the concept of research relies on 
distinct variables. After that, each measure in research is systematically created before 
data collection and standardization. Following this, data are in the form of numbers and 
in principle allow precise measurement. Then theory is largely causal and deductive. 
Also, the procedures are standard and the replication is assumed. Finally, the procedures 
normally involve statistics, tables or charts and a discussion of how they relate to 
hypotheses (Neuman 2003: 145). 
The quantitative research approach in my thesis is exemplified in the first and the 
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second parts of cases. The main attention will focus on the records of the campus 
security events for five years, which is collected in the CSRS at the Ministry of 
Education in Taiwan. I tried to find the trend in risk patterns from the system record and 
to establish some key factors for risk governance.  
The second quantitative research element will move onto the workers who operate the 
CSRS at high schools. The research design involves a questionnaire which includes five 
subjects: personal information, personal experience and opinion about the system, 
personal opinion about the organisation culture and personal experience about the 
student accident event (see Appendix V). The pilot test was conducted in April 2009. 
The questionnaire was sent to the school managers at a training conference in July 2009 
in Taiwan. The attendees were the staff playing the roles of operators of the CSRS at the 
high schools.  
3.4.3 Qualitative research 
Sometimes research may find some trends from social phenomena through quantitative 
research. However, if a researcher wants to explore the meaning behind the presentation 
of large-scale accounts of social phenomena, those data may be collected by recording 
respondents‘ experiences through an interview. Such research may be designed with 
experimental research, social survey or the discursive interviews of qualitative research 
(Gomm 2008: 208). Therefore, some research may use a language of case and context, 
examine social processes and cases in their social context, and look at illustrations or 
the product of meaning in specific surroundings (Neuman 2006: 157). 
The function of qualitative research is not merely for counting and dealing with 
numbers but also focusing on the information which illustrates the words-descriptions, 
accounts, opinions, feeling of people, particularly, in small groups or individuals. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to determine or predict precisely what data may be 
collected before the survey (Walliman 2006: 129). However, there are five suitable 
purposes for qualitative studies: understanding the meaning of the events which may 
involve people‘s lives and experiences; understanding the particular context and the 
influence from the context of actions; identifying unanticipated phenomena or influence, 
and producing new grounded theories; understanding the process which may be caused 
by events and actions; developing causal explanations (Maxwell 1996: 17). 
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Because of its elasticity, qualitative research is broadly used in social science research. 
For example, the generation of results and theories are understandable and 
experientially credible to researcher and respondent; conducting formative evaluations 
are intended to help improve existing practice; engaging in action research with 
practitioner participants ensures they have an impact on the results generated and 
outcomes and actions they lead to (Maxwell 1996: 21). Qualitative research reveals the 
complexity within phenomena. And it may be extremely useful for exploration of how 
to sense a phenomenon (Krathwohl 2004: 229). Also, it may interpret human problems 
and concerns; make people, problems, and situations ―come alive‖; portray phenomena 
in their context; describe complex personal and interpersonal phenomena that would be 
impossible to portray with quantitative research‘s single dimensional scales; provide a 
holistic view of phenomenon; help get inside and help handle problems (Consider 1995; 
Krathwohl 2004: 562). 
My thesis contrasts the cross-data analysis and comparative data with the method of 
qualitative to explore the relationship of socio-technological risk governance from two 
factors: the organisational culture and the cognitive difference with risk governance in 
hierarchical organisations. My research design adopts the use of the interview survey on 
three groups of people. The first group focuses on the junior staff, the senior staff and 
the heads of department at high schools. Then the interviews move onto managers and 
directors in five different cities. Finally the research focuses on the senior managers 
who are system designers and governmental level managers. After the interviews, I 
integrate the respondents‘ opinions, which may show us the wide range of attitudes 
among people distributed at different levels of organisation when facing and managing 
risk, and compare the similarity or difference of experiences in managing risk-related 
events to describe how the situation varies across different organisations. 
3.4.4 Long-term research 
Both the questionnaire and interview are the main methods for collecting quantitative 
and qualitative data in my thesis. They may help discover the significant trends in 
socio-technical risk from quantitative research, and explore the meaning-related factors 
of risk from qualitative research. However, such results may be like a mirror showing 
only part of the puzzle in the life cycle of risk. Therefore, if a research desires to find 
out the complexity of risk, long-term research may be one of the fundamental demands. 
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Long-term research is also called longitudinal research; it is one of the best methods to 
contrast cross-sectional research. The cross-sectional research design collects one or 
more variables in the same period of time. However, the data collected in the 
longitudinal research may come from more variables of events and longer periods of 
time, which could provide at least a calculation of change and a conceivable illustration 
of change (Menard 2002; 2008: 1). Therefore, if a research can follow up the same 
sample for a long period of time, the researcher may discover what things happen and 
treat the problem of causation with more precision (Seale 2004: 343).  
Although longitudinal study benefits from controlling time order problem, there are still 
some unavoidable concerns for research. For example, it is very expensive because 
more data need to be collected and a large sample has to be kept in touch with, which 
increases the difficulty for the research (Seale 2004: 343). Thus a researcher may needs 
to assess the intention of the research design before using a longitudinal study. There are 
four basic designs for longitudinal research: total population designs, repeated 
cross-sectional designs, revolving panel designs and longitudinal panel designs (Menard 
2002; 2008: 4). My thesis applies cross-sectional designs at the first case study and tries 
to measure the five-year database collected by the CSRS. Although campus security 
events may be a different set in each case at different times, they still can be comparable 
with each other. 
3.4.5 Interview 
The most important information in a case study is from the interview (Yin 2009: 106). 
The major method of data collection in my thesis depends on the qualitative research, 
and the function of support for data assembled comes from interviewee‘s respondents. 
Seale claims that nowadays people live in an interview society; the interview has 
become increasingly public compared to the past of our lives (Silverman 1997; Seale 
2004: 105). In qualitative research, the interview is probably the widest employed 
method (Bryman 2004: 319), it may produce dissimilar classes of information from 
individuals or groups, which makes itself a highly flexible and unpredictable instrument 
for social research (Seale 2004: 180). 
Sometimes sociologists may be interested in the attitudes of some specific social groups, 
or engage in the study of people‘s feelings. One of the key methods of attitude research 
is the interview (Gilbert 2001: 123). Interviews may provide essential sources of 
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evidence for a case study, if the case study is about human activity or behaviour. Also, it 
may furnish important insights into such affairs or events. The interviewees also may 
highlight shortcuts which could help a researcher to distinguish other connected 
information of value (Yin 2009: 108). 
There are two tasks for researchers when they use interviews in research. The first thing 
is to follow the line of inquiry and to observe the research protocol. Secondly, 
researchers may ask more conversational questions in an unbiased manner which assists 
the richness of inquiry (Yin 2009: 106). Thus, researchers may be careful in both 
satisfying the line of inquiry for data collection and using nonthreatening questions for 
interviewee at the same time in the interview. 
Furthermore, three conditions may be noticed in the interview. Firstly, each individual 
opinion is seen as the source of subjective meaning. Secondly, from the psychological 
point of view, data collected from interviewees may explain an experience or personal 
narratives. Finally, both interviewer and interviewee should be satisfied with the aims 
and methods (Silverman 1997; Seale 2004: 105). 
Generally, there are three types of case study interview for researchers: in-depth 
interview, focused interview and structure interview. In in-depth interviews, the 
researcher may ask key respondents their opinions about events. They also may ask the 
interviewees to propose their own insights into certain occurrences and may use such 
propositions as the basis for further inquiry, not just a single sitting. The interviewee 
also may suggest other persons for you to interview, as well as other sources of evidence. 
Then the focused interview may ask interviewees for a short period of time such as an 
hour. Researchers may still remain open-ended and assume a conversational manner, but 
they may be more likely to follow a certain questions derived from a protocol. Finally, 
the interview may entail more structured questions, consistent with the limits of a survey, 
which may be designed to produce quantitative evidence for the case study (Merton, 
Fiske, & Kendall, 1990; Yin 2009: 107). 
In a technical society, more and more researchers rely on e-research for research 
because it is more convenient and cheaper than face to face interviews. However, some 
concerns may be assessed before an e-survey is used. For example, authenticity, any one 
could set up in an open web site, which makes it difficult to control the respondent; and 
the credibility would be a big problem as well. Doing e-research one needs to be aware 
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of possible distortions from web site because it is crucial for a researcher to distinguish 
the respondent background from e-survey (Bryman 2004: 390). Consequently, my thesis 
focuses on face to face interview, which may achieve some benefits to support my 
research. Firstly, it may be easy for researchers to maintain rapport with respondents. 
Secondly, it may help researchers gain more commitment and motivation from 
interviewees. Following this, it improves the success rate for the survey and reduces the 
impact on data collection. Finally, it provides follow-up probes chances for research 
(Curasi 2001; Bryman 2004: 479).    
Therefore, the survey in my third part of the case is designed using a semi-structured 
interview. The choice of respondent has been described in 3.3.3 section. The interview 
questions were evaluated and piloted, and were extended when needed during the 
progress of the interview. By doing so, the data provided richer and wider information 
for the research.  
3.5 Data collection  
Today, more and more social science researchers rely on technology software to analyse 
databases because it provides effectiveness for information management. There are 
three possible ways which may help researchers key in data: direct automatic entry, 
automatic creation of computer files for importing into analysis and manual keying-in of 
data (Bobson 2002; Walliman 2006: 110).  
The following section will describe how I undertook the fieldwork to collect the data for 
my thesis. The first step was to collect the database of the campus security events over 
five years, those recorded by the CSRC by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan. Before 
doing this case study, I obtained an official document which gave me admission to apply 
for the data for analyses (see Appendix VI). In the CSRS, the number of recorded data 
about the campus security events is 117,066, between 2004 and 2008. 
The second step in my case focuses on the opinion of the campus staff at high schools. 
Following my pilot, the questionnaire was slightly modified. The modified 
questionnaire was completed by the staff responsible for operating the CSRS at the staff 
training conference between the 13
th
 July and the 24
th
 July 2009 in Taiwan. There were 
1,154 questionnaire copies delivered and 1,055 copies returned. There were 805 valid 
responses and 250 invalid responses within the 1,055 returned copies. 
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Finally, the third step in the case tried to find out any significant differences in risk 
management between the high schools staff and the senior managers, from primary 
level to governmental level. The respondents involve the general staff and the heads of 
department at five schools, and their local managers and directors in five cities. After 
collecting the data, I found that most of the respondents were male with a similar 
educational background; therefore, I chose eight female respondents who were general 
staff with different educational backgrounds and who had worked for less than two 
years at the current schools they were based; also there were three volunteer 
respondents. Then the interviews moved onto two system designers and two 
governmental level managers. Therefore, the total number of interviewees was thirty 
four for this part of case study. 
3.6 Data analysis 
There is no doubt that one of the challenges for research is question design crucial to 
producing valuable and applicable evidence (Gilbert 2001: 86). If a researcher can 
explore the actual phenomena of interest through a survey, it may improve the outcome 
of research. However, sometimes similar data at different organizations may be recorded 
in different ways, which may create additional work for a researcher to interpret and 
summarize the collected data (Walliman 2006: 110). Therefore, one of the important 
tasks for researchers is to analyse data as effectively as possible following its collection. 
This section illustrates how I analyzed the collected data in each part of my case. The 
first one involves the analysis of the CSRS database. Originally, each data item was 
recorded in Chinese in the CSRS so the whole data set was transformed from the 
original Chinese programming language to an Excel file. This step made it possible to 
convert and reclassify the meaning from a Word to a numerical form with codes. After 
that, the numerical data in Excel was used to copy to SPSS.v16 software. Finally, the 
numerical data was re-encoded to SPSS.16 software for quantitative analysis. The 
second part of the quantitative data was collected using a questionnaire. Section 3.4 has 
shown that the 805 valid respondents will be analysed by SPSS 16 software. The third 
part of my data analysis involves qualitative data which was collected through face to 
face interview. The interviews were followed by question sheets. Two different question 
sheets have been used in the interviews which depended on the interviewee‘s 
background. The total number of respondents is thirty-four in this part of the case study; 
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the choice of sample has been discussed in section 3.4. Each interview was been 
recorded by mp3 recorder. The interview data was recorded from voice to Word form, 
then verbatim input to Atlas.ti v.5- or Nvivo-9.  
3.7 Research ethics 
For research, data collection and analysis is essential work which must be informed by 
ethical consideration. One of the most important rules in ethics is to follow the policy of 
value neutrality. Researchers also have to keep in balance violations of privacy and 
confidentiality when publishing results (Gomm 2008:19) and avoid risk for respondents. 
In recent years principles of ethical research have been designed by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), which provide guidelines for researchers. For instance, 
the research subject, its purpose and possible risk must be explained to each person 
involved in the research. Also, the anonymity of respondents must be respected, and 
research participants must be recruited in a voluntary way. Then any harm to research 
participants must be avoided. Finally, the independence of research must be clear, and 
any conflict of interest or partiality must be made explicit (ESRC 2005; Gomm 2008: 
366). 
The research ethics of the thesis follows the principles of the University of York 
Humanities and Social Science Ethics Committee. Research Governance was approved 
by each organization, agency and individual involved in the case study before the 
research. For the first part of case study, I obtained an official document from the 
Ministry of Education, which confirms the consent given to the case study. In addition, 
the research subject and purpose have been described in full at the start of the 
questionnaire. Also, every interviewee read and signed the protocol before the interview 
started (see Appendix VII). 
3.8 Reliability and validity 
Research ethics, data collection and data analysis may focus on the goal of research; 
however, both the reliability and the validity of the research are also crucial issues. 
Reliability is usually a central concept in measurement. There are two main aspects in 
this consistency: consistency over time and internal consistency. Consistency over time 
is usually expressed in the question. Internal consistency relates to the concept-indicator 
idea of measurement described earlier. It is hard to reduce error variance in social 
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science, but error variance may present wherever measurement is used. Sometimes, our 
central strategies in research will account for variance in a dependent variable, it is 
necessary for researchers to estimate the reliability of all measures, especially the 
dependent variable (Punch 2005: 95). 
In order to improve the reliability of this study, a pilot of the questionnaire for the 
second aspect of the study was conducted in April 2009, and twenty respondents 
returned the questionnaire which has illustrated in section 3.2.2.2. The respondents‘ 
opinions were then integrated in an updated questionnaire which is used in the 
following quantitative research. Furthermore, every question in each case study had 
been discussed with the researcher‘s supervisor and validated in part through discussion 
with a professional practitioner (in Taiwan) with work experience in this area before the 
question sheet was designed. Such techniques may improve the reliability of the thesis. 
When dealing with the reliability issue, the aim of the thesis moves onto its validity.  
Validity refers to the truth-value of a research project; reliability concerns the 
consistency with which research procedures deliver their result. The measurement 
validity of questions in interviews and questionnaires can be improved by various 
methods (Seale 2004: 72). 
Sometimes validity is more difficult to achieve than reliability; it refers to the bridge 
between the construct and the data. Consequently, qualitative researchers may be more 
interested in authentication than validity, because authentication means giving a fair, 
honest and balanced account of social life from the viewpoint of the subject (Neuman 
2006: 182). My thesis relied on quantitative and qualitative data to analyse the CSRS 
data with a five-years-long database, and to collect the staff attitudes about using the 
CSRS within different organizational cultures and to distinguish any significant 
differences in risk management between the junior staff and the senior managers. The 
measurement error may be reduced by doing comparison across the three elements of 
my case study. Moreover, in order to improve the validity of the interview data, I asked 
a number of multilingual (Chinese/English speaking) researchers from different 
academic backgrounds to translate the same piece of qualitative data to compare those 
with my own translation: this gave reassurance that my own version captured the 
meaning of respondents. 
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3.9 The schedule of the research 
Table 3.2 The schedule of the research 
Calendar 
 
 
Task 
2009 2010 2011 
5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 
Literature Review * * * * * * * * * * * *    
Research Designed * * * * * * * * *       
Fieldwork   * * * * * * * *      
Transcription work    * * * * * * *      
Data Analysis     * * * * * * * *    
Writing up the Thesis      * * * * * * *    
First Draft Modified          * * * *   
Thesis Completed            * * *  
Printing              * * 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a brief account of the background of the research question 
and design, methods approach and choice, and shows the methods which are used in the 
thesis. The first part of the case focuses on the reported risk trends by analysing the 
database produced by the CSRS. The second part of the case is focused on the personal 
attitudes of the operators of the CSRS within high schools. The third element of the case 
is concerned with the significant difference on risk governance between the junior staff 
and the senior managers.  
The complexity and variety of the campus security events that appear in the database for 
different areas will help us understand risks and how they were managed and what 
lessons this would have in general for developing a more ‗socially robust‘ approach to 
risk management. Therefore, this thesis adopts a mixed methods approach, which 
involves case study, secondary data analysis, quantitative research, long-term research 
and interviews to collect and analyse the data from the CSRS and different groups of 
operators and managers (see Figure 3.4 below). The following chapters describe the 
details of the CSRS database and the results of the survey. 
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Figure 3.4 Research design: exploring risk governance in a socio-technical system  
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Chapter 4: The analyses of the Campus Security Report System in Taiwan 
4.1 Introduction  
As the previous chapter discussed, risks have accompanied human behaviour and 
activities from pre-industrial to modern society, and as we saw in Chapter 2, that Beck 
(1992) claims that people today are living in a ‗risk society‘, one that creates new forms 
of risk. In everyday life, new types of risk may be particularly associated with the 
innovation of technology. Car transport is an obvious case in point: according to the 
World Report on child injury prevention, ‗nearly 1.3 million people were killed in road 
crashes and up to 50 million more were injured or disabled‖ around the world in 2004 
(Peden et al, 2008: 31). At the same time, if risks do not harm society in such an 
obvious and immediate way, they may not cause citizens concern either. Moreover, risks 
may be linked to a taboo which acts to suppress attention to them (Douglas 1978). In 
contrast, Foucault (1978), as we have seen, argues that rather than being hidden, the 
identification and disciplining of risk is characteristic of the biopolitics of society and a 
form of power which, while controlling risk, inevitably controls people. Indeed, one of 
any organisation‘s or government‘s main tasks may be to prevent uncertain risks and so 
protect but also control the citizen and his/her property (Chapman & Ward 2002). This 
is why writers such as Renn have argued that government or other public or private 
institutions should explore and seek to understand the dynamics of risk (Renn 2008). In 
this chapter, I introduce and discuss in some detail the development of a national IT 
system in Taiwan that was established by government to manage and so ‗discipline‘ 
risks, initially linked to potential environmental disasters, but subsequently broadened 
to include a much more extensive risk register. 
There is no doubt that in every region or country natural or man-made disasters occur 
unavoidably because of some regional characteristics related to climate or geographical 
factors such as flooding or earthquake, as was seen most tragically in the flooding in 
Pakistan in the summer of 2010. Most citizens pay attention to visible threats rather than 
invisible risks, because people are more likely to be concerned about the more tangible 
risks they face and ignore less tangible risks that may well carry major threat. Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982: 35) argue that each culture creates its own values through which 
natural or normal risks are defined in citizens‘ minds through the socialization process 
or the expression of a shared subculture. Consequently, Beck (1992c: 2) suggests that 
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people have responsibility to develop a cooperative strategy within their culture to deal 
with risks accompanying the development of civilization in the global society. As an 
example of this process, this chapter examines the development background of the 
Campus Security Report System (CSRS) in Taiwan, and shows why Taiwan‘s Education 
Department established a unique reporting system to manage those emergency events 
occurring on campuses, according to the ―Disaster Prevention and Protection Act‖ 
introduced in 2000. I also discuss the procedure through which the managers at 
governmental department level monitor the various campus security events. Then I will 
move on to explore the database recorded in the CSRS and the annual report published 
by the Campus Security Report Centre (CSRC).  
My thesis focuses on the operational model and functions of the CSRS and tries to 
explore some possible or predictable patterns of the events by analysing the historical 
record carried in the data over a period of time, and how this might be understood by 
those seeking to manage risk. I am mainly interested in providing a description of the 
system and how it ‗works‘ and how it is constructed, how data are recorded, and indeed 
what this data shows in broad terms: in this chapter I do not want to deconstruct or 
challenge the data as such or the process itself; the latter is the task of chapters 5 and 6. 
The first section below describes the background of how the CSRS was created in 
response to a series of disasters, particularly with reference to Taiwan‘s geographic 
environments. The second section discusses the relationship between the development 
and design of the CSRS itself. The third section demonstrates the diversity of the 
campus security events and the creation of a list of risk categories within the CSRS, and 
also shows how those were involved in operating the system. The fourth section 
explores the extensive body of data held by the system, data which was generated by the 
local operators recording events and incidents to the system itself. Finally, the focus will 
move on to the annual reports, whose purpose is to offer an analysis of some possible 
trends for risk governance, prepared by the CSRC staff, based on their interpretation of 
the data.  
4.2 Background to the development of the CSRS in Taiwan 
There are various reasons or purposes why organizations seek to develop a risk 
management system. Some relate to handling emergency events; some may be expected 
to help reduce the severity of damage from potential threats. Those events and threats 
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may endanger the safety, life or property of citizens or organizations. The Department of 
Contract and Management Services (CAMS) in Western Australia, for example, was 
established to provide contracting service to government agencies, and their key role is 
to manage contract and procurement risks (Baccarini et al 2001: 139). Inevitably, most 
public regimes may take some degree of responsibility for reducing risk for citizens or 
societies. Thus, a hierarchical organization may develop or design some strategies, plans 
or management systems to prevent or to monitor most visible and invisible risks from 
endangering people or damaging property. Such governance functions may be varied 
from case to case; some may depend on the internal demand of institutions such as the 
CAMS task described above, and some may be influenced by the external conditions 
such as environmental issues or geographical limitations. In the next section, I will 
interpret how the CSRS was initially developed and established with respect to the 
management of geographic risks.  
4.2.1 The geographical location of Taiwan 
Taiwan, also called ‗Formosa‘, is the largest island of the Republic of China (R.O.C) in 
Eastern Asia located off the southeastern coast of mainland China and the eastern edge 
of the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 4.2.1). The shape of the island is like a leaf that is 
narrow at both ends. It is located in the southeastern corner of Eurasia and is separated 
from the Asian continent by the Taiwan Strait which is located at 23.46‘N 121.0‘E. The 
average distance between mainland China and Taiwan is about 200 kilometers. The East 
Sea is in the north of Taiwan. The distance between Taiwan and the Ryukyu Island, 
which is the southernmost island of Japan, is about 600 kilometers. And there are 350 
kilometers from the northern-most point of the Philippines to the southern-most point of 
the Taiwan. The territory of Taiwan occupies 35,980 square kilometers (13,892 square 
miles). It is about a quarter of the size of Britain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1 The geographical location of Taiwan 
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From a climate science point of view, the Tropic of Cancer spans the south of the 
Taiwan. This has benefited the whole island which is covered by tropical and 
subtropical vegetation. However, some drawbacks are caused by such a geographical 
location. For example, Taiwan is within the path of typhoons created by the tropical 
storms that blow up in the marine tropical weather areas. From a geological point of 
view, Taiwan is near the seismic fault of the Pacific Ocean, which has caused some 
serious damage to the island such as with the ―Chi-Chi‘‘ (also called ‗921‘) earthquake, 
a 7.3 Richter scale quake on September 21, 1999. Consequently, both typhoons and 
earthquakes are major natural disasters because they usually cause serious property loss 
and physical damage for society and people in Taiwan. 
In respect to its geographical location, Taiwan is situated in and controls the waterway 
which governs marine transportation through the Taiwan Strait. As such, the country 
enjoys a strategic location and pivotal control point in eastern Asian. This was one of 
the reasons why the Netherlands, Spain and Japan have occupied Taiwan by force in the 
past (Murray 1998: 5). Otherwise, Taiwan has continued in the shadow of potential 
force threat after the post World War II, especially the rise power of mainland China 
(Allen 2000: 7), such as the attack of Dachen Islands in 1954, the attack of Jinmen 
Island in 1958, and the demonstrations of missile exercise which targeted on the north 
and south of Taiwan between 1995 and 1996 by the China military threats (Allen 2001: 
113-121). In light of this, risk management might be seen to be one of the important 
issues for the country because it suffers from so many natural disasters or potential 
man-made (military) threats. 
4.2.2 The original establishment of CSRS  
As previous section highlighted, the potential threats in Taiwan have never reduced or 
eliminated from the military forces of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) after the 
government leaded by Kuomintang (KMT) retreated from China continent to the main 
island of Taiwan. Therefore, most of the government regimes may take part of 
responsibilities on national security and the organizational culture in government 
institutions may be more sensitive on risk/emergency management. Allen (2000: 9) 
points out that ―culture has always occupied an important space in the politics of 
Taiwan‘s national survival and identity which has rise the possibility of civil society and 
the changing role of culture in defining national identity‖. He concluded three phases of 
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culture policy in Taiwan, including the era of cultural reconstruction between 1945 and 
1967, the era of cultural renaissance between 1967 and 1977, and the era of cultural 
reconstruction from 1977 to the present (ibid 11-12). Otherwise, the cultural renaissance 
contented three-step process which included public dissemination, moral education and 
active demonstration. Therefore, the course design not only related to the society and 
ethics but also contained the responsibility of citizenship and morality at primary and 
secondly school. Consequently, more courses were introduced at high school such as 
Chinese culture, military education, natural and social science. Indeed, culture content 
may be influenced by social changes but it could be impacted by the national security 
more possible than by other factors. For Taiwan, the threat from PRC military force is 
extremely obvious; government regimes, therefore, have to pay more attention to risk 
management task and citizens may take responsibility for national security as well. Such 
a social circumstance may create a unique sensitive culture such as vigilance and 
surveillance of potential threats or risks. Schools at that time, consequently, not only 
were responsible for the education task but also may have to assist the government with 
the national policy on risk management by teaching military education course, which 
can explain why military officers serve on campus in Taiwan. Those staff not only 
provides basic military education and national security concept to students but also have 
to monitor and deal with the campus security events. 
Obviously, in order to reduce loss of property and to prevent the potential threats 
coming from disasters, governments may develop emergency plans in advance to 
alleviate the damage, for example, in the USA, the Environment Protection Agency 
(EPA) was established to support local and state regional government to compare and 
control potential environmental risks (Morgan et al 2000: 49). Sometimes comparing 
similar disasters or events that have happened in other countries may be seen as a useful 
strategy. For example, the Northridge earthquake occurred in California on January 17
th
, 
1994, causing over 60 deaths, more than 5,000 injuries, and over 25,000 people left 
homeless; the direct economic losses were estimated at about $25 billion (FEMA 2010). 
Conjecturing that such a huge disaster may happen in Taiwan as well, Taiwan‘s 
government convened all the relevant departments which handle potential risk events to 
make a draft plan for preventing damage caused by natural disasters, called the ―Natural 
Disaster Prevention and Protection Scheme‖.  
On April 26
th
 in the same year, a CI 140 China Airlines plane crashed at Nagoya Airport, 
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Japan. The Japanese government deployed a standard procedure to manage and deal 
with this man-made emergency. The government was seen to demonstrate an effective 
response in its handling of the event. Referencing the crisis management experience 
from the Nagoya crash, the Taiwanese scheme has been modified again to be more 
complete and its name changed to the ―Disaster Prevention and Protection Scheme‖. 
Although such schemes for protecting people and preventing disasters have been 
implemented, natural disasters continue to cause serious harm to society, such as the 
typhoon ‗Herb‘ in 1996, the typhoon ‗Winnie‘, the collapse of the Lincoln Building in 
1997, and the CI 676 China Airlines crash at the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport 
in 1998 (Cheng-Hsin 2003: 51). 
Moreover, in Taiwan itself, the largest earthquake that has caused the most serious 
damage on record, as noted above, was the Chi-Chi earthquake in 1999. According to 
the report from the National Fire Agency in Taiwan, the earthquake caused 2,415 deaths, 
with an additional 29 missing and 11,305 injured; also, 51,711 houses collapsed and 
53,768 houses were damaged, including many classrooms and buildings at schools 
(National Fire Agency, Ministry of The Interior, 2000). Fortunately, there were no 
students at school at the time because the earthquake happened during the night. After 
this major event, on July 19
th
 2000, a proposed law for controlling emergency disasters 
was discussed by the Legislative Department and published as an official document, 
which provided a formal standard for managing disasters, called the ―Disaster 
Prevention and Protection Act‖ (Laws & Regulations Database of the R.O.C 2010).  
According to the ―Disaster Prevention and Protection Act‖, each governmental 
department should make plans for the prevention and management of disasters. As a 
result, the Campus Security Report Centre (CSRC) was established by the Ministry of 
Education R.O.C. The responsibility of the centre is to integrate information about 
disasters, supply the resources and manage emergency events which happen at schools 
(CSRC 2010). In order to handle the various and unpredictable events across multiple 
schools, the CSRC developed a management system in July, 2001, called the ―Campus 
Security Report System‖ (CSRS). It supports the managers at the CSRC to manage all 
the campus emergency events that are reported by local system operators at schools. 
4.3 The structure of management at the CSRS 
There are a number of good reasons to choose the CSRS as the subject of my case study. 
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Florig et al (2001:915) point out that there are some advantages to studying risks within 
the school setting. Firstly, most people know and care about risks in school: risk culture 
is school reflect the heightened sensitively dealing with minors as a ―vulnerable‖ social 
group. Secondly, a wide range of risks are involved in school security events, such as 
physical, chemical, biological, and social risks. Third, risks are typically sorted into a 
manageably small number of categories, such as asbestos related, infectious diseases 
and school bus accidents. Finally, in light of the above, risk events may be recorded 
promptly and effectively. In this section, I introduce the management structure and the 
operational functions of the CSRS. 
4.3.1 The structure of the CSRS 
The establishment of the CSRS was based on the ―Disaster Prevention and Protection 
Act‖. According to the Act, the Central Disaster Response Centre (CDRC) was 
established as the command centre which controls and manages every disaster at the 
national level (see Figure 4.3.1 which shows in bold the lines of co-ordination across the 
different levels of the system). The responsibility of the CSRC is to monitor and report 
any emergency events within the educational system. The major function of the CSRS is 
to handle each security event on campus, including both man-made and natural disasters, 
around the country immediately, from primary schools to universities. It provides a 
platform to monitor unpredictable accidents and uncontrollable disease events for the 
government (CSRC 2003).  
A second management level is provided by local government located at the middle of 
the command structure. There are Departments of Education at twenty-three cities or 
counties, two municipality cities (Taipei and Kaohsiung), and the Centre Regional 
Office, which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Schools themselves 
are the third tier of the system. There are 636 secondary schools and 2,403 primary 
schools governed by the twenty-three cities and counties, 155 universities or colleges 
governed by the CSRC directly, 469 schools (includes high school, secondly school and 
primary school) managed by Taipei and Kaohsiung cities, and 373 high schools and 
vocational high schools governed by the twenty-two local cities or counties 
management centres. 
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4.3.2 The management and operational model of the CSRS 
As methodology chapter described, the CSRS was devised as a result of a directive from 
the Ministry of Education. According to the directive, each school, including private and 
public schools, ought to establish a central place for school managers to control and deal 
with campus security events. If any event injures students or staff, or damages facilities 
at a campus, a school‘s manager should report the details of the event to the CSRC 
through the IT network. 
In Taiwan, each school has an individual account number and confidential code 
provided by the CSRC as an authorization for school managers to login to the CSRS 
(See Figure 4.3.2). Users will find some multi-functions after logging on to the CSRS 
web-page. Firstly, the school managers not only report the campus security events 
through the system but also may download some standard procedures or acts in regard 
to the emergency event or disaster prevention. Secondly, the web page may show some 
breaking news or information for users, which provides timely information for 
cities/counties or school managers. If an emergency event or natural disaster causes a 
threat to local schools, for example, the CSRC may give direction or guidance to school 
 
Source: Campus Security Report Centre (2009) http://140.111.1.166/csrc/ 
Figure 4.3.1 The structure of Campus Security Report System 
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risk managers through the system immediately. Third, the system also provides a 
practice and training page for users who might have never used or operated the system 
before to understand the correct procedures and regulations before they use this system. 
Finally, the annual reports about campus security events prepared by the CSRC provide 
a basic analysis of the events, some recommendations and suggestions on how to 
prevent the events and the policies that management within schools, local cities/counties 
managers should adopt. I will discuss these reports towards the end of this Chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In reporting a particular incident, after logging in to the system, school managers are 
required to provide some details about the event. The system will automatically show 
the reporting time, school name and location, which have already been set up in the 
system, and gives a sequence number at the top of the form. Then the person who makes 
the report should sign in his/her name and contact telephone number for the CSRC 
manager to collect the information rapidly. After that, some basic information of the 
event, including the event category, happening and reporting time, the current location 
of the client, the number of people involved, and the location of event, should be filed to 
complete the report.  
At the same time the reporter should provide some details of the person(s) involved, 
such as their gender, name, age, identity, severity scores, department and current 
location. However, if an event relates to damage/loss of the facility/property, the 
 
 
Source: CSRC (2010) http://csrc.edu.tw/ 
Figure 4.3.2 The Campus Security Report System web-page 1 
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reporter will be asked to describe the situation and the quantity of damaged property, 
and to estimate the amount of money lost in this event. Following this is the summary of 
the event which shows the causes and processes of event. The description of the event 
gives the outline in sequence of chronological order, which shows a clear correlation of 
the event, and some review and suggestions for improvement in managing the 
risk may be provided in this part for future reference. Finally, the reporting information 
is printed out in the campus security form and sent to the head of unit and the Principal 
at the school when the reporting procedure is finished. It may also be sent to the director 
of the CSRC at the Ministry of Education at the same time if the event has caused 
serious injury to the student/staff or damage to the property/facility on/off campus (See 
Figure 4.3.3). 
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Reporting time:11:40:10 19/05/2010 Event S/N: 25XXX1 City: Taichung City  
Name of School: University of  OOO Reporter: Peter Huang Contact Tel: 04-2237XXX0 
Campus Security Event Report form  
Main Category  Sub Category  
Sub 
sub-category 
Level  
Number 
of Deaths  
Number 
Injured 
Number  
hospitalised  
Other  
Accident  Traffic Event  
Off-campus 
Traffic event   
C 0 1 0 0 
Time of the 
event  
Time of 
gett ing report  
Event Location  
Any other schools 
involved 
10:00:00 
18/05/2010 
21:30:00 
18/05/2010 
Sti ll checking No 
Information of  the Client  
Ge nd er  Na me  
Se ver it y 
sco r es  
I de nt it y  
S t a t us  
o f 
s t ude nt  
Ca t ego r y o f 
sc ho o l  
Age  Dep ar t me nt  
Cur r e nt  
Lo ca t io n  
D id  it  
happ e n t o  
h im/ her  
be fo r e  
No t e 
Ma le  OOO  
Ser io u s  
I n ju r y  
S t udent  ge ner a l  U n iver s it y  21  So c io lo g y  Ho sp it a l  No   
Loss of  property  
Severi ty 
scores  
Name of 
property 
Property  Unit  Quanti ty 
The amount 
of money 
Insurance 
Semi-  
destroyed  
Motorcycle  Vehicle  Cars 1 10,000 no 
Summary of Event：  
 At 10:00:00 AM 18/05/2010, Student XXX at  XXX school had an off -campus 
traffic accident .  
The causes and processes 
of the event  
 
(Outlined in chronological 
order) 
 1 .  At 21： 20, a tutor XXX reported that  a second -grade student  XXX at  the  
XXX Department is at  the ICU in the ci ty hospital now.  
2.  At 21：22, The duty personnel cal led the ci ty hospital to determine the latest  
si tuation of the student ,  but  the hospital refused to answer  this inquiry to 
protect  the patient‘s privacy because they  could not  confirm the identity of the 
person who was calling via telephone.  
3At 21： 25, the duty personnel reported the event  to the director of CSRC 
(Universi ty),  the department supervisor and tutor of the student .  The 
director instructed the duty personnel to visi t  the student  and his families in the 
hospital and to help with the  leave procedure and the applicat ion of student  
insurance.  
4.  At 22： 20, the duty personnel and the student‘s tutor visi ted the student  in 
hospital and understood the student‘s inj ury si tuation and the causes of the 
accident .  According to the student‘s parents,  the student  hi t  a  t raffic island 
for dodging the coming car on his way to deliver goods.  He got  bruises and 
contusion on the legs and upper body, lacerat ion on the chin,  and 
intracranial hemorrhage and concussion.  The student st i ll got  clear  
consciousness but  had to stay in the hospital for the observation of the need 
of surgical operat ion.  
5.  At 22：30, the duty personnel reported the condit ion to the director of CSRC 
(Universi ty),  and provided the student‘s parents some detai ls about how to 
apply for student  insurance and emergency assistance.  
6.At 23： 30, the duty personnel returned to office for his duty and informed 
related departments on this event .  
Treat  si tuation：  
 
 
Review and improving 
suggestion：  
1 .  This accident  was caused by speeding while driving.  
2.  Arrange a course in traffic safety t raining to improve awareness of traffic 
securi ty and safety education for students and staff.  
3 .  Provide safe-driving courses  for students who ride motorcycles.  
Contractors  Head of Unit  Principal  
 
 
  
The suggestion of the 
Ministry of Education  
Countersigned  View by the educational department  
Records for future reference  
   XXX 
  
 
 
Source: Campus Security Report System http://csrc.edu.tw/ 
Figure 4.3.3 Sample of the campus security event report form  
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Thus, through this system, every event happening at schools around the country is not 
only handled by school managers but also reported to and monitored by the local 
government and the CSRC at national level. And the recorded data are lodged in the 
management system at schools, in the CSRC and in the Department of Education (local 
government) which governs the schools in the city or county (see Figure 4.3.4). Those 
managers in the same hierarchical system can also share the information about an event 
at the same time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 The category and level of the CSRS 
The CSRS provides a communication channel among local schools, local educational 
governing departments and the CSRC at government level, which helps transfer the 
particular emergency event information from a scene in the local area to central 
government. However, the reported content of events may vary when provided by 
persons who make it without reference to standard operating procedures or categories. 
Because the scope, level and personal or social attitude to risks were seen to depend on 
people‘s viewpoints and understandings of what might be regarded as acceptable risk 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 81), the CSRC has developed a reference standard for 
managers to reduce the variations in report content. Here I go on to explain this 
 
Source: CSRC (2009) http://140.111.1.166/csrc/ 
Figure 4.3.4 The campus security event report web-page 2 
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standardizing process and discuss the categories of risk reporting that it has generated. 
4.4.1 The category of the campus security event 
Bearing the above in mind, managers are the key persons responsible for reporting the 
event at each school, because their statement covers the main features of the event. 
Therefore, the content of the report made by the manager is quite crucial. The more 
clearly a reporter describes the events, the more accurately a local or centre manager 
can monitor them. Since the concept of risk varies from person to person, there is no 
value-free way to classify risky phenomena when people manage risks (Morganger et al 
2000: 52). Moreover, the reporter could not judge the event from their personal points 
of view because any judgment may cause confusion for a system manager when they 
evaluate the influence of the event.  
In order to enhance the efficiency of reporting, the CSRS has devised the reporting 
content according to some key, standardised items: client, problem, time, location and 
the category of the event. When system managers at the CSRC receive the campus 
security event report from local school managers, they may give some feedback or notes 
on dealing with the event. However, how local managers decide what kind of events 
they should report to the CSRC, how reporters distinguish the levels of event and what 
kinds of the regulations may help managers to operate the system are clearly not 
straightforward matters. Indeed, a systematic way to compare and rank such risk 
reporting by operators is unfeasible; therefore, the risk management agencies have taken 
on the responsibility to classify the thousands of specific risk events (ibid 49). Florig et 
al (2001: 915) point out that categories for school risks might be based on the agent 
responsible for the harm, the activity that produces the hazard, the location, the pathway, 
the reason for the risk, the group at risk, the respondent for creating the risk, or the 
entity who is responsible for managing the risk. In light of these considerations, Florig 
created twenty-two categories for school risk ranking.  
In a similar fashion, according to the CSRC (2001), any events which may affect the 
management or government of the administration work or threaten students‘ safety 
on/off campus are regarded as campus ‗security‘ events. Those events were classified 
into five main categories and forty sub-categories in the CSRS from 2000 to 2003 (see 
Table 4.4.1). The main categories included the ‗accident‘ event, ‗security related‘ event, 
‗violence and deviant behavior‘, ‗counseling conflict‘ event and ‗illegal‘ events 
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involving children and teenagers. Each item also involved various sub-categories. 
Firstly, the accident events included traffic accident on/off campus, drowning, poisoning, 
injury received during laboratory or practical training, disease, suicide or a self-harm 
event, mountain accidents, damage caused by strong wind, earthquake and others. 
Secondly, the security-related events comprised fire on campus, a campus security event, 
harassment or theft and disputes event within rented accommodation. Third, violence 
and deviant behavior events referred to fighting, murder, robbery, kidnapping, threat, 
trespass, sexual harassment and acts against the ―Drugs Prevention and Cure Law‖ etc. 
Counseling related events, included incidents of conflict between students and teachers, 
parents and teacher/staff, and staff and staff, punishment or abuse events, student protest 
and other related events. Finally, illegal events involved incidents of running away from 
home (for more than three days) and abuse, and other illegal events against children‘s 
welfare legislation. It is worth noting that the ‗client‘ who is involved in this last 
category is less than eighteen years old. 
Table 4.4.1 The main and sub-categories list in the CSRS from 2000 to 2003 
Main - 
categories 
I. Accident 
Event 
II. Security- 
related Event 
III. Violence & Deviant  
Behavior 
IV. Counseling 
Conflict Event 
V. Illegal Event 
involving 
Children & 
Teenagers (Under 
18) 
Sub 
categories  
1.Traffic accident in 
and out of the 
campus 
2. Drowning event 
3 Poisoning 
4. Injury received 
during laboratory or 
practical training 
5. Disease 
6. A suicide or 
self-harm event 
7. Mountain 
accident 
8..Strong wind 
9. Earthquake 
10. Other  
1. A fire on 
campus 
2. A campus 
security event 
3.A 
harassment 
event on 
campus  
4. A theft on 
campus 
5 A dispute 
event within a 
rented house 
1. Fighting  
2. Murder 
2. Involved in a robbery 
3. Involved in kidnapping 
4. Threat against the person 
5. Trespass 
6. Sexual harassment 
7. Illegal possession of firearms  
8. Against the drugs prevention 
and cure law 
9. Fighting event 
10. Hindering freedom 
11.Involved in disturbing social 
order 
12. Involved in theft 
13. Sexual assault or obscene 
behaviour. 
14. Involved in gambling event 
15. A swindle event 
16. Extortion 
17. Other 
1. A conflict event 
between student 
and teacher. 
2. A punishment 
or abuse event. 
3. A protest event 
from student. 
4. A conflict event 
between parent 
and teacher 
(staff). 
5. A conflict event 
between staff and 
staff. 
6. The other 
related conflict 
event. 
1. Run away from 
home (more than 
three days) 
2. An abuse event 
3. Other illegal 
event 
4. Against the 
child welfare law 
However, after being used for several years, the categories in the CSRS were found not 
complete enough to cover all the events occurring on campus and needed to be modified. 
Therefore, a modified classification was established in 2004 (see Table 4.4.2). Two main 
categories and forty-seven sub-categories were added to the original classification. The 
first new main category was ―natural disaster‖, which through existing from the start 
was separated out from the category of ‗accident event‘ to cover multiple disaster events, 
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including windstorm disaster, flood, landslip and mudflows and the presence of 
Solenopsis invicta Buren (a particularly aggressive and dangerous red ant). The second 
new category was ―other‖, which provided a flexible open-text space for operators, 
involving most conflict events between staff and students, and some administrative 
problem. Morgan et al. suggest that ―agencies or organizations conducting risk-ranking 
projects would be well-advised to develop several alternative categorizations‖. They 
believe the availability of several alternative categorizations may encourage the operator 
to adopt a broad systematic thinking concerning what is important about the risks and 
how they should be categorized and ranked (Morgan et al 2000: 57). 
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Table 4.4.2 The Modification of the Sub-categories in the CSRS from 2003 to 2008 
 
 
Accident event Security related event 
Violence & Deviant 
Behaviour 
Counseling Conflict 
Event 
Illegal Event involving Children 
&  
Teenagers (Under 18) 
Natural Disasters 
(2004) 
Other 
(2004) 
Diseases 
(2005) 
(2004) 
․ Poisoning.  
․ Injured from 
re-establishment. 
․ Injured by building 
collapse.  
․ Injured from part-time 
work place. 
(2005) 
․ Chemical material in 
laboratory causing 
poisoning. 
(2007) 
․ Suicide with child. 
․ Student suicide or 
self-harm. 
․ Staff suicide or 
self-harm. 
(2004) 
․A fire outside of campus. 
․Facilities destroyed by 
someone on campus. 
․An explosion on the campus.  
․A dispute event from 
bargains.  
․People from outside to pose 
risk to teachers and students.  
․Campus facilities or 
equipment lost through theft.  
․The property loss by theft.  
․Swindling 
․Injury 
․Robbery  
․A threaten and extort event.  
․Suspect be kidnap. 
․The other violent event.  
․Sexual assault or obscene 
behaviour (over 18). 
․Sexual harassment (over 18).  
․Other campus 
security-related event. 
 (2005) 
․ A dispute event from 
internet. 
․ A hacker to invade the 
school network system. 
․Staff swindle by the network.  
(2004) 
․ Illegal car racing.  
․ Suspect involved in sex 
business.  
․ Suspect involved to 
arson and to destroy.  
․A faction to intervene the 
campus.  
․ Run-away from home 
and did not go to school 
(under senior high 
school).  
(2005) 
․Student disorder during a 
ceremonial event.  
․ Student harassing 
teaching. 
․ Group of students 
cheating. 
․ An internet-based 
swindle 
․ Hacking  
․Suspect involved to 
hinder families. 
(2004) 
․A resist event from 
student.  
(2004) 
․ Student to drift.  
․ Student in to the illegitimate 
place.  
․ The other children and 
teenager protect case.  
․ Adult to compel children or 
teenager to marry.  
․ Illegal to utilize children or 
teenager. 
․ Kidnap or sell children or 
teenager.  
․ To force children or teenager 
by sexual assault or indecent 
attitude.  
․ To use harmful drug or illegal 
medical for children and 
teenager. 
․ Children and teenager suspect 
involved the sex business.  
․ The other against Child and 
Youth Sexual Transaction 
Prevention Act. 
․ Sexual assault or obscene 
(under 18) (2004) 
․ Sex harassment (under 18). 
(2005) 
․ To take or provide noxious 
tapes or books for children 
and teenager.  
․ Sexual assault causes 
pregnancy (under 18).  
․ High risk family.   
(2004) 
․Windstorm disaster 
․Flood 
․Landslip and 
mudflows 
․ Solenopsis ivicta 
Buren 
(2005) 
․Eearthquake 
․To be struck by 
lightning. 
․The other disaster. 
(2004) 
․ A conflict even 
between staff and 
staff. 
․ A problem of 
personnel matters. 
․ A problem of 
general. 
administration 
․ The other 
problem. 
․ A problem of 
educational 
administration. 
(2005) 
․A problem of 
administration.  
(2005) 
․ A generally disease 
event 
․ Statutory disease 
(Swinepox) 
․ The other statutory 
disease 
․ Statutory disease 
(Scarlet fever) 
․ Statutory disease 
(Dengue fever) 
․ Statutory disease 
(Tuberculosis) 
․Statutory disease 
(Enterovirus) 
(2007) 
․ Statutory disease  
(Pertussis)  
․ Statutory disease  
(SARS)  
․ A generally disease 
event ( Ophthalmia)  
(2008) 
․ Statutory disease 
(Swine flu cause severe 
illness). 
․ Statutory disease (flu 
cause severe illness). 
․ A generally disease 
(flu). 
․ A generally disease 
(H1N1). 
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Some other minor changes were made in 2005. One main category and twenty-four 
sub-categories were added into the classification. ‗Disease‘ was separated from the 
accident-related category and extended the scope of disease risk to include general and 
some statutory diseases such as Swinepox, Scarlet fever, Dengue fever, Tuberculosis 
and Enterovirus. Also, some sub-categories were added into other main categories. For 
instance, the poisoning event caused by chemical material in the laboratory was one of 
sub-category of the accident event, and some dispute events were relocated into the 
security-related category, such as online trading risks and incidents of computer 
hacking. 
Elsewhere, some events regarding to student conduct have entered the violence and 
deviant behaviour category, including harassment caused by students in a ‗ceremony‘ or 
in class, cheating by groups of students, swindling or hacking events through the 
internet and other suspicious activity. Furthermore, some new types of event have 
appeared in the ‗illegal‘ category which involve children and teenagers, such as, giving 
or providing noxious tapes or books for children and teenagers, pregnancy caused by 
sexual assault and the ‗high risk family‘, which may imperil children because of their 
parent‘s mental or physical problems. Finally, three disaster items were added into the 
natural disasters category, such as earthquakes and lightning strikes. After the 
modification of the classification in the CSRS, the event list was regarded as containing 
most of the likely forms of risk that need to be addressed by campus security staff. 
There were eight main categories and one hundred and nineteen sub-categories on the 
CSRS list in 2008 (See Appendix VIII). 
However, yet another more recent modification of the CSRS was implemented in 
February 2010, which combined similar items together and redefined the application of 
some existing sub-categories with actual behaviour. The biggest modification was that 
each main category was not only broken-down into sub-categories but also the latter 
were given more detailed description. Therefore, the function of sub-sub-categories is to 
provide more clear classification and guidance for operators. Morgan et al (2000: 54) 
note that ―creating lists of the subcategories, and even sub-sub-categories, can be 
helpful in assuring that inclusion and exactness criteria are satisfied‖. The eight main 
categories of events then were broken down into more subcategories, arriving at one 
hundred and twenty-one items (See Appendix IX), which, given what we have seen so 
far, may be modified by the CSRC when it is seen to be needed in the future. 
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What we see then is a highly complex risk-reporting system that has grown with time, 
sought to standardize and refine the range of categories it covers, and done so in such a 
way as to apparently limit the interpretative work that the reporting manager is asked to 
do. Moreover, the risks reflect changing social concerns in Taiwan at a national level, 
notably anxiety over new forms of disease and the impact of new technologies, such as 
hacking on the internet; so, as Beck argues, technologies provide some function for risk 
management, but they also may be the source of new risks. In addition, the actual 
technical functionality of the system has been expanded and interpreted across the 
different reporting levels.  
As the system has developed, the redefinition of risk events, for example, the relocation 
of online risks from the ―dispute‖ to the ―security‖ category reveals not only a 
―tidying-up‖ process but also a changing cultural judgment about risk-events and the 
sort of responses they require, and the categories within which they fall. Moreover, 
increasing the levels of severity also reflects forms of cultural judgment, which as 
Douglas would argues, reflect levels of risk in a form of ‗solidarity‘ which, as I argued 
in Chapter 2, appears to be strongly hierarchical. Indeed, the conceptual logic and 
architecture of the system is itself ordered in hierarchical terms, the organization having 
to create its own culture in conformity with external circumstances and pressures. Such 
phenomena may also explain why the CSRC has to control and to monitor a large 
number of events which contain both man-made and natural disasters. The modification 
of regulations and categories were made to improve the system function, suggesting 
some flexibility of system. It may be interesting to understand the actual causes of these 
modifications. I will try to explore such phenomena in later chapters. I now go on to 
discuss how this ordering is reflected in the various degrees of ‗severity‘ that define the 
relative threat posed by specific types of risk in the schools/colleges.  
4.4.2 The diversity of campus security events 
The previous section discussed the eight main categories of the campus security events 
and described the sub-categories which are subdivided from the main categories. This 
section tries to explain the different degrees of severity associated with events, graded in 
particular in terms of the level of injury to student or staff and the loss of property to the 
campus facility. Such events not only caused harm to people but also created damage to 
campus facilities. Therefore, they were classified into personal risk and property risk.  
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According to the CSRC (2003), the system for reporting security events is divided into 
three degrees of severity: A, B and C (see Table 4.4.3). The first degree is ―A‖ level, 
which relates to three factors. The three criteria are as follows: does the event cause 
death or is it concerned with death; does it refer to a property loss of over NT 
$1,000,000; finally, does the event prompt significant media interest and would its 
handling need some support or intervention from government. If any A-level event 
happens according to one or more of these criteria, the school managers are required to 
contact the CSRC by telephone within fifteen minutes. After collecting more detail 
about such an event, the school manager ought to report the latest information and 
complete the operational procedures within two hours. If there is any trouble with the 
internet reporting system, the procedure may be replaced by use of a fax. After the 
functioning of the internet is restored the manager should repeat the procedure again 
through the system itself. 
The second level of an event is classified as having a ―B‖ level degree of seriousness. 
The actual events categorised at this level may be similar to those allocated an ―A‖ level 
grading. The standard point also focuses on three factors but the seriousness is slighter 
than the level above. Any event classified at this level may cause heavy injury for the 
victim or make a property loss of a facility of between over NT $100,000 and under NT 
$1,000,000. In addition, anything not categorized into A level and that cannot be 
handled immediately may be grouped into this level. If a B-level event happens, the 
school managers should report to the CSRC within twelve hours. The alternative 
measure is the same as that of the ―A‖ level. 
Finally, the lowest degree is ―C‖ level. Any event causing slight injury for a student or 
staff or leading to a property loss under NT $100,000 dollars is categorised as C level 
and has to be reported to the CSRC within fourteen days. Obviously, most of the C-level 
events just cause minor injury for students or staff and are likely to involve only a slight 
loss of property on a campus. Such results may cause some school managers to ignore 
the events‘ growth rate at this level; however, the C-level events may still generate 
enormous personal problems to students and staff on campuses. 
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Table 4.4.3 The diversity of the campus security events list 
 
 
Multiple and numerous campus security events have been recorded in the CSRS by the 
staff at schools with the help of such regulations and operational guidelines. In addition 
to demonstrating the actual operation of the system, some illustrative examples are 
presented as follows, drawn from cases of laboratory accidents and poisoning, which 
show the details of the governance process in practice. The cases were selected from the 
CSRS system and translated into English directly from the original contents to provide 
more clear sketches. According to research ethics provisions, all the names relating to 
clients or schools have been deleted and been replaced by OOO or XXX. 
Accident category; Sub-category: Laboratory accident  
Case A: a B-level event in a university laboratory 
1. At 10:30 AM on 11 June 2004, the health centre received a report that a first-grade 
student OOO at the department of Mechanical Engineering scalded her face due to an 
exploration caused by the process of heat treatment. 
2. A school nurse arrived at the laboratory to help with the emergency treatment 
immediately and called 119 to help transport the student to OOO hospital. The duty 
personnel arrived at the hospital to provide follow-up assistance. According to the 
doctor, there is a third-degree scald on the student‘s face, and the accident also 
caused the ablepsia on her right eye. Now she is still under treatment. 
Case B: a B-level event in a secondly school chemistry laboratory 
1. At 16:15 PM on 25 June 2004, a science teacher made sodium hydroxide solution for 
students at a laboratory. Student OOO put down the sodium hydroxide solution on 
the table so hard that the mixtures spilled out and scalded one of his eyes. 
Condition 
 
Level 
Harm to the person Loss of Property Time to report Note 
A 
The event causes a 
victim‘s death or is life- 
threatening. 
The property loss is over 
NT 1,000,000. 
Report within 15 
minutes with telephone 
or fax and within 2 hours 
online. 
The event needs help 
from government or 
other agency and may 
cause media or societal 
concern 
B 
The event causes the 
victim serious injury. 
The property loss is 
between NT 100,000 and 
under NT 1,000,000. 
Report within 12 hours 
online or with telephone 
or fax.  
Other event not reaching  
A level and cannot be 
handled immediately 
C 
The event causes the 
victim slight injury or ill 
health. 
The property loss is 
under NT 100,000. 
Report within 14 days.  
Source: CSRC (2009) http://csrc.edu.tw/Main.mvc/IndexTemp 
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2. Teacher OOO cleaned the student‘s face with clean water immediately and asked the 
health centre to call 119. The student was delivered to the OOO hospital at 16:25 PM, 
accompanied by a school nurse, and his parents were notified at the same time. 
3. Because of the serious injury, the student was referred to XXX hospital. 
Case C: a B-level event in a high school‘s cooperative education factory 
1. On 12 January 2008, a second grade student OOO who studies at the Automotive 
Repair Division fractured his left arm with a lathe by accident while he was moving 
goods at the cooperative education factory. 
2. The student was sent to the XXX hospital immediately for an operation; and he is 
hospitalized now. 
Case D: a C-level event in a university chemistry laboratory 
At 15:30 on 23 July 2008, teacher OOO‘s upper lip was injured and two of his incisors 
were broken in a gas explosion when doing physics teaching research with teacher XXX 
in the laboratory. He was sent to XXX hospital for treatment. According to the doctor, 
the client‘s situation is stable and an operation for dental implants is in progress now. 
Accident category; sub-category: Poisoning  
Case E: a B-level event - a university student group poisoned during a trip 
1. Fifty-two third-grade students at the medical department traveled to the OO national 
Park and XX amusement park on the 8th and the 9th January 2003. 
2. The students had breakfast at the XX amusement park and lunch at the AA restaurant 
in the OO national park. 
3. Students felt uncomfortable one after another on 9 January evening, and the number 
reached twenty by 06:00 PM on 10 January. Eleven of them went to see doctors by 
themselves and went back to school/home. 
4. The district health centre received a report of this event from OOO clinic and 
undertook a collection of specimens. 
Case F: an A-level event of a group poisoning in a normal practical training class at a 
high school  
1. At 12:30PM on 16 June 2008, second-year student OOO vomited and had a stomach 
ache after the home economics class. Another seven students had similar symptoms 
around 13:00. 
2. The school health center took charge of the event and asked for an ambulance to send 
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the students to hospital. 
Case G: an A-level event involving group poisoning in a class at a secondary school  
On 16 June 2008, a grade one class had a comprehension class for the first and second 
classes. Students were separated into four groups, making popcorn with coal, branches, 
leaves and newspaper. Those cooking materials were bought from A, B, C, D and E 
supermarkets and were manufactured by X, Y and Z factories. Students ate the popcorn 
they made accompanied by coke and some soft drinks. Some students felt dizzy, had 
stomach ache, were sick and had cold sweats one after another around 11:15. After 
being sent to the hospital and being treated, the students were in a stable condition and 
recovering. 
These narratives give a brief snapshot of real reports that were logged on to the system, 
illustrative of the different degrees of risk as seen by the managers according to 
perceived degrees of seriousness. At a more general level, what I have described so far 
is a national system that is designed to capture/report and require local or wider action 
through a variety of different actors located within the system. The system is one that 
has been refined over time in response to changing circumstances. I now go on to 
explore at a finer level of detail what actual events have been lodged on the system over 
time, and how the risk management centre (CSRC) provided reviews and 
recommendations of risk-related incidents within the system to schools/universities in 
Taiwan. 
4.5 The Annual Report of the CSRS 
The multiple security events that have happened at campuses around the country 
demonstrate some diverse risk patterns, with differing attributions of seriousness. The 
recorded data may be regarded as information on the basic trends or causes of events for 
the staff and managers, to enable them to avoid potential future risk-laden events. It is 
not therefore surprising that the CSRC has provided some recommendations and 
reviews to schools, city managers and the governmental managers by publishing ―the 
annual statistics and analysis report of the campus security events‖ which can be found 
on the CSRC web-page. In this section, the discussion focuses on annual reports which 
were published over five years, between 2004 and 2008. What I want to do is to treat 
these reports in terms of the common themes and issues they include rather than 
covering them on a year-by-year basis.  
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In this first part of the exploration of annual reports I will focus on the school level. 
Generally speaking, most of the reviews and recommendations provide a rough sketch 
of risks to schools and local city/county managers. Those suggestions highlight some 
common events and general problems for all levels of schools. For example, some cases 
with a high-proportion or frequency of events, including injury from sport or hobbies, 
disease, or a punishment or abuse event, are more prevalent among students at primary 
school level (CSRC 2004, 2005). Therefore, the suggestions made to primary schools 
demand that every school examine the campus facility safety process in order to reduce 
tangible threats or to improve the campus order to reduce some possible or invisible 
harm to children in their leisure time and alleviate some potential threats on campus. 
Consequently, suggestions include requests to schools to enhance the communication 
with parents to avoid children going to school with an illness as the disease risk has the 
highest rate at primary school. This may prevent the interactive transmission of the 
disease on campus but such conversations depend on the relationship between rights and 
obligations between parents and school. Furthermore, the review not only suggests a 
discourse between school staff and students‘ parents but has also advised schools about 
improving teacher‘s ‗emotional intelligence‘ management, which may be an effective 
way to reduce the extent of ‗counseling conflict‘ events. It may be found that most of 
the reviews relating to primary schools focused on the dialogue between school 
managers and teachers, which showed that students play passive roles in the process of 
dealing with such events because of a perceived incapacity they have in regard to 
self-management. 
Compared with primary schools, there are more comments about secondary schools in 
the reports, reflecting the greater diversity of events occurring at this level of school. 
Broadly speaking, secondary schools have a similar percentage in both ‗the injury from 
sport or hobby‘ and ‗disease‘ events with primary schools; the various events causing 
harm to students, including traffic accident, fighting, intimidation, counseling conflict 
event between teacher and student, are regarded as being subject to the internal 
regulation and discipline management on the campus itself. However, two special 
events were notable in relation to national laws: events about ‗suspected behaviour 
against the drug prevention and cure law‘, and ‗illegal event involving children and 
teenagers under eighteen‘ (CSRC 2004, 2005), both events are not only managed at the 
school but also governed by the educational regimes at the governmental level. Such 
events showed that students have changed the roles they play in the framing of risk from 
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being passive to active and from victims to perpetrators. Therefore, the review suggests 
the educators at secondary schools have to pay more attention to educating students in 
self-defense and developing the students‘ safety awareness. For instance, the fact that 
‗traffic accident‘ got the highest percentage showed the schools should improve traffic 
safety training and education. Also, the enhancement of self-defense education not only 
provides information on self-property protection and management but also promotes 
awareness of the ―Preventing Adolescent Drug Abuse Act‖ and ―Regulation of Child 
and Adolescent Welfare Act‖. Moreover, in order to reduce the students‘ pecceived 
deviant behaviour, schools may try to segregate students to avoid the possibility of 
imitated behaviours. However, while this is seen as a way of alleviating the imitated 
behaviour between student and their peer group, also adult behaviour from the local 
community has gradually affected the school circumstance. This means managers not 
only have to prevent some potential deviant behaviour on campus but also need to 
monitor what are seen as invisible threats surrounding the school.  
Not surprisingly, the more activities a student takes part in, the more events may arise 
on campus, which can be easily shown in high schools. According to the CSRC annual 
reports (2004, 2005, 2007, 2008), many of the most frequently occurring events which 
happened in high schools were similar to those founds in the secondary school such as 
accident and violence and deviant behaviour events. However, the diversity of events 
are much greater compared with those at the secondary school. For example, most of the 
traffic events were caused by motorcycle accidents at high school level because some 
students use motorcycles as the transportation to school. In addition, injury from sport 
or hobbies may be caused by the fact of more multiple activities at more senior schools. 
Furthermore, some events relating to personal deviant behaviour found in high schools 
also have increased significantly if compared with those in secondary school, such as 
fighting, threatening behaviour, swindling or other violence-related events, which were 
often seen to be caused by impulsive behaviour among teenagers. Furthermore, it is 
important to notice that both ‗the gang violence event on campus‘ and ‗running away 
from home event‘ increased remarkably over the five years. Generally speaking, ‗the 
gang violence event‘ may be influenced by some predictable factors such as peer group 
pressure or imitation of adult behaviour. Whereas, ‗running away from home events‘ 
were sometimes caused by some unpredictable factors such as contact with friends on 
the internet. Consequently, schools are advised to provide not only general knowledge 
94 
 
for students to help them with self-protection but also organize some interpersonal 
relationship courses for them to reduce such events. 
Finally, some high-frequency ‗A‘ events are reported to have caused serious harm to 
students at university, such as ‗traffic accident‘, ‗suicide‘ or ‗self-harm event‘, ‗disputes 
associated with rented accommodation‘ and those linked to financial problems. The 
traffic accident was the highest percentage of event causing injury to students at 
university. Such events occurred outside the campus. According to the statistical 
information, although the total number of students gradually decreased year by year,  
traffic-related events remained in a high proportion and caused serious problem to 
students. This phenomenon shows that such events may be difficult to manage by 
relying on a university‘s own power to prevent the traffic accident because most of the 
events happened in the wider community. Therefore, some strategies which needed to 
be implemented across the educational and wider regulatory regimes have been 
proposed by the CSRC. Those schemes recommended to the university not only suggest 
the need to provide information about the high accident rate locations for student but 
also to connect the city/county police power to restrict dangerous driving. By doing so, 
it may improve the road safety around the campus. However, some events, for example, 
the ‗suicide‘ or ‗self-harm event‘ may be caused because of the student‘s personality or 
influence of interpersonal relationships with partners, peer group stress, and the pressure 
of learning at university. Otherwise, it is worth noticing that many dispute events were 
caused by business actions such as rental disputes due to the lack of experience in 
signing contracts, or lack of understanding about internet scams. The reports argue that 
these events showed that in addition to academic knowledge, university education also 
has an obligation to students to improve their ability in wider forms of social learning. 
The discussion above pointed out some general recommendations according to the 
CSRC annual report reviews, which discuss some main events and so risks 
characteristic of and problems at different levels of school. Such reviews were 
integrated and analysed by the CSRC, at the national level. From Foucault‘s point of 
view, the power of the state lies not only in its control of resources but its discursive 
power. The governmental regimes which govern or manage risky events see this power 
embodied in policy and practice, expressed within powerful documents. The huge 
recorded data in the CSRS may be a good example of this because it is very difficult for 
a school to design or to develop such a system to manage the complex risks associated 
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with campus events. Whether the Annual Reports actually work in this way – as 
important expressions of power shaping behavior expressed as policy implementation - 
will be discussed later in the thesis. In a hierarchical organisational culture these 
documents may play a more symbolic role in confirming and acting as a medium 
through which a bureaucratic structure operates. 
From the rather different perspective of Douglas, schools located in different 
cities/counties may be influenced by local culture or regional characteristics, and local 
culture may generate behaviour which may not be regarded as risk-related. For example, 
a ‗gang violence‘ event on campus may be caused by some people living in local 
community, and may be interpreted narrowly from a governmental manager‘s point of 
view in understanding the actual situation as in need of formal report and control, 
whereas the regional residents may be the most appropriate people who understand the 
dynamic of local culture: local people may ignore such apparent threats, if such 
potential risks are considered as acceptable or as usual for local cultures.  
From Beck‘s point of view, some new events, which accompanied the innovation of 
technology, have appeared and are seen to have caused some visible harms or invisible 
threats to students in this ―risk society‖. On the one hand new technologies improved 
the management function on campus events and integrated a large volume of 
risk-related data through the operation of the CSRS; on the other hand, they themselves 
may be the causes of potential threats. For example, the reason why students run away 
from home may be the influence of their peer group or some new friends they made 
through the internet. It can be predicted that more and more campus security events may 
be caused by the technology with the increasing use of computers and other digital 
devices in the future. Beck would also say that the CSRS itself creates risk events 
through the very categories it has produced and extended over the years through which 
behavior is then labeled as risk-related. The following discussion will move onto the 
recommendations made to managers made in CSRS Annual Reports, which provide 
some possible governance function inasmuch as they are made in order to prevent the 
events on campus. 
Different levels of school may be offered distinct methods to govern the risk events 
which are seen to depend on the ability of managers to cope with risk. Some common 
suggestions for schools and local managers were presented in the annual reports (CSRC 
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2004, 2005, 2006 2007, 2008). Firstly, schools may improve the implementation of 
campus security reporting, which means that all events should be reported as clearly and 
fully as possible. Secondly, schools may build better practice through standardising 
security reporting. Third, schools may improve the emergency event management 
through upgrading their process ability, from the level of dealing with events to the level 
of reducing the disaster and preparedness, to promote the prevention function and to 
reduce some potential events. Fourth, schools may organize some workshops which 
focused on the campus security events to improve the manager‘s ability in handling the 
emergency events and to reduce the event rate through the study of cases that have 
happened in the past. Fifth, schools may establish a support network which connects the 
school and community to integrate the social resources to prevent some potential threats 
around schools. Finally, schools may diagnose the campus security problems and 
develop some recent, middle and long-term objectives and action strategies for 
managers to enhance the campus security. According to these suggestions, it may be 
found that some recommendations related to the operational problems of managing the 
CSRS. Some are suggested to improve the preventative function rather than handling or 
dealing with events. Another of the suggestions is to integrate the CSRS with a wider 
social resource, inasmuch as recommendations not only focused on managing the events 
on campus but also on connecting the educational system with the society. 
In order to promote the cities/counties management ability, the CSRC also proposed 
some recommendations to those managers. Firstly, every city/county may enhance the 
dissemination and publicising of the campus disaster management work. From a 
management point of view, the responsibility of risk management is not only one for a 
single person or department but also for every internal staff member. Secondly, local 
governors may examine the school manager‘s ability in dealing with the contingencies 
found within their region. Third, city/county managers may develop some possible 
preventative strategies to handle the possible emergency events according to the city‘s 
characteristics and staff ability. Fourth, each city/county may integrate the existing 
resources and evaluate the internal organizational abilities in monitoring the emergency 
events; also the government regimes may establish a cooperative relationship across city 
and city. The last suggestion is to link information and practice to police regimes across 
the organizational boundary to educational institutions by suggesting the police ban the 
dangerous driver and enforce a ban on students driving without licenses. Achieving the 
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suggestion above, it is assumed in the Reports that every city may alleviate the harm to 
students substantially. 
Beyond the Reports‘ substantive recommendations, the CSRC has also reviewed how 
the system itself is working. A number of recommendations have been made through 
these reviews. First of all, the reporting system may redevelop its function to make it in 
as much accordance as possible with the requirements of managers as operators at the 
school level. Also, according to the operators‘ experiences, it is hard to classify some 
incidents according to the categories available on the system. Then the data analysis 
task may be influenced by the reporting of information because the recorded data at the 
system were not exactly matching every requirement on system. In addition, the CSRC 
may take responsibility to improve the environmental safety for students by cooperating 
with police forces and promoting a cross-ministry partnership arrangement. Finally, a 
last point addressed is the environmental safety for children, focusing on an 
improvement in students‘ ability in self-protection through better personal judgments 
and viewpoints, while a second goal is to list the students in high-risk families and in 
disadvantaged groups to reduce the cases of abused children. In such cases, school may 
link the tasks of the education department with social welfare institutions in the city to 
limit the possible cases of risk. 
Clearly, both the reviews and recommendations to schools, cities/counties and the 
CSRC managers indicated the extensive and general issues from different viewpoints. 
Some reviews highlight the universal problems at schools from primary to university. 
Schools at different levels have different events, depending on the different 
characteristics of local practices and context or the geographic locations of schools. 
However, some events may be caused by similar causes; some may appear because of a 
wider range of factors, which is hard to pick up by studying the annual reports. Most 
suggestions to cities/counties recommended some broad management strategies. Not 
surprisingly, this may be a common feature of policy made by a hierarchical 
organisation. From the management point of view, the government highlighted the 
questions and problems for subordinate regimes. The local managers are encouraged to 
follow the advice to make some suitable plans for themselves; such schemes may be 
more perceived as being more reliable and effective for risk management and more 
acceptable to local culture where a hierarchical system is in place. 
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4.6 The analyses of the recorded data in the CSRS 
The discussion above highlights the operation procedure and the actual function of the 
CSRS. Obviously, it may provide an effective function for managing risky events across 
a country and may improve the range of tasks by the modification of categories. The 
management centre also produces some reviews and recommendations year by year; 
such suggestions may give the local managers some references for preventing some 
potential or similar events happened on campus. Although the annual reports showed 
the basic event patterns year by year, they provided just a rough sketch of the actual 
incidence of risk-related events. Therefore, I tried to explore the actual recorded data 
across five years and in doing so produce some of my own raw data on risk trends 
which has never been discussed or explored before. 
The previous section noted that the CSRS was established in 2000. It is unavoidable that 
a new system may need to operate for a few years before it achieves its full functionality. 
Therefore, the analysis of data recorded in the CSRS is focusing on the middle five 
years from 2004 to 2008. According to the database provided by the CSRC which I was 
given access to through my fieldwork contacts in Taiwan, the total number of events, 
which included all at the A, B and C levels, recorded in the system were 117,066 cases 
between 2004 and 2008 (see Table 4.6.1).  
As can be seen, just over one-third (30.2 %) of the events recorded were A-level (35,315 
cases), and over ten per cent of the events were reported as B-level (13,358 cases). Most 
of events were classified at C-level (68,393 cases) which covered over half of whole 
events. It may be worth highlighting the similar trends of events with the percentage of 
16.9, 16.8 and 16.7 respectively in 2004, 2005 and 2006; however, the number of events 
has increased significantly to 21.7 % in 2007; the number then reached its highest peak 
(27.9 %) in 2008 which can be seen at the bottom row of the Table. Also, onec an note 
that there were 36.7 % (12,946 cases) of the A-level events occurring in 2008, which is 
much higher than those in the other four years. Consequently, nearly one-third of the 
proportion (32,603 cases) appeared in this year, which presents a significant rise in the 
total events between 2004 and 2008. 
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Table 4.6.1 The three levels of event compared over time 
Years 
levels 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
A-level 
Count 3,886 6,642 4,863 6,960 12,964 35,315 
% within level 11.0% 18.8% 13.8% 19.7% 36.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.3% 5.7% 4.2% 5.9% 11.1% 30.2% 
B-level 
Count 2,643 2,430 2,396 2,627 3,262 13,358 
% within level 19.8% 18.2% 17.9% 19.7% 24.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 2.3% 2.1% 2.0% 2.2% 2.8% 11.4% 
C-level 
Count 13,230 10,648 12,275 15,863 16,377 68,393 
% within level 19.3% 15.6% 17.9% 23.2% 23.9% 100.0% 
% of Total 11.3% 9.1% 10.5% 13.6% 14.0% 58.4% 
Total 
Count 19,759 19,720 19,534 25,450 32,603 117,066 
% of Total 16.9% 16.8% 16.7% 21.7% 27.9% 100.0% 
 
4.6.1 The distribution of the main categories of campus security events in the 
CSRS 
After examining the distribution of main categories at different event levels, the 
following section is focused on the proportion of the eight main categories (see Table 
4.6.2). The Table 4.6.2 shows the proportion of each main event, which compared 
categories within five years, the highest percentage of the campus event was accident 
event which reached 41,341 cases (35.3 % compared with total number of events). The 
‗disease event located at the second place, having over one quarter of the event ratio 
compared with the total proportion numbering 32,204 cases (27.5 %). Then both of the 
violence and deviant behaviour and the illegal events involving children and teenagers 
(under eighteen) were ranked third and the fourth, 15,028 cases (12.8 %) and 13,765 
cases (11.8 %) respectively. After that, security-related events were fifth which at 8,458 
cases and the proportion is also under 10%. The three lowest counts relating to the 
categories were ‗other‘, ‗natural disaster‘ and ‗counseling conflict‘ events, which only 
occupied less six per cent among the three categories in total, their percentage were 2.4, 
1.8 and 1.1 respectively.  
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Table 4.6.2 The distribution of main categories compared over five years 
Years  
Main categories 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) 
Accident 11016 9.4 8139 7.0 7260 6.2 6930 5.9 7996 6.8 41341 35.3 
Security 1786 1.5 1528 1.3 1623 1.4 1739 1.5 1782 1.5 8458 7.2 
Violence 1885 1.6 1826 1.6 3544 3.0 3423 2.9 4350 3.7 15028 12.8 
Counseling 157 0.1 201 0.2 322 0.3 277 0.2 365 0.3 1322 1.1 
Illegal 813 0.7 1486 1.3 2395 2.0 3648 3.1 5423 4.6 13765 11.8 
Natural 352 0.3 548 0.5 247 0.2 623 0.5 326 0.3 2096 1.8 
Other 247 0.2 404 0.3 485 0.4 776 0.7 940 0.8 2852 2.4 
Disease 3503 3.0 5588 4.8 3658 3.1 8034 6.9 11421 9.8 32204 27.5 
Total 19759 16.9 19720 16.8 19534 16.7 25450 21.7 32603 27.9 117066 100 
The comparison has demonstrated the distribution of the eight main-categories and their 
proportion from 2004 to 2008. I have then tried to explore the change of the total events 
which has been presented in the following figure (see Figure 4.6.1). According to the 
Figure 4.6.1, the most significant increase was in the illegal event category involving 
children and teenagers (under eighteen), with a five-fold rise from 2004 (813 cases) to 
2008 (5,423 cases). The disease event ranked second which also has a large increase of 
about three times from 3,503 cases reaching a peak of 11,421 cases in this period of 
time. The violence and deviant behaviour event was located third, doubling from 1,885 
to 5,423 cases in five years.  
The most obvious decrease was located in the accident event from the peak 11,016 cases 
in 2004 drop to the lowest point 6,930 cases in 2007, but then it has grown to nearly 
8,000 cases in 2008. Some categories remained stable during the five years, for example 
the security-related events were typically under 2,000 cases, and both the counseling 
conflict event and natural disaster event saw a slightly fluctuating trend with the average 
around 250 and 400 cases respectively. Otherwise, there was a gradual increase in the 
‗other‘ category from over 200 to over 900 in this period time.  
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Figure 4.6.1 The distribution of main categories compared with the number of events  
over five years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to explore this pattern of events more deeply, the comparison of the distribution 
of the data moved onto the total population of students comparing the number of events 
with the total population of student, per 100,000 students (see Table 4.6.3). The first and 
the second rows on the left side of the Table show the number of events and their 
proportion over five years. Then the third row indicates the total population of students, 
which presented the proportion of event with total numbers of student during the year. 
Finally, the bottom row describes the proportion of events per 100,000 students. It can 
be seen that there were 26,387,508 students in total over the five years.  
The contrast of the percentage per 100,000 students with total event is located at the 
fourth column of each year. It shows that 443.64 cases relate to campus security events 
per 100,000 students. It is worth noticing that the total population of students has a 
significant decrease from 5,372,346, in 2004 to 5,165,831, in 2008. However, the 
proportion of events when compared to the total population did not reduce at the same 
rate. It remained stable at around 0.368 %, 0.371 % and 0.369 % in 2004, 2005 and 
2006 respectively, but the percentage then has increased significantly to 0.484 % in 
2007 and reached the peak at 0.631 % in 2008 (see Figure 4.6.2).  
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Table 4.6.3 The distribution of main categories compared over five years 
Categories 
Years 
Accident Security Violence Counseling Illegal Natural Other Disease total 
2004 
Number of events 11016 1786 1885 157 813 352 247 3503 19759 
% with total event 9.41 1.53 1.61 0.13 0.69 0.30 0.21 2.99 16.90 
The number of 
students 5372346 
0.00205 0.00033 0.00035 0.00003 0.00015 0.00007 0.00005 0.00065 0.00368 
Every 100,000 
students 
205.05 33.24 35.09 2.92 15.13 6.55 4.60 65.20 367.79 
2005 
Number of events 8139 1528 1826 201 1486 548 404 5588 19720 
% with total event 6.95 1.31 1.56 0.17 1.27 0.47 0.35 4.77 16.80 
The number of 
students 5319364 
0.00153 0.00029 0.00034 0.00004 0.00028 0.00010 0.00008 0.00105 0.00371 
Every 100,000 
students 
153.01 28.73 34.33 3.78 27.94 10.30 7.59 105.05 370.72 
2006 
Number of events 7260 1623 3544 322 2395 247 485 3658 19534 
% with total event 6.20 1.39 3.03 0.28 2.05 0.21 0.41 3.12 16.70 
The number of 
students 5286885 
0.00137 0.00031 0.00067 0.00006 0.00045 0.00005 0.00009 0.00069 0.00369 
Every 100,000 
students 
137.32 30.70 67.03 6.09 45.30 4.67 9.17 69.19 369.48 
2007 
Number of events 6930 1739 3423 277 3648 623 776 8034 25450 
% with total event 5.92 1.49 2.92 0.24 3.12 0.53 0.66 6.86 21.70 
The number of 
students 5243082 
0.00132 0.00033 0.00065 0.00005 0.00070 0.00012 0.00015 0.00153 0.00485 
Every 100,000 
students 
132.17 33.17 65.29 5.28 69.58 11.88 14.80 153.23 485.40 
2008 
Number of events 7996 1782 4350 365 5423 326 940 11421 32603 
% with total event 6.83 1.52 3.72 0.31 4.63 0.28 0.80 9.76 27.90 
The number of 
students 5165831 
0.00155 0.00034 0.00084 0.00007 0.00105 0.00006 0.00018 0.00221 0.00631 
Every 100,000 
students 
154.79 34.50 84.21 7.07 104.98 6.31 18.20 221.09 631.13 
Total 
Number of events 41341 8458 15028 1322 13765 2096 2852 32204 117066 
% with total event 35.31 7.22 12.84 1.13 11.76 1.79 2.44 27.51 100.00 
The number of 
students 26387508 
0.00157 0.00032 0.00057 0.00005 0.00052 0.00008 0.00011 0.00122 0.00444 
Every 100,000 
students 
156.67 32.05 56.95 5.01 52.16 7.94 10.81 122.04 443.64 
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Figure 4.6.2 The distribution of percentage of main categories compared with total 
population of students over five years 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6.2 The distribution of the sub-categories of campus security events in the CSRS 
The previous section presented the distribution of eight main categories within five 
years. This section explores some sub-categories according to their high frequency and 
the significantly increasing rates which can be seen on the Figure 4.6.2 such as, 
‗accident‘ event, ‗violence and deviant behaviour‘, or a ‗illegal‘ event for children and 
teenager (under eighteen), and ‗disease‘ event. As presented in the section 4.5.1, the 
accident event occupied the highest proportion of all risks, nearly one-third of the events 
that occurred. According to the CSRC (2008), there are nineteen sub-categories have 
been classified within the ‗accident‘ event category (see Table 4.6.4).  
It can be easily seen that the total number of accident events were 41,341 between 2004 
and 2008. It is impossible to avoid paying attention to the traffic event off campus, 
because over half of the 22,170 cases (53.60 %) belonged to it. Moreover, by combining 
both traffic accidents on campus and outside teaching events with it, the total percentage 
of traffic events comes to sixty per cent, which showed most of the campuses accident 
were caused by traffic-related events.  
It may worth noting that the proportion of ‗poisoning‘ events was only 4.50 % (1,876 
cases), but even so it occupies fourth place, compared to all events. Moreover, because 
of the change in the sub-categories across the five years, it can be seen that the ‗suicide 
or self-harm‘ event was only recorded in first three years, in 2004, 2005 and 2006, and 
then it was differentiated into three sub-categories: ‗suicide with own child‘, ‗student 
suicide‘ and ‗staff suicide‘ in 2007. Therefore, combining four sub-categories of the 
‗suicide‘ event in total, the whole percentage of this category reached 3.4 % (1,405 
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cases), which raised the incidence of suicide up to the fifth place. 
Table 4.6.4 The distribution of the number of sub-categories accident event over five 
years 
Years  
Sub-categories Accident 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) 
traffic event on campus 343 0.80 243 0.60 248 0.60 338 0.80 504 1.20 1676 4.10 
traffic event out- side 
teaching course 
32 0.10 20 0.00 63 0.20 68 0.20 93 0.20 276 0.70 
traffic event off campus 6404 15.50 4528 11.00 3897 9.40 3483 8.40 3858 9.3 22170 53.60 
drowning 126 0.30 105 0.30 87 0.20 101 0.20 114 0.30 533 1.30 
poisoning 299 0.70 463 1.10 425 1.00 345 0.80 344 0.80 1876 4.50 
Injured from playing sport 
or hobby 
2025 4.90 1402 3.40 1364 3.30 1140 2.80 1280 3.10 7211 17.40 
fall from building 56 0.10 47 0.10 46 0.10 56 0.10 74 0.20 279 0.70 
mountain accident 43 0.10 30 0.10 18 0.00 17 0.00 11 0.00 119 0.30 
Injury through experiment 89 0.20 66 0.20 41 0.10 36 0.10 31 0.10 263 0.60 
suicide or self-harm 237 0.60 275 0.70 280 0.70 0 0 0 0 792 1.90 
injury from 
re-establishment 
12 0.00 6 0.00 7 0.00 14 0.00 11 0.00 50 0.10 
injury through building 
collapse 
8 0 8 0 8 0 12 0 6 0 42 0.10 
other 1245 3.00 862 2.10 727 1.80 995 2.40 1200 2.90 5029 12.20 
injury associated with 
part-time work 
43 0.10 18 0.00 9 0.00 20 0.00 21 0.10 111 0.30 
chemical contamination in 
laboratory 
0 0.00 3 0.00 17 0.00 1 0.00 3 0.00 24 0.10 
other material 54 0.10 63 0.20 23 0.10 11 0.00 126 0.30 277 0.70 
suicide with own child 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 30 0.10 24 0.10 54 0.10 
student suicide 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 248 0.60 284 0.70 532 1.30 
staff suicide 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 15 0.00 12 0.00 27 0.10 
Total 11016 26.60 8139 19.70 7260 17.60 6930 16.80 7996 19.30 41341 100 
The above section examined the sub-categories of accident event. The following section 
explores the other sub-categories linked to violent and deviant behaviour. According to 
the CSRC (2008), twenty-seven sub-categories have been categorized into such events 
(see Table 4.6.5). As can be seen, the highest percentage event was the ‗general fight‘ 
event, which comprised almost 43% in this sub-category. Also the actual number of this 
event has nearly doubled from 829 cases in 2004 to 1,642 cases in 2008. Moreover, the 
other campus violence and deviance behaviour events ranked second with 2,779 cases 
(18.5 %). It may hard to determine the actual content of the sub-category of ‗other‘ 
because it includes any event that could not be classified into the sub-category of 
‗violent and deviant behaviour‘. One way in which a researcher might identify what was 
included within this category would be to check the reporting data on a case-by-case 
basis.   
Furthermore, some sub-categories may deserve more attention because of their 
significant increase over the five years. For example, there was a more than four times 
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rise in students suspected of behaving in such a way as to contravene ―the drugs 
prevention and cure law‖, from 124 cases in 2004 to 477 cases in 2008, which 
presumably reflects a perception of the domestic increase in the use of illegal drugs 
among students in Taiwan. The other case which may be worth mentioning is the 
incidence of gang violence on campus, inasmuch as although there were only 7 cases in 
2004, this has increased ten times to the peak, with 73 cases in 2006; it then gradually 
decreased to 33 cases in 2007. After that, it has risen slightly again to 35 cases in 2008, 
but the event growth ratio still shows a five-fold increase between the years 2004 -2008.   
The change in some other sub-categories may also be worth noting, such as the rate of 
suspects involved in stealing which ranked fourth (6.9 %) in the violent and deviant 
behaviour category, with a doubling of cases from 166 in 2004 to 333 in 2008. Also, the 
incidence of cases of students running away from home (under senior high school) was 
ranked fifth (686 cases 4.6 %), and increased gradually from 107 cases to 166 cases, 
between 2004 and 2008. Generally speaking, most of the violent and deviant behaviour 
events may regard as visible physical conflict on campus; however, some events may be 
hard to prevent such as gang violence on campus because such cases sometimes happen 
on the outside of a campus or produce some psychological trauma to students or create 
some emotional and personal difficulties which an individual keeps private, such that 
the staff/teacher is never aware of this problem on campus. However, such risks appear 
to indicate that some invisible threats from outside the campus have gradually 
influenced the campus security. Moreover, some similar conditions might be associated 
with the problem of use of the internet such as an internet swindle or hacking which 
may be regarded as less visible threats. Although the first reporting of such events were 
recorded in 2005 and 2006 respectively, it may be predicted that these less tangible risks 
and unpredictable related to the use of the internet may happen more and more as digital 
technology spreads throughout Taiwan. 
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Table 4.6.5 The distribution of the number of event and the percentage in sub-categories 
of the violent and deviant behaviour event over five years 
Year 
Sub-categories of violence and deviant 
behaviour 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) 
Student to fight with weapons 80 0.5 85 0.6 100 0.7 77 0.5 38 0.3 380 2.5 
A faction to have a fight 10 0.1 3 0 3 0 1 0 8 0.1 25 0.2 
General fight event 829 5.5 758 5 1719 11.4 1479 9.8 1642 10.9 6427 42.8 
Suspect involved in killer 21 0.1 19 0.1 15 0.1 9 0.1 14 0.1 78 0.1 
Suspect involved in robbery 38 0.3 39 0.3 47 0.3 52 0.3 52 0.3 228 1.5 
Suspect involved in threaten 67 0.4 32 0.2 142 0.9 141 0.9 155 1 537 3.6 
Suspect involved in kidnap 12 0.1 1 0 3 0 2 0 7 0 25 0.2 
Suspect involved in steal 166 1.1 119 0.8 175 1.2 237 1.6 333 2.2 1030 6.9 
Suspect involved in gamble 14 0.1 6 0 4 0 4 0 29 0.2 57 0.4 
Suspect involved in sexual assault 33 0.2 76 0.5 93 0.6 87 0.6 94 0.6 383 2.5 
Suspect involved to sex harassment 39 0.3 70 0.5 100 0.7 128 0.9 194 1.3 531 3.5 
Suspect involved to possess firearms 11 0.1 13 0.1 13 0.1 19 0.1 31 0.2 87 0.6 
Suspect involved to against the drugs 
prevention and cure low 
124 0.8 103 0.7 148 1 215 1.4 477 3.2 1067 7.1 
Suspect involved to hinder the low, 
order and official business 
6 0 5 0 10 0.1 11 0.1 4 0 36 0.2 
Suspect involved to hinder families 20 0.1 17 0.1 23 0.2 26 0.2 41 0.3 127 0.8 
Illegal car racing 10 0.1 4 0 7 0 6 0 3 0 30 0.2 
Other campus violence and deviance 
behaviour 
277 1.8 291 1.9 645 4.3 666 4.4 900 6 2779 18.5 
Other illegal event 8 0.1 35 0.2 70 0.5 61 0.4 113 0.8 287 1.9 
Run away from home(under senior 
high school) 
107 0.7 130 0.9 125 0.8 158 1.1 166 1.1 686 4.6 
Student to harass ceremony 0 0 2 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 9 0.1 
Teacher harassment by student 3 0 0 0 10 0.1 5 0 2 0 20 0.1 
Gang violence on campus 7 0 15 0.1 73 0.5 33 0.2 35 0.2 163 1.1 
A swindle event from internet 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 4 0 
A hacker to invade the network system  0 0 2 0 6 0 2 0 6 0 16 0.1 
May to do sex business 3 0 1 0 6 0 2 0 4 0 16 0.1 
Total 1885 12.5 1826 12.2 3544 23.6 3423 22.8 4350 28.9 15028 100 
The discussion of these sub-categories above involves every level of school. The next 
sub-category was developed and focused on some special clients on campus. The main 
category of ―illegal event involving children and teenagers‖ only addressed on the 
students under eighteen. Although this category only covers parts of the population in 
schools, the trend of events showed a significant increase over five years. According to 
the CSRC (2008), nineteen sub-categories have been classified into this category (see 
Table 4.6.6). The highest percentage located in event caused by ‗sexual assault‘ (under 
eighteen), followed by ‗sex harassment‘ (under eighteen), the number of cases reached 
3,287 (23.9 %) and 1,612 (11.7 %) respectively. Both events also contained high 
increase of the proportion over five years. For example, in 2004, only 79 cases regarded 
to the ‗sexual assault‘ event; however, it were nearly five times higher in 2005 (383 
cases), and the number of this event continued growing up to 1,249 cases in 2008,which 
were fifteen times higher than the number in 2004. Notably, cases of sexual harassment 
increased almost thirty times from 2004 (24 cases) to 2008 (709 cases). The third place 
created by ‗running away from home in three days‘ with 1,391 cases in total (10.1 %) 
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and it were a slight risen from 229 cases in 2004 to 347 cases in 2008.  
More generally, there were some remarkable cases worth highlighting and comparing 
over the five years of data; for example, Table 4.6.6 shows there were 1,352 cases in 
total caused by an ‗abuse‘ event showing an increase from 38 cases in 2004 to 233 cases 
in 2006 then to 524 cases in 2008. Furthermore, the ‗high risk family‘ also may worth 
mentioning; although it only ranked fifth with 1,074 cases (7.8 %), and there was only 
one case in 2005; however, it reached 63 cases in 2006, which is sixty times higher than 
the number in 2005; after that, another sixty times increase appeared in 2008 with 602 
cases. Finally, the sub-category of ‗the use of harmful drugs‘ hadh 824 cases (6 %) over 
five years, but it actually grew nearly sixty times between 2004 and 2008, from 6 to 557 
cases. 
Table 4.6.6 The distribution of the number of events and the percentage in 
sub-categories of illegal activity involving children and teenagers  
(under 18) event over five years 
Years  
Sub-categories of illegal event 
involving children and teenagers 
(under 18) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) 
Student to drift 106 0.8 145 1.1 202 1.5 190 1.4 232 1.7 875 6.4 
Student into the illegitimate place 5 0 1 0 3 0 9 0.1 5 0 23 0.1 
Runaway from home(in three days) 229 1.7 251 1.8 263 1.9 301 2.2 347 2.5 1391 10.1 
Protect client from illegal event 137 1.0 62 0.5 75 0.5 85 0.6 139 1.0 498 3.6 
An abandonment case 48 0.3 7 0.1 6 0 16 0.1 16 0.1 93 0.7 
Other children protect case 111 0.8 167 1.2 323 2.3 361 2.6 630 4.6 1592 11.6 
Adult to compel children to marry 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Illegal to utilize children 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 8 0.1 
Kidnap or sell children or teenager 1 0 8 0.1 9 0.1 14 0.1 6 0 38 0.3 
To force children to sex assault 19 0.1 72 0.5 83 0.6 124 0.9 134 1.0 432 3.1 
To take noxious tapes 0 0 1 0 3 0 17 0.1 22 0.2 43 0.3 
To use harmful drug 6 0 38 0.3 63 0.5 160 1.2 557 4.0 824 6.0 
Children may involved the sex 
business 
3 0 13 0.1 21 0.2 31 0.2 42 0.3 110 0.8 
An abuse event 38 0.3 172 1.2 233 1.7 385 2.8 524 3.8 1352 9.8 
Other against children low event 5 0 23 0.2 40 0.3 33 0.2 62 0.5 163 1.2 
Sexual assault(under18) 79 0.6 383 2.8 622 4.5 954 6.9 1249 9.1 3287 23.9 
Sex harassment(under 18) 24 0.2 116 0.8 317 2.3 446 3.2 709 5.2 1612 11.7 
Sexual assault cause pregnancy(un 18) 0 0 23 0.2 67 0.5 111 0.8 145 1.1 346 2.5 
High risk family 0 0 1 0 63 0.5 408 3.0 602 4.4 1074 7.8 
Total 813 5.9 1486 10.8 2395 17.4 3648 26.5 5423 39.4 13765 100 
What about the ‗disease‘ category over the five years? According to the CSRC, ten 
sub-categories have been classified into the ‗disease‘ category (see Table 4.6.7). As can 
be seen from Table 4.4-7, there were 16,716 cases (51.9 %), over half of the percentage 
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in total were linked to the ‗Enterovirus‘ disease. It has increased significantly from 
1,233 cases in 2004 to 4,061 cases in 2005; it then dropped back to a low point in 2006 
(1,245 cases); after that, the cases have significant increased to 2,613 cases in 2007 and 
reached a peak in 2008 (at 7,564 cases).  
Moreover, the ‗Swinepox‘ disease was positioned third with 3,733 cases in total (11.6 
%). It has increased from 47 cases in 2004 to 490 cases in 2006, then it reached a peak 
in 2008 (1,996 cases). Otherwise, it may be worth noting that, combining 2007 and 
2008, the number of events contained over half of the proportion (over 60 %) compared 
to the events over five years. Generally speaking, except that the general disaster has 
slightly decreased in 2008, most of the sub-categories of disaster events show no 
extraordinary trend over five years period without the ‗Enterovirus‘, ‗Swinepox‘ and 
‗Ophthalmic‘ diseases. 
Table 4.6.7 The distribution of the number of event and the percentage of sub-categories 
of the disease category over five years 
Years  
Sub-categories 
of disease 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) 
General disaster 2033 6.3 1248 3.9 1556 4.8 2732 8.5 1384 4.3 8953 27.8 
Enterovirous 1233 3.8 4061 12.6 1245 3.9 2613 8.1 7564 23.5 16716 51.9 
Tuberculosis 122 0.4 109 0.3 103 0.3 99 0.3 167 0.5 600 1.9 
Scarlet fever 16 0 30 0.1 63 0.2 29 0.1 49 0.2 187 0.6 
Peruses 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 13 0 18 0.1 
Swinepox 47 0.1 107 0.3 490 1.5 1093 3.4 1996 6.2 3733 11.6 
Dengue fever 28 0.1 25 0.1 77 0.2 107 0.3 40 0.1 277 0.9 
SARS 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 
Other 12 0 8 0 122 0.4 315 1.0 140 0.4 597 1.9 
Ophthalmic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1045 3.2 68 0.2 1113 3.5 
Total 3503 10.9 5588 17.4 3658 11.4 8034 24.9 11421 35.5 32204 100 
The discussion above showed the diversity of campus security events which were 
divided into eight main categories. After being modified a few times, there are one 
hundred and nineteen sub-categories in 2008. The top twenty of the events have been 
selected which depended on the number of events in total between 2004 and 2008, and 
they are shown below in Table 4.6.8. In the following section I will compare some 
factors with each category, which may help to discover more significant reporting trends 
over time.  
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Table 4.6.8 The top ten of the sub-categories between 2004 and 2008 
S/N Sub-categories Count % in total Main-category 
1 Traffic event out of campus 22170 18.9 Accident 
2 Enterovirous disease 16716 14.3 Disease 
3 General disease 8953 7.6 Disease 
4 Injured from playing sport or hobby 7211 6.2 Accident 
5 General fighting 6427 5.5 Violence 
6 Other accident event 5029 4.3 Accident 
7 Swinepox 3733 3.2 Disease 
8 Sexual assault (under 18) 3287 2.8 Illegal 
9 Other campus violence event 2779 2.4 Violence 
10 Poisoning 1876 1.6 Accident 
11 Traffic event in campus 1676 1.4 Accident 
12 Other property loss by theft 1635 1.4 Security 
13 Equipment loss by theft 1615 1.4 Security 
14 Sex harassment (under 18) 1612 1.4 Illegal 
15 Other children protect case 1592 1.4 Illegal 
16 Runaway from home(in 3 days) 1391 1.2 Illegal 
17 Abuse event 1352 1.2 Illegal 
18 Other campus security event 1288 1.1 Security 
19 Strong wind 1127 1 Natural 
20 Ophthalmic 1113 1 Disease 
 4.6.3 The distribution of the campus security events  
The previous section explored the particular sub-categories used in the reporting system 
and the broad patterns and range of changes seen over the levels of incidence of 
different types of risk-events as reported by operators. The focus was exclusively on 
events that occurred within the context of the campus. In this section I will examine the 
data in regard to some other broader factors beyond the campus in general, such as 
region, gender, season and time, which may, from a management of risk perspective, 
suggest other factors shaping the trends of the events. Such factors were main detail of 
events which were provided by school managers. Studying such factors may help to 
discover some unknown results and patterns of event. According to the previous 
discussion, the recorded data in the CSRS were reported by the local school managers 
around the country. Therefore, the examination of the distribution of the events with the 
regional factor is the first main concern of this section.  
In Taiwan, the twenty-five cities/counties are divided across the territory (as shown in 
Figure 4.6.3). There is no doubt that the population of each city may be divergent 
between urban and rural areas. In order to analyze the proportion of students within 
each area, this was secured from information published on the Ministry of Education‘s 
web page, (see Table 4.6.9). Table 4.6.9 shows some statistical information, including 
the number of events, the number of students and the proportional rate of events, which 
were counted across five years. The first and second column shows the number and the 
percentage of events in the period. The third and fourth columns record the number of 
students and the incidence per ten thousand of students in cities/counties. Finally, the 
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extreme right column presents statistical data reporting the total number of events by 
city and the incidence per ten thousand students, again over the five years. 
According to Table 4.6.9, the top five cities with the highest numbers of cases were 
Keeling city, Taipei city, Hsinchu city, Kaohsiung county and Pingtung county within 
which the number of cases were 22,762, 14,077, 9,385, 8,352 and 8,326 respectively. It 
is worth noting that, except for Hsinchu city, the other four cities/counties are located at 
the edge of the territory, for example Keeling City and Taipei City are at the most 
northern and Kaohsiung and Pingtung County at the most southern ends of the country. 
It is also interesting to point out that both Taichung City and Changhua County are 
located at the middle of the country. They have very similar rates in the number of 
events and their incidence per ten thousand students with a difference of nearly ten 
thousand in the total population of students over the five years. 
The Table also shows a significant change when we compare the number of events per 
every ten thousand students by analyzing against the factor of region. It may be 
explained that the high event reporting rate may be much higher in a city. For example, 
compared with other cities, Keelung has the highest reporting rate with over two 
thousand cases (22,762) across five years, and the incidence is same as ranked. 
However, diversified trends may appear if the number of students in the city was 
counted in. For example, there is a dramatic change appearing in Hualien and Penghu 
counties, and they have only 4,228 and 3,645 cases in total over five years while the 
incidence rate reached the second and the fourth place with around 150.83 per ten 
thousand students in Penghu and 103.86 per ten thousand students in Hualien. 
Consequently, if the number of students is taken into the consideration of the 
measurement factor of events at both the cities above, the incidence of jumps up to the 
second (150.83 per ten thousand students in Penghu County) and fourth (103.86 per ten 
thousand students in Hualien county) place when comparing all cities. Finally, the total 
incidences across the three years have similar rates at around 36 to 37 per ten thousand 
students in total among 2004, 2005 and 2006, as shown on the bottom of the Table, but 
then this has almost doubled to 63.11 per ten thousand students in 2008. 
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Figure 4.6.3 The twenty-five cities and counties in Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.esltaiwan.com/articles/44/1/Map-of-Taiwan/Page1.html 01072010 
112 
 
Table 4.6.9 The distribution of event by cities over a five year period 
Years 
 
 
 
Statistic of the 
event 
 
 
Cities/counties 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Event 
in this 
year 
% in 
this 
year 
Total 
student 
in year 
Incidence 
per 
10,000 
students 
in city 
Event 
in this 
year 
% in 
this 
year 
Total 
student 
in year 
Incidence 
per 
10,000 
students 
in city 
Event 
in this 
year 
% in 
this 
year 
Total 
student 
in year 
Incidence 
per 
10,000 
students 
in city 
Event 
in this 
year 
% in 
this 
year 
Total 
student 
in year 
Incidence 
per 
10,000 
students 
in city 
Event 
in this 
year 
% in 
this 
year 
Total 
student 
in year 
Incidence 
per 
10,000 
students 
in city 
Total 
event in 
city 
 
Incidence 
per 
10,000 
students 
in city 
over 5 
years 
Taipei city 2385 0.121  724117 32.94  2693 0.137  715366 37.65  2454 0.126  712950 34.42  2977 0.117  706674 42.13  3568 0.109  696606 51.22  14077 39.59  
Kaohsiung 183 0.009  330535 5.54  193 0.010  330171 5.85  235 0.012  328693 7.15  326 0.013  328248 9.93  380 0.012  323320 11.75  1317 8.03  
Keelung city 2594 0.131  88462 293.23  3783 0.192  87733 431.19  3492 0.179  86881 401.93  5843 0.230  86031 679.17  7050 0.216  84325 836.05  22762 525.16  
Taipei county 360 0.018  802870 4.48  264 0.013  783624 3.37  305 0.016  768933 3.97  316 0.012  757959 4.17  563 0.017  743629 7.57  1808 4.69  
Tao yuen 912 0.046  472313 19.31  750 0.038  472595 15.87  843 0.043  477164 17.67  1040 0.041  479852 21.67  1585 0.049  479680 33.04  5130 21.54  
Hsinchu county 443 0.022  112224 39.47  274 0.014  111330 24.61  280 0.014  111450 25.12  482 0.019  111162 43.36  671 0.021  109439 61.31  2150 38.70  
Hsinchu city 1538 0.078  129511 118.75  1510 0.077  132114 114.30  1410 0.072  132840 106.14  2108 0.083  134339 156.92  2819 0.086  134687 209.30  9385 141.45  
Miaoli county 704 0.036  126832 55.51  388 0.020  122868 31.58  396 0.020  121710 32.54  487 0.019  119643 40.70  521 0.016  117380 44.39  2497 41.04  
Taichung county 1043 0.053  346956 30.06  858 0.044  348537 24.62  702 0.036  348192 20.16  1218 0.048  347422 35.06  2040 0.063  342089 59.63  5861 33.82  
Taichung city 783 0.040  345003 22.70  720 0.037  345503 20.84  908 0.046  343179 26.46  747 0.029  340713 21.92  901 0.028  335874 26.83  4059 23.73  
Changhua county 649 0.033  264230 24.56  757 0.038  260581 29.05  829 0.042  257303 32.22  862 0.034  254435 33.88  968 0.030  250822 38.59  4065 31.58  
Nantou county 342 0.017  96899 35.29  340 0.017  95849 35.47  386 0.020  96532 39.99  369 0.014  95695 38.56  659 0.020  94348 69.85  2095 43.71  
Yunlin county 359 0.018  141273 25.41  354 0.018  140680 25.16  559 0.029  140539 39.78  397 0.016  140288 28.30  319 0.010  138977 22.95  1988 28.33  
Chiayi county 626 0.032  104012 60.19  838 0.042  103765 80.76  678 0.035  103126 65.74  618 0.024  102391 60.36  743 0.023  99699 74.52  3503 68.29  
Chiayi city 640 0.032  82219 77.84  481 0.024  81164 59.26  296 0.015  81372 36.38  502 0.020  80293 62.52  503 0.015  80052 62.83  2422 59.79  
Tainan county 1084 0.055  291027 37.25  807 0.041  287684 28.05  792 0.041  283498 27.94  758 0.030  277663 27.30  811 0.025  272437 29.77  4252 30.11  
Tainan city 620 0.031  183267 33.83  533 0.027  182840 29.15  570 0.029  179617 31.73  605 0.024  176481 34.28  766 0.023  171925 44.55  3094 34.60  
Kaohsiung county 1388 0.070  290692 47.75  1245 0.063  283753 43.88  1417 0.073  281446 50.35  1750 0.069  277387 63.09  2556 0.078  272116 93.93  8356 59.46  
Pingtung county 1374 0.070  191884 71.61  1205 0.061  187021 64.43  1172 0.060  185620 63.14  1919 0.075  183204 104.75  2656 0.081  178944 148.43  8326 89.85  
Yilan county 31 0.002  95390 3.25  38 0.002  94629 4.02  72 0.004  93669 7.69  72 0.003  92116 7.82  93 0.003  90230 10.31  306 6.57  
Hualien county 853 0.043  82806 103.01  581 0.029  81499 71.29  763 0.039  81817 93.26  865 0.034  81228 106.49  1166 0.036  79738 146.23  4228 103.86  
Taitung county 238 0.012  41859 56.86  222 0.011  41936 52.94  247 0.013  41942 58.89  279 0.011  41281 67.59  310 0.010  40855 75.88  1296 62.35  
Penghu county 558 0.028  15509 359.79  712 0.036  15742 452.29  675 0.035  15649 431.34  840 0.033  15822 530.91  860 0.026  178944 48.06  3645 150.83  
Kinmen 50 0.003  11063 45.20  174 0.009  10986 158.38  52 0.003  11378 45.70  63 0.002  11391 55.31  90 0.003  11613 77.50  429 76.02  
Matsu 2 0.000  1439 13.90  0 0.000  1395 0.00  1 0.000  1340 7.46  6 0.000  1344 44.64  5 0.000  1316 37.99  14 20.49  
Unknow 0       0         0      1 0      0       1 0 
Total 19759 1  5372346 36.78  19720 1 5319364 37.07  19534 1  5286885 36.95  25450 1  5243082 48.54  32603 1  5165831 63.11  117066 44.36  
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In order to explore the context of some cities with a disproportionately high level of 
incident, I tried to compare those cities/counties with the higher event rate by exploring 
the rates in eight main categories and the distribution of the proportion, as shown in 
Figure 4.6.4. The nine cities have been selected by the comparison of the proportion of 
the number of events to the number of students in those cities. It is evident that Keelung 
was the highest recorded city because of the huge quantity of disease cases with over 
ten thousand of the cases in this period of time. The similar condition also made Taipei 
and Hsinchu cities ranked as the second and third places compared with all the other 
cities/counties. According to the Figure 4.6.4, the accident event was nearly equal in 
trends both in Taipei and Keelung cities; however, the total population of students in 
Taipei is nearly ten times more than that of Keelung, which can be seen in Table 4.6.9. 
Generally speaking, the accident event was recorded as the biggest problem in most 
cities/counties compared with other categories; however, the disease event also may 
cause some concern within cities/counties such as in both Keeling and Hsinchu. 
Figure 4.6.4 The distribution of event according to the higher proportion at nine cities 
over the five year period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysing the CSRS data with regional factors as above may provide another aspect to 
explore more fully since it points to rates as they vary across the rural or urban city, 
especially in the north or south of the country, which exhibit a significant difference. 
Exploration of the CSRS database with other factors may provide more information 
about the trends seen. Consequently, in the following section I try to explore the 
distribution of the eight main categories with regard to gender. However, whereas I 
could measure, as above, trends with knowledge of total student numbers for any city, I 
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can only discuss gender through the data recorded within the system (see Table 4.6.10).  
According to the Table 4.6.10, ‗violent and deviant behaviour‘ events are principally 
associated with male (80.6 %) compared to female (19.4 %) students, around eight to 
two. In contrast, the proportion recorded in the ‗illegal event for children and teenager 
(under eighteen)‘ demonstrates the opposite trend, in that it was near six in female (57.8 
%) to four in male (42.2 %). 
It is interesting to note that most of the proportion of male to female was six to four, 
including ‗accident‘ events, the ‗security-related‘ events, ‗counseling conflict‘ events, 
‗natural disasters‘ and ‗other‘ events. This proportion showed the frequency of campus 
security events are overall recorded as related to male more than female students.  
Table 4.6.10 The distribution of the main event compared gender with five year  
Years  
Main categories 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) Count (%) 
Accident 
event 
Male 6241  15.5 4810  12.0 4528  11.3 4269  10.6 4997  12.4 24845  61.7 
Female 4109  10.2 3150  7.8 2669 6.6 2562 6.4 2910 7.2 15400 38.3 
Security-related 
event 
Male 696  13.1 596  11.2 669 12.6 572 10.8 646  12.2 3179 60 
Female 457 8.6 366 6.9 406 7.7 382 7.2 512 9.7 2123 40 
Violence & 
Deviance behaviour 
Male 1424 9.7 1387 9.4 2842 19.3 2773 18.8 3437 23.4 11863 80.6 
Female 356 2.4 394 2.7 652 4.4 608 4.1 842 5.7 2852 19.4 
Counseling conflict 
event 
Male 91  7.2 129 10.3 219 17.4 181 14.4 241  19.2 861 68.4 
Female 47  3.7 67 5.3 93 7.4 83 6.6 107 8.5 397 31.6 
Illegal event for 
children & teenager  
(under 18) 
Male 248 1.8 522 3.9 933 6.9 1503 11.1 2478 18.4 5684 42.2 
Female 501 3.7 942 7.0 1422 10.5 2104 15.6 2831 21 7800 57.8 
Natural Disaster 
event 
Male 46  27.1 18 10.6 7  4.1 25 14.7 18 10.6 114  67.1 
Female 37 21.8 6  3.5 1  0.6 3 1.8 9  5.3 56  32.9 
Other Campus event 
Male 98 4.6 201  9.4 224 10.5 324  15.2 450  21.1 1297 60.7 
Female 72  3.4 131 6.1 152 7.1 230 10.8 254 11.9 839  39.3 
Disease evnet 
Male 1567 5.0 2918 9.3 1715 5.5 4409 14.1 6124 19.5 16733 53.4 
Female 1699 5.4 2560 8.2 1871 6.0 3375 10.8 5115 16.3 14620 46.6 
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Figure 4.6.5 The distribution of the main event compared gender with five year 
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Following this brief comparison by gender, what we see in respect to any correlation 
such comparison may help to discover more possible trends of event (see Table 4.5.11). 
Before discussing the detail of time, we need to bear in mind that in Taiwan, the 
academic year has two semesters, from September to January, with the second one 
running from February to June. 
As can be seen from Table 4.6.11, there are two time peaks directly associated with 
accident event; the highest rate was on October (5,366 cases) which is one month after 
the start of new academic year. The second peak shows in May (4,305 cases), two 
months before the end of the second term. Security-related events have a slight 
fluctuation during the term. The violence and deviance behaviour event has a similar 
trend to that of the accident event, but the highest peak was in April (1,999 cases) and 
the second one appears in October (1,788 cases) (see Figure 4.6.6).  
Otherwise, illegal events relating to children and teenagers (under eighteen) also 
reached the highest rate in October (1,836 cases). Finally, disease events had the highest 
number of events in June (6,766 cases) and the second peak in October (5,910 cases). 
Generally speaking, the first peak of events appeared in October, the second month of 
new academic year, and the second one was in June, the final month of the second term. 
Table 4.6.11 The distribution between the main-categories and month 
Month 
Main-categories 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Accident event 2516 1986 4058 3752 4305 3171 1256 1294 4344 5366 4672 4621 41341 
Security-related event 633 512 883 821 862 650 344 345 844 973 906 685 8458 
Violence & Deviance 
behaviour  
811 570 1381 1999 1941 1201 266 311 1623 1788 1594 1543 15028 
Counseling conflict vent 80 67 127 142 161 116 26 50 128 142 152 131 1322 
Illegal event for children 
& teenager (under 18) 
883 709 1255 1322 1459 966 348 518 1449 1836 1476 1544 13765 
Natural Disaster event 14 4 11 26 54 287 321 350 479 390 27 133 2096 
Other Campus even 206 125 178 250 287 198 134 131 392 376 313 262 2852 
Disease event 1351 886 1766 1876 3948 6766 275 421 2569 5910 3531 2905 32204 
Total 6494 4859 9659 10188 13017 13355 2970 3420 11828 16781 12671 11824 117066 
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In general, examining the campus security events by time has presented multiple and 
significant trends across five years. The data also allow us to examine time not merely 
by month or by time of event during a 24 hour period (see Table 4.6.12). The Table 
4.6.12 shows the highest peak of the accident events appeared at 11.00a.m., one hour 
before the break time in the midday, the second and third high frequencies were at 9.00 
a.m., one hour after the start of classes, and at 4.00p.m., nearly one hour before the 
classes are over. Furthermore, a similar daily pattern occurs in the violence and 
deviance behaviour event (see Figure 4.6.7). 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the high proportion of the counseling conflict event 
occurred at a particular time. For example, the first peak appeared at one hour before the 
start of school, and the second one happened at one hour after the first class. The third 
high frequency came off before the lunch time, and the forth took place at the second 
class after lunch break. Otherwise, not surprisingly, most of the illegal events for 
children & teenager (under eighteen) and disease events were reported at the start of the 
school which is the principal time a school will contact its students.  
Generally speaking, the highest proportion of events, in total, appeared at the starting 
time of the school from 7.00-8.00a.m. as shown in the bottom row. After that, the 
second and third peaks happened at around 9.00 and 11.00 a.m. Following this, it 
dropped to the lowest point at lunch time. Then the cases have gradually increased from 
after lunch time at 2.00 p.m. Finally, the events combined total categories remained 
steady between 2.00 and 4.00 p.m., which was over 6,650 and under 6,760 cases. 
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Figure 4.6.6 The distribution of event by month over a five year period 
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Table 4.6.12 The comparison of main categories with time (24 hours) 
Time 
categories 
none 
00:00 
00:59 
01:00 
01:59 
02:00 
02:59 
03:00 
03:59 
04:00 
04:59 
05:00 
05:59 
06:00 
06:59 
07:00 
07:59 
08:00 
08:59 
09:00 
09:59 
10:00 
10:59 
11:00 
11-59 
12:00 
12:59 
13:00 
13:59 
14:00 
14:59 
15:00 
15:59 
16:00 
16:59 
17:00 
17:59 
18:00 
18-59 
19:00 
19:59 
20:00 
20:59 
21:00 
21:59 
22:00 
22:59 Total 
Accident event 1667 458 369 285 220 248 653 2292 1849 2069 2993 2381 3112 2215 2649 2911 2638 2930 2176 1643 1608 1572 1422 981 41341 
Security-related event 714 248 237 252 151 107 218 454 487 380 471 390 448 380 441 443 450 410 324 289 353 287 253 271 8458 
Violence & Deviance 
behaviour  
753 202 131 125 81 59 79 372 615 614 1172 778 1396 631 852 1087 1279 1509 825 494 607 550 532 285 15028 
Counseling conflict 
event 
73 2 2 1 1 2 2 68 142 106 148 109 139 74 65 138 67 38 38 28 31 25 19 4 1322 
Illegal event for 
children & teenager 
(under 18) 
2701 115 118 83 56 54 155 474 1128 541 871 391 796 419 559 644 696 708 599 596 865 440 445 311 13765 
Natural Disaster event 324 38 21 16 20 49 76 141 232 93 159 78 116 54 88 184 67 60 45 25 126 21 26 37 2096 
Other Campus even 260 44 33 18 24 16 33 157 321 218 312 125 159 96 148 161 146 113 105 94 91 53 61 64 2852 
Disease event 4427 173 139 99 99 90 151 606 5756 3267 3676 1464 1864 854 984 1190 1384 882 1291 1060 1641 427 395 285 32204 
Total 10919 1280 1050 879 652 625 1367 4564 10530 7288 9802 5716 8030 4723 5786 6758 6727 6650 5403 4229 5322 3375 3153 2238 117066 
Figure 4.6.7 The main categories and years compared with time (24 hours) 
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Both the analyses with month and time factors above have demonstrated the recording 
of events occurs according to a certain rhythm, reflecting the peaks and troughs of 
activity, periods when there is likely to be more monitoring of activity and so on. 
Moreover, the participants who are involved in the events may be another main factor 
shaping the risk record. Consequently, I compared the main categories with different 
levels of schools (see Table 4.6.13). It is clear that the primary school occupied nearly 
one-third (44,295 cases) of the proportion, compared with the total number of schools 
and the highest incidence of event in this educational level was ‗disease‘ event (24,505 
cases). Moreover, the high school has ranked the second (27,811 cases) over five year 
period, and nearly thirty per cent of the events at high school were cause by ‗accident‘ 
category. Then the third place was taken by university (25,132 cases) (see Figure 4.6.8). 
It may worth noting that nearly two-third of the proportion was ‗accident‘ at university 
as well. Finally, the secondary school was located at fourth, both ‗violence and deviance 
behaviour‘ and ‗illegal events for children & teenager (under eighteen)‘ with a similar 
proportion, and they contained over half of the percentage at this level of school.  
To summarise, the comparison of the eight main categories with the school level 
showed some significant trends at different levels of school. Indeed, every level of 
school may get different types of event, which may be influenced by some multiple 
factors or students‘ activities, which I explore in the later section during my discussion 
of the annual report prepared by the CSRC. 
Table 4.6.13 Comparison of the main categories with school level 
 School  
Main-categories kindergarten 
Primary  
school 
Secondary 
school 
High  
school 
University Total 
Accident event 48 9334 3826 10767 17356 41331 
Security-related event 26 2422 1363 2271 2374 8456 
Violence & Deviance 
behaviour  
0 1275 5926 6415 1412 15028 
Counseling conflict vent 0 329 458 474 61 1322 
Illegal event for children & 
teenager (under 18) 
4 4458 5111 4048 139 13760 
Natural Disaster event 5 1281 349 300 161 2096 
Other Campus even 1 691 489 1093 576 2850 
Disease event 220 24505 1982 2443 3053 32203 
Total 304 44295 19504 27811 25132 117046 
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The discussion above highlighted the distribution of the eight main categories of event 
at different levels of schools from kindergarten to university. Among the numerous 
campus security events that have been recorded into the system, some relate to injury to 
students and staff. Therefore, the next comparison data focused on the nature of injury 
events within the eight main categories (see Table 4.6.14). Table 4.6.14 demonstrates 
that there were 101,481 cases relating to the injury condition. Broadly speaking, over 
half percentage of events did not cause injury to the clients, the 58,347 cases were 
normal and 1,350 cases were missing. However, nearly one-third of the events have 
caused minor injury to individuals and about five per cent of the cases caused serious 
injury to clients. Moreover, the 4,153 death have recorded in the database over five 
years. Otherwise, over 75% of the death cases caused by accident events which arrived 
3,193 cases; and the second high proportion of event were followed by disease event 
which caused 793 deaths.  
Incidents of death varied by time and month (see Figure 4.6.9 and 10). As can be seen, 
on Figure 4.5.9, the highest proportion of the death happened in October (388 cases). 
The second rank was in May (375 cases) with similar peak as the highest one. The 
Figure 4.6.10 shows that there were a gradual increased of the death cases from 129 
cases, at 8.00a.m., to 214 cases, at 11.00a.m. Then it has decreased significantly to 160 
cases at 8.00pm. After that, the number of event rise steadily to the peak with 276 cases 
in 4.00p.m. Finally, the death cases drop to a second low point with 147 cases at six 
o‘clock in the afternoon. 
The diversity of the multiple factors above presents more widely notions of the campus 
security events which provide some possible trends or patterns for manager‘s to 
understand and prevent future reoccurrence of events which appear to have greatest risk 
of occurrence at certain times of the day and year at particular time. The exploration of 
Figure 4.6.8 The distribution of the main categories with school level 
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the data also relates to the client‘s age (see Figure 4.6.11). According to the Figure, the 
highest proportions of the event occurred at the client age between seventeen and 
nineteen, and were around 23,000 cases, approximately the end year of high school and 
the beginning year of the university period. It is worth noticing that the higher event 
ratio began at age five to seven, and was about 12,000 cases, which is about the first and 
second year in primary school. After that, the event ratio has decreased gradually until 
age twelve (10,000 cases). Then the second high point occurred between ages twelve 
and fourteen which is the first or second year at the secondary school, nearly 17,000 
cases. The event ratio then reduces to the age just before seventeen (just over 15,000 
cases) a situation in this period time similar to the primary stage.  
 
Table 4.6.14 Comparison of main-categories with the injury condition 
 Injury condition  
Main-categories Death 
Heavy 
injury 
Minor 
injury 
Normal Missing Total 
Accident event 3193 4614 22814 9584 36 40241 
Violence & Deviance behaviour  107 82 560 4495 52 5296 
Counseling conflict vent 29 250 2269 11854 308 14710 
Illegal event for children & teenager (under 18) 1 7 188 1054 8 1258 
Natural Disaster event 30 59 1261 11192 941 13483 
Other Campus even 0 2 0 3 1 6 
Disease event 793 159 5366 20165 4 26487 
Total  4153 5173 32458 58347 1350 101481 
 
Figure 4.6.9 The proportion of the death rate compared the event with month  
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Figure 4.6.10 The proportion of deaths compared with time (24 hours)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.11 The distribution of clients‘ across different age  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To conclude, from 2004 to 2008, most of the events in the CSRS were reported as being 
at C-level, i.e. nearly sixty per cent; the second one was A-level, just over one-third in 
total. The examination of the proportion with the main categories shows that the 
category of ‗accident‘ got the highest reporting rate, over thirty per cent, followed by the 
category of ‗disease‘, nearly one-third of the event. Consequently, the comparison of the 
data highlights that the highest increase of event was the category of ‗illegal event 
involving children and teenagers (under eighteen)‘, with a five-fold rise; and the 
category of ‗disease‘ which saw a tripling in number. Moreover, the distribution of main 
categories with five years pointed out that 443.64 cases may occur per 100,000 students. 
Elsewhere, the analyses of sub-categories presented some specific distribution of events 
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within each category. For example, in the accident category the highest incidence event 
was ‗traffic accident out of campus‘, over half of the percentage in total; the second one 
was ‗injury from playing sport or hobby‘. Furthermore, the ‗general fight‘ event has 
created the highest percentage in the ‗violent and deviance behaviour‘ category; also, 
some sub-categories may be worth noticing because of their significantly increased ratio, 
such as the sub-category of ―the drugs prevention and cure law‖, which showed a 
domestic increase in the use of illegal drugs by students on/off campus; and the ‗gang 
violence on campus‘ which has also increased ten-fold, suggesting that the campus 
security events were not only caused by internal students but also by external people 
from off-campus. Consequently, the category of ‗illegal event involving children and 
teenagers‘ seems a particularly sensitive issue for managers and may well provide a 
focus for managing risks through moves towards greater social disciplining of behaviour. 
For example, the ‗sexual assault‘ (under eighteen) and ‗sex harassment‘ (under eighteen) 
increased significantly while some sub-categories such as ‗running away from home 
(for more than) three days‘, the ‗high risk family‘ and the ‗use of harmful drug‘ appear 
to reflect similar social phenomena and student behaviour; however, normally such 
factors are out of the control of schools.  
Besides, the comparison of main categories with multiple factors, such as region, time, 
gender and different level of school, demonstrated more diverse trends of event. For 
instance, the contrast of cities with years highlights that high frequency events may 
occur in some cities/counties. Counting the total population of students in a city we find 
some dramatic changes in particular cities. The comparison of gender across the main 
categories shows that the event rate is higher among males than it is females. Such 
phenomenon appeared at most of the categories except the ‗illegal event for children 
and teenager (under eighteen)‘. Moreover, the comparison of the main categories with 
the factor of month presented that the highest event ratio appeared in October and the 
second peak occurred in June. Consequently, the examination of the categories with the 
factor of time, during a 24 hour period, demonstrated more specific patterns on each 
category. For example, the highest peak of the ‗accident‘ events appeared at 11.00a.m; 
the high proportion of the ‗counseling conflict‘ event occurred at some particular time, 
such as one hour before the start of school and one hour after the first class; and most of 
the ‗illegal events for children & teenager (under eighteen)‘ and ‗disease‘ events were 
reported at the start of the school, which is the staring time of school to contact the 
clients; then the highest proportion of events, in total, appeared at the starting time of 
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the school from 7-.00-8.00 a.m.. 
The discussion and exploration above of the data illustrates the ways in which 
risk-related events are lodged in the system, the patterns of recording and their variance 
by time, region, or gender and so on. How these are handled was indicated briefly with 
the various cases I recounted earlier in the Chapter. Together these show the operational 
functioning of the CSRS, and point to the way managers‘ reporting is governed by the 
available categories, and how the latter have also changed over time. The assumption is 
that by understanding and studying these events the system may provide some 
experience and guidance for managers to identify possible risk areas and prevent similar 
events in the future and may supply some simulated situations for students to 
understand how to avoid potential and similar threats.  
The comparison and contrast above of the eight main categories and part sub-categories 
within the database analysis highlights many possible and significant risks and their 
trends over time. From a regional point of view, the analysis of data with cities 
presented a clear sketch of the pattern of events in each city/county which may give 
managers more information to develop some suitable or useful strategies; such analyses 
may prevent the event happening within their area of governance. Some significant 
risky trends have also been discovered related to the time or month and suggest high 
potential threats of risk across different levels of school. Without this enormous volume 
of data to support the exploration of risk, any individual campus event may be seen as 
the tip of an iceberg, with significant trends hidden beneath the surface. 
The patterns over the five years period report a number of common features: a growing 
incidence in the actual number of risk-related events; a change in the relative 
importance of some types of event – such as the growth in illegal drug use; a highly 
gendered and to a lesser extent geographically related pattern; and a temporal pattern 
that relates to the start of the college year and college day. Managers record these events 
to a system that conveys the information upwards through a hierarchical reporting 
structure, reflecting both organizational and legal requirements. Clearly, there is an 
extremely large volume of data being captured here which has to be ordered and 
structured in such a way as to provide the basis for feedback and more general 
guidelines to schools and colleges. As Foucault argues, government seeks to deploy its 
‗power‘ to manage risk, which may be demonstrated through understanding the design, 
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development and modification of the CSRS. Such ‗power‘ not only allowed the 
designers to handle any risky event through a management scheme but also gives them 
the authority to build a disciplined reporting system that maintains some degree of 
control. Also, this power may build more directions for operators to follow, a good 
example being the modification of the main and sub-categories and the classification of 
the three levels of severity of events. The system has built a national network through a 
directive from the Ministry of Education, which together may be classified as forming 
an official bureaucratic structure. Both the regulation and direction of the system are 
shaped by the ‗power‘ of the reporting regime on behalf of the Taiwanese government. 
The main aim of the system is to try to reduce, handle and control every risky event, if 
the working function of the governance task is to be successful. 
It seems that the CSRS has provided the basis for extensive governance and 
management functions for schools, cities/counties, and improved the transfer time of the 
information about risks for managers from local schools to governments to handle the 
vast number of campus events more efficiently. Positively, the system has established a 
platform for communication between different levels of school and educational 
management regimes, using the discursive repertoire provided by the categories. 
However, the discussion so far has been simply about the database in the system and the 
function of it. If we are keen to look behind the figures an explore the phenomenon of 
the system‘s operational function, one of the possible ways may be to explore the 
opinion of people using the system now. This is the central concern of the next chapter. 
In the following section I will discuss some suggestions and reviews found in the annual 
reports of campus security events which were analyzed by the CSRC, since the 
exploration of such secondary data may provide us with a sense of how risks are 
perceived at a general level, and what management responses have emerged. 
4.7 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter is not to produce an analysis of (the extensive) primary data 
to generate recommendations for policy making, but to explain and show how the 
system has been designed to function and the trends apparent within the database in the 
CSRS, established to improve the governance and monitoring of the campus security 
events around the country. Such a system demonstrated how a hierarchical organization 
driven by government requirements implements a policy of protection and governance 
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of large-scale campus security events. The discursive power of risk-management which 
provides the basis for strong risk governance may constrain a citizen‘s freedom or create 
a heavy reporting workload for risk managers, and sometimes have side-effects on risk 
management itself. Indeed, the CSRS showed the level of management competence in 
handling the multiple campus events and may also help answer some questions which 
were discussed in the literature review chapter of my thesis. Firstly, the modification of 
the main and sub categories for governing the increasing campus events in the CSRS 
may be evidence of the fact that the scope of risk was sometimes changed by the 
transition of social activities or sub-cultures such as the cyber crimes or disputed events 
caused by innovation in technologies. The campus security event categories have been 
modified several times because of the new types of events created by the change in 
students‘ behavior and how this is perceived and registered by those operating the 
system. For example, the events of ‗running away from home‘ may be caused by 
students‘ peer group pressure, one of the youth sub-culture. Some events may be caused 
by poor domestic relationships or be affected by the friends such as some invisible 
friends through internet. Some factors may come from the influence of community such 
as ‗gang violence on campuses‘. Secondly, the standardization of the risk may be one of 
the effective ways for hierarchical organizations to manage risk. The managers‘ capacity 
with regard to the evaluation and assessment of the risks may be different due to 
personal experience, ability, and knowledge. The standard regulations and rules which 
were designed for school managers may help reduce the difference across campuses in 
managers‘ performance. As Foucault argues, the establishing of discipline and 
regulation may empower the government to handle and operate a risk management 
system in which the management function is top-down in a hierarchical organization. 
However, as Bijker highlights, through the concept of SCOT, the actual production and 
interpretive ‗work‘ within such systems and through which they are built is key; this 
means that it is important to attend to the voices, opinions, experiences and problems 
encountered by operators, often located at the lower level of management, and an 
interactive dynamic that is a kind of information feedback through bottom-up links 
between managers and operators in the organization. This interaction may reinforce, or 
sometimes challenge, the internal dynamic of a hierarchical culture in managing risk. In 
respect to the first, the modification of the categories, for example, was a result of 
interaction between the system managers and the opinion of the operators. The recorded 
data does not, however, present the manager‘s personal experience and opinion about 
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operating the system from their point of view. This is something I explore in detail in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
More generally, the analysis of the databases presented the dissimilarity of risky trends 
at different levels of school. As Douglas describes, the relationships of social contexts at 
the hierarchical organizations are high grid/ high group culture. All the cases in this 
chapter study were collected from different levels of schools and different geopolitical 
locations of cities. Such regimes have a similar bureaucratic culture which made it 
possible to achieve the massive data recording in the system. Without the contribution 
of managers in different stages of education, the system goals may not be achieved. 
Examining the CSRS may find that every school has been contained in the same risk 
management system and regulated by a governance/surveillance culture. The analyses 
of the reported events demonstrated some possible trends and potential risky conditions. 
For example, the environmental element may link with the levels of school, the member 
factor may contain student‘s age or gender and the regional causes may reflect the 
dynamic play of sub-cultural differences between rural county and urban city. 
Nevertheless, comparing the ratio of the total population of students with the number of 
events we find that the pattern is disproportionate because the event reporting rates of 
some cities were unexpected when compared with the total population of students in the 
city. Therefore, it could be a reasonable inference that the reports of campus security 
events may not fully reflect the actual pattern in those cities/counties. Consequently, 
some patterns may be worth considering such as the city that reached the highest event 
report ratio did not get the highest of number of student; otherwise, some city and 
county had similar event reporting ratio but the number of students were a ten-fold 
difference, compared the total population of students on both areas. It may be argued 
that if the discipline in the CSRS becomes established, as Foucault might argue, the 
reporting ratio should not get a huge difference between rural and urban cities. As 
Douglas points out, however, the attitude of facing risk may be different from person to 
person or region to region and this may explain why the different risk patterns are 
created in those areas. Furthermore, the number of students have decreased across the 
five years, while the event reporting ratio still has a significant increase year by year, 
such phenomenon may provide evidence, as Beck highlights, that new type of risks 
have been created by the innovation of technology in the ‗risk society‘. Combining the 
patterns above may explain why it is that although the technology has influenced the 
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society and culture, the acceptability and so the actual reporting of risk may be different 
by regional characteristics, local culture, and even local sub-culture.  
Evidently, the classification and categories of the campus security events have evolved 
and adjusted to be what is seen as being comprehensive. As Beck argues, specific rules 
and institutions are developed and designed to identify and assess risk for citizens. The 
CSRC relied on information technology to improve the risk management tasks on 
campus. There is no doubt that the CSRS has acted to support the government to govern 
risk events. However, it is unavoidable that new types of campus security events will 
happen with the ongoing innovation of modern technologies, which may influence 
educational institutions and society as well. Inescapably, risk management systems have 
to be modified and the operational functions and regulations have to be regulated to help 
enhance operators‘ ability in dealing with the varied campus events. Therefore, the 
experience in dealing with campus security events may provide important lessons for 
newcomers to this field of work.  
Approaching the issue from a SCOT perspective (Bijker and Pinch, 1990), we can argue 
that the modification and evolution of the CSRS tries to solve perceived problems 
identified by different groups, reported by the school operators and found in the annual 
analyses of the database, to achieve the functions of the CSRS and to prevent some 
invisible and potential events for risk management. The annual reports not only pointed 
out potential threats from the historical record data but also supported some useful 
information that may reduce possible campus security events in the future. In theory, 
this task of researching the historical event should reduce the likelihood of events 
because it may help people to understand the risk; however, in practice, the event still 
happens frequently, as found through the data analysis. Studying the annual reports one 
sees comment on similar types of events at different level of school and the potential 
threats at specific times, and they also provide a similar type of analysis and repeat 
reviews and recommendations across the five years. Therefore, the function of the 
annual report may appear to be one of a standard procedural task for the hierarchical 
organization. Consequently, it is important to go beyond the reports and to explore the 
interaction between managers and schools and the sub-cultural dynamic at work within 
the school. 
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From the SCOT point of view, the discovery of operator‘s opinion and views on the 
system should provide important information on the framing of risk. Consequently, 
some questions arise after this exploration of the database provided in this chapter. What 
is the operator‘s personal experience and opinion in regard to operating the CSRS? 
What is the manager‘s opinion about the dynamic of organizational culture through 
which the management of risk events occurs? What is the manager‘s feeling and 
experience when facing or after dealing with the campus security events? Both the 
discussion of the system database and the annual reports above was based on 
information recorded by those actors working within Taiwan‘s educational system. 
From the CSRS perspective, the data is a simple automatic log of risks that reflect rising 
trends in various forms of danger. But, how such events and risks actually enter the 
system is far from automatic. Therefore, I have designed a questionnaire for collecting 
my second primary data based on the personal opinions of people who operate the 
system at school, focusing on the manager‘s viewpoints directly. So the following 
Chapter moves on to the discussion on the managers‘ opinions about operating the 
CSRS within Taiwan‘s high schools. 
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Chapter 5: Using the CSRS: managing risk  
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter explained the development and background of the CSRS, and 
provided an analysis of the pattern of risk as reflected in the database and its changes 
over time; I also discussed the annual reports published by the CSRC and how these can 
be seen as both functional and symbolic policy documents. As described before, the 
huge volume of data recorded in the system, which demonstrates the comprehensive and 
extensive reporting of events at schools and colleges, was produced by the system 
operators around the country. As a digital system, its design, subsequent development 
and use will reflect diverse interests and needs, a point noted generally within the SCOT 
approach (see Bijker 1989: 35). Different social groups may come into conflict because 
the framing and utility of the technology are influenced by the personal experience, 
needs or the knowledge of users. Eventually, a technical system may evolve and 
stabilize through discussion of the system‘s function and the solution it provides to 
questions that arise, as well as questions caused by the system, with different interests 
shaping problems and how they should be resolved. 
The purpose of this chapter is to focus attention on the operators‘ opinions and whether 
they have similar or differing views about the design and utility of the system; these 
participants are responsible for the management or operation of the system and they 
have to deal with campus security events at school. As described in the methodology 
chapter, in Taiwan, there is a group of special staff working in the educational system 
who come from the Ministry of National Defence: their responsibility relates to the 
governance of campus security and the instruction of students in the concept of military 
and national security. Some of the staff originally worked in the military then 
transferred from there to the education system, others were recruited after they had 
graduated from university. According to the Ministry of Education, there were around 
3,700 military staff working at 161 Universities (including Colleges) and 487 high 
schools around the country in 2009. As can be seen, one of the responsibilities of these 
staff is to operate the CSRS.  
The chapter is divided into four sections and a closing summary. The first part describes 
the characteristics of participants, presenting their background and role. The second 
section explains the design of the questionnaire and the basic description of the 
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demographic profile of the respondents. The third section focuses on the respondents‘ 
opinions relating in broad terms to the management of risk, captured through the main 
items on the questionnaire. The fourth section explores some questions and responses in 
more depth to illustrate some specific patterns identified from respondents‘ answers. 
The fifth and final section provides a summary and the conclusions of the chapter. 
5.2 The managers' backgrounds and the survey sample  
The function of CSRS is built on an information technology (IT) system designed to 
serve the education system; its concept was constructed on the basis of a command and 
control relationship between the education system and the national disaster management 
centre. As described in the methodology chapter, the structure of the system contained 
three management levels, from central government to local government then to schools. 
This is clearly a hierarchical set of relations and in Douglas and Wildavsky‘s (1982) 
terms has a strong ‗grid‘ characteristic. What is of interest in this chapter is whether this 
is also reflected in the perceptions of risk among the users, and their assessments of the 
system. This may vary by position and length of time using the system, so, as I show 
later, one way to understand the real situation of the actors‘ concept of risk within the 
educational system is to explore their views after they have had some experience of 
using the system.  
As I noted in the methodology chapter, my thesis focuses on 393 high schools, which 
are managed by the Taiwan Province, and the integration and command structure within 
the whole educational administrative system suggests a high/grid and high/group form 
of bureaucratic culture. According to the Department of Education in Taiwan Province, 
there are approximately 2,013 staff assigned to manage and operate this system in those 
high schools. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the users‘ attitudes through 
the quantitative data collected by a questionnaire. As noted above, the participants have 
worked in a highly bureaucratic culture. Thus, before I sent out the questionnaire and 
started the quantitative data collection, I visited the head of the Military Office at the 
Department of Education in Taiwan Province, which is responsible for managing 393 
high schools that formed the focus for my survey, not only to explain the goals of my 
research but also to show an authorization document which provided evidence that the 
CSRS had approved my research. By doing so, my fieldwork for the data collection was 
more acceptable and likely to get a higher return. Each year a training schedule set by 
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the Department of Education in Taiwan Province brings high school staff together. I 
used the opportunity in July 2009 to attend this national training conference which 
brought together around 1,150 staff and which provided me with a chance to collect the 
quantitative data. Consequently, the questionnaires were sent out during three series of 
annual staff training conferences between the 15
th
 July and 24
th
 July, in 2009. This 
sample population is, therefore, drawn from the people who participated in the training 
conferences, which comprises just over half of the total population of staff at the 
national level. 
Eventually, the questionnaires were sent out to 359, 398 and 397 groups of respondents 
respectively during the three training conferences. There were 1,154 questionnaire 
copies delivered and 1,055 returned in total. The proportion of questionnaires returned 
was, therefore, about 91%. After examining the returned questionnaires, there were 923 
responses seen as valid and 132 invalid responses within the 1,055 returned copies. The 
923 valid questionnaires were then rechecked in terms of the detail of response to the 
range of questions: some respondents agreed with every item which I decided seemed to 
be doubtful and simply an automatic ‗box-ticking‘ of replies. I discounted these which 
left me with 805 to analyse in total. 
5.3 The questionnaire design and distribution of the survey 
As noted earlier, a pilot of the questionnaire used to collect the quantitative data had 
been completed before the actual survey. In this section I will focus on two points, the 
measurement of research and the questionnaire design, to explain the quantitative 
element of the fieldwork. Before the discussion of the survey data, I will discuss the 
concept of research design and the function of measurement, focusing on the 
questionnaire and the measurement targets of the survey. Then the discussion will move 
onto the basic distribution of the survey results themselves.  
5.3.1 The questionnaire design  
As described in the methodology chapter, the research method used to collect the 
quantitative data was a questionnaire given to operators/managers of the CSRS. 
Generally speaking, five main variables were taken into account in the design of the 
questionnaire; the first variable relates to the participants‘ background and personal 
characteristics, the second to the respondents‘ experience of using the technical 
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management system. The survey then addressed their perceptions about operating the 
system. Following this, the focus moved onto their personal opinion about the 
organisational culture and risk management. The final topic explored personal 
experience in dealing with campus security events. I try to explore the causal links 
between each variable; and the basic concept of my research design and the comparative 
process is shown below (see Figure 5.3.1.1). In the following section I will provide 
detail on each main variable as they appear in the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
According to the Figure above, the first main variable focuses on participants‘ personal 
information which has itself been divided into nine sub-variables. The questionnaire 
asked participants to tick a code from each variable, which identified the managers‘ 
background. The operational definitions of nine variables are outlined below.   
A. Basic information  
1. Rank:  
This identified the military rank of a participant, divided into four groups: 
Lieutenant, Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel. 
2. Gender:  
The participant‘s gender: Male or Female.  
3. Job position in department:  
The participants‘ current positions and their period of service at school: 
There were four options： General staff (under 2 years), General staff (over and 
include 2 years), Supervisor of Department and Head of Department. 
Figure 5.3.1.1 The correlation explored between the main variables 
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4. Type of school the respondent working in now:  
The type of school which a participant served in; there were four options: General 
High School, Vocational High School, Complete School and Liaison Office 
[city/county management centre]. 
5. The time respondents have been working in the Military Training Office:  
The time which the participant have been working at the MTO, there were four 
options：under 2 years, 2 to under 5 years, 5 to under 10 years and over 10 years. 
6. The time respondents have been working at the current school:  
The time which the participants have been working at the current school, there were 
four options：Under 2 years, 2 to under 5 years, 5 to under 10 years and over 10 
years  
7. Academic Qualification: 
The participants‘ academic degree - including University/College, Master and PhD. 
8. Military Training Background:  
Participants‘ military training background, according to their military training level, 
including Basic training, Intermediate training, Advanced commander training and 
‗Summit‘ training. 
9. The respondents‘ current role in the campus security at school:  
This asked the participants if their current jobs related to campus security 
management. 
The second section related to participants‘ personal experience of using the technical 
management system. Participants were asked to tick either yes or no box to each 
question (see Table 5.3.1.1). The actual questions appear below: 
Table 5.3.1.1 The personal experience of using the technical management system  
The focus of the question 
10. Have you had any experience of operating any other similar systems elsewhere before operating 
this system? 
11. Was that similar security report system used in the military? 
12. Did you receive any training from school before you first operated this system? 
13. Did you receive any information about why the Minister of Education designed this system? 
14. Did you receive any analysis report or result about ‗campus accident events‘ from the Minister of 
Education? 
After the collection of this objective information, the next three sections focus on 
satisfaction in regard to operating the CSRS, to capture wider subjective perspectives 
from the operators‘ viewpoints, including personal attitudes about the experience of 
operating this system, viewpoints relating to the risk management process within the 
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organizational culture, and personal experience of dealing with the campus security 
events. This range of data was collected using a closed-ended questionnaire and Likert 
scale. 
The first part of this section focused on participants‘ opinions about some processes and 
concepts of operating the CSRS (see Table 5.3.1.2). Generally speaking, in this section I 
tried to explore the participants‘ opinion about operating the system to determine 
whether there were any problems using the technical system.  
Table 5.3.1.2 Personal opinions about operating the CSRS 
The focus of the question 
15. Do you think that the reporting procedures are simple and easy to follow? 
16. This system is effective for schools to manage risk events. 
17. This system provides a good communication channel in managing risk for the education system. 
18. Student security is more important than studying at school. 
19. The operating training provides enough knowledge for you to operate this system. 
20. The classifications of the event in the system are clear and include every sort of event. 
21. The system categories may change because of the interest in some events from the media  
I then explored operators‘ views on managing risk through the organisational culture 
(see Table 5.3.1.3). Here I was interested in asking about managing risk events on 
campus including issues about the obligations of the school, dealing with risk, opinions 
on personal privacy, historical data analysis and the surveillance of schools by the 
Ministry of Education. The later questions sought more critical views among the 
participants‘ about their organizations and where the boundaries between privacy and 
school reputation lie. 
Table 5.3.1.3 Personal opinion about the organisational culture 
The focus of the question 
22. A school has an obligation to deal with any events which happen to students and staffs 
23. A school has an obligation to protect personal privacy when accidents happen to students or staff 
24. This system may invade students‘ or staffs‘ privacy when transferring personal information 
25. Asking a school to report an accident is one of the functions of surveillance for the Minister of 
Education to monitor schools 
26. It is a school‘s obligation to anticipate and prevent other accidents with the help of historical 
database analysis 
27. It is an obligation of the Minister of Education to analyze the historical database 
28. Sharing information about campus security events which happened at other schools could help a 
school prevent similar events 
29. To protect the reputation of a school, sometimes the administrative manager may temporarily 
withhold information about specific events 
30. Reporting school accident events may make colleagues hostile towards you because this may be 
seen as being too ready to please management 
The final section (see Table 5.3.1.4), was designed to collect respondents‘ experience of 
managing or dealing with campus events. This concluded with a multi-choice question 
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designed at the end of the questionnaire, asking the participants to choose 
high-frequency accidents they had met before from eight main categories. 
Table 5.3.1.4 Personal experience about campus security events 
The focus of the question 
31. Accident events usually happen to particular types or groups of student 
32. Schools should notify the client that the event will be sent to the Campus Security Centre when 
dealing with the even 
33. Schools should notify the clients‘ legal guidance immediately when dealing with the event 
34. Client and his legal guardians have the right to know how a school reports the event 
35. Sporadic events which involve multiple-factors such as ‗food poisoning‘ are hard to control 
36. Some events happen with high frequency such as ‗car accidents‘, so they are hard to reduce 
37. Latent [potential or unknowable]events such as ‗suicide‘ are hard to anticipate and to manage 
38. While technology may help with risk event management, sometimes it also causes some new 
problems, for instance: recording counselling conflict events with mobile phones, posting an 
unwanted video on the internet or sending an e-mail to the minister of the Ministry of Education 
etc 
39. According to your experience from the past, which event(s) were more common in your school? 
(Multi-choice) 
Having outlined the structure and logic of the survey I now move on to the description 
of the basic distribution of the actual survey results. 
5.3.2 The distribution of the survey  
As I discussed in the previous section, after double checking the survey results, the 
return rate of the questionnaire was around ninety per cent and the valid respondents 
were 805. In this section I will explore some basic results of the survey, including the 
distribution of respondents with their background such as rank, position in department, 
working time at school and educational qualification, and the four sections of the 
questionnaire, including the proportion of respondents‘ experience of using the technical 
management system, the perspective on operating the system, attitudes towards risk 
management in relation to the wider organizational culture and their personal attitude 
towards the campus security event itself. 
5.3.2.1 Basic characteristics of the respondents 
The respondents for this quantitative research were managers who operate the CSRS in 
high schools. The first set of questions, therefore, were used to classify the participants‘ 
background, including senior/junior staff which may present by military rank and 
position in the department and other characteristics such as whether the respondent is a 
junior or senior staff member and the educational qualification they hold. The first 
variable is the rank of respondent (see Figure 5.3.2.1). As can be seen, the highest 
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proportion is major, compared with other ranks, more than 50% in total (439 
respondents [54.4 %]). What follow in sequence are the rank of lieutenant colonel (314 
respondents, 39 %), the rank of captain (51 respondents, 6.3 %) and the rank of 
lieutenant which only related to one respondent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the variable of gender (see Figure 5.3.2.2), most of the respondents are male, 
nearly three quarters in total (595 respondents), with females being just over a quarter of 
participants (210 respondents). The third variable is the position of the participant which 
was sequenced by their working time and roles at school (see Figure 5.3.2.3). There 
were 326 general staff (over 40 %) working for over (and including) two years, 194 
supervisors of department (24.1 %), 153 general staff (19 %) working for less than two 
years and 132 heads of department (16.4 %).  
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Figure 5.3.2.1 The distribution of the rank of respondents 
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Figure 5.3.2.2 The gender distribution of respondents 
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A fourth variable presented the working place of the respondents (see Figure 5.3.2.4). In 
Taiwan, there are three types of high school: general high schools, vocational schools 
and ‗complete high schools‘ [students from year 7 to year 12]. Both general high 
schools and vocational schools had a similar proportion: 352 respondents (43.7 %) and 
342 respondents (42.5 %) respectively, with only 93 respondents from complete schools 
(11.6 %). There were 18 respondents working at liaison office as the managers at the 
city/county level. 
 
 
 
 
 
The fifth and sixth variables related to the working time at the Military Training Office 
(MTO) and at the current school. Broadly speaking, nearly 40 % of respondents (306 
participants) have worked at MOT over five years and less than ten years; then 
managers working for over two years to less than five years ranked the second (198 
respondents 24.6 % (see Figure 5.3.2.5). In terms of time worked at the school, most of 
the respondents had been there for less than two years (373 respondents, 46.3 %), and 
the proportion of participants reduced gradually with the increasing of working time at 
the current school (see Figure 5.3.2.6). 
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Figure 5.3.2.3 The distribution of the respondents‘ position in the department 
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Figure 5.3.2.4 The distribution of the respondents‘ working place 
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In terms of academic and military qualifications, most of the participants had university 
qualifications (620 respondents, 77 %); and 185 participants had masters qualifications 
(23 %) (see Figure 5.3.2.7). In terms of their level of military training, the majority had 
achieved intermediate commander training (see Figure 5.3.2.8). The final variable 
focused on their current job. It can be found that around 53 % (427 participants) of 
participant were responsible for campus security, and 47 % (378 participants) were not 
(see Figure 5.3.2.9). 
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Figure 5.3.2.5 The distribution of the respondents‘ working time at MTO 
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In summary, as Table 5.3.2.1 shows, some key demographic characteristics are that the 
majority held university degrees and over half of the sample population occupied the 
rank of major; most of these are men, and over forty per cent of the respondents are 
general staff working for over two years at their current school. A significant minority (c. 
40%) of the respondents worked at the MTO for between five years and ten years, and 
three quarters of the population took the intermediate commander training in the 
military. Finally, over half of the respondents are responsible for the operation of the 
campus security system within their current work role. 
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Figure 5.3.2.8 The distribution of the respondents‘ military training background 
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Table 5.3.2.1 The demographic background of respondents     N=805 
Personal Information Number % 
1.Rank Lieutenant 1 0.1 
Captain 51 6.3 
Major 439 54.4 
Lieutenant Colonel 314 39 
2.Gender Male 595 73.9 
Female 210 26.1 
3.Position in 
Department 
General staff(under 2 years) 153 19.0 
General staff (over and include 2 year) 326 40.5 
Supervisor of Department 194 24.1 
Head of Department 132 16.4 
4.Work Place General High School 352 43.7 
Vocational High School 342 42.5 
Complete High School 93 11.6 
Liaison Office 18 2.2 
5.Period of Time 
working at 
Military Training 
Office 
under 2 year 155 19.3 
2 to under 5 years 198 24.6 
5 to under 10 years 306 38.0 
over 10 years 146 18.1 
6. Period of Time 
working at 
current school  
under 2 year 373 46.3 
2 to under 5 years 242 30.1 
5 to under 10 years 135 16.8 
over 10 years 55 6.8 
7. Academic 
Qualification 
University 620 77.0 
Master 185 23.0 
PhD 0 0 
8.Military 
Background 
Basic training 30 3.7 
Intermediate commander training 605 75.2 
Advance commander training 169 21.0 
Summit training 1 0.1 
9.Current Job in 
Campus security 
Yes 427 53.0 
No 378 47.0 
5.3.2.2 Personal experience of using the technical system 
The discussion above presented the respondents‘ personal background, working time 
and educational and other qualifications; in this section I will explore their experience 
of using the technical system (see Table 5.3.2.2). The first question focused on whether 
respondents had experience of operating similar management systems before. According 
to the Table, nearly seventy per cent of respondents had had a similar experience before, 
some in military settings, whereas the remainder did not. Most respondents had received 
training before they operated the system (nearly 70 %), though around a third did not 
get the training practice before using the system.  
I also wanted to explore respondents‘ knowledge of the development of the CSRS. Thus 
one question asked the participants if they had any information about the reason the 
CSRS was designed in the first place. Most of the respondents (over 80%) did, and most 
also received information about the annual reports prepared by the CSRC. 
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N=805 
 Yes (%) No (%) No 
Answer 
Have experience of operating other similar systems 556(69.1) 247(30.7) 2(0.2) 
Was that similar security report system used in the military 150(18.6) 453(56.3) 202(25.1) 
Get any training from school before first operated this system 545(67.7) 249(30.9) 11(1.4) 
Get information about the Minister of Education designed this system 650(80.7) 155(19.3) 0 
Get analysis report/ result from the Ministry of Education  599(74.4) 206(25.6) 0 
Having examined some aspects of the respondents‘ personal experience of using the 
technical system, I then sought their responses about procedures, effectiveness and 
training in the technical aspects of the system. The data is reported below in Table 
5.3.2.3. 
N=805 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mean SD 
The reporting procedures are simple 
and easy to follow 
79(9.8) 533(66.2) 116(14.4) 71(8.8) 6(0.7) 3.76 0.777 
System is effective for schools to 
manage risk events 
83(10.3) 421(52.3) 200(24.8) 80(9.9) 21(2.6) 3.58 0.898 
System provides a good 
communication channel in managing 
risk for the education system 
117(14.5) 496(61.6) 130(16.1) 50(6.2) 12(1.5) 3.81 0.810 
Student security is more important 
than studying at school 
278(34.5) 462(57.4) 58(7.2) 7(0.9) 0 4.26 0.622 
Operating training provides enough 
knowledge for you to operate this 
system 
93(11.6) 560(69.6) 117(14.5) 35(4.3) 0 3.88 0.649 
Classifications of the event in the 
system are clear and include every 
event 
70(8.7) 503(62.5) 166(20.6) 61(7.6) 5(0.6) 3.71 0.754 
System may change because of the 
interest in some events from the 
media 
141(17.5) 489(60.7) 136(16.9) 34(4.2) 5(0.6) 3.90 0.748 
Across the range of questions, it is clear that most of the responses are positive more 
than negative. Generally speaking, around sixty to seventy percent of the participants 
agreed that the systems operating procedure is simple (M=3.76; SD= 0.777), and they 
believed that it can provide an effective management function (M= 3.58; SD= 0.898) 
and communication channel for schools to manage risk events (M= 3.81; SD=0.81). 
However, around ten per cent of the respondents questioned the functionality of the 
system and showed a negative attitude to the task of risk management. 
Most of the respondents (over 90%) agreed that student security is more important than 
study and learn knowledge when they arrived and stay at school, that operator training 
provides enough knowledge to operate the system and that the classification of events is 
clear, with their main value and standard deviation as M= 4.26; SD= 0.622, and M= 
Table 5.3.2.3 Views about the operation of the CSRS 
Table 5.3.2.2 The distribution of personal experience with the CSRS 
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3.88; SD= 0.649 respectively. Moreover, most of the respondents agree that the system 
classifications are clear and include most events (M=3.71; SD=0.754); and they felt that 
the media could have an effect on reporting levels (M= 3.90; SD= 0.748).  
In summary, it can be seen that answers showed a more positive than negative attitude 
in response to this set of questions. As a bureaucratic institution, the CSRS tries to build 
a standard operational procedure for the management of risks, though this was seen to 
be subject to disruption at times if the media reporting of risk required new categories to 
be put in place. The broad picture is of a system that requires quite high levels of 
conformity to reporting procedures, and that these appear to ‗make sense‘ for most 
respondents. It was important to ask more generally about the relationship between 
these views and opinions about the wider organizational culture in regard to 
expectations about reporting and privacy, and the obligation of the school to oversee 
risk management itself (see Table 5.3.2.4). On both fronts, the majority view 
privacy/confidentiality and risk management as the prime responsibility of the school 
(M= 4.25; SD= 0.606) and (M= 4.43; SD= 0.539) respectively.   
However, as Table 5.3.2.4 below shows, it was also the case that most respondents 
agreed that personal privacy may be invaded when information was transferred through 
the system (M=3.54; SD=0.906). It is interesting to note that over forty per cent of the 
participants believe that one of the legitimate functions of the CSRS is to monitor the 
school and, yet in this regard, monitoring for many did not equate with surveillance or 
supervision of the school by the MOE (M=3.26; SD=0.988).  
Monitoring raises more strategic issues in regard to its longer-term value in the sense of 
providing data on which future action can be taken: here most felt that schools are under 
the obligation to prevent other events through the help of an analysis of the historical 
database (M= 4.00; SD= 0.623), as is also the case with the MOE (M= 3.84; SD= 
0.722). In short, most of the managers consider that educational institutions have an 
obligation to prevent the potential for accidents through lessons learned from the 
database, not surprisingly therefore, nearly ninety per cent of the participants agreed 
with the position that sharing security event information is legitimate and would help 
prevent similar events occurring in the future (M=4.03; SD=0.643). 
At the same time, there is evidence that respondents regarded protecting the school‘s 
reputation as equally important inasmuch since over 50% of the sample agreed with the 
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view that in some contexts managers temporarily withhold information about a specific 
event in order to protect the school‘s standing in the wider public domain (M=3.40; 
SD=1.012). The question of reporting events or withholding news of them is however 
also complicated by other data here which shows that about thirty per cent of 
respondents felt that their colleagues may become hostile towards them for reporting on 
risks, though around similar proportion of respondents likely to trigger this was not 
indicated (M=2.89; SD=1.02). 
Table 5.3.2.4 Perspectives on the organisational management culture 
N=805 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mean SD 
A school has an obligation to deal 
with any events  
257(31.9) 501(62.2) 37(4.6) 8(1.0) 2(0.2) 4.25 0.606 
School has an obligation to 
protect personal privacy  
366(45.5) 423(52.5) 15(1.9) 1(0.1) 0 4.43 0.539 
The system may invade 
students‘/staffs‘ privacy when 
transferring personal information 
83(10.3) 406(50.4) 185(23.0) 123(15.3) 8(1.0) 3.54 0.906 
Reporting an accident is one of 
the functions of surveillance to 
monitor schools 
76(9.4) 281(34.9) 239(29.7) 194(24.1) 15(1.9) 3.26 0.988 
School has obligation to 
anticipate and prevent other 
accidents with the help of 
historical database analysis 
138(17.1) 540(67.1) 113(14.0) 13(1.6) 1(0.1) 4.00 0.623 
The Ministry of Education has an 
obligation to analyze the 
historical database 
126(15.7) 458(56.9) 192(23.9) 28(3.5) 1(0.1) 3.84 0.722 
Sharing information about 
campus security events could 
help prevent similar events 
152(18.9) 548(68.1) 83(10.3) 20(2.5) 2(0.2) 4.03 0.643 
Protecting a school‘s reputation, 
the administrative manager may 
withhold specific events 
79(9.8) 374(46.5) 172(21.4) 152(18.9) 28(3.5) 3.40 1.012 
Reporting events may make 
colleagues hostile towards you  
50(6.2) 186(23.1) 238(29.6) 288(35.8) 43(5.3) 2.89 1.020 
To conclude, in regard to a schools‘ obligation to deal with any risk-events, protecting 
personal privacy, anticipating/preventing other events, analyzing the historical database 
and sharing the event information with other schools, most of the participants present 
positive opinions. However, nearly half of population believed that one of the functions 
of the system is to monitor the school for the higher educational regime, and a similar 
proportion also pointed out that for protecting a school‘s reputation sometimes the 
administrative managers may temporarily withhold information about some specific 
events. Here risk management is linked to reputational management and suggests an 
organisational culture whose practices are both hierarchical and sensitive to the 
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public-facing status of the educational systems as a whole. I will try to explore these 
issues through my qualitative interview data in the next chapter. 
5.3.2.3 Personal experience in dealing with campus security events 
In regard to actual events (see Table 5.3.2.5 below), the risk-reporting pattern (as we 
saw in Chapter 4) reflects a high rate of ‗accidents‘ within the broad range of categories 
available. As can be seen, nearly half of the participants confirm this in respect to their 
own experience, and note that accidents usually happen to particular types/groups of 
student (M= 3.17; SD= 1.025) and most of the respondents agreed with the statement 
that the school should notify the client (the student/parent) that information about the 
incident should be sent to the CSRC (M=3.2; SD= 0.993).  
Table 5.3.2.5 Personal experience/reporting about campus security events 
N=805 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Mean SD 
Accident events usually happen to 
particular types or groups of 
student 
44(5.5) 355(44.1) 112(13.9) 280(34.8) 14(1.7) 3.17 1.025 
Schools should notify the client the 
event will be sent to the Campus 
Security Centre when dealing with 
the even 
49(6.1) 315(39.1) 222(27.6) 187(23.2) 32(4.0) 3.20 0.993 
Schools should notify the clients‘ 
legal guidance immediately when 
dealing with the event 
275(34.2) 468(58.1) 39(4.8) 20(2.5) 3(0.4) 4.23 0.685 
Client and his legal guardians have 
the right to know how a school 
reports the event 
198(24.6) 507(63.0) 76(9.4) 23(2.9) 1(0.1) 4.09 0.677 
Sporadic events which involve 
multiple-factors such as ‗food 
poisoning‘ are hard to control 
119(14.8) 474(58.9) 111(13.8) 95(11.8) 6(0.7) 3.75 0.874 
Some events happen with high 
frequency such as ‗car accidents‘, 
so they are hard to reduce 
69(8.6) 328(40.7) 162(20.1) 231(28.7) 15(1.9) 3.25 1.024 
Latent events such as ‗suicide‘ are 
hard to anticipate and to manage. 
68(8.4) 315(39.1) 162(20.1) 246(30.6) 14(1.7) 3.22 1.028 
Technology may help with risk 
event management, sometimes it 
also causes some new problems 
270(33.5) 426(52.9) 81(10.1) 25(3.1) 3(0.4) 4.16 0.754 
Most of the participants, around ninety per cent, agreed that a school should notify 
clients in regard to any legal guidance they might need (M=4.23; SD=0.685) and clients 
have the right to know how the school reported the event to the CSRC (M=4.09; 
SD=0.677); just a few participants took a dissenting view from this. I also asked about 
their experience of types of event such as sporadic, high frequency and latent events 
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(M= 3.75; SD= 0.874; M=3.25; SD=1.024 M=3.22; SD=1.028 respectively). Generally 
speaking, nearly three quarters of the participants believe that sporadic events involve 
multiple-factors so they are hard to control as are ‗latent‘ (potential) events. Also, 
around half of the participants agreed that it is hard to reduce the incidence of some 
events that have a high frequency, though it is interesting to see that nearly thirty per 
cent of participants challenge this view. Consequently, there are around four in five of 
the participants believe that risk may accompany the using of technology itself (M=4.16; 
SD= 0.754). 
Finally, the last question was designed as multiple-choice question to conclude the 
participants‘ experience of dealing with common events (see Table 5.3.2.6), primarily   
the eight main categories according to the CSRS. It can be seen that the highest 
incidence event was ‗accident‘ (86.3 %), followed by ‗violence and deviant behaviour‘ 
(57.5 %), ‗counselling and conflict‘ events (37.5 %), security (29.7 %), disease (28.9 %), 
‗illegal‘ events relating to children and teenagers (27.6 %), ‗natural‘ events (7.8 %) and 
‗other‘ campus security events (6.3 %). Generally speaking, the report on their 
experience of recording and handling risk-events is similar to the analysis of recorded 
data in the CSRS which I discussed in the last chapter. 
Table 5.3.2.6 The frequency of personal experience of events (Multi-choice) 
N=805 
Accident Event 695(86.3) Illegal Event for Children & Teenager 222(27.6) 
Secure Preserve Event 239(29.7) Natural Disaster Event 63(7.8) 
Violence & Deviance Behavior 463(57.5) Other Campus Event 51(6.3) 
Counselling & Conflict Event 302(37.5) Disease Event 233(28.9) 
In summary, this section has presented the basic data from the survey. In broad terms it 
appears that there is a general consensus that the system ‗works‘ and that it is broadly 
functional and useful. There are though some issues thrown up by the data in regard to 
such matters as privacy, surveillance and proper and legitimate levels of monitoring and 
reporting that are worth examining more closely. In this next section, I adopt a different 
approach and cluster and compare responses across such themes in more integrative 
ways.  
5.4 Comparison of respondents' specific opinions  
The exploration above considered the main findings of the survey and managers‘ 
opinions about operating and managing the CSRS. The results provide several clues as 
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to how to manage risk more effectively and improve the prediction and prevention of 
future events; however, they were from analyses of only one independent variable, 
which simply presents the basic distribution of results with respect to a single issue. In 
order to get a better understanding of the operators using and managing the system and 
how their backgrounds reflect their broader opinions, it is necessary to compare the data 
across two or three independent variables. In this section, therefore, I will examine the 
respondents‘ opinions by comparing multiple factors across two or more variables and 
the statistical results of an independent t-test, complemented by one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA).  
The t-test and ANOVA will be used here to compare participants‘ attitudes towards the 
system with multiple variables and to distinguish respondents‘ opinions with regard to 
different issues. Brace et al. point out that the statistical function of an independent 
t-test and one way analysis of variance ANOVA can be effective ways to compare two 
or more independent groups of individuals (Brace et al. 2009: 127). I will thus examine 
respondents‘ perceptions, particularly regarding levels of satisfaction with three discrete 
but key issues. 
5.4.1 The measurement of independent t-test with respondents’ opinions about the 
operation of the CSRS 
The measurement task of this section will focus on the variables that include two groups 
of individuals, selected according to gender (Male/Female), academic qualification 
(University/Master degree) and the respondents‘ current role (whether the participant 
responses for managing the system at their current school). These variables each involve 
just two nominal sub-variables; the independent t-test task is applied to identify the 
difference between both sub-variables. Before doing this analysis, I would like to repeat 
that the Likert scale, five points on a spectrum from positive to negative, was adopted in 
the questionnaire to evaluate participants‘ attitudes, the numbers from 5 to 1 
corresponding with approval to disapproval.  
The first task is to examine participants‘ satisfaction with the operating system (see 
Table 5.4.1.1). Responses fall mainly into two categories, one relating to issues about 
the broad efficacy and utility of the system, the other the relationship of the system to 
the wider organizational culture and needs of the school/college in which it is based. 
The first independent variable, shown in the top row of Table 5.4.1.1, can be used to 
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compare participants‘ attitudes towards operating the system according to gender and it 
can be seen that only in respect to the question about the perceived clarity of the 
classification system and whether it includes every event do we see any statistical 
significance (t = 2.371; p<0.05) between male and female staff. Also, it is interesting to 
note that the mean values show male managers are more satisfied with the operation of 
the system than female managers, except over the question of whether student security 
is more important than studying at school, women being more likely than men to agree 
with this.  
Moving on to participants‘ personal opinions about operating the system measured 
against the variable of academic qualification, shown in the middle row of the table, 
there are three statistically significant results to questions relating to the effectiveness of 
the system for a school in managing risk (t=1.668; p<0.05), in acting as a good 
communication channel (t=2.779; p<0.001) and whether there is adequate training for 
operators to use the system (t=1.668; p<0.05). More generally it is clear that participants 
with a Master‘s qualification are less satisfied with the system than managers educated 
to undergraduate level, indicating an inverse relationship between qualifications and 
satisfaction. 
The next stage is to compare satisfaction with the system against the variable of whether 
participants manage the system at their current school. The results are located at the 
bottom of the table. Two results are statistically significant: one relates to the 
user-friendliness of reporting procedures (t=-1.320; p<0.05); the other to the system‘s 
function as a communication channel for managing risk events (t=-1.393; p<0.05). The 
results suggest that those currently using the system have more reservations about it 
than other staff, although the differences between some mean values are relatively small 
and, in the case of operating training, non-existent. Nevertheless, it seems that current 
system managers are more sensitive to certain issues, such as security and media calls 
for changes to the system, than non-system managers.  
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Table 5.4.1.1 Independent t-test within the comparison of personal opinions about 
operating the system measured against three variables  
N=805 
 
Procedure are 
Simple 
Effective for 
Manage risk 
Communication 
Channel 
Student 
Security 
Operation 
Training 
Clear 
Classification 
Event change 
Regulation 
Gender 
Male 3.77 3.61 3.84 4.24 3.90 3.75 3.91 
Female 3.71 3.49 3.74 4.30 3.84 3.60 3.89 
t value 0.993 1.638 1.600 -1.066 1.172 2.371* 0.284 
       P=0.029  
Academic 
Qualification 
University 3.78 3.61 3.86 4.26 3.90 3.72 3.89 
Master 3.69 3.48 3.67 4.24 3.84 3.69 3.95 
t value 1.374 1.668* 2,779*** 0.315 0.954* 0.494 -0.999 
   P= 0.012 P= 0.001  P=0.019   
Current Job 
Yes 3.72 3.58 3.78 4.27 3.88 3.74 3.92 
No 3.79 3.57 3.86 4.24 3.88 3.67 3.88 
t value -1.320* 0.106 -1.393* 0.764 -0.015 1.273 0.696 
  P= 0.013  P=0.015     
*p<.05 **<.01 ***<.001 
The analysis above compared participants‘ opinions about operating the system using a 
t-test with three main variables containing two sub-variables. In this section participants‘ 
opinions about their organizational management cultures will be measured against three 
variables (see Table 5.4.1.2). Organizational culture issues can also be categorized into 
two groups: participants‘ concepts of organizational obligations; and the influence of 
potential problems or side-effects on organizational dynamics when the system is used 
to manage risk at school. Just two of the results shown in Table 5.4.1.2 are statistically 
significant. There are gender differences between administrative managers over the 
question of whether to temporarily withhold an event in order to protect the school‘s 
reputation (t=-1.466; p<0.01); and in the question about whether one of the school‘s 
obligations is to anticipate and prevent accidents by analyzing the historical database, 
participants‘ academic qualifications are significant (t=2.303; p<0.01).  
Broadly speaking though, there is no significant difference between the genders on 
organizational management culture issues. Likewise when gender is measured against 
the variables of academic qualification and whether participants are responsible for 
managing the system. However, there are some interesting patterns within the 
comparison results: male managers, for example, seem to feel more obliged to prevent 
events and share information across organizations than female managers; female 
managers meanwhile appear to be more worried that the system will be used for 
surveillance purposes by top-level management than their male counterparts. They are 
also more likely to believe that client privacy should be protected and that managers 
will be tempted to withhold details of events that might damage their schools‘ 
reputations (Male M=3.37; Female M=3.49).  
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Moreover, participants with a Master‘s degree are more likely than managers with a 
Bachelor‘s degree to be satisfied with most aspects of the system; however, it is 
interesting to see that participants with a higher education background seem less 
convinced that it is the school‘s obligation to deal with and prevent events, involving 
students or staff, than those with a high school or lower background. Participants 
responsible for managing the system seem to be the most positive about organizational 
obligation issues. However, they are more likely than the other staff to show negative 
attitudes towards issues such as invasion of clients‘ privacy, using the system to monitor 
schools, withholding events to protect a school‘s reputation and colleagues‘ hostility to 
managers responsible for operating the system. 
Table 5.4.1.2 Independent t-test within the comparisons of personal opinions about the 
organisational management culture measured against three variables 
N=805 
 Obligation 
Protect 
Privacy 
Invaded 
Privacy Surveillance 
Prevent 
Accident 
Data 
Analysis 
Sharing 
Information 
Protect 
Reputation 
Colleagues 
Hostile 
Gender 
Male 4.26 4.43 3.55 3.25 4.01 3.86 4.04 3.37 2.94 
Female 4.20 4.45 3.50 3.30 3.96 3.80 4.01 3.49 2.76 
t value 1.279 -0.589 0.705 -0.607 1.025 0.932 0.499 -1.466** 2.133 
         P=0.007  
Academic 
Qualification 
University 4.27 4.43 3.52 3.28 4.02 3.85 4.06 3.38 2.87 
Master 4.18 4.45 3.59 3.21 3.90 3.82 3.93 3.49 2.97 
t value 1.730 -0.434 -0.877 0.850 2.303** 0.611 2.390 -1.370 -1.251 
      P=0.007     
Current Job 
Yes 4.29 4.44 3.52 3.22 4.00 3.86 4.06 3.39 2.87 
No 4.19 4.42 3.55 3.31 3.99 3.82 3.99 3.41 2.91 
t value 2.334 0.639 -0.442 -1.349 0.354 0.812 1.627 -0.269 -0.576 
*p<.05 **<.01 ***<.001 
The final task is to compare participants‘ opinions about dealing with events measured 
against three factors (See Table 5.4.1.3). Three topics are salient here: the rights and 
privacy of clients and their legal guidance; the characteristics of events described from 
participants‘ personal points of view; and the possible causes of events. As can be seen 
in the Table, three items are statistically significant. the first one discusses whether most 
sporadic events involve multiple-factors, which makes them hard to reduce, measured 
against the variable of gender (t=1.823; p<0.01), and the second one relates to the issue 
of whether the using of technology may help manage risk but may also cause new 
problems, measured against the gender variable as well (t=-2.573; p<0.01), and the third 
one returns to the issue about whether the sporadic events are hard to control, measured 
against the variable of whether the participants are responsible for managing the 
system(t=1.949; p<0.01). 
Generally speaking, when measured against the variable of gender the comparisons 
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show that male managers‘ responses to the questions raised are more likely to be 
positive than their female counterparts. For example, they are more likely to believe that 
campus events may happen to particular students, or to agree that both client and their 
legal guardians have a right to know about the reporting procedure. But the opposite is 
true about other issues to do with the rights of the client. For example, female managers 
are more likely to agree that schools should tell clients if an event is going to be sent to 
the CSRC, and that new events can be caused by new technology that is supposed to 
help prevent the happening of events.  
When measured against the variable of academic qualification the comparisons also 
reveal some potential cleavages. For example, participants with Master‘s degrees seem 
more likely than those with Bachelor degrees to agree with most of the issues identified; 
however, they are less likely to be in favour of schools notifying clients and their legal 
guardians about the way the event will be dealt with, including the reporting procedure, 
than participants with Bachelor degrees.  
Lastly, it can be seen that if a participant is responsible for managing the system, then 
they are more likely to believe that most events are caused by a particular group of 
students: that events with many unpredictable factors, including sporadic, frequency and 
latent events, are hard to prevent and reduce; and that new risks are created and 
accompanied by the of preventative technologies. 
Table 5.4.1.3 Independent t-test within the comparison of personal experiences about 
the campus security events measured against three variables 
N=805 
 
Particular 
Student 
Event  
Sent out 
Notify Legal 
Guidance Right 
Sporadic  
Event 
Frequency  
Event 
Latent  
Event 
New  
Problem 
Gender 
Male 3.27 3.18 4.23 4.10 3.78 3.30 3.24 4.12 
Female 2.88 3.25 4.24 4.06 3.66 3.14 3.16 4.28 
T value 4.780 -0.868 -0.143 0.835 1.823** 1.922 0.950 -2.573** 
      P=0.009   P=0.008 
Academic 
Qualification 
University 3.16 3.19 4.24 4.10 3.75 3.23 3.20 4.14 
Master 3.19 3.23 4.22 4.05 3.75 3.33 3.30 4.24 
T value -0.407 -0.402 0.241 0.962 0.099 -1.137 -1.167 -1.571 
          
Current Job 
Yes 3.21 3.16 4.20 4.08 3.81 3.26 3.25 4.20 
No 3.12 3.25 4.27 4.10 3.69 3.25 3.19 4.12 
T value 1.130 -1.204 -1.464 -0.284 1.949** 0.156 0.763 1.410 
      P=0.007    
*p<.05 **<.01 ***<.001 
Comparing participants‘ opinions about the operation of the system, management 
culture and personal experience of dealing with events, using the statistical function of 
t-test against three independent variables (gender, academic qualification and systemic 
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responsibility) provides a more nuanced overview of their opinions and attitudes, and 
even show some potential patterns.  
In general, with respect to gender, male managers‘ attitudes were more positive. This 
was the case with most issues, including system efficacy and utility function, 
organizational obligations, the potential problems or side-effects of using the system to 
manage risk and the characteristics of events. However, the analysis also reveals that 
female managers were more positive on issues relating to the rights and privacy of 
clients and their legal guardians, and the possible causes of events. Female managers 
were more likely to put student security before school study: that the system may be 
invasion of clients‘ privacy; and that school managers should notify legal guardians 
about the details of an event to protect their rights. Apart from this, it also seems that 
female managers are more sensitive about the monitoring function of the system, 
especially with respect to surveillance to school, and the possibility that colleagues may 
be harbouring resentments. Therefore, it could be argued that the female managers have 
extended their domestic role from the home to the workplace when it comes to risk 
management at school. 
In terms of educational background, participants with lower educational qualifications 
seem to be more satisfied with most aspects of the system, including its efficacy and 
utility, concept of organizational culture and organizational obligation, and surveillance 
function. However, managers with higher academic qualifications expressed strong 
opinions on issues relating to the rights and privacy of clients and their legal guardians, 
potential problems or side-effects influencing the organizational dynamic, the 
characteristics of events, and the possible causes of events. For example, participants 
with a Master‘s background seemed to believe that the regulation of the system was 
susceptible to media concern; and were more likely to agree that using the system may 
infringe clients‘ rights to privacy. They were also more convinced that some managers 
withhold events to protect schools‘ reputations and that their role as operators of the 
system caused hostility amongst their colleagues.  
As for the results relating to responsibility, participants charged with operating the 
system were more likely than other staff to agree that schools have an obligation to 
manage and deal with events, as well as the characteristics of events and the possible 
causes of events. On the other hand, participants not responsible for managing the 
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system were more likely to agree that schools have an obligation to protect the rights 
and privacy of clients and their legal guardians. They also believed that the system may 
have a negative effect on school dynamics. Predictably, participants responsible for 
operating the system were more concerned about how to handle or manage events than 
the rights of clients, and seemed ignorant of the possible/potential threats from notifying 
clients and their legal guardians about the details of how events are reported.  
From the results presented, further significant patterns can be inferred to explore the 
participants‘ views on the efficacy and utility function of the system, and the potential 
problems that exist at the school and which may have already influenced the 
organizational dynamic. It could be surmised that participants‘ attitudes are likely to be 
influenced by characteristics such as gender, academic qualification and whether they 
are responsible for operating the system. However, the statistical function of the t-test 
simply examines the comparison with variables containing two sub-variables. 
Consequently, in the next section I will apply one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
the comparison measured against other independent variables with more sub-variables. 
The results should provide a more detailed picture of managers‘ opinions about the 
system efficacy or utility functions and their attitudes towards organizational obligations, 
the rights and privacy of clients, through the comparison measured against the multiple 
sub-variables.  
5.4.2 Measurement of respondents’ opinions about the operation of the CSRS 
measured with one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)  
In the previous section the results of the t-test compared against three independent 
variables containing two groups of individuals were considered. The comparisons reveal 
some significant patterns, which may be useful when it comes to understanding 
participants‘ concepts of and opinions about using the system, and might help highlight 
the interaction of organizational culture and organizational dynamics. However, 
although it is useful for understanding the differences and relationships between two 
sub-variables, only two sub-variables of each independent variable can be used in the 
statistical function of the t-test. Therefore, as Marsh and Elliott (2008: 183) point out, it 
may be necessary to use another appropriate statistical procedure for examining a 
continuous dependent variable and a categorical independent variable with more than 
two categories, in this case ANOVA.  
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In this section then, the measurement task will focus on the comparison of participants‘ 
opinions about three main groups of issues measured against more independent 
variables i.e. more than two groups of individuals. ANOVA will be used to compare the 
three main sets of questions measured against six independent variables, each of which 
has four sub-variables. The variables include participants‘ military rank, position in their 
department, the type of school they are working at, length of time they have been 
working in the military training office, length of time they have been working at their 
current schools, and their military training background.  
To begin with, participants‘ opinions about operating the system are measured against 
the six independent variables (see Table 5.4.2.1). Five pairs of results are statistically 
significant. The first is related to the argument about the perceived clarity of the 
classification system and whether it includes every event, measured against the variable 
of rank (F=2.835; p<0.05). The next three pairs of significance are comparisons, 
measured against time spent working in the MTO, of opinions about the simplicity of 
the operating procedures of the system (F=2.871; p<0.05), whether the system is an 
effective form of risk management (F=3.758; p<0.05), and whether adequate training is 
provided for operators (F=3.379; p<0.05). The fifth significance shows on the issue of 
the effectiveness of the system for a school in managing risk measured against the 
variable of the length of time the participants have been serving at their current schools 
(F=2.792; p<0.05).  
Here it is worth noting that some of the results show significant differences when the 
comparison of participants‘ opinions about operating the system are measured against 
the six independent variables. Firstly, the comparison result measured against the 
variable of rank, located in the first column of the Table, shows in relation to questions 
about whether security is more important than study at school. The lower ranking 
officers are more likely than the higher ranking ones to agree with this (Captain M=4.31; 
Major M= 4.27; Lieutenant Colonels M=4.23). Moreover, in contrast, the mean values 
of most of the issues by Captain are lower than that by Major. From this perspective, it 
seems that Majors are more likely than Captains to be satisfied with the operation of the 
system. However, the outcomes are reversed when the comparison is between Major 
and Lieutenant Colonel. Majors are less likely than Lieutenant Colonels to be satisfied 
with the operation of the system. Generally speaking, it can be concluded that 
participants who are Majors seem more satisfied with the operation of the system than 
154 
 
those who are Captains and Lieutenant Colonels. 
Comparing opinions about operating the system measured against the variable of 
departmental position is reported in the second column of the Table. As can be seen, the 
discussion about the simplicity of operating the system measured against the 
participants‘ positions in the department shows that the general staff is likely more than 
the senior staff to be satisfied with the operation of the system, especially over whether 
the operating procedure of the system is simple (General staff working for less than two 
years M=3.80; General staff working for over two years M=3.75; Supervisor M=3.74; 
Head of Department M=3.74). The results also show that the senior staff may be a little 
less satisfied than junior staff regarding the risk management capabilities of the system 
and whether the system provides a communication channel between educational 
regimes; however, if the participant is also head of their department, their attitudes 
towards the operating procedures of the system become more positive. For example, the 
result with regard to the question about whether operators are given adequate training 
shows that junior staff and heads of departments are more likely than middle-level staff 
to agree that they are (General staff working for less than two years M=3.92; General 
staff working for over two years M=3.86; Supervisor M=3.88; Head of Department 
M=3.92). Finally, the examination result about the possibility of changing reporting 
regulations highlights that heads of department seems more than other staff to believe in 
this phenomenon (General staff working for less than two years M=3.86; General staff 
working for over two years M=3.91; Supervisor M=3.88; Head of Department M=3.98). 
In general, junior staff members are more likely than senior staff and heads of 
department to be satisfied with most of the operating procedures of the system. 
Conversely, senior staff are more likely than junior staff to place security before study 
and believe in the possibility of changing the reporting regulations of the system. 
The third stage of the analysis involves comparing participants‘ opinions about 
operating the system measured against the variable of type of school worked at. The 
results are shown in the middle section of the Table and, generally speaking, there 
seems to be no significant differences in the opinions of managers working at the three 
different types of schools or by city/county; however, a common feature which can be 
found in most of the results is that city/county managers are more likely than 
participants working at other types of school to be satisfied with most of the efficacy 
and utility function aspects of the system.  
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The fourth stage is the examination of participants‘ attitudes towards operating the 
system measured against two independent variables used to determine whether 
participants‘ attitudes towards the functions of the system are dependent on length of 
service. The first variable relates to time spent in the Military Training Office (MTO) 
and is arranged in the fourth column of the Table. As can be seen, most of the results 
show that juniors are more likely than seniors to agree with the management function of 
the system, particularly regarding the effectiveness of the system for managing risk in 
schools (less than two years M=3.76; two to under five years M=3.63; five to under ten 
years M=3.50; over ten years M=3.47) and its capabilities as a communication channel 
across the educational institutions (less than two years M=3.90; two to under five years 
M= 3.86; five to under ten years M= 3.74; over ten years M=3.82).  
The second variable relates to time served at current schools and is arranged in the fifth 
column of the Table. Here length of service seems to have had a slightly different effect 
on the participant‘ attitudes toward the operating functions of the system. Participants 
with longer tenures at their current schools are more likely to be positive about the 
simplicity of the operating procedure of the system (less than two years M=3.77; two to 
under five years M= 3.76; five to under ten years M= 3.64; over ten years M=3.93). By 
contrast, staff with shorter service times in the MTO are more likely to express positive 
attitudes about the system‘s ability to manage risk in schools (less than two years 
M=3.64; two to under five years M= 3.55; five to under ten years M= 3.40; over ten 
years M=3.71). Thus, according to the results of the comparison measured against these 
two variables, service time at MTO and at current school, participant‘s satisfaction with 
system efficacy and utility function would appear to gradually decrease with the 
increase of the participants‘ service time in the MTO; however, if they have been at the 
same organization for over ten years, participants tend to be satisfied with the efficacy 
and utility function of the system in line with the increase of their working time at the 
department.  
The fifth and final stage of the analysis compares participants‘ opinions about operating 
the system against the variable of military training background.
1
 The results of this 
stage suggest that, in general, participants with the higher levels of military training are 
more satisfied with the efficacy and utility function of the system – especially with 
respect to questions about the simplicity of the system operating procedures (Basic 
                                                     
1
 The opinions of the participant with summit training will be ignored as there is just one respondent. 
156 
 
Training M=3.70; Intermediate Training M=3.75; Advance Training M=3.78), the 
effectiveness of the system at managing risk in schools (Basic Training M=3.53; 
Intermediate Training M=3.56; Advance Training M=3.63), the perceived clarity of the 
classification system and whether it includes every event (Basic Training M=3.43; 
Intermediate Training M= 3.71; Advance Training M=3.77). However, participants with 
lower levels of military training were more likely to agree with statements to do with 
the basic functions of the system, such as its role as a communication channel for 
educational institutions. (Basic Training M=3.90; Intermediate Training M= 3.81; 
Advance Training M=3.81).   
To sum up, ANOVA comparing attitudes towards the particular/utility function of the 
system measured against six independent variables produced five pairs of statistically 
significant results, which may in turn help to uncover some of the opinions toward the 
system held by managers from different backgrounds, as well as demonstrate the 
potential relationships and dynamic between school and city managers, or high and low 
ranking mangers.  
In addition, the comparison of participants‘ personal experiences of operating the 
system measured against the variable of rank shows that Majors are more likely to 
express positive opinions towards the operating function of the system. It is noteworthy 
that participants‘ satisfaction with the utility function of the system may decrease with 
rank; however, the reverse can be seen in the more positive responses from heads of 
departments to the questions about the efficacy and utility function of the system. Not 
surprisingly, city/county managers are more positive than school managers about most 
aspects of the managing function of the system. Likewise, it is to be expected that 
participants who have been working for less than two years, either at the MTO or their 
current school, will be more satisfied with the operation of the system than other 
managers. Therefore, given the results of the comparisons, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the longer participants work at an organization, the less satisfied with the 
efficacy and utility function of the system they become; however, this may change if 
they stay at the same organization for more than ten years; in this case they tend to be 
more satisfied with the system function than average. Finally, it can be seen that staff 
with higher levels of military training are more likely than other staff to be satisfied 
with the managing and operating functions of the system.  
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Table 5.4.2.1 One-way ANOVA within the comparison of personal opinions about 
operating the system measured against six variables  
N=805 
 
Procedures 
are Simple 
 Effective for 
  Manage Risk 
Communication 
Channel 
Student 
Security 
Operation 
Training 
Clear 
Classification 
Change 
Regulation 
Rank 
Lieutenant 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 
Captain 3.75 3.45 3.78 4.31 3.88 3.47 3.86 
Major 3.80 3.61 3.85 4.27 3.89 3.77 3.91 
Lieutenant Colonel 3.69 3.56 3.77 4.23 3.87 3.67 3.90 
F value 1.616 0.658 0.899 0.857 0.091 2.835* 2.243 
       P=0.037  
Position in 
Department 
General Staff(Le 2) 3.80 3.70 3.90 4.23 3.92 3.73 3.86 
General Staff(Ov 2) 3.75 3.55 3.81 4.24 3.86 3.67 3.91 
Supervisor 3.74 3.48 3.75 4.28 3.88 3.80 3.88 
Head 3.74 3.64 3.83 4.29 3.92 3.67 3.98 
F value 0.247 2.046 1.050 0.417 0.398 1.552 0.812 
         
Work 
Place 
High School 3.76 3.66 3.83 4.28 3.89 3.74 3.93 
Vocational 3.72 3.50 3.80 4.23 3.86 3.69 3.90 
Complete 3.85 3.49 3.74 4.23 3.91 3.67 3.80 
City/county  3.83 3.78 4.22 4.33 3.94 3.78 3.94 
F value 0.818 2.398 1.897 0.588 0.259 0.398 0.871 
         
Years in 
MTO 
less than 2Y 3.80 3.76 3.90 4.26 3.90 3.74 3.85 
2Y to 5Y 3.85 3.63 3.86 4.32 3.97 3.77 3.95 
over 5Y to 10Y 3.74 3.50 3.74 4.21 3.89 3.69 3.91 
over 10Y 3.62 3.47 3.82 4.25 3.75 3.64 3.89 
F value 2.871* 3.758* 1.641 1.171 3.379* 0.987 0.512 
  P=0.036 P=0.011   P=0.018   
Years in 
Current 
School 
less than 2Y 3.77 3.64 3.86 4.28 3.90 3.71 3.88 
2Y to under 5Y 3.76 3.55 3.78 4.25 3.91 3.73 3.94 
5Y to 10Y 3.64 3.40 3.73 4.18 3,80 3.67 3.89 
over 10Y 3.93 3.71 3.91 4.29 3.84 3.76 3.91 
F value 1.864 2.792* 1.321 0.981 1.084 0.310 0.335 
   P=0.040      
Training 
Background 
Basic Training 3.70 3.53 3.90 4.10 3.77 3.43 3.77 
Intermediate 3.75 3.56 3.81 4.25 3.88 3.71 3.92 
Advance 3.78 3.63 3.81 4.31 3.92 3.77 3.87 
Summit 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
F value 0.124 0.361 0.132 1.096 0.559 1.749 0.539 
*p<.05 **<.01 ***<.001 
The previous section examined the participants‘ opinions about operating the system 
measured against six independent variables. In this section, their opinions about 
organizational management culture, including issues to do with privacy, the obligations 
of schools and educational institutions, and phenomena which may impact on 
organisations, will be considered. These will be measured against six independent 
variables, each containing four sub-variables, again using the statistical function of 
ANOVA (see Table 5.4.2.2).  
Table 5.4.2.2 indicates that five comparison results reach statistical significance. The 
first two relate to the questions about whether the Ministry of Education is obliged to 
analyse the historical database, measured against the variable of participants‘ 
departmental positions (F=2.818; p<0.05) and whether reporting events amounts to 
surveillance in schools, measured against the variable of work place (F=4.361; p<0.01). 
The other three relate to the questions about whether schools have a duty to protect 
158 
 
students‘ privacy during school hours (F=2.988; p<0.05), whether they should attempt 
to anticipate and prevent student accidents with the help of historical database analysis 
(F=4.653; p<0.01), and whether the Ministry of Education is obliged to analyze the 
historical database‖ (F=3.594; p<0.05), all of which are measured against the variable of 
the length of service with the MTO.  
Again, it is worth noting that the results reveal some marked patterns across the 
opinions of managers from different backgrounds and present multiple phenomena. The 
analysis begins with a comparison of attitudes to organizational culture measured 
against the variable of rank, shown at the top of the table. The results indicate that junior 
officers are more likely than senior officers to agree with some statements exploring the 
possible phenomena and obligations of organization, such as questions about whether 
the system is used to monitor schools (Captain M=3.41; Major M=4.32; Lieutenant 
Colonel M=3.16), or whether managers may withhold some events to protect schools‘ 
reputations (Captain M=3.45; Major M=43.41; Lieutenant Colonel M=3.39); conversely, 
juniors are less satisfied than seniors with their management culture in relation to 
organizational obligations and the interaction between managers/operators and 
administrative staff/teachers, over questions such as whether schools are obliged to 
prevent accidents happening to students (Captain M=4.10; Major M=4.26; Lieutenant 
Colonel M=4.24), or the possibility of colleagues becoming hostile due to the reporting 
of an event (Captain M=2.59; Major M=2.91; Lieutenant Colonel M=2.91). Junior staff 
are thus more likely to be concerned about the possibility that one of the system‘s 
functions is monitoring schools for the benefit of higher level managers, and may be 
more protective of the reputation of their organizations. Senior staff, on the other hand, 
are more likely to see risk management and prevention as an organizational obligation. 
They also seem to be more aware of the impact on organizational dynamics of reporting 
events through the system. 
The results of comparing organisational management culture against the variable of 
participants‘ positions in the organizational hierarchy are presented in the second 
column of Table 5.4.2.2. Here the results show that junior staff is more likely to express 
positive attitudes towards issues related to client privacy and flag up the potential 
problems of using the system in schools, such as invasion of privacy (General staff 
working for less than two years M=3.62; General staff working for over two years 
M=3.54; Supervisor M=3.50; Head of department M=3.49) or the system as a form of 
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state surveillance and control (General staff working for less than two years M=3.31; 
General staff working for over two years M=3.28; Supervisor M=3.27;Head of 
Department M=3.14). Moreover, as staff in lower positions are more than likely to 
express concerns about student privacy and highlight the surveillance function of the 
system, it can therefore be concluded that status role is probably one of the factors 
influencing managers‘ attitudes and opinions on risk management. 
The third stage of the comparison task involves exploring opinions about organisational 
culture measured against the variable of work place. Predictably, city/county managers 
are more likely than school staff to give positive answers to most of the questions about 
privacy and the prevention of events. There were some negative responses to questions 
about the potential problems caused by using the system to manage events, such as 
whether the reporting process is an invasion of client privacy (high school M=3.60; 
vocational school M=3.52; complete school M= 3.38; city/county M=3.39), and the 
possibility of hostility from colleagues for reporting of event (high, vocational and 
complete school M= 2.86, M=2.92 and 2.94 respectively; city/county M=2.67). 
Otherwise, city/county managers seemed to be more concerned about how to manage 
risk events than issues relating to client privacy and rights. Moreover, they were also 
more likely than most to believe that some managers withhold events to protect schools‘ 
reputations.   
The comparison of organizational management culture measured against length of time 
in the MTO is shown in the fourth column of Table 5.4.2.2. According to the results, the 
participants‘ positive attitudes towards the possibility that managers may withhold some 
events are in direct proportion to their time in the MTO. For example, senior staff are 
more likely than junior staff to agree that some managers would withhold some events 
to protect their school‘s reputation (less than two years M=3.25; two to under five years 
M= 3.40; five to under ten years M= 2.89; over ten years M=3.55). The longer the 
participants had been working for the MTO, the more they seemed to believe that some 
managers are more concerned about their schools‘ reputations than dealing with or 
reporting events.  
However, other results to do with organizational obligations in relation to preventing 
events suggest that participants‘ positive attitudes are directly proportional to the 
variable of their time in the MTO. These include the discussion about whether schools 
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have an obligation to deal with student accidents (less than two years M=4.30; two to 
under five years M= 4.29; five to under ten years M= 4.21; over ten years M=4.21), 
whether schools have to anticipate or prevent accidents happening to students (less than 
two years M=4.15; two to under five years M= 4.01; five to under ten years M= 3.94; 
over ten years M=3.93), whether educational regimes have to analyze the database (less 
than two years M=3.95; two to under five years M= 3.89; five to under ten years M= 
3.83; over ten years M=3.70), and whether sharing information is an effective way to 
reduce the incidence of events (less than two years M=4.13; two to under five years M= 
4.04; five to under ten years M= 3.99; over ten years M=3.98). Therefore, it seems that 
the longer managers serve at the MTO, the less satisfied they are on issues relating to 
organisational obligations; meanwhile, managers who spend less time at MTO are more 
concerned about client privacy and organizational dynamics/relationships. 
As a consequence of this finding, it is necessary to compare organizational culture 
against the variable time spent at the current school. Two results show participants‘ 
positive attitudes decreasing with time spent at the current school: whether the Ministry 
of Education is obliged to analyze the database (less than two years M=3.88; two to 
under five years M= 3.82; five to under ten years M= 3.81; over ten years M=3.80) and 
hostility from colleagues towards those who report events (less than two years M=2.94; 
two to under five years M= 2.88; five to under ten years M= 2.83; over ten years 
M=2.76). Therefore, it may be closer to the truth to say that junior staff are more likely 
than senior staff to agree that organizations have a duty to analyze an event. Junior staff 
also appears to be more likely to encounter hostility from other colleagues as a result of 
reporting events. 
In general, it is hard to find significant differences in participants‘ opinions about 
organizational management culture measured against the variables of time at MTO and 
time at current school. However, there do seem to be some inconsistencies in the impact 
of increase in time served. For example, juniors are less likely than seniors to be 
positive about the potential surveillance implications of the system; but when 
participants have served at the same school for over ten years, their attitudes may 
become towards the system‘s functions may become more positive (less than two years 
M=3.22; two to under five years M= 3.33; five to under ten years M= 3.31; over ten 
years M=3.07). Nevertheless, junior staff remain more convinced that managers may 
withhold some events to protect schools‘ reputations than senior staff. 
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To end this particular line of enquiry, participants‘ opinions about organizational culture 
are measured against their military training, the results of which can be seen at the 
bottom of Table 5.4.2.2. Broadly speaking, participants with higher military training are 
more likely than those with lower military training to have positive attitudes towards 
privacy issues and the obligations of organizations. However, when the argument 
focuses on whether one of the system‘s functions is surveillance of schools, the 
participants‘ positive attitudes decrease as their level of military training increases 
(Basic Training M=3.43; Intermediate Training M= 3.27; Advance Training M=3.17). 
In summary, the following results from the comparison of attitudes towards the 
obligations of organizations and the potential problems of the system measured against 
six independent variables are worth noting. Firstly, participants with lower military rank 
and levels of training are more likely to be concerned about privacy issues. However, 
the reverse is true for the obligations of organizations. For example, the results show 
that higher-ranking managers are more likely than the lower-ranking ones to express 
positive attitudes towards the issue of whether organizations should analyse the 
database. Here it is interesting to note that participants with a lower military rank and 
level of training seem more likely to agree that the system has a surveillance function; 
whereas, managers with a higher military rank and level of training are more likely to be 
concerned about the possibility of colleagues resenting managers who are responsible 
for reporting events. 
Secondly, it is important to point out that similar results occur in the comparison of 
opinions for both the heads of departments and the less general staff in relation to the 
discussion about organizations‘ obligation to analyze the database and the sharing of 
information for preventing events. Moreover, it is worth noting that as participants 
move up the ladder, from junior to senior, more positive attitudes are expressed about 
whether managers sometimes temporarily withhold events to maintain schools‘ 
reputations. It may be worth exploring the circumstances leading to events being 
withheld and there will be a further discussion in the next section. 
Thirdly, the majority of city/county managers show a positive attitude toward issues 
relating to organizational sub-culture and dynamics. For example, city managers tend to 
dispute the phenomenon that reporting events may make other colleagues hostile toward 
the managers; however, school managers from three different types of schools present 
162 
 
similar positive attitudes toward such phenomenon. It seems that it is hard for managers 
working at higher levels of administrative units to comprehend that the reporting of an 
event may have an effect on interactional and organizational dynamics at the lower 
levels of a hierarchical organization. Fourthly, junior staff members who have served at 
an educational institution for less than two years appear to be more sensitive than 
seniors to issues related to client privacy and the possibility of resentment from 
colleagues due to the reporting of event, when measured against the variables of time 
spent in the MTO and time spent at current school. Also, junior staff are more likely to 
agree that the analysis of the events database is one of the obligations of educational 
regimes. However, the longer the time spent at the current school, the stronger the belief 
that some school managers withhold events that may harm their schools‘ reputations. 
Finally, managers with higher levels of military training are more positive about client 
privacy and the organizational obligation to analyze the database than those with lower 
levels of military training. However, they are less convinced that one of the system‘s 
functions is to monitor schools. Meanwhile, managers with intermediate military 
training are more likely to believe that some managers may withhold information about 
certain events to protect their schools‘ reputations, and that some colleagues may resent 
event reporters. 
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Table 5.4.2.2 One-way ANOVA within the comparison of personal opinions about the 
organizational management culture measured against six variables 
N=805 
 Obligation 
Protect 
Privacy 
Invaded 
Privacy Surveillance 
Prevent 
Accident 
Data 
Analysis 
Sharing 
Information 
Protect 
 Reputation 
Colleagues 
Hostile 
Rank 
Lieutenant 5.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 
Captain 4.10 4.45 3.49 3.41 3.86 3.82 4.04 3.45 2.59 
Major 4.26 4.45 3.56 3.32 3.99 3.82 4.03 3.41 2.91 
Lieutenant Colonel 4.24 4.40 3.52 3.16 4.02 3.88 4.02 3.39 2.91 
F value 1.670 0.844 1.034 2.527 1.856 1.202 0.775 0.129 1.869 
           
Position in 
Department 
General Staff(Le 2) 4.28 4.46 3.62 3.31 4.08 3.92 4.11 3.26 2.96 
General Staff(Ov 2) 4.19 4.43 3.54 3.28 3.95 3.78 3.98 3.52 2.94 
Supervisor 4.26 4.42 3.50 3.27 3.96 3.82 4.02 3.35 2.73 
Head 4.32 4.44 3.49 3.14 4.05 3.96 4.08 3.39 2.94 
F value 1.646 0.169 0.652 0.768 1.994 2.818* 1.935 2.429 2.232 
       P=0.038    
Work 
Place 
High School 4.26 4.45 3.60 3.23 4.01 3.87 4.07 3.43 2.86 
Vocational 4.21 4.41 3.52 3.30 3.98 3.81 4.01 3.39 2.92 
Complete 4.28 4.40 3.38 3.38 3.96 3.83 3.92 3.31 2.94 
City/County  4.56 4.61 3.39 2.50 4.22 4.06 4.22 3.67 2.67 
F value 2.089 1.143 1.774 4.361** 0.994 0.961 1.948 0.741 0.513 
      P=0.005      
Years in 
MTO 
less than 2Y 4.30 4.48 3.57 3.28 4.15 3.95 4.13 3.25 2.85 
2Y to under 5Y 4.29 4.51 3.51 3.28 4.01 3.89 4.04 3.40 3.02 
5Y to under10Y 4.21 4.37 3.53 3.30 3.94 3.83 3.99 3.41 2.89 
over 10Y 4.21 4.42 3.55 3.12 3.92 3.70 3.98 3.55 2.77 
F value 
1.375 2.988* 
0.18
9 
1.172 4.653** 3.594* 1.878 2.273 1.778 
   P=0.030   P=0.003 P=0.013    
Years in 
Current 
School 
less than 2Y 4.25 4.44 3.57 3.22 4.03 3.88 4.06 3.36 2.94 
2Y to under 5Y 4.26 4.44 3.49 3.33 3.99 3.82 4.01 3.45 2.88 
5Y to under 10Y 4.24 4.41 3.58 3.31 3.91 3.81 3.96 3.40 2.83 
over 10Y 4.18 4.44 3.45 3.07 3.96 3.80 4.07 3.47 2.76 
F value 0.232 0.065 0.568 1.372 1.309 0.467 0.913 0.528 0.690 
           
Training 
Background 
Basic Training 4.13 4.43 3.47 3.43 3.97 3.77 4.00 3.23 2.83 
Intermediate 4.23 4.42 3.56 3.27 3.97 3.82 4.01 3.44 2.90 
Advance 4.33 4.49 3.49 3.17 4.09 3.94 4.10 3.29 2.88 
Summit 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 
F value 1.698 0.863 0.413 0.989 1.619 1.339 0.897 1.353 0.442 
           
*p<.05 **<.01 ***<.001 
The analyses above revealed more about the participants‘ different attitudes towards the 
issues of organizational obligations and the potential problems for organizational 
dynamics, when measured against the participants‘ multiple backgrounds. In this section 
I will focus on the comparison of the participants‘ personal experiences of dealing with 
the events in relation to the issues of the rights and privacy of the client, the particular 
characteristics of events, and the possible causes of events, measured against six 
independent variables (see Table 5.4.2.3). Five results are statistically significant: the 
comparison in relation to questions about whether sporadic events are hard to control, 
measured against the variable of rank (F=3.290; p<0.020); whether events may happen 
to particular groups of students, measured against the variable of work place (F=4.379; 
p<0.01); whether events may happen to particular groups of students, measured against 
the variable of time spent in the MTO (F=4.080; p<0.01); whether frequently occurring 
events such as car accidents are difficult to prevent, measured against the variable of 
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time in the MTO (F=2.963; p<0.05); and whether latent events are hard to anticipate, 
measured against time in the MTO (F=4.330; p<0.01).  
The results relating to participants‘ personal characteristics present their major attitudes 
towards each issue. Firstly, the comparisons of participants‘ opinions about dealing with 
events measured against the variable of rank are shown at the top of Table 5.4.2.3. It can 
be seen that the junior officers express less satisfaction than seniors about whether 
events may happen to particular groups of students (Captain M=2.90; Major M=3.20; 
Lieutenant Colonel M=3.16) and whether schools should notify clients about how 
events will be reported (Captain M=3.18; Major M=3.24; Lieutenant Colonel M=3.15). 
Also, the majority of participants show the strangest attitudes on some issues, with 
mean values over 4, in relation to questions about whether schools should notify the 
client‘s legal guardian of the event (Captain M=4.14; Major M=4.26; Lieutenant 
Colonel M=4.20), whether client and their legal guardian have the right to know the 
reporting procedure (Captain M=4.08; Major M=4.09; Lieutenant Colonel M=4.10), and 
whether new problems may arise from the use of technology (Captain M=4.14; Major 
M=4.17; Lieutenant Colonel M=4.15). The results show most of the managers agree 
with these issues and their attitudes are probably unrelated to their military rank. 
Secondly, comparing managers‘ personal experiences of dealing with events measured 
against the variable of current departmental position (see second column of Table 
5.4.2.3) it is interesting that junior staff present more positive attitudes than seniors, in 
particular about whether events happen to certain types of students (General staff less 
than two years M=3.24; General staff over two years M= 3.14; Supervisor M=3.16; 
Head of Department M=3.14), and whether a school should notify the client‘s legal 
guardian of the event (General staff less than two years M=4.25; General staff over two 
years M= 4.24; Supervisor M=4.20; Head of Department M=4.24). However, regarding 
the characteristics of particular events, the results would appear to reverse, with junior 
staff less likely than senior staff to present positive attitudes on the issues 
high-frequency and latency events may be hard to prevent and reduce (General staff less 
than two years M=3.08; General staff over two years M= 3.24; Supervisor M=3.28 
Head of Department M=3.23), and new problems may arise from the use of technology 
(General staff less than two years M=4.10; General staff over two years M= 4.13; 
Supervisor M=4.23; Head of Department M=4.20). In addition, it is worth noting that 
managers‘ positive attitudes appear to gradually decline with seniority in relation to 
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whether events happen to particular groups of students but increase with regard to 
whether new problems are caused by the use of the system‘s technology. Given such 
trends it may be conjectured that managers‘ confidence in their ability to control or 
prevent events may decrease as their experience accumulates and/or they rise through 
the hierarchy, as their awareness that the uncertainty of an event is not only influenced 
by the event itself but also by random causes. Alternatively, they develop a form of 
inertia to reporting through repeated exposure to a problem. 
Moving on to the comparisons of personal experiences of dealing with events measured 
against the variable of type of school worked at, presented in the third column of Table 
5.4.2.3, it can be seen that the majority of managers express the highest positive 
attitudes about issues whose mean values are over 4 in total – including whether schools 
should notify clients‘ legal guardians, whether clients and their legal guardians have the 
right to know about the reporting procedure, and whether new events may accompany 
the use of the system. In general, the comparisons reveal no significant differences over 
client privacy/rights and events with particular characteristics measured against the 
variable of types of school worked at. However, it is interesting to note that city/county 
managers are more likely than school managers to be negative about whether schools 
should notify clients that an event will be sent to the CSRC (High school M=3.18; 
Vocational school M=3.22; Complete school M=3.26; City manager M=2.89). Such 
results suggest that city/county managers are more likely to be concerned about the 
procedure for managing events than the protection of clients‘ rights and privacy.  
Fourthly, in the comparison of participants‘ personal experiences of dealing with events 
measured against the variables of time served in the MTO and current school, some 
results show that the participants support some of the claims, where mean values are 
over 4 in total. This suggests that participants‘ attitudes toward these issues are 
unrelated to the time they have served in the MTO or at their current school – they 
include the issue of whether schools should notify the clients‘ legal guardian, whether 
clients and their legal guardian a have right to know about the reporting procedure, and 
whether new events may accompany the use of the system. Broadly speaking, there is 
no noteworthy difference within the comparison measured against the variable of time 
spent in either the MTO or at the current school. However, managers relatively new to 
their current organizations are more likely to agree that events may happen to particular 
students than managers that have been in their departments for over five and less than 
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ten years, who are most likely to believe that the majority of events are hard to prevent 
or reduce, sporadic, frequent or latent. 
To finish, there is an exploration of managers‘ personal experiences of dealing with 
events measured against their military training background, shown at the bottom of 
Table 5.4.2.3. As can be seen, three results indicate stronger positive attitudes towards 
certain issues, with mean values over 4 across four sub-variables. These are to do with 
whether schools should notify the client‘s legal guardian, whether clients‘ and their legal 
guardian have a right to know about the reporting procedure, and whether new events 
may accompany the use of the system. Other results worth noting are, for example, 
participants with lower levels of military training are more likely to present positive 
attitudes on issues to do with clients‘ rights such as the question about whether schools 
should notify the client that the event will be sent to the CSRC (Basic training M=3.30; 
Intermediate training M=3.22; Advance training M=3.12; Summit training M=2.00). 
However, this result is reversed when the discussions relate to the rights of client‘s legal 
guardians. That is to say, managers with higher levels of military training are more 
likely to agree that clients and their legal guardians have a right to know about how 
events are reported (Basic training M=4.07; Intermediate training M=4.08; Advance 
training M=4.12).  
To sum up, the results obtained by comparing managers‘ personal experience of dealing 
with events measured against six independent variables would appear to reveal some 
basic differences in attitude towards issues such as client privacy and the rights of the 
client, as well as the interpretation of particular types of events and their causes. 
Broadly speaking, the higher ranking managers seem to be more positive on issues 
relating to the right of clients and their legal guardians, and events with particular 
characteristics such as sporadic, frequent and latent events. However, this positivity 
does not extend to schools notifying clients that an event will be sent to the CSRC. One 
explanation for this may be that the higher-level managers tend to avoid any potential 
side-effects or uncontrollable factors when dealing with events. City/county managers 
seem to have stronger opinions on issues relating to the rights of clients and their legal 
guardians, the characteristics of particular events, and whether events are caused by the 
system itself but the majority of managers appear to change their attitudes toward 
dealing with and facing the events the longer they spend at the MTO or at their current 
schools. Senior staff are less likely than the junior staff to believe that events normally 
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happen to particular groups of students, when their opinions are compared measured 
against both time served in the MTO and current schools. Seniors are also less likely 
than juniors to agree that schools should give the client legal guidance about the details 
of events. Lastly, participants‘ attitudes towards events are clearly influenced by the 
amount of professional military training they have had, especially when it comes to the 
rights of clients and their legal guardians. Participants with substantial military training 
are more likely to express positive attitudes towards client rights and the characteristics 
of particular events. 
Table 5.4.2.3 One-way ANOVA within the comparison of personal experiences of 
campus security event measured against six variables  
N=805 
 
Particular 
Student 
Event  
Sent out 
Notify Legal 
Guardians Right 
Sporadic  
Event 
Frequency  
Event 
Latent  
Event 
New  
Problem 
Rank 
Lieutenant 5.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 
Captain 2.90 3.18 4.14 4.08 3.47 3.14 2.96 4.14 
Major 3.20 3.24 4.26 4.09 3.78 3.24 3.23 4.17 
Lieutenant Colonel 3.16 3.15 4.20 4.10 3.76 3.30 3.25 4.15 
F value 2.378 2.173 1.288 0.617 3.290* 0.957 1.667 0.069 
      P=0.020    
Position in 
Department 
General Staff(Le 2) 3.24 3.18 4.25 4.05 3.74 3.18 3.08 4.10 
General Staff(Ov 2) 3.14 3.19 4.24 4.10 3.70 3.26 3.24 4.13 
Supervisor 3.16 3.31 4.20 4.12 3.87 3.32 3.28 4.23 
Head 3.14 3.09 4.24 4.09 3.73 3.22 3.23 4.20 
F value 0.347 1.348 0.203 0.338 1.544 0.569 1.275 1.238 
          
Work 
Place 
High School 3.02 3.18 4.28 4.11 3.77 3.15 3.16 4.14 
Vocational 3.26 3.22 4.22 4.08 3.75 3.32 3.24 4.17 
Complete 3.34 3.26 4.10 4.03 3.61 3.34 3.32 4.17 
City/County 3.28 2.89 4.28 4.22 4.17 3.44 3.33 4.44 
F value 4.379** 0.764 1.817 0.519 2.196 2.130 0.775 0.959 
  P=0.005        
Working in 
MTO 
less than 2Y 3.24 3.12 4.34 4.06 3.65 3.06 2.96 4.12 
2Y to under 5Y 3.32 3.25 4.22 4.11 3.67 3.25 3.25 4.11 
5Y to under 10Y 3.13 3.19 4.22 4.11 3.81 3.36 3.32 4.18 
over 10Y 2.95 3.24 4.16 4.04 3.84 3.23 3.25 4.23 
F value 4.080** 0.546 1.792 0.523 2.226 2.963* 4.330** 0.872 
  P=0.007     P=0.031 P=0.005  
Worked in 
Current 
School 
less than 2Y 3.27 3.15 4.30 4.09 3.76 3.21 3.18 4.17 
2Y to under 5Y 3.11 3.21 4.20 4.13 3.72 3.26 3.29 4.14 
5Y to under 10Y 3.06 3.29 4.15 4.05 3.77 3.36 3.26 4.18 
over 10Y 3.04 3.33 4.13 4.05 3.78 3.24 3.07 4.15 
F value 2.224 1.012 2.545 0.452 0.136 0.641 1.044 0.154 
          
Training 
Background 
Basic Training 3.27 3.30 4.23 4.07 3.53 3.03 2.83 4.13 
Intermediate 3.13 3.22 4.22 4.08 3.80 3.27 3.26 4.16 
Advance 3.27 3.12 4.27 4.12 3.63 3.24 3.14 4.16 
Summit 3.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 
F value 0.907 1.063 0.279 0.130 2.603 0.556 2.163 0.031 
          
*p<.05 **<.01 ***<.001 
In this section, the main focus has been on participants‘ responses to three groups of 
questions measured against six independent variables, each of which contains four 
sub-variables, using the statistical function of one-way ANOVA. Their satisfaction 
levels, conceptions of and opinions about each issue can be distinguished and classified 
by contrasting the sub-variables in each independent variable. Some of the results may 
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be simply general conceptions of the function of the system for most of the participants; 
the others show the participants‘ perspectives and value-judgements about the reporting 
of events and the system more generally.  
According to the results relating to military rank, it seems that middle-ranking managers 
are the most satisfied with the efficacy/utility function of the system and most likely to 
believe that organisations have an obligation to deal with and prevent events. They are 
also are more concerned with the rights and privacy of clients, as well as the potential 
problems or side-effects of using the system. The majority of participants, regardless of 
military rank, present the highest positive attitudes on issues relating to the priority of 
student security at schools, the privacy and right of client and their legal guidance, and 
the possibility of cause of new event. 
The results relating to departmental role suggest that junior staff are more likely than 
senior staff to be satisfied with the efficacy and utility of the system, support the rights 
and privacy of clients, but are concerned about the potential problems of the system 
such as its surveillance function, and believe that the causes of events can be predicted, 
for example, by distinguishing particular groups of students. Seniors, on the other hand, 
are more attuned than juniors to organizational cultural issues such as whether the 
regulation of the system may be changed because of media concerns, or whether 
educational regimes have an obligation to conduct historical data analysis.    
The results relating to the types of school participants are working at reveal that 
city/county managers are more satisfied with most of the issues in regard to the efficacy 
and utility function of the system, and the obligation and culture of event management 
of organizations. It is also worth noting that the city/county managers see student 
security as more important than study at school, and generally believe some potential 
problems exist at school such as the temporary concealment of events to protect schools‘ 
reputations. However, it can also be seen that the city/county managers are more likely 
than the school managers to express negative attitudes on the following issues: the 
system surveillance function, which is one of the possible side-effects on schools, the 
possibility of hostility towards the event operators, which is one of the potential 
problems, and whether schools should notify clients that events will be sent out, which 
is one of the rights of clients.  
Comparing length service times in the MTO and current schools shows that junior staff 
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are more likely than senior staff to express positive attitudes on most issues, including 
the efficacy and utility function of the system, organizational culture, schools‘ 
obligations, the rights and privacy of clients and their legal guardians, regardless of their 
length of service. However, the reverse is true when the argument moves on to the 
potential problems or side-effects of using of the system, the characteristics and possible 
causes of events, juniors are less positive than seniors. Given this tendency, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that a manager‘s attitude towards the system is influenced by his 
or her personal experiences of dealing with events. The relative emphasis they place on 
client privacy/rights as opposed to the management of events will also change, 
depending on their departmental responsibilities. The interaction or relationships 
between managers and their colleagues are likely to be related to length of service, in 
other words, the longer the managers spend at a department, the more the things they do 
will be accepted by their colleagues.  
The results relating to level of military training suggest that participants with higher 
level military training are more likely to be satisfied with the efficacy and utility of the 
system, the organizational obligation and the right and privacy of clients and their legal 
guidance. It is interesting to note that participants with an intermediate training 
background are the most likely to believe that school managers may be tempted to 
withhold the details of events in order to protect their schools‘ reputations and that some 
colleagues can be hostile towards managers. Participants with a higher level training 
qualification are also less likely to believe that the system is used for surveillance 
purposes, or to agree with schools notifying clients that an event will be sent to the 
CSRC.  
Overall, to conclude this section, some statistically significant results have been 
obtained by comparing participants‘ responses to three main groups of questions, 
measured against each independent variable containing two or four groups of 
sub-variables using the statistical measurement tasks of t-test and one-way ANOVA. 
Some of the results suggest significant patterns or trends in managers‘ opinions about 
the operation of the system. Some highlight the role of organizational dynamics in risk 
management and the interaction between managers and other colleagues at schools. 
Others reflect participants‘ experiences of dealing with events and their respective 
self-awareness. Obviously, managers approach risks with different viewpoints or 
attitudes depending on their position or status, which may require them to consider the 
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impact or side-effects of their actions on the organization as a whole. Therefore, it is 
worth delving deeper here into the links between dealing with an event and protecting 
organizational reputation by looking at two particular groups of managers, the most 
junior and most senior staff of a department. By doing so, it may be possible to 
distinguish differences in opinions between managers with multiple backgrounds. In the 
next section, I will therefore attempt to explore such phenomena and the results will 
hopefully provide more information to help understand and explain the dynamics of risk 
management in hierarchical regimes. 
5.5 Overview: managers’ attitudes towards the implications of risk assessment and 
management  
The previous section compared the participants‘ opinions about using the system to 
manage events: while the t-test enabled us to determine some initial and important 
differences between male and female managers, the subsequent use of ANOVA 
identified further differences with respect to military rank and position in regard to 
managing the system. Such findings are likely not only to provide evidence about 
differing opinions of the operation of the system from participants with different 
backgrounds, but also to demonstrate some possible or potential phenomena that may be 
evidence of some other interactions/different perspectives between general staff and 
head of the department or the manager and colleagues at school, which could reflect 
wider aspects of the organisational culture and dynamics. 
However, the comparison undertaken above just shows general statistical results for 
participants‘ opinions on three groups of questions, measured against a single variable. 
In order to gain a clearer sketch of the participants‘ opinions and define the possible 
boundary between the organizational discipline and the participants‘ attitudes when 
managing events, I will reintegrate all the questions with similar attribution and 
classifications into four new groups of issues. These new issues will be used to examine 
the participants‘ perspectives through particular groups of samples, which may provide 
more trends and patterns to help understand the managers‘ opinions of dealing with the 
events. 
In order to define a possible boundary between the discipline of the organisation and the 
values of managers with different backgrounds, the samples will be limited according to 
some particular characteristics such as rank and seniority. More mature school staff will 
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be compared with the inexperienced, which may help us to distinguish different 
concepts of risk management. The problem is that only three variables are allowed in 
the SPSS statistical software at the same time. Therefore, both the statistical tools of 
SPSS and Excel will be applied to the comparisons in this section.  
In this section, consequently, the first major task is the measurement of four new groups 
of issues compared against the two contrasting samples (the more senior and less junior 
staff) and the total population. The results may reveal some ambivalence or divergence 
across the different backgrounds of the participants. Secondly, if the comparison of 
results presents some significant or particular patterns, those issues and outcomes will 
be discussed further. Such comparison tasks will probably not only show more multiple 
trends, which present the diversity of attitudes among the participants with different 
experience or seniority, but also may throw light on some potential phenomena at local 
school level and which influence most of the managers there.  
5.5.1 Comparison of senior and junior staff attitudes 
As discussed above, the focus here is on particular groups of samples, classified into 
two groups (the more senior and junior staff). With respect to the first of these, some 
characteristics are key to defining the group, such as having the highest military rank – 
‗Lieutenant Colonel‘ and the longest service time at MTO and current school – over ten 
years. Using this basis, twenty-one participants were found to match the limitation. The 
second group, the more junior staff, was defined according to their status as ‗Major‘, the 
most common of the ranks. The common characteristic of the more junior managers is 
that their length of service at the MTO and their current school is less than two years, 
the shortest of any of the managers in my sample. In total, ninety-nine participants fell 
into this category. In the following discussion I will explore the results by comparing 
four particular groups of issues measured against these two groups. 
Here I am mainly interested in respondents‘ views on using the system, the simplicity of 
its operating procedures, whether adequate training is provided for operators and the 
perceived clarity of the classification system and whether it includes every event they 
confront. With respect to the senior group (See Table 5.5.1.1) unsurprisingly, perhaps, 
no participant shows an opinion at the highest positive scale over the three questions. 
The data indicate that most of the more senior staff are satisfied with the system‘s 
operational functionality, and believe that the system‘s procedures and the training 
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programme help them to manage risk-related events at school.  
Table 5.5.1.1 Results showing the evaluation of using the system (Senior Staff) N=21 
Evaluation of Using System (Senior Staff) 
Status          Question 
Opinion 
Strong 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strong 
Agree 
Rank Lieutenant Colonel 
Working Time at MTO Over 10 years 
Working Time at School Over 10 years 
Q15 Procedure 0 0 3(14.3) 16(76.2) 2(9.5) 
Q19 Knowledge 0 0 5(23.8) 15(71.4) 1(4.8) 
Q20 Classification 0 1(4.8) 6(28.6) 14(66.7) 0 
With the junior group, attitudes (See Table 5.5.1.2) are more positive than negative over 
the three questions, a similar result to the senior staff. However, compared with senior 
staff, there are minor reservations about the use of the system and its classification of 
events. 
 Table 5.5.1.2 Results showing the evaluation of using the system (Junior Staff) N=99 
Evaluation of Using System (Junior Staff) 
Status          Question 
Opinion 
Strong 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strong 
Agree 
Rank Major 
Time at MTO Under 2 years 
Time at School Under 2 years 
Q15 Procedure 0 6(6.1) 14(14.1) 71(71.7) 8(8.1) 
Q19 Knowledge 0 4(4) 11(11.1) 74(74.7) 10(10.1) 
Q20 Classification 1(1) 5(5.1) 13(13.1) 70(70.7) 10(10.1) 
Both results above suggest that there are no major differences in the participants‘ 
attitudes towards the operation of the system based on seniority. Likewise, the opinions 
of the total population (see Figure 5.5.1.1) on this set of issues are similar to those of 
more senior (see Figure 5.5.1.2) and more junior staff (see Figure 5.5.1.3) with similar 
distributions and trends, most participants expressing more positive attitudes than 
negative ones across the three groups of samples. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that managers‘ satisfaction with using/operating the system is neither related 
to their military rank and time at the MTO/current schools, nor whether they are the 
more senior staff or more junior ones. 
Figure 5.5.1.1 Likert Scale distribution relating to the evaluation of use of the system 
(Total Population: N=805) 
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Figure 5.5.1.2 Likert Scale distribution relating to the evaluation of use of the system 
(Senior Staff: N=21) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5.1.3 Likert Scale distribution relating to the evaluation of use of the system 
(Junior Staff: N=99) 
 
 
 
 
The second group of issues examines the participants‘ viewpoint in managing risk 
through their personal attitudes towards organizational obligations and expectations 
including whether student security itself is more important than studying at school, 
whether schools are under obligation to deal with events that happen to students, the 
perceived effectiveness of the analysis of the historical record for a school in managing 
risk, and whether the analysis of the historical database is one of the responsibilities of 
the Ministry of Education. The initial comparison with respect to organizational 
responsibilities show that most senior staff, whatever their location, agree that the 
government is under an obligation/expectation to prevent events and protect students at 
school (see Table 5.5.1.3). They also tend to agree with the assertion that security takes 
precedent over the pursuit of knowledge at school. 
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Table 5.5.1.3 Attitudes of Senior Staff opinion relating to the responsibilities, 
obligations and expectations of the organisation                                      
N=21 
Obligations/ Expectations of Using System (Senior Staff) 
Status          Question 
 
 
Opinion 
Strong 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strong 
Agree 
Rank Lieutenant Colonel 
Time at MTO Over 10 years 
Time at School Over 10 years 
Q18 Security 0 0 0 14(66.7) 7(33.3) 
Q22 Obligation 0 0 2(9.5) 15(71.4) 4(19.0) 
Q26 Anticipation 0 0 3(14.3) 16(76.2) 2(9.5) 
Q27 Analysis 0 1(4.8) 6(28.6) 13(61.9) 1(4.8) 
With regard to the same issues, the attitudes of the more junior staff (see Table 5.5.1.4) 
are slightly less positive when it comes to the obligations and expectations of schools, 
especially whether student security at school is more important than studying, and 
whether schools are under an obligation to deal with and prevent events. In general, it 
can be seen that most of the junior staff show more positive attitudes than negative ones 
toward the organizational obligations and expectations about the use of the system for 
managing events and in regard to the latter do so more strongly than their senior 
counterparts. 
Table 5.5.1.4 Attitudes of Junior Staff relating to the responsibilities, obligations and 
expectations of the organisation   
                                                                N=99 
Obligations/ Expectations of Using System (Junior Staff) 
Status          Question 
 
 
Opinion 
Strong 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strong 
Agree 
Rank Major 
Time at MTO Under 2 years 
Time at School Under 2 years 
Q18 Security 0 1(1) 4(4) 58(58.6) 36(36.4) 
Q22 Obligation 0 1(1) 3(3) 61(61.6) 34(34.4) 
Q26 Anticipation 0 1(1) 9(9.1) 63(63.6) 26(26.3) 
Q27 Analysis 0 4(4) 17(17.2) 61(61.6) 17(17.2) 
Comparing these results with the wider population (see Figure 5.5.1.4, 5.5.1.5 and 
5.5.1.6) similar trends can be seen across the three Figures. Despite a few negative 
opinions, most of the participants seem to agree with the statements relating to personal 
judgment or awareness. For example, they tended to support the view that student 
security is more important than study at school, that schools are under an obligation to 
deal with and anticipate/prevent risk events happening to students, and that educational 
management regimes should undertake analyses of the historical database.  
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Figure 5.5.1.4 Attitudes across the Total Population relating to security, risk 
management, analysis and organizational obligations (N=805) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5.1.5 Attitudes of Senior Staff relating to security, risk management, analysis 
and organizational obligations (N=21) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5.1.6 Attitudes of Junior Staff relating to security, risk management, analysis 
and organizational obligations (N=99) 
 
 
 
 
Moving on to participants‘ attitudes towards the system‘s management functions and the 
invisible/potential problems of using the system to manage events, the seven questions 
classified into this group include: Question 16 (the usefulness of the system managing 
risk); Question 17 (whether the system provides an effective communication channel 
between the educational regimes and schools); Question 25 (the controversial issue of 
whether schools are monitored by the Ministry of Education through the system); 
Question 28 (which relates to the discussion about whether event prevention can be 
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improved by sharing information about events); and three other questions 35, 36 and 37 
(which ask whether sporadic, frequent and latent events are hard to prevent and reduce 
in that they are caused by many unpredictable and unavoidable factors).  
Seniors‘ opinions (see Table 5.5.1.5) about using the system for risk management 
contrast with their attitudes towards the other reclassified issues above. They seem 
reluctant to disclose their opinions on some system management function issues, to do 
with the effectiveness of the system for managing risk, whether the system has 
established a communication channel across educational institutions, and the effect of 
sharing information on reducing the incidence of similar events. When the discussion 
issues move on to particular events caused by uncertain or unpredictable factors, their 
opinions are more diverse. For example, some seem to believe that sporadic, frequent 
and latent events are influenced by multiple-factors, which makes them unpredictable 
and difficult to prevent, while strong negative attitudes are shown on these issues in the 
Table. This trend is pronounced in the discussion of latent events; over fifty percent of 
the more senior staff disagreed that latent events are uncontrollable, which may because 
senior staff shoulder more responsibility for managing and preventing risks at school; 
therefore, they may try to anticipate possible events potentially under their control.  
Similar patterns can also be seen in the discussion about the system‘s surveillance 
function, which reveal a degree of ambivalence and doubt amongst senior staff. Such 
results suggest that the definition of risk boundaries or limitations may differ between 
individual senior staff. They probably highlight some underlying phenomena but, taken 
by themselves, these results are not enough to explain the causal links and interactions 
in the organisations in question. Therefore, it will be necessary to explore such 
phenomena and causes in more detail later on. 
Table 5.5.1.5 Attitudes of Senior Staff relating to using the system to manage risks  
                                                                 M=21 
Using System to Manage Risk (Senior Staff) 
Status          Question 
Opinion 
Strong 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strong 
Agree 
Rank Lieutenant Colonel 
Time at MTO Over 10 years 
Time at School Over 10 years 
Q16 Effective 0 1(4.8)  5(23.8) 12(57.1) 3(14.3) 
Q17 Communication 0 0 4(19.0) 12(57.1) 5(23.8) 
Q25 Surveillance 1(4.8) 9(42.9) 7(33.3) 4(19.0) 0 
Q28 Sharing  0 1(4.8) 2(9.5) 14(66.7) 4(19.0) 
Q35 Sporadic 0 4(19) 4(19) 11(52.4) 2(9.5) 
Q36 Frequent  1(4.8) 8(38.1) 5(23.8) 7(33.3) 0 
Q37 Latent 0 11(52.4) 5(23.8) 5(23.8) 0 
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The exploration above revealed some divergence in seniors‘ viewpoints on the system‘s 
risk management functions managing and the opinions of juniors (see Table 5.5.1.6) 
also appear to diverge. Their attitudes towards the system‘s risk management function 
were mostly negative but, in general, they were even more ambivalent than their more 
senior counterparts. On one hand, junior staff are much more positive than seniors about 
the usefulness of the system for managing events and establishing a communication 
channel across educational regimes, as well as the possibility that sharing information 
amongst schools helps reduce the incidence of similar events. On the other hand, they 
are much more negative on issues related to the question of whether it is difficult hard to 
manage or deal with particular events because of uncertain and unpredictable factors. 
The junior staff seems to believe events could be prevented and reduced by system 
management functions such as the sharing or collecting of information about and 
experiences of similar events; however, they are likely to extend their stronger attitudes 
to both sides, especially on the surveillance issue. 
Table 5.5.1.6 Attitudes of Junior Staff relating to using the system to manage risks  
                                                              M=99 
Using System to Manage Risk (Junior Staff) 
Status          Question 
 
 Strong 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strong 
Agree 
Rank Major 
Time at MTO Under 2 years 
Time at School Under 2 years 
Q16 Effectiveness 3(3) 4(4) 18(18.2) 57(57.6) 17(17.2) 
Q17 Communication 2(2) 3(3) 9(9.1) 68(68.7) 17(17.2) 
Q25 Surveillance 3(3) 22(22.2) 26(26.3) 36(36.4) 12(12.1) 
Q28 Sharing  1(1) 3(3) 7(7.1) 66(66.7) 22(22.2) 
Q35 Sporadic 0 18(18.2) 10(10.1) 57(57.6) 14(14.1) 
Q36 Frequency 2(2) 38(38.4) 19(19.2) 33(33.3) 7(7.1) 
Q37 Latent 4(4) 39(39.4) 17(17.2) 31(31.3) 8(8.1) 
The following Figures compare attitudes on the seven issues across the three population 
groups (see Figure 5.5.1.7, 5.5.1.8 and 5.5.1.9). According to the results shown in the 
Figures, the participants present both positive and negative attitudes on these issues 
across the three population groups. Seniors are more likely to disagree than the other 
two population groups, especially on the issue of whether the system is used for 
surveillance of schools or whether latent events are hard to anticipate because of some 
uncontrollable factors. This trend is contrary to the Figures relating to the total 
population and the more junior staff; they show more positive attitudes overall.  
The distribution results above demonstrate the considerable diversity of opinion that 
seems to exist amongst the sample. The results not only indicate participants‘ attitudes 
towards the use of the system for risk management, but also appear to suggest an 
underlying ambivalence towards the system‘s functions and purpose. More 
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multidimensional attitudes were revealed than in the discussion of the other two sets of 
issues and the comparison results not only show similar trends in the positive opinions 
but also stronger negative attitudes on issues related to using the system for risk 
management amongst both senior and junior staff.  
Overall then, some managers in both groups seem to dispute aspects of system‘s risk 
management function. Other managers are likely to be concerned and believe that 
events with unpredictable or uncontrollable factors may be hard to reduce and prevent, 
which is be evidenced by the higher proportions of negative responses to those 
questions. Moreover, some ambivalent results have arisen in the discussion of the 
sporadic, frequency and latent events probably because such events containing many 
uncertain factors may be barriers to risk management. Therefore, combining the 
findings above, it can be reasonably concluded that managers‘ opinions about using the 
system to manage risk are not related to their position or time spent in their departments; 
that is to say, their evaluations of the use of the system to manage risks and the system‘s 
functions reflect individual differences. 
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Figure 5.5.1.8 Likert Scale distribution relating to the use of the system to manage risk 
(Senior Staff: N =21) 
Figure 5.5.1.7 Likert Scale distribution relating to the use of the system to manage risk 
(Total Population: N=805) 
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The next set of questions is to do with the issues of client privacy and client rights, as 
well as the behaviour and organizational effects caused by using the system to manage 
risk at school. There are six questions on these issues. Participants‘ attitudes towards 
client privacy are explored in Questions 23 (whether schools are under an obligation to 
protect their clients‘ privacy) and Question 24 (whether uploading information about 
events onto the system is an invasion of privacy). Question 29 addresses the impact of 
the system on organizational behaviour in schools, specifically, whether some managers 
may withhold the details of an event to protect their schools‘ reputations. Clients‘ rights 
are considered in Question 32 (whether schools should notify clients that an event will 
be reported to the CSRC), Question 33 (whether schools should notify clients‘ legal 
guardians immediately after an event have occurred) and Question 34 (whether clients 
and their legal guardians have a right to know the details of the reporting procedure).  
Senior staff gave both positive and negative responses to the questions on privacy issues 
(see Table 5.5.1.7) although they were unanimous about the importance of maintaining 
client confidentiality. There were mixed opinions about whether sharing event 
information is an invasion of privacy and while some senior managers disagreed that 
administrative staff may be tempted to withhold particular events to protect their 
school‘s reputation, others tended to agree that the phenomenon existed at their schools. 
Moreover, regarding the issue of whether clients and their legal guardians have a right 
to be informed about the event reporting procedure, over eighty percent of the senior 
staff agreed with this statement. However, a few staff still held the contrary opinion on 
issues relating to clients‘ rights, especially the issue of whether schools should notify 
clients that an event will be sent to the CSRC. Overall, diverse opinions on privacy 
issues, the rights of clients and their guardians, and whether schools act to protect their 
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Figure 5.5.1.9 Likert Scale distribution relating to the using of system to manage risk 
(Junior Staff: N =99) 
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reputations were demonstrated, evidenced by the similar percentages of both attitudes 
expressed in the Table. Such an outcome may reflect personal viewpoints or experiences 
and awareness derived from managing events. 
 
                                                                M=21 
Privacy Issues (Senior Staff) 
Status          Question 
Opinion 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Rank Lieutenant Colonel 
Time at MTO Over 10 years 
Time at School Over 10 years 
Q23 Protect Privacy 0 0 0 13(61.9) 8(38.1) 
Q24 Invade Privacy 0 7(33.3) 3(14.3) 10(47.6) 1(4.8) 
Q29 Reputation 1(4.8) 4(19) 7(33.3) 8(38.1) 1(4.8) 
Q32 Notification 1(4.8) 8(38.1) 3(14.3) 9(42.9) 0 
Q33 Legal Guardians  1(4.8) 2(9.5) 0 14(66.7) 4(19) 
Q34 Right 0 2(9.5) 1(4.8) 16(76.2) 2(9.5) 
As for the opinions of junior staff on the issues above (see Table 5.5.1.8) around half of 
agreed that the transfer of personal information around the system may be an invasion 
of client privacy. Interestingly, twice as many junior staff (29.3%) answered ―Neither‖ 
to this question (seniors = 14.3%). Over one-fifth (22.2%) denied that managers 
withheld the details of events to protect their schools‘ reputations, despite around half of 
the population (50.5%) acknowledging that this is probably the case. They were also 
less convinced about the need to notify clients when events are sent to the CSRC, 
although on the issue of clients‘ rights the results were similar to those obtained from 
the senior staff. In general, the juniors were more likely than seniors to give both 
positive and negative responses and also presented more ambivalent attitudes towards 
the use of the system for managing risk, particularly on the issues of privacy and clients‘ 
rights. Therefore, it may be worth examining these results more closely and I will be 
attempting to do this in the next chapter with the qualitative data.  
 
                                                                M=99 
 Manage Risk of Using System with Junior Staff  
Status          Question 
 Opinion 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Rank Major 
Time at MTO Under 2 years 
Time at School Under 2 years 
Q23 Protect Privacy 0 1(1) 1 51(51.5) 46(46.5 
Q24 Invade Privacy 1(1) 14(14.1) 29(29.3) 42(42.4) 13(13.1) 
Q29 Reputation 5(5.1) 17(17.2) 27(27.3) 43(43.4) 7(7.1) 
Q32 Notification 4(4) 30(30.3) 26(26.3) 29(29.3) 10(10.1) 
Q33 Legal Guardians  0 1(1) 4(4) 59(59.6) 35(35.4) 
Q34 Right 0 3(3) 11(11.1) 63(63.6) 22(22.2) 
The next step is to compare the responses above with the overall results on this set of 
questions (see Figure 5.5.1.10, 5.5.1.11 and 5.5.1.12). From the diagrams below it can 
be seen that multiple opinions were presented by the total population as well as the 
Table 5.5.1.8 Result showing the privacy issues of using the system (Junior Staff) 
Table 5.5.1.7 Privacy issues arising from the use of the system (Senior Staff) 
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more senior and more junior staff on both positive and negative attitudes. This suggests 
that most managers are likely to be torn between protecting clients‘ privacy and using 
the system for risk management. It is also worth noting that the most negative and the 
most positive attitudes are expressed by more senior staff; while, the discussion of the 
clients‘ privacy/rights issues presents many different patterns across the three population 
groups.  
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(Total Population: N=805) 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
 
In conclusion, in this section I filtered two extreme samples from the total population 
according to military rank and seniority in the MOT and current department (the more 
senior and junior staff). I then measured their opinions on four new groups of issues, 
which are classified according to the similar attribution, and contrasted the result with 
the total population. On the one hand, when ―evaluating‖ the use of the system or the 
―obligations/expectations‖ of schools, the three population groups express similar 
opinions irrespective of seniority. Such outcomes can be interpreted as evidence that 
managers‘ attitudes towards the system‘s functions and the obligations of the 
organization are not affected by position or status, or time served at a department. On 
the other hand, in their responses to questions about using the system for risk 
management and maintaining clients‘ privacy, the participants seem to demonstrate 
diverse attitudes toward these issues. Some managers are in complete agreement with 
the statements, whereas others are strongly opposed, while some remain neutral. 
Underlying these differences in opinion might be the participants‘ different personal 
experiences of dealing with privacy/rights issues and the risk management task. 
Regarding issues related to the use of the system for risk management, most managers 
seem to be satisfied with the system‘s utility function and operating procedures for 
managing events. However, on the issue in relation to reporting action, this may affect 
organisations, such as the temporary concealment of events for the sake of schools‘ 
reputations, both groups of managers as well as the total population present more 
negative attitudes on the system management function. It would be reasonable to 
assume that organisatuion culture and attitude toward events, probably influence and 
impact on managers‘ judgment, awareness or values on this issue. It seems that some 
conflicts have confused managers on the priority between organizational discipline and 
personal valuation when they manage events. For example, the results suggest that 
many managers believe the system has a surveillance function; therefore, they may be 
reluctant to report events so avoiding possible sanction or withhold an event to protect 
the schools‘ reputation.  
Obviously, these phenomena and influences may interact with each other and, 
consequently, create increasing uncertainty. This, in turn, undermines the effectiveness 
of the system in terms of managing risks. The exploration of privacy issues shows that 
some managers are ambivalent regarding the importance of personal privacy or clients‘ 
right. Indeed, when managing risks that appear to contain more uncertain/unpredictable 
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factors which may have a possible impact on organisational reputation or the clients‘ 
privacy, managers‘ judgement, evaluation and management attitudes seem to be 
important factors shaping how these risks are addressed. In reality, it is difficult to 
determine where the boundary between organizational discipline and clients‘ 
right/privacy should lie, because the perception of these two risks may differ from 
person to person. Indeed, parts of the data on managers‘ judgments and views on the 
using of the system for risk management have manifested both the positive and negative 
attitudes. Therefore, in the following discussion I will pick out some issues with different 
or significant patterns and other questions which may be classified as controversial issues 
for risk management at organizations, and discuss them in detail. By doing so, I hope to 
highlight and present other diverse trends and patterns to help explain and understand 
some common concepts of the using of the system for risk management.  
5.5.2 Alternative patterns among the senior and junior staff and total population 
The previous section drew attention to the diversity within the data by comparing 
opinions of two particular levels of samples on the four groups of issues with those of 
the total population. In this section, some issues with particular results or patterns have 
been selected for further discussion. Firstly, there is the issue whether a client‘s personal 
privacy is invaded by the process of information exchange and how this compares across 
the three population groups (see Figure 5.5.2.1). As can be seen, the results show similar 
trends in the opinions of both the total population and the more junior staff. The positive 
attitudes of the senior staff (47.6%) and the total population (50.4%) are also quite close 
together. However, the negative responses of senior staff (33.3%) are nearly double those 
of the total population (15.3%) and the junior staff (14.1%). 
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invade clients‘ privacy across Total Population, Senior and Junior Staff 
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The second issue where opinions diverge significantly is whether a school should notify 
a client that an event will be sent to the CSRC (see Figure 5.5.2.2). Senior staff is both 
more positive (42.9%) and more negative (38.1%) about this issue than the other two 
population groups. Only 14.3% of senior staff chose ―Neither‖ to represent their 
opinions on this issue, about half as many as in the total population (27.6%) and junior 
staff (26.3%). Moreover, it is interesting to note that similar proportions of junior staff 
expressed negative (30.3%) and positive (29.3%) attitudes as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
On issues that may be related to risk management in hierarchical organisations, one 
relevant result is that to do with the system‘s surveillance function (see Figure 5.5.2.3). 
The ‗negative‘ attitude was most common amongst senior staff (42.9%) with 
significantly fewer ‗neither‘ (33.3%) and ‗positives‘ (19%). Junior staff and the total 
population were more positive about this, with over one-third (total 36.4% and junior 
34.9%) agreeing with the statement that one of the system‘s functions is to monitor 
schools, with just 24.1% and 22.2% ‗negatives‘ respectively; around one-third of seniors 
(33.3%) chose ‗neither‘. Finally, it may be worth noting that the proportions of junior 
staff are similar to that of the total population across five scales of attitude.  
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With respect to invisible phenomena in schools and the question about whether some 
managers may withhold events to protect schools‘ reputations, from the results obtained 
from the three populations (see Figure 5.5.2.4) it can be seen that between one-fifth and 
one-third (21% and 33.3%) of participants do not see this issue as important, but 
managers across the population groups seem to agree that it happens in their current 
schools, evidenced by positive results of over/around 50%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, there are two questions that have not yet been discussed in this section because 
of their unique characteristics and attribution. One was designed to explore the change 
in the organizational dynamic when dealing with risk, the other relates to the particular 
characteristics or personalities of clients. The first question addresses the issue of 
whether the organizational dynamic might be altered by hostile reactions to event 
reporters from colleagues when the system manager reports events to the educational 
management regime: the results are presented by population group in Figure 5.5.2.5. As 
can be seen, senior staff most strongly disagreed with the suggestion that relationships 
between event reporters and their colleagues might be strained, with over three quarters 
answering in the negative (76.2%); just one-third of the total population and junior staff 
(around 34.3%) disagreed and around a quarter of the total population and junior staff 
(about 25.3%) agreed with the suggestion. 
 
 
 
 
3.5
18.9
21.4
46.5
9.8
4.8
19
33.3
38.1
4.8
5.1
17.2
27.3
43.4
7.1
0
10
20
30
40
50
SD D N A SA
Total population
Senior Staff
Junior Staff
Figure 5.5.2.4 Likert Scale distribution relating to the protection of a school‘s 
reputation by withholding events across Total Population, Senior and Junior Staff 
 
186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the issue of whether events happen to particular types or groups of student, the 
results to which are presented by population group in Figure 5.5.2.6, the majority of 
senior staff (57.1%) disagreed with this suggestion and 28.6% agreed. The total 
population and junior staff scores were also high and of a similar proportion, for both 
positive attitudes (44.1% and 44.4% respectively) and negative (34.5% and 35.4% 
respectively). Senior staff is less convinced than the total population and junior staff that 
events normally happen to particular groups of students. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
I will now divide and integrate all questions with similar attributions and characteristics 
into four groups – evaluations of using the system: obligations and expectations of the 
system; the basic concept of risk management employed when using the system; and 
privacy and clients‘ rights issues in relation to the using of the system. These particular 
groups will then be compared against two specific groups of samples, which are the 
more senior and more junior staff selected from the total population.  
Generally speaking, it is hard to distinguish a significant difference in the discussion 
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regarding the evaluation of system procedure/function and the responsibilities, 
obligations/expectations of schools and organizational regimes in the responses of the 
more senior and more junior staff compared with the total population. However, it can 
nevertheless be seen that the senior staff are more likely than the junior ones and the 
total population to present multiple attitudes on the issues in relation to the using of the 
system for risk management and the privacy and rights of clients; such phenomena may 
be evidenced by the diverse trends and patterns of results when contrasting between the 
senior staff and other two populations. For example, some seniors seem to be more 
confident than their junior counterparts about using the system for risk management, 
even given the possibility of hostility from colleagues or infringements of personal 
privacy. Other seniors also express more positive attitudes than juniors on issues 
relating to clients‘ rights, such as the necessity of notifying the client‘s legal guardian. It 
seems that senior staff are more likely than other staff to agree with the system‘ 
surveillance function and the clients‘ right to be informed about the event-reporting 
procedure. The results also demonstrate that the attitudes of the junior managers 
towards the four new groups are broadly the same as the total population.  
Obviously, some significant differences in participants‘ attitudes can be seen by 
contrasting between two particular samples and the total population. It seems that the 
participants‘ attitudes toward different issues may be influenced by their personal 
experiences of dealing with events or the length of time they have served at their current 
school, and even their job position. Therefore, it is worth considering the potential 
problems facing organizations; answers may be obtained from different levels of 
managers. Studying and collecting such information may provide more evidence to 
explain the ambivalence amongst each group of managers, as well as help to distinguish 
the balances and boundaries between the organizational discipline to manage risk and 
managers‘ self-awareness/judgments of using the system for risk management.  
5.6 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter has been not only to examine participants‘ attitudes towards 
the system‘s utility functions, the organizational obligations and the rights/privacy of 
clients but also to explore some potential or possible problems that probably exist at 
local schools and already influence organizational dynamics and managers‘ attitudes 
toward dealing with events. The statistical results of mean value and standard deviation 
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present participants‘ general concepts and opinions on the multiple issues about the 
operation of the system measured against each independent variable. The independent 
t-test helps highlight participants‘ different attitudes towards the system while one way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to demonstrate more significant patterns and 
show the influence of participants‘ seniority and position, and attitudes reflecting 
academic and military training. The contrasts between particular groups of samples and 
the total population demonstrate some significant trends and such findings may be 
understood as revealing the broad attitudes of managers towards the use of a technical 
management system, as well as the general behaviours or dynamic that exists at the 
organisational culture level.  
The establishing of the CSRS is likely to construct and develop a utility management 
system for controlling and preventing possible or potential threats which may harm 
people or cause the loss of property at the educational institutions. From a SCOT point 
of view, the utility of a technical system not only is reflected in the way it is managed 
but the system may also has to solve and consider some potential problems which 
prevail within the organizational culture. By doing so, the system‘s function could be 
made more acceptable to most of its operators, as a ―socially robust‖ process. Indeed, in 
discussing results in the previous sections it was found that most system operators 
tended to agree with the management and prevention functions of the system; however, 
some concerns and invisible behaviours also existed at most of the local schools. I will 
now attempt to integrate the perspectives into the three main population groups – the 
total population, senior staff and junior staff, understanding the process of risk 
management within a cultural context from within the SCOT perspective.  
Firstly, the broad opinions of the total population towards managing risk and 
organizational culture are linked and shown in Diagram 5.6.1. According to the diagram 
four stages have to be negotiated in the process of risk management. In a high 
grid/group organizational culture, the first step is to distinguish the type of risks 
threatening the organization, which can also be conceived in terms of certainty and 
uncertainty. To manage these risks, the organization as a whole will not only need to be 
able to control and predict dangers but must also reduce the uncertainties and 
unpredictability generated by risk. After this has been achieved, the risk assessment 
might move on to which potential threats are acceptable or unacceptable given the 
current organizational culture. Finally, in a hierarchical organization, the main task of 
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risk management may be to establish a standardization procedure to manage and handle 
events, which may be one way of avoiding the influence of individual judgment.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the rectangle shows on the bottom right of the diagram, the management framing of 
the CSRC probably constructs a strong integrative decision structure. The priority here 
reflects the values of the organization within a hierarchical culture, where system 
managers try to reduce or avoid any uncertainty risks impacting on the organization. 
Indeed, most participants tend to agree with the system‘s utility function, they seem to 
believe that the standardization of operating procedures, categorization and 
classification of risks may be a systematic and effective solution to controlling and 
handling risks; they are not only following the standard procedures to operate the 
system but are also beginning to understand that new risks will sometimes come from a 
risk society and the technical system itself, shown on the bottom left hexagon. 
Therefore, they will be more likely to accept that dealing with risks is an obligation of 
the organization. With respect to this, the evidence shows that over three quarters of the 
participants believe the system is an effective channel/function for transferring 
information and helping to handle/manage events; and over ninety percent of 
participants believe that schools have an obligation to deal with events. 
Diagram 5.6.1 The CSRC culture of risk and its management: Total Population   
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Regarding the second stage of context, the majority of participants seem to agree that 
the evaluation of risks can be improved by sharing information and experiences. Most 
participants seem to believe that through the interchange of knowledge risks can be 
made more predictable. The system therefore arguably improves managers‘ ability to 
partly overcome the limitations of risk assessment and predict some uncertain risks; 
some scepticism and problems may also arise if events contain many uncertainties, for 
example, sporadic, high frequent and latent events, and participant attitudes towards 
such events may differ from each other. For example, city managers and heads of 
departments are more likely than most school staff to believe that the system may 
empower the abilities of prediction and prevention of events in the use of the system 
because they may carry more responsibilities on handling events within educational 
regimes. It seems that the more responsibilities the managers take on, the more they 
have positive attitudes towards the control and prevention of risks. Also, the results 
show that around quarter of the participants never receive analysis reports or results. 
Clearly, although predicting abilities can be improved by the understanding of similar 
events, without the exchange of information the prevention function of the system 
cannot be fully operationalized. 
Moving on to the third stage of context which discusses potential threat and attitude 
toward school culture, most of the participants accept the existence of potential threats 
with few or no side-effects, but nevertheless feel that such risks are unacceptable. This 
is shown by the overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards placing security above study 
in schools. Moreover, according to CSRS regulations, any event on the system‘s list 
must be reported to the CSRC through the system and updated if necessary, following 
the system‘s standard operating procedures, which is a kind of disciplinary obedience. 
However, in practice, it seems likely that if events relate to organizational reputation or 
may impact on the organization in other ways, managers‘ attitudes towards the system 
management function may change and the events will be withheld, leading to an 
under-reporting of incidents. Indeed, the choice of which risk to worry about may 
depend on how priorities of the local organizational culture and interests of the 
organisation as a whole are determined.  
The fourth stage (the highest line on the Diagram above) of context which examines risk 
management task and type of culture, optimum efficiency, at the highest level of 
educational institutions managers have not only established a utility system to 
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communicate and discourse with schools but have also developed a standard procedure 
to handle and manage events that are unacceptable to organizations. The data suggests 
that most managers will tend to comply with disciplinary procedures when handling 
routine and repeat events, and seem to accept and agree with most of the management 
and operation functions of the system. Such outcomes highlight the fact that, in order to 
manage risk, standardisation may take precedence over individualization in a specific 
socio-technical context. 
Indeed, the opinions of the total population presented and demonstrated some general 
concepts and attitudes towards the system management function; however, it is unlikely 
that the invisible interactions and behaviours inside the organizational dynamic will be 
identified by analysing the broad conceptions of the participants as a whole, because 
such imperceptible factors and causalities may relate more to personal values or the 
moral judgments of managers themselves, and internal pressure from other colleagues 
and the organizational culture. Such interactions might instead be discerned from the 
senior staff group (see Diagram 5.6.2), others may be distinguished amongst the 
opinions of junior staff (see Diagram 5.6.3). As can be seen in the Diagram 5.6.2, 
despite the three problems that could be found, which are shown on the two sides of the 
ellipse with shadow columns, most of the opinions and attitudes toward the risk 
management function of the CSRC are similar, apart from the contrast in the results of 
senior staff to total population. It seems that the more responsibilities managers take on 
the more positive their attitude towards the prevention of risks. For example, city 
managers and heads of departments are less likely than most school staff to express 
negative attitudes on issues related to the prediction and prevention of events in the use 
of the system. However, if the risks contain many uncertainty factors, seniors, who have 
also been serving at their schools longer than juniors, may present less positive attitudes 
toward the system utility function. Heads of department, for example, presented less 
positive attitudes than other staff towards the prevention of sporadic, frequency and 
latent events.  
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Finally, the discussion of junior staffs‘ opinions revealed similar patterns to the opinions 
of the total population when it came to using the system (see Diagram 5.6.3). However, 
two particular phenomena may be worth noting: regarding the use of the system to 
control risks, juniors were not only more concerned with the system‘s surveillance 
function but also appeared to be more sensitised to colleagues‘ hostility behaviour at 
school. It seems reasonable to conclude that there is a degree of ambivalence about the 
system, which causes managers to oscillate between their subjective judgments of how 
best to protecting organizational reputations and their objective evaluation of using the 
system for event management. As Douglas and Wildavsky suggest, science and 
technology cannot by themselves determine the threats in regard to moral or cultural 
issues because it is society itself that makes the decision of what risk is (Douglas & 
Wildavsky 1982: 81).  
 
 
 
 
Diagram 5.6.2 The CSRC culture of risk and its management: Senior Staff  
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In this chapter, the broad attitudes of participants towards the systems functions have 
been explored through the use of statistical methods and some potential 
phenomena/behaviour have been highlighted, as well the interaction in local 
organizations (schools). Significantly, some contrary attitudes and ambivalent 
behaviours seem to arise from the exploration and discoveries of some controversial 
issues within the comparison of contrasting samples. In hierarchical organisations, one 
of the best ways for managing and dealing with risks/events may be to follow the 
standard operating procedure. As can be seen, nearly one-fifth of managers claimed to 
have received no information about the purpose of the system design and one quarter do 
not receive reports from the CSRC; most seem still to support the system‘s utility and 
function. In risk society, the use of the system for risk management may generate new 
risks from within the system itself, which may explain some of the disagreements and 
debates amongst managers over the functioning of the system. In a high grid/group 
organisational culture, it is likely that managers will not only comply with the 
disciplines and regulations of the organisation in a high grid/group management 
structure but will also confront and engage in behaviour which deviates from this. My 
quantitative results seem to show that some local sub-cultures influenced some staff to 
Diagram 5.6.3 The CSRC culture of risk and its management: Junior Staff  
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deal with risk in their own way. As I highlighted in the previous section, for example, 
some operators not only focuses on the management of risk but also concerns they have 
about reputation management – which in one sense poses an even greater risk than the 
events they report; however, such conflicting phenomena are unlikely to be explained, 
let alone discovered through quantitative data alone. This matter of reputational risk 
draws attention to the ways wider social risks are created by the system, and ones that 
are not within the system itself. They are probably hidden in the local organizational 
culture and experienced by some of the system operators. Therefore, it may be 
important to be interesting to explore the priorities and judgements of managers: is it the 
management of events with standardised objective values or the protection of 
organizational reputation that is more significant with subjective valuation? In the next 
chapter consequently I will explore the interpretations and perceptions of how the 
educational regime develops a technical system to manage risk, and whether there are 
another problems existing within an organisation as a result of this. I will deploy 
qualitative research, relying on face to face interviews, among system 
designers/managers, city/county managers and school staffs which may help to uncover 
how managers reconcile event management and local organisational practices.  
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Chapter 6 The system in practice: local operators and system designers 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter explored managers‘ attitudes towards the functions of the CSRS 
and their experiences of using the system to manage campus events. Significantly, most 
of the managers are likely to approve of the system management function in its dealing 
with events, as shown by the statistical results of my quantitative survey. Nevertheless, 
some participants‘ attitudes appeared to vary on issues related to the organisational 
culture. Some of their attitudes are likely to be influenced by personal values about the 
rights and privacy of clients, and some may be affected by the sub-culture of the 
organisation, such as the hostility towards system operators from other colleagues at 
schools. Others, such as heads of departments and city managers, were, more than 
general staff, likely to be worried about how to manage events more effectively. Such 
diverse views which existed across managers from different backgrounds are hidden 
inside of the organisation and are difficult to explore within the hierarchical culture in 
the schools, using simply a survey technique.  
While some phenomena have been discovered by analysing the statistical results of the 
survey data, such figures and the trends observed are probably not enough to explain the 
dynamics of and interaction within the organisations in question. Therefore, in order to 
explore the opinions and practical experiences of managers operating the system in 
more detail, this chapter reports on a more qualitative set of data derived via in-depth 
interview. The subset of respondents is drawn from the managers, from those senior 
staff at the centre of the CSRC to those in the local school, who actually operate the 
system. These managers are classified into three groups by their position and 
responsibility within the management framework of the system: system operators in 
schools; system managers of the educational sector at the city/county level; and 
managers charged with designing and managing the system at the government level.  
In this chapter, qualitative research methods are adopted to explore the interaction 
between operators and managers, and analysis of the data collected by the 
semi-structured interviews. Denzin and Lincoln (2008: 16, after Becker, 1996) argue 
that there are five main differences between qualitative and quantitative research. These 
relate to the use of positivism and post-positivism, acceptance of postmodern 
sensibilities, capturing the individual‘s point of view, examining the constraints of 
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everyday life, and securing rich descriptions. However, the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive and qualitative research can be used to enhance quantitative analysis, 
for example, by unpicking, explaining or accounting for otherwise hidden mechanisms 
and making key variables more measureable or hermeneutically. Its analytical function 
may even help to uncover potential relationships between and invisible influences over 
each individual variable or sub-sample, or examine the effect of clusters of related 
variables (Rosaline 2008:11).  
The purpose of this chapter then is not only to investigate the visible phenomena and 
debates relating to the personal values of participants and their organisational 
sub-cultures, themes which were explored in previous chapters, but also to consider the 
possible gaps in the system at the government level, policy practitioner at city/county 
level and school staff. There are three main aims here: firstly, to establish precisely 
which events are acceptable and unacceptable for different levels of managers; secondly, 
to define where the boundary between organisational culture and administrative 
discipline lies when managers deal with events; and thirdly to understand how managers 
established, in practice, the order of priority between organisational reputation/benefit 
and risk management itself. In the following section, I will describe my fieldwork and 
how the data were collected, and present the results of analyses of the findings. I have 
arranged the results according to three main topics which examine: how an educational 
regime develops a technical system to manage risk; operating a technical management 
system according to organizational and personal perspectives; and how are potential 
problems involved in influencing the modification of a technical system through 
multiple factors existing inside and outside of the organization.  
6.2 Fieldwork and data collection  
The data collection process involved conducting 34 semi-structured interviews with 
designers, managers and operators of the system between 8
th
 July and 31
st
 August 2009 
(see Table 6.2.1).
2
 The respondents were chosen to reflect the different levels of 
managers and operators (i.e. designers and managers of the CSRS at governmental level, 
policy practitioners at city/county management level, and school managers at the local 
level) as well as the views of both general staff and heads of department at the 
city/county and school levels. As a consequence, the interviewees were from five 
                                                     
2
 The research design and issues to do with the questions asked have already been considered in the 
methodology chapter. 
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different cities/counties located in the middle, north and south of Taiwan. In addition, 
the respondents also contain some staff who volunteered to participate in the interviews.  
Table 6.2.1 The background and distribution of interviewees 
Code Personal Background of Interviewees Number of Respondents 
S Campus Security Report Centre System designer * 2 
M 
Manager of CSRS CSRS manager * 1 
Manager of Taiwanese Province  Middle-level manager *1 
A Head of City or County  5 Respondents (1 is also a Designer) 
B Manager at City or County Level  5 Respondents 
C Head of Department at High School 5 Respondents 
D Senior Staff at Department (over 5 years ) 5 Respondents 
E Junior Staff at Department (less than 2 years) 8 Respondents 
V Volunteer  3 Respondents 
 Total 34 Respondents 
Note: in the following quotations from the interviews, shown within quotation marks, the use 
of ‗number with code‘ is to substitute for the personal background or job title of the 
interviewee and so anonymise the data set. 
In order to collect information from a diverse subset of system managers to operators, 
two distinct schedules were used in the semi-structured interviews. One was for the 
designers and managers of the system, people who are not only at the top of 
management framework but also helped to establish the system and have to manage it 
and make the policies for risk governance. The questions for this group explored the 
design concept behind the system, their risk management experiences, opinions about 
the system‘s functions, training programme and the education available for users, the 
effect and utility of analyses of the recorded database and the problem of using a 
technological system for managing events.  
The other interview schedule was for two types of participants, general staff and the 
heads of departments at local high schools or city/county level. The questions for this 
group were mainly about the system‘s development e.g. operating the system, dealing 
with events, opinions on operational procedure and the potential problems of using the 
system, and the actual application of system information e.g. the protection of clients‘ 
rights, the new events accompanying the use of a technical system, and so on. 
All the interviews were captured by a digital recorder. The files were transcribed in 
Chinese and coded independently, with the help of AtlasTi-5 and NVivo-9 software, and 
then the coded data was translated into English (see Appendix X). The results are 
expected to contrast and distinguish possible differences or gaps between 
managers/designers and local managers/operators of the system.  
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6.3 The development of a system for managing risk within a hierarchical 
organisation  
In the previous chapter, I considered how the categories and classification of events in 
the CSRS have been modified several times to make them as comprehensive as possible 
because of the increase of diverse events that might be created by new types of social 
phenomena or major events, influenced perhaps by imitation of peers such as street car 
racing and illicit drug abuse. 
An enormous amount of data has been collected by the system over the past ten years or 
so. It is therefore interesting to explore how a technical management system works in 
practice in an educational regime. Hughes (1989: 51) points out that some factors may 
be built into the design of a technical system – including messy, complex and 
problem-solving components; therefore, both ―social construction‖ and ―social shaping‖ 
should be taken into consideration (Williams and Edge 1996: 54). In this section, 
therefore, I will explore the occasion of establishing a technical management system 
and its function for managing risk in hierarchical regimes.  
In Chapter Four, I discussed the fact that natural disasters such as earthquakes or 
typhoons happen quite frequently in Taiwan and often cause serious damage to people 
or property. Although with modern technology these types of events can often be 
predicted, such occurrences are still fraught with uncertainty and usually happen too 
quickly for people to be evacuated from the danger zone. In order to control the level of 
casualties and the loss of property, most governments have contingency plans for 
managing the threats posed to their countries by natural (as well as man-made) disasters, 
via diverse communication technologies:   
‗…originally, the responsibility for reporting was with the Department of 
XXX, and the events were reported via paper and telephone. We hope the 
reporting procedure will be more online and digital when the duty passes 
to the Department of Military Training Education from the XXX 
Department…‘ S2  
As S2 highlights, a predecessor‘s managing process relied on paperwork and the 
telephone to report events occurring within the educational regime. The process of 
translating and handling information is a feature of more or less all organisations, 
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regardless of the media used. However, the excerpt above raises two issues: why the 
responsibility for risk management was transferred from the XXX department to the 
Department of Military Training Education and whether there were any particular 
reasons causing the transfer of duty which managed the campus security events at 
educational organisations. If so, it may be worth exploring the kind of the motive 
causing changes in the responsibilities within the bureaucrat regime. As was highlighted 
in the previous chapter, there are many staff working in educational institutions in 
Taiwan, from high schools to universities, with military backgrounds who are 
responsible for campus security. The management framing of the CSRC seems to fit 
best with Douglas‘s high group/ grid risk management culture (Douglas 1978: 7). One 
of the functions of the system is to transfer information about events from local schools 
to governmental management centres immediately, whether the emergent events were 
caused by students or natural disasters. Without a high degree of cooperation and team 
work, and importantly, conformity to an organisational culture, it would be extremely 
difficult to achieve such a goal. In relation to this, it would appear that the original 
conceptualisation and design of the system was similar to that of military intelligence 
gathering. The excerpt below tends to support this viewpoint:  
‗…the concept of the system may be from the military, because most of the 
military training instructors are from the military. This system (CSRS) may 
be an extension of the reporting system used within intelligence services 
and the information system used in the military and the spirit of the 
military reporting system extended to schools…‘ A2 
Most of the operators at school level and managers at local government level believe 
that the inspiration for the system was the military. Indeed, the response of one of the 
system designers probably highlights some aspects of the basic construction underlying 
the passage of information from local school to the management centre and the 
governance framing of risk management at educational regimes: 
‗…the system is like radar in the Navy, local radar is used for detecting 
information….. Then this transfers the information to the middle radar 
centre…. the information then is transferred to the operation 
centre…..Actually, it is a kind of distributive construction and centralizing 
management… ‘ S2 
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While it might have been an imitation of a management framing in the military and 
related to the principle of radar system for integrating information, as S2 suggests, this 
does not tell us the reason why the educational institutions decided to develop a new and 
more technical system for handling events, to replace the existing and less technical 
system. What was the major occasion which gave birth to the system? The excerpt 
below from another system designer hints at the factors that may have brought about the 
system:  
‗…there was a typhoon called ―Nari‖ around 2000. We sent a notice to 
schools but we found that the whole city was flooded, and a power failure 
was caused in Taipei. So schools could not report the condition, either by 
internet or by Fax. …..the Minister asked every department for information 
about the disaster urgently. ……. None of the departments, not even the 
XXX Department [the department originally responsible for overseeing 
reporting] could provide any information, except us. Where were the 
resources of information from? I was the duty officer at the time. The 
director of the Department, [whose military background was Lieutenant 
General] asked me to think about what communication method I could use. 
I used the method of ―Sound Indication‖, [a kind of alternative method for 
communication such as use of sound or light and flag signal etc]. So I 
separated staff into several groups and designated them to different schools 
for understanding the latest condition of the schools, and asked them to 
report it to the management centre. In the disaster prevention meeting, we 
were the only unit providing the latest information, which made the 
superiors think that the Department of Military Training Education was 
capable of collecting first-hand information of a disaster and transferred 
the reporting responsibility to our Department from the XXX 
department‖….‘ S1 (A1) 
It seems that the major event giving birth to the system was a natural disaster, the 
unpredictable consequences of which exposed the inadequacies of the original reporting 
method. As I pointed out in the literature chapter, in Chinese, the concept and the 
meaning of the word for ‗risk‘ incorporates both danger and opportunity. Although 
Typhoon Nari caused some destruction and much confusion, it also hastened the 
establishment of a technical management system. The alternative method of ―Sound 
201 
 
Indication‖ shows how managers relied on their professional knowledge and experience 
to deal with such events, when the original reporting methods failed and the situation 
got out of hand. It seems reasonable to infer that an organisation with a high group and 
grid management culture will be more effective at dealing with most messy and 
complex situations, when an unpredictable event challenges the original organisational 
order. This was recognised by the internal government reshuffle and removal of 
management responsibility from the XXX department to the Department of Military 
Training Education. In addition, the development of a technical management system 
probably not only provided a utility function for organisations to control other similar 
disasters but also improves managers‘ ability to distinguish the true nature of an event. 
These functions of the system are evident in the opinions expressed by system managers 
and policy practitioners at the top and middle levels of the management framework, 
who:  
‗…can understand the real damage on campus clearly and plainly…‘ M1 
Understanding and handling developing events is bound to be a priority for most 
managers responsible for campus security, who have not only to deal with any situations 
that arise but must also interpret and collect information about the event in a prescribed 
fashion. Despite the ease of disseminating information through contemporary media, 
most governmental organizations still have to clarify the meaning of this information for 
themselves. Therefore, one function of the system seems to be to solve this problem, 
which is confirmed by the following comment:  
‗…although the information and media are well developed…….actually 
sometimes the information from the media may not show the truth, we 
have to clarify the information through the system…‘ M2 
As far as risk management is concerned, relying on outside information received from 
outside sources is problematic because such information might be exaggerated or come 
from the second-hand material, which may expose organizations to some unacceptable 
side-effects or additional harm. As the exploration in the previous chapter shows, 
managers‘ viewpoints of the system‘s function may change with their position or 
responsibilities for managing risks. Such phenomena also seem to be supported by the 
following quote:  
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‗…When I was a junior staff, I had no idea why the Minister of Education 
developed such a system, which was expensive in terms of human 
resources and hardware equipments.……During the two years I served at 
the Liaison Office [which is at the city management level, similar to a city 
council], I came to understand the need for professionalism and an 
efficient communication channel for collecting information quickly, to 
help with risk management‘ B4 
Judging from the opinions expressed above, it seems that managers may change their 
attitudes towards the system‘s utility function and the concept of managing risk as their 
responsibilities for handling events increases. However, the system‘s functions may not 
be able to cope with a sudden or unexpected increase in events due to social change or 
the changing behaviour of students themselves. Therefore, managers may have to 
improve the system‘s functions for dealing with new types of events; moreover, some 
problems may be created by the system itself. 
‗…when system was modified after it finished….it was like an illegal 
building…add another function to the left or right…the operating of the 
system cannot be as smooth as originally…it is hard to modify it 
overall …or to destroy and re-build it…. It may cost a lot…..S1 (A1)  
The excerpt above seems to point to another problem with using a technical system to 
manage risk in a hierarchical organization. An increase in the number of potential 
problems may be solved by the modification of the system‘s functions; however, doing 
this may also be detrimental to the original functions and structure of the system. If the 
modifications made to the system cause it to become overloaded, then managers may 
have to design a new system but will then have to face another problem, that of 
budgeting in hierarchical organizations. In the discussion above, I explained the 
beginning and subsequent development of the system. However, most of the 
descriptions were provided by system designers. I would now like to explore some 
viewpoints of managers at the middle management level, who operate the system in 
schools and report information to the CSRC for managing events.  
6.3.1 Perspectives on the system: managers and operators 
City managers‘ attitudes towards the functioning of the system seem to be based on a 
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broad conception of risk management – including the handling of event information, 
dealing with events, reconstruction/rehabilitation work following events, follow-on 
training and the sharing of experiences. This reflects their central position. On one hand, 
they are not only responsible for managing events that happen in their administrative 
domain but may also need to request extra resources to help schools and to improve 
staff‘s abilities to deal with events. On the other hand, as middle managers they have to 
transfer the information they collect to the command and control centre at the higher 
management level, from which they may receive more help or support. This broad 
conception can be seen in the quotation below.  
‗…the system can transfer information about campus security to the 
command centre quickly....They handle the information with the help of 
SOPs and give orders immediately, including how to communicate, how to 
rescue, how to respond to the media, and how to deal with the problems. I 
think controlling information and dealing with the problems is the main 
direction of risk management...‘ A3 
As A3 suggests, comprehensive risk management not only involves dealing with the 
events that occur but also collecting and controlling information before an event 
happens and rehabilitation after the event. The excerpt highlights the basic concept of 
managing risk and reminds us that sometimes dealing with the possible side-effects of 
events may be more important than dealing with the event itself. Events can be single 
cases or random occurrences, which can make them hard to deal with; however, there 
will be a protocol for dealing with frequent occurrences and managers may also be able 
to prevent or reduce reoccurring events by learning from experience. This is something 
emphasized by another city manager: 
‗...firstly about risk management, the system not only shows the specific 
problem of a campus event but in fact it also describes the details of the 
event and the process of dealing with it at the school... it can also be the 
reference for a school providing some experience for the management of 
risks. …[The] system can provide some experience for staff who do not 
have experience of dealing with the event….‘ A2 
Obviously, when managers have a wide range of responsibilities, from directing 
subordinates how to deal with events to transferring information to their immediate 
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superiors, their perspective on the system‘s functions of system is likely to be much 
broader. The system for this kind of manager is not just a means of handling, 
communicating or transforming the event. It also has another function, which is to 
accumulate experience and information about how to deal with similar events in future. 
The system is a point of reference for staff and this type of manager tends to see it as a 
means for reducing harm from similar cases, by making junior staff more aware of how 
to deal with risks.  
So far, I have examined opinions on the system‘s functions from the viewpoint of the 
managers but I would now like to explore the opinions of the system operators working 
in schools. Some seem to have similar viewpoints to the city managers; others suggest 
that the requirements of the system for users at the local level may be different from 
those of managers at the governmental level. For example:  
 ‗…it classified the campus security events in a more organized way…‘ C2  
‗…a management from higher authorities to school …a guidance 
function…if schools do not have experience to deal with…..it directed 
information for referral…we need to centralize the manpower, resources 
of finance and time…it focuses on a point… ‘ C1 
‗…it seems to provide less management function for schools but it 
promoted the function of managing schools for the Ministry of 
Education….[I]t is a good system for issuing information from top to 
bottom…‘ D2 
It is reasonable to assume that local operators have both less experience and fewer 
resources available to them than managers at government level. As can be seen from the 
excerpts above, local operators tend to believe that only higher managers have the 
capability and resources to integrate events. Local operators simply follow the 
procedure and report events. They rely on the command centre to provide the necessary 
guidance and support, including manpower and resources. They seem to believe that the 
command centre has more resources, greater flexibility and knowledge necessary to 
help them solve most of problems. This attitude is expressed by C5 below:  
‗…the front staff can properly accept guidance… they have only got 
limited resources and may have a biased view or opinion. The higher level 
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of staff controls more resources and can use them flexibly...they may be 
better at coordination as well‘ C5 
Most of the junior staff probably has little experience of dealing with emergent events; 
therefore, as well as a means for reporting events the system is also a channel through 
which they can seek help from a higher authority. It is highly unlikely that they would 
be able to mobilize the resources required to solve the problems created by emergent 
events. Thus the main function of the system for local operators seems to be to provide 
knowledge and resources, rather than information transfers. Junior staff will attempt to 
integrate them into the local management culture as well as they can when serving at the 
bottom of a hierarchical organization. However, understanding all regulations relating to 
handle events at the same time may be not easy for some staff. Some indication of why 
this may be the case may be found in the following answer:  
‗…let educational staff know what kind of events should be 
reported ….otherwise they may be punished….[The system] can prevent 
and control…and provide an alert function…It functions as an early 
warning, which makes you know what problems usually happen to Senior 
High School students and the real situation of the school you serve. ‘ E3 
Following the regulations to the letter as stipulated by management may be one way for 
junior staff to avoid punishment for not reporting events. They can also use the system 
as a reference resource to help them predict possible accidents. In addition, the archive 
of events may be a useful source of information about events which junior staff may 
never experience.  
‗…the senior staff may not necessarily describe what happened 
before……we can inquire about the historical record, which is very 
helpful.… ‘ E5 
As well as the functions of preventing events and avoiding punishment, for junior staff, 
the system seems to serve another purpose, helping them to understand and adapt to the 
local organisational culture. It seems that the system is a knowledge learning tool for 
junior staff, which not only gives information about previous events but also helps them 
adapt to the dynamics of the organization. Significantly, the function of the system for 
operators and managers depended on the way they use the system to manage risks. 
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Consequently, it is interesting to explore the managers‘ concept of handling events 
within the hierarchical organization, which is the focus of the next section.  
6.3.2 Handling events in a hierarchical organisation 
The discussion above shows that there are diverse views reflecting different manager 
interests and positions. I will now try to explore the different concepts of dealing with 
events amongst the highest managers to the lowest users in the hierarchical 
organisation.  
There are many reasons why senior managers, at the highest levels of an organisational 
bureaucracy, have to control as well as understand the information they receive about 
events that occur within their administrative domains. They will be more concerned 
with helping or providing the correct information to ministers immediately than dealing 
with events. They will be anxious to avoid being blamed for events by legislators, the 
media or the general public because making a mistake in respect to risk information 
within the administrative system is seen as unacceptable. Handling event information 
for the Minister seems to be more important than the actual condition of the victim(s). 
Such a position is expressed in the following answer:  
‗….what is the majority concern in the Ministry of Education. The concerns 
do not focus on how many students‘ died or got injured…they care more 
about [the question] did the minister understand the problem... will he be 
interrogated in parliament….did the department handle the information 
properly… as the XXX event… television knows…every citizen 
knows…but the minister did not ….[T]he minister has to handle any event 
immediately… he cannot avoid the interrogation of legislators or 
journalists….‘ S1 (A1)    
It seems reasonable to conclude that managers‘ attitude towards dealing with and 
handling events will be influenced by the reactions of the general public, who will 
probably be more interested in how information is presented than the debates about how 
well managers dealt with an event. And, in this respect, it seems that the system has 
improved the ability of managers to handle events at the highest administrative 
organizational level. However, middle managers still have to deal with events that 
happen within their administrative domains, as the following suggests:  
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‗…the education authority is concerned about the process of dealing with 
events at school now. If there is inadequate information we can give 
guidance immediately, or give some administrative resource support‘ A2 
So far, the exploration of managers‘ opinions has examined the view of senior 
management; now I will present some material relating to handling events with the help 
of the system from the observations of users. As can be seen, both positive and negative 
opinions towards the handling of events were expressed by system operators. 
‗…we can report events quickly if the event is an emergency and or an 
important issue. There are two ways to do this. With important and 
emergency events we use the telephone to report it first; then the other is 
through the system…an alert function…but it depends on the cases…such 
as deviant behaviour or behaviour that frightens students...some events 
with potential problems…like the suicide of a student... you cannot 
observe the state of the student beforehand...‘ F2 
Basically, two main functions of the system can be found in the viewpoints of users. 
Firstly, it provides a communication channel for managers between local schools and 
government administrative departments. Reporting all emergencies or particular events 
to a direct authority is an essential administrative procedure of a hierarchical 
organisation. The system not only provides a channel to do this but reduces the time 
spent doing it. Secondly, there is a prevention function as the frequency of some events 
can be reduced with the help of the analysis of data and greater caution regarding the 
frequency characteristics identified. However, if events contain many uncertainties or 
merely potential risk then the prevention function may be reduced. Such preventative 
tasks can be seen in following response. 
‗…the majority is prevention…because in some months accidents will be 
higher than others, which can improve the effectiveness of prevention in 
schools if we can see the figures. Students drowning will happen in 
summer every year. If we publicise it two or three months before, to take 
extra care…it is a considerable help… ‘ B3 
Unique events are likely at each school, in the sense that they reflect the characteristics 
of the students or the community the school belongs to. The point is that managers may 
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try to improve the system themselves, by searching for a utility function that fits the 
purposes of their particular organization. 
‗in the school I served at, we just used it for reporting ….it has some  
reduced function for disasters…but the results of statistical analysis shows 
a timing and information use….which helped risk management and 
prevention for the organization…… ‘ C3 
Indeed, to handle events, managers need to not only understand the internal 
characteristics of their organizations but also to collect more information on the 
probable threats to the organisation. The system allows managers to send ‗early warning‘ 
messages to students, who may in turn pay more attention to the potential threats being 
advertised and reduce the frequency of some events. Sometimes the influence and effect 
of the figures may be stronger than the scripts for preventing and handling events: 
 ‗…let the figures speak, let schools know those frequency events, why 
they are so high…. We can take precautions against events before they 
happen…‘ B1 
Despite the positive opinions of some users about the preventative function of the 
system, others presented negative viewpoints on it. In particular, they seemed to believe 
that the system is only there to help control events for the purposes of the higher 
management. For them, the system just offers a reporting function and does not provide 
any extra help or resources for school managers to deal with events.   
‗…the function of management is just from top to bottom. But for us local 
schools unite; it did not provide positive help for the basic level of 
school….‘F6 
Significantly, some of the system users believed that the reporting procedure just 
provided more information for superiors to handle and control events. Local managers 
might still have to solve the problem by themselves and cannot get any support from 
their superiors. There seems to be some gaps between users in local schools and 
managers at the governmental level about the functions of the system, as the excerpt 
below suggests,  
 ‗…I think that it may have if I am a superior at the top. For those below, 
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normally we report through it, actually we have to report again by 
telephone. So for us, it just means added work. Superiors at the top think 
that paper information may help them manage, there are some gaps in the 
middle…….‘F4 
‗…It‘s just a reporting system; and less of a management function for 
schools. Why I think that there is no management function is because the 
higher authorities will not tell you how to deal with events… we only have 
to report an event….schools still have to deal with the event by 
themselves….‘ D3 
Another common phenomenon in bureaucratic organizations is highlighted by the 
response below. Establishing the campus security centre and reporting of events are 
duties for some staff at school. They are not likely to argue about this because of their 
status, and their training has taught them to accomplish their responsibilities and duties 
without question.  
‗…we processed it when we got the plan from the higher authorities 
according to the characteristics of the school. We communicated with the 
president and other heads of departments at school; then established the 
campus security centre at school. Mainly we are military personnel, we do 
what we have been told by our superiors, we execute it at the basic 
level..….‘ C2 
So, functionality is in part related to the disciplining of a hierarchical culture, as the 
following comments demonstrate:   
‗…I dealt with events according to the obligations given by the school, 
whether you are happy or not. I will report the event …‘ C5 
‗…my personal opinion is that I should report it according to the 
regulations. Describing the truth and do not omit anything. I think that this 
is the best way…‘ D5 
In general, system managers and system users almost inevitably have different 
viewpoints and attitudes towards the system‘s functions. On the one hand, dealing with 
events may be the first priority for schools because the system user may also be a 
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handler at the school. On the other hand, the priority of handling of event information is 
probably the main concern at the governmental level, because managers not only have 
to find possible sources of support but must also try to avoid secondary harm to the 
organisation brought about by the interrogations of legislators or journalists. So, 
managers serving at different levels of organisation have their own concerns and 
viewpoints with the use of the system and dealing with events. Consequently, I will now 
try to explore what kinds of organisational problems may happen and influence the 
operating and use of the system.  
6.3.3 The potential problems of managing events within a hierarchical organisation  
The management system was originally developed by the Ministry of Education. After it 
had demonstrated its ability to gather information and mobilize manpower, management 
was transferred to the Department of Military Training Education, which developed and 
managed the CSRC. One of the answers below highlights some phenomena that cannot 
be fully divulged but which are probably a feature of general management in most 
hierarchical organisations. 
‗the whole task failed at the XXX department [which was the management 
unit for collecting campus events originally]; in any government 
organisation, whether they are educational administrative departments or 
others, they will not admit failure because you may be punished if you 
admit failure; including failing on investment or a programme……they 
published the annual report on the campus report analysis…but looking at 
the report now, it was just for reference, it‘s kind of perfunctory…there are 
some problems with it..‘ S1 (A1)  
It seems that the management task had been organised and managed by others in 
different departments for a period of time. The management of campus events is a 
routine task whereby managers collect information then publish an annual report. In the 
past, although the report was completed, it was of little use because the analysis data 
was limited, the work of a bureaucratic management culture. This demonstrates that the 
impact of risk management partly depends on how much importance managers accord it; 
they may pay attention to it or just as easily neglect it. Therefore, attitudes and 
behaviour of managers is an important part of risk management, which not only 
influences the success of programs but also has an impact on the utility of the system. 
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This view is apparent in the following response:  
‗…when the system had been operating for two years there was a review; I 
think that the change of managers was a big problem. The changing of 
operating staff was too sudden; it was not done gradually, all managers 
were changed. After the change and depending on their level of concern 
about the task,…the attention level of directors….after a period of time the 
occasion [ using the system information to prevent particular events] has 
gone; it is hard to understand…..S1(A1)  
Managers are like a ‗juncture‘ it seems in the sense that they can not only help to 
improve the system‘s utility but can also reduce its functioning as well. If the director of 
a department pays attention to the task of management, the problems inherent in the 
system may not become apparent, at least not immediately. Obviously, if system 
managers understand the concepts and functions of the system, they may make full use 
the system to manage risk. However, when managers are replaced, the new managers 
might not yet know how to operate the system properly, which means the utility of the 
system will probably be reduced. Such problems are not likely to happen at the highest 
levels of the CSRS but may appear at lower levels, as is evident in the following 
discussion of organisational culture: 
‗…the campus is also a hierarchical organisation, from the president to 
heads of departments. Particularly, in a private school, he [the school 
president] thinks that I understood everything; I am the highest, dealing 
with events according to my role. He ignored the fact that risk 
management is team work, that he‘s just one of the team… ‘ S1 (A1) 
Indeed, the risk management task is a kind of team work, extremely difficult to 
perform using personal power or knowledge alone. The response above indicates that 
there are directors who sometimes ignore the team-working dimensions of risk 
management. Whole problems can normally only be resolved by the interaction of 
team workers and require more than just the personal determination of a school 
president. It seems that some directors have a tendency to overuse their power as part 
of a hierarchical organization. Such ultra vires behaviour may influence the dealing 
with and handling of risk, and have an impact on the system‘s functions.  
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The discussion has so far concentrated on problems of operating the system that are 
likely to be related to management behaviour and leadership within schools. But there 
are also some potential problems at the cross-management level, between higher and 
lower levels of the organizational framework, for example,  
‗…generally, a report published in government units just shows the figures. 
We think that such analysis with big trends only presents trends. It is 
actually very hard to find out about concrete policy making or strategy 
from a government report … In the last two or three years, we have 
modified some processes … counselling schools with the highest event 
rate … the effect is better ... just figures for schools or lower management 
level … there is no pain for them immediately … ‘ S2 
The excerpt above not only adds to our understanding of why the overall responsibility 
for managing events was passed to a different department. It also highlights the 
possibility that, if the handling of events simply means providing regular and routine 
information for managers, then the preventative rates of the system may not be as high 
as expected because, despite the observation made earlier by one respondent, it is 
unlikely that statistics alone show how to prevent or deal with events. It seems that most 
managers serving at lower management levels simply follow the regulations or 
procedures if there are no particular policies or strategies in place for dealing with an 
event. Managers in different positions may have their own concerns; and most risk 
managers seem to deal with events through their existing models of an event with the 
help of the technical system. The following response illustrates this: 
‗ it‘s just for reporting, the school still has to deal with events … except for 
an important event, superiors will not assign people to help, the system is 
just for reporting events, it cannot provide any help and just perplexes me, 
it‘s less functional. We carry on preventing events as we have always 
done … this will not be enhanced simply when we got notices from 
superiors … we still follow our regular practice to deal with things in 
school … ‘ D4 
As the quote suggests, some managers believe that even when they report an event 
through the system, only minimal support will provided by higher management. They 
even argue that reporting an event may bring more trouble than it is worth or overload 
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them with extra problems in addition to the event itself. It seems that they tend to stick 
with existing models for dealing with risks, rather than changing the regulations despite 
the frequent suggestions of superiors. The response below also helps to explain 
managers‘ concerns in this respect:     
‗…I think that the system did not perform very well. [I]t is of limited of 
support from superior….‘ D1 
‗… For schools it may be useful occasionally but its general function not 
so much; many teachers do not even know we have the thing [reporting 
system]. ‘ F8 
The risk management task is just one of the responsibilities of school staff, although 
there are probably many administrative staff and teachers who do not properly 
understand the system or even know about its existence. This is possibly why some 
managers expressed negative attitudes towards the use of the system to manage events. 
These operators have had to respond to events without the support of either higher 
management or their colleagues at school. Moreover, the answers below include some 
negative opinions and attitudes that indicate there is another potential problem with the 
system. 
‗…the management function is not good enough … the function could be 
promoted … It‘s just a reporting system, only there to provide information 
for our bosses … I cannot sense the prevention function…. ‘ B2 
‗…the reporting is passive which means the action of reporting takes place 
after the events have happened … so from a management perspective, it 
does not help the task of prevention management actually … It tends to be 
more about reducing and recovering the damage … It‘s a passive operation‘ 
B4 
From this perspective, the reporting process is a passive response to events that 
managers cannot control or prevent, because it does not occur until after an event has 
happened. They feel that the system functions more as a way of reducing and recovering 
damage than preventing events, partly because managers are located in a passive 
position. It seems that there are some possible gaps and even tensions between the 
system managers and operators, and some operators even argued that using the system 
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to report events can cause additional complications. Even so, they will still tend to 
follow the rules about reporting incidents at school. Consequently it may be worth 
exploring how system managers built the reporting culture after establishing the 
management system, and what system operators‘ experiences with and opinions of this 
organisational culture are. 
6.3.4 Building a risk management reporting culture 
In general, it is probably reasonable to assume that most staff will follow a regulation 
that has been issued from above, when working in a hierarchical organisational culture. 
There would appear to be no room for deviating from or applying personal judgement to 
the administrative regulations. Such a viewpoint is considered in the answer below:  
‗… in this culture, they have to report events if the regulations ask them to. 
No one will refuse to do this on campus … schools may also not report in 
the normal manner … report or not report, you can control by yourself …‘ 
S1 (A1) 
As the decision to report is made by individual users of the system, they can choose 
whether to report an event or not. If a case is not publicised by the media, no one will 
ever know the event happened, apart from the school itself, not even the CSRC. 
Likewise it is impossible for the Ministry of Education Department to monitor 
everything that happens in each school around the country. The reason school managers 
report events seems to be because they believe that the system can help them prevent 
future events. Therefore, there may be some potential benefits after reporting through 
the system. For example,   
‗…I do not think so; the Ministry of Education Department cannot monitor 
what happened at school … it just provides an early warning for 
schools …‘ C4 
It might be argued that system designers should consider how to improve the reporting 
culture rather than just expect users will follow the regulations when operating the 
system designed by the CSRC. However, even if they do this, they will still have to 
contend with the unpredictable aspects of local culture, which may influence and affect 
the reporting of events. One of the possible concerns is highlighted in the following 
response:  
215 
 
‗…did users follow the reporting regulation to reflect the events with the 
three levels or did they withhold events which will cause some ―Dark 
Figure‖? …‘ S1 (A1) 
The ―Dark Figure‖, in related to some event withholds by school and managers did not 
report them to the CSRC through the system, referred to here are the potential invisible 
threats which may influence the management and prevention functions of the system 
because it may reduce the system‘s reliability. Apparently, it is likely to be an important 
issue for system designers to consider how to reduce and prevent it from happening at 
the local level. To avoid such phenomena, system managers may not only have to 
improve and modify the system‘s function but might also have to empathize with the 
behaviour and thinking of the users. The following excerpt considers this issue:     
‗… When the system began operating, some schools avoided reporting 
events. They would withhold events and thought that it was unnecessary to 
let you know. Why I should tell you if you did not get the information of 
event? Because it is no help for me … there are some reasons. Firstly, it 
influences the reputation of school. Second, it may influence the rights of 
clients and parents. Third, what kinds of benefit you can give to me if I 
report the information to you …‘ S1 (A1)  
From the discussion above, it seems that system managers find it difficult to influence 
the reporting process as it currently stands. Events may be happening at every school 
around the country but because the decision to report is up to system operators, system 
managers may never get to hear about them. System designers and managers may 
therefore have to introduce some functions or establish new regulations to construct a 
reporting culture that reflects their position within the system, as passive receivers of 
information. Alternatively, they can attempt to integrate or track events recorded by 
others organization or systems. For example:  
‗…we use many ways … such as tracking insurance companies firstly … 
then put the information of the student‘s claim into the system … and send 
a governmental document to the Bureau of Education in the city … asking 
them to correct it … they will alert us the following year … ‘ S2 
The excerpt above suggests that tracking events through other channels may help to 
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create a reporting culture which takes into consideration the tendencies of system 
operators from higher level to lower level management. Tracking insurance companies 
seems to be an alternative way of governing the event-happening ratio in schools. In 
addition, tracking student insurance claims was an example of pro-active management, 
which not only improved a reporting culture but also gave a warning to the local 
authorities. To establish an efficient reporting culture, it would seem that the senior 
managers need to provide their subordinates with practical assistance rather than simply 
punishing them. This would not only improve the reporting culture but also the 
reporting rate in the future. Moreover, there are online network features to the system 
that provide a degree of automatic reporting of events: 
‗Because this is a network system, staff will check the reports from 
different levels of schools in the CSRS every day. It has two functions. 
Firstly, checking the reporting functions and procedure … if there is any 
mistake … we will give feedback immediately … another is that we must 
integrate important campus events and present them to ministers … if there 
are any mistakes in the report, we will send an official document to rectify 
them … this is a kind of inspection … M1 
Inspection is a kind of monitoring function and can be used to control and improve the 
quality of the system overall. It enables system managers give feedback and guidance 
online, as well as check the information of events. There are two functions being 
performed here – the interchange of information and correcting mistakes immediately. 
These are not only an essential part of administration but also a legislative requirement 
according to the laws of country, for example,  
‗…whether it is the ―Gender Equality Education Law‖… or the ―Sexual 
Assault Prevention Ordinance‖ … depending on the regulation … these 
regulations ask that the report is made but that it does not reveal the names 
of clients.‘ S1 (A1) 
Most of the administrative regulations of the CSRS mirror the laws of the country and 
an event cannot be dealt with in a way that goes against these laws. Therefore, the 
system also has a notification function, which is to make sure operators do not break the 
law when carrying out their duties. This is described below: 
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‗… because the law requires it … We will notify them how to do it through 
a window. So, if we make some modifications … we send notices to 
reporters to report [according to the procedures and regulations of law]…‘ 
S2  
Significantly, most operators will want to avoid another incident happening when 
handling or dealing with an event with legal implications. Some of the opinions 
expressed in the interviews with school operators suggest that monitoring immediately 
also puts pressure on staff when dealing with and reporting such events. For example,  
‗…that is a bigger problem if superiors get the information after the 
media …‘ A5 
‗…the system lets educational staff know what events should be reported 
up a level, otherwise they may be punished … and it encourages 
alertness …‘F3 
The limitations of regulations or law may cause managers to realise the importance of 
being timely when dealing with events. Such pressures can be seen in the following 
answers: 
‗…there is a mandatory requirement of the system … 15 minutes to report 
the event by telephone if it is ―A‖ level and paper work in one hour; then, 
12 hours for ―B‖ level; after that, ―C‖ level in one day … we will feel 
under pressure, actually…‘ C4 
‗…I think that there is a punishment if we do not report events 
immediately, it may cause much inconvenience for the school. I may have 
to deal with many things at the same time…‘ D1 
From the management point of view, on the one hand, when establishing a reporting 
culture they may have to consider not only some positive functions for encouraging and 
providing support to users; on the other hand, they may also have to introduce some 
negative regulations for avoiding punishment, even for behaviour against the law. 
Punishment though appears to be rare, suggested by the comment below:  
‗…there was only one case which suffered punishment … they did not 
report a sexual assault case … according to the law … he got punished ... a 
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serious punishment…‘ S1 (A1) 
Obviously, the establishment of a reporting culture has to prioritise the rule of law, then, 
the requirements of the organization and the support functions for system users. In this 
section, I have explored the occasion of the system‘s design, the basic concept of 
handling events, the potential problems of managing events and how to establish a 
reporting culture in a hierarchical organisation. Significantly, some gaps and similar 
concepts can be found between the system designers and operators through the 
discussion of the development of a technical management system for managing risk. In 
the following section I will focus on exploring users‘ opinions towards operating the 
system in risk society.  
6.4 The operation of a technical management system in risk society 
The previous section explored the historical background to how a technical system was 
developed, discussed its functions and the advantages and disadvantages of handling 
events within a hierarchical organisational framework. As we have seen, the design of a 
technical system not only has to consider the functions identified by the organisation as 
important but may also have to understand the requirements of managers and operators. 
As Hughes (1989: 52-53) points out, the development of a technological system is about 
solving problems or fulfilling goals. The focus should be on the social problem rather 
than developing a specific or unique software program for technical purposes (Williams 
& Edge 1996: 53-55). The discussion above examined participants‘ opinions towards 
the functions of the system but, in this section, the focus will shift to their experiences 
of operating the system in a risk society.  
6.4.1 Using the system in organisations 
The reasons for establishing the technical system in schools, which I explored in the 
previous chapter, essentially boil down to improving management‘s abilities to handle 
the natural or man-made events that occur in educational institutions. In order to 
establish a successful technical system, system builders have to consider various 
factors – including technology, economy and policy (Hughes 1983; Donald 1989: 196). 
At the same time, and indeed because of these social and economic costs, risks will be 
prioritised. For example:  
‗…you may not pay attention to some events, but they may be a concern 
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for other institutions … such as an association concerned about leisure in 
primary schools … For us, if it is a ―C‖ level case, then maybe we will not 
worry about it really… we have to deal with it according to our priority…‘ 
S2 
Although the system was designed for controlling and handling events in schools, at the 
highest level of management, managers may hope to control what are seen as more 
significant unpredictable events rather than attend to general events that may just cause 
slight injury or inconvenience to students. Such a view may be found in this comment 
by the system manager:  
‗…actually it can be distinguished as [risks of] many kinds, one can be 
dealt with by school themselves … like a slight injury by traffic car 
accident … they need to report it according to the regulation but this level 
of event can be solved by schools themselves …‘ M1 
It seems that although the regulations of the system ask operators to report every event, 
system managers tend to ignore events which may be seen as routine cases that can be 
fixed by schools themselves. Even so, staff in schools reported a tension between both 
the dealing with and reporting of events at the same time: 
‗…actually I think that dealing with an event is more important than 
reporting it … we will report the event if we really need your help … if not, 
then you control it instead. And we may feel rushed and confused about 
the point of dealing with the event …‘ D1 
On the one hand, the system has improved the abilities of a hierarchical organization to 
manage risk because it helps the highest managers to handle events around the country 
immediately. On the other hand, the system may cause some inconvenience for local 
organizations because the process of reporting events demands staff resource and time, 
which probably could have been devoted to alleviating risk in the first place. It seems 
that the system not only provides a visible means for managing risks at the highest 
organizational level, it may also have an unacceptable influence that impacts the 
effectiveness of those dealing with events at the lowest organisational level. Indeed, for 
most operators, priority given to either reporting or dealing with events is likely to 
depend on their personal attitudes towards the use of the system more than its actual 
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apparent functionality.  
This reference to handling ‗real events‘ and doing so effectively at the local level 
reflects a basic concern of most managers, who will try to deal with events in as simple 
a way as possible and avoid more complicated side-effects of the event from 
reoccurring again.  
‗…we must think for ourselves. We have to deal with events rather than 
complicating things when an event happens …‘ A4 
Indeed, system managers implement regulations for operators to follow or use as a 
reference point but sometimes users will still deal with events according to their 
judgment or thinking, users are not in Woolgar‘s (1991) terms so easily ‗configured‘. 
Consequently, I will now explore some aspects of operating of the system that contrast 
with the original design. Respondents felt that some operational factors should be 
considered before a technical system is designed for users. For example:  
‗…we hoped that it would be easy to use from the screen without training 
when we designed it …‘ S1A1 
It seems that both ease of operation and instant response are the two main factors which 
have to be considered regarding the operation of the system, because such factors may 
cut the operational training and management time it takes for managers to collect 
information at the top of organization when managing risks. Meanwhile, those using 
and operating the system may have slightly different expectations to system designers or 
managers. The operators not only provide information about the events but may also 
hope to receive some resources as a result, for example, 
‗…we will expect that monitors and managers [of risks] at the top of the 
organization provide some resources to us [to deal with it] ...‘ C4 
It seems that most operators not only give information but also want to be given support 
through the system, because they are likely to be more concerned about dealing with 
events than controlling them, in their roles at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy. 
When operating a system to manage risks, people may worry about dealing with the 
procedure if they know their actions will be monitored or under surveillance by other 
managers at the top management level. However, they will also be interested in the 
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responses of their superiors to their reports: 
‗…we do not know if we can get resources from superiors … just complete 
the responsibility as a reporter … can this case be a reference case or 
matters for teaching … [but] there is not any follow-up information to 
understand it ...‘D2 
Obviously, in order to prevent or control some of the unpredictable factors or impacts of 
events, most operators will seek more information from the system, especially if they 
know the system has integrated data on many similar events already. There seems to be 
some differences in the expectations of system designers/managers and operators 
regarding the operation of the system. While some operators wanted more guidance 
from superiors at the top of the management framework, other comments related to 
simplifying the design of the system, developing a simpler process of operation, using, 
for example, tables and a selection pre-defined functions rather than typing in text: 
‗…firstly, simplify it [the operation procedure] … reporting the continued 
information of event causes it to add a new case [the system may recognize 
the reporting of following information as new event]...‘ A2 
‗…using tables or a selection function rather than language description ...‘ 
B3 
‗…the user cannot add a new column if the system information is not 
enough for describing the events….‘ C4 
Some operators seem to depend on those aspects of the system that may enable them to 
avoid making mistakes when operating it, especially if senior staff are away. This may 
involve various technical elements. For example:  
‗…the system should provide some samples, a standard demonstration ...‘ C5 
‗…the system should notice automatically if the operator makes 
mistakes…‘ D1 
‗…you can only see the record of the school … if you could check events 
from other schools it may be more helpful …‘ F5 
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‗…integrating some information which shows a good sample from other 
schools … and creating a public discussion space would be useful…‘F6 
Yet at the same time, the technical limits of the system were also apparent; when a 
system has operated for a period of time the system itself and the equipment which runs 
the system may not support its effective functioning, as it was originally conceived. As 
one local operator said: 
‗…the computer equipment at a school may not all be new … it may be 
very slow … the information may stick … or off-line … the equipment is 
too old mostly ...‘A5 
Obviously, by using the system to manage events system managers not only expect to 
improve a regimes‘ ability to control events but also operators‘ ability to anticipate 
events. Operators are empowered with the task of preventing events. However, a basic 
presupposition is that the equipment channelling the technology and its functions can be 
upgraded and controlled with each new threat identified by risk society. Consequently, I 
will now turn to how managers apply the mass of data to the prevention of events and 
how the staff used this information within the hierarchical organisation. 
6.4.2 Perspectives on the use of data 
As discussed above, the functioning of the system may be different depending on the 
perspectives and purposes of system managers or users. In this section, I will explore 
interviewees‘ views and concepts about the analysis of data within three operating levels, 
from the top to the bottom of the system management framing. Obviously, both 
application and sharing of data were considered when developing the system according 
to the responses I had from the system designer. In order to apply the system data 
properly managers may have to understand what the priority for the organization is, and 
how to achieve the best effect from it. For instance:  
‗…we must find out which problems we are more concerned with than 
others from the system, this may be understood through the report. Some 
problems may come from the intuitions of media or citizens … such as, if 
lots of people are taking drugs, I do not need the report information to 
support my viewpoint … the superiors will support the policy change 
without the support from figures ... some events may need guidance from 
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the figures … For example, when is the peak month or season of the year 
for traffic accidents … or more events from death or drowning … or 
suicide … we can provide preventative information … to remind each unit 
and institution … how much can achieved by early warning … it is worth 
referencing‘ S1 (A1)  
It is true that some events may be prevented by the analysis of recorded data, if they 
contain information on frequency characteristics or geographic location, or the personal 
behaviour of a particular group of the population, who can then be targeted. Whereas, 
other events which cause concern and worry in the media or among the public may be 
hard to understand via data themselves, especially if the events related to some 
contested risks such as drug abuse or antisocial behaviour such as car racing. 
Significantly, the analysis of the data has improved some aspects of event prevention 
and policy making; however, sometimes policy making for managing events may be 
caused by a single event and without the data to support it. There is another benefit of 
sharing information and giving authority for analysis of data in a technical system. For 
example, the system design not only includes a data analysis function for senior 
managers but also provided one for operators, a point noted in the answer below: 
‗…the database provides an online data saving function actually … each 
unit can search for historical information on campus events at their school, 
we also hope they can analyze events according to the reporting after the 
events … they may modify or draw some policies on campus security … 
according to the trends of a school … ‘ S2 
Despite the fact that the analysis of data provides some preventative function, to help 
prevent similar events and enable policy makers to reduce deviant behaviour amongst 
students, two drawbacks may be found in the technical management system according 
to the responses of system managers. Firstly, it is difficult to examine the effectiveness 
of sharing information through the system because the system is just designed for the 
reporting of events not for tracking the effectiveness of management itself. Secondly, 
the turnover of staff may bring in new managers not familiar or versed in the 
management task and system function, as can be seen below,  
‗…regarding how they make some strategies according to the reports or 
figures, actually they will not respond to us. This part is hard to 
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understand… ‘ M1 
‗…I just received the work for half a year. I heard from senior staff that 
there is an annual report … it seems to focus on … I am not sure that it 
is focused on accidents … I have not dealt with this part in this half 
year now…‘ M2 
Indeed, both preventing events and making policies may be improved by the analysis of 
data from a technical system; however, sharing information and inheriting experience 
may be hard to design into the system‘s functions because such factors may be difficult 
to standardise depending on how operators use the information and what their focal 
point is. Consequently, it may be worth examining whether the system operators use and 
analyse the data after they report events through the system.  
According to the responses, it seems that the tasks of analysing data have been done by 
most of the middle management level at cities or counties. They tended to see various 
possible reasons and factors which caused and created the events within their 
administrative management boundaries. As can be seen, they not only analyse the events 
by month and year but also tried to distinguish the possible reasons. They are likely to 
believe that some events did not happen by coincidence and they can be integrated into 
some frequency characteristics; even the analysis of data may help them to find out 
some solutions for reducing the probability of events occurring. Such ideas are 
contained in the following answers: 
‗…we focused on how many cases there were from January to December 
every year in the county. Then we analyzed the categories of events. Why 
does it happen in these few months? ... we can find the frequency of 
events and the function for dealing with them from reporting of campus 
events.‘ A3 
‗For example, how does the traffic accident happen? How does the 
suicide happen? How does campus violence and bullying happen? Then 
provide the reference for counselling.‘ A4 
However, when examining the analysis of data with local operators, they expressed both 
positive and negative opinions about this task. As can be seen, some school operators 
tried to understand the characteristics of events with the help of historical data. It may 
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have been a requirement of their current work to look into the practicalities of events, 
for example, the business of traffic security. Others focused on examining the broader 
statistical pattern of events at their schools. For example:  
‗Hope to understand the characteristic of school, did the media report it, 
such as fights … relationships between male and female or traffic 
accidents, which probably show what kind of events happen at this 
school …‘ C1 
 ‗…we did the statistics by month and season according to the statistical 
information from superiors, or statistics by year in relation to all of the 
events that happened at school …‘ D4 
Despite some operators analyzing the data for improving the management of events or 
supporting particular work at school, most of the system users did not seem to have 
considered analyzing the data. As can be seen, most operators expected to acquire more 
information from senior staff in the organization rather than analyzing the data by 
themselves. They tended to believe that they did not have the qualifications or abilities 
to analyze the data. Although some operators may be curious about the system‘s 
functions, they just surf the system and check some historical data. This is evidenced in 
the answer below: 
‗…we are not at the top of the organisation … we expect surveillance and 
management from the top of organisation, and them to release some 
figures for us to reference …‘ C4 
‗…we did not analyse … we may not have the ability to analyze data at 
our school‘ D2; D3 
‗…the quality is too low at school. We do not have this function‘ C3 
‗As I know, we did not … we will log into the system to understand what 
events have happened at school … just curious …‘ F5 
It seems there is a big disparity between the system designers and operators, contrasting 
the manager at the top of management framing with those at lower end, when it comes 
to discussing the matter of data analysis. On the one hand, the system designers built in 
a utility function for operators to integrate and analyze data through the system. This 
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function seems to be applied and used only at the sub-organisational management level. 
On the other hand, most of the operators expected information from the system, as 
opposed to functions. They tended to believe that the system should provide information 
automatically, and were reluctant to analyze the data because they felt they did not have 
the necessary knowledge or skills to do so. It seems that most of the operators did not 
know that the system already has a basic statistics function. Consequently, in the next 
section I will explore whether managers and operators actually use the analysis of 
information for managing events. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, an annual report has to be published by the CSRC each 
year and then posted on the web-pages of the system. As can be seen, the task of 
producing an annual report has been undertaken by the CSRC each year; however, the 
system managers seem just to post it onto the webpage and send it to the other internal 
departments in the Ministry of Education Department. This is apparent from the answer 
below: 
‗…every year the Ministry of Education Department will integrate and 
analyze the data … the report was published when XXX was charged with 
the responsibility … we followed their way … analyzing the data and 
composing a report every year ...‘ S2 
‗…each year we will ask for these figures and the database … we 
commissioned some professional scholars to analyze it … the results we 
will post on the web-page for academic areas … students or parents who 
are interested in it or for reference … we will send it to other internal 
departments … but I have not seen any department using the information 
for policy making …‘ M1 
In Chapter Four, the discussion of the database presented some significant trends, which 
provided many clues about how to prevent certain events; however, two problems are 
apparent from the excerpt above. To begin with, it may be reasonably inferred that most 
of the internal departments likely are not concerned or will not consider a report from 
other departments for policy making, particularly if the report was not produced by 
them. Therefore, the analysis of the system database is likely to have become a kind of 
routine procedure or task, published each year and posted on the web-page in a 
hierarchical organization. The second problem is whether operators receive or check 
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those annual reports from the web-page of the system through the internet. Such debates 
may also be a concern for system managers, for example: 
 ‗…it is hard to understand. When people demand data through the 
network, they will not give feedback and let us know who asked the 
information … if we do not know which units asked for the information, 
we may not understand how to follow-up effectively …‘ M1 
Indeed, on the one hand, the system has made it more convenient for organizations to 
manage events, which in turn makes events more controllable. On the other hand, it has 
also caused uncertainty for organisations, which means the report information is less 
useful. Such phenomena significantly could be found within some operators‘ answers. 
As can be seen, unless operators have particular requirements due to their work or 
responsibilities, in which case they will check the reports online, most claim to have got 
the annual reports from other resources, such as meetings, workshops, training or 
official documents, for example:  
  ‗…I have looked but not every year. I download data from the CSRC. I 
am not sure that they posted it on the web-page for school to download …‘ 
B4 
 ‗…I have looked at a report in relation to traffic accidents which is 
commissioned by the analysis from University …the other part I did not‘ 
B5 
‗…the information was sent by official document to us … it is a table with 
ratios ... we read it if they sent to us … passively …‘ D1; D5 
 ‗…related reports, such as internal newspapers or the information from 
the meeting of head of departments, then including electric board from 
network etc…‘ V3 
Despite the annual reports being posted on the web-page of the system, significantly, the 
action of collecting information was not taken for most of the school staff. It seems that 
they got information from other channels, passively, even though they can easily and 
automatically download it from the system. Otherwise, some staff seem not to have had 
any information, neither from the system nor from other resources.   
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‗…I did not see it, because I just arrived so I only know about the 
information of school …‘ F3; B1; D3; F6 
‗…it can probably be seen at a higher level … I do not know if I can see it 
or not … I heard about it in a workshop … I felt that the information was 
more and more prospective … ‘ C5; F4; F8 
It seems that the system designers built in an automatic function for sharing information, 
a function for feeding back experience to operators. However, as can be seen, some 
operators argue that the system‘s function is just to report incidents to the highest level 
in the event of an emergency case and that the procedure for reporting of events may 
cause overload to staff. Some operators even think that they cannot get any information 
or support from the system. The discussion above highlights a general phenomenon, 
which is that users in a hierarchical organisation will normally not retrieve information 
from system actively but wait for information from the system passively. It seems that 
the annual reports were probably not very effective for preventing events because events 
still happened at school and caused harm to students, which is shown by the statistical 
results of Chapter Four. Therefore, it is worth considering here whether there are any 
problems with the report, or if any suggestions about the report were made by managers 
or operators. 
In Chapter Four, I reviewed the mass of event information recorded by the system; such 
data is likely to indicate that particular events happen at individual times, months or 
seasons according to the trends or figures of statistical results. However, although such 
statistical information opens up the possibility for even prediction, it does not provide a 
suggestion function for dealing with or preventing events. This problem is evident 
within the excerpt below from one of the system designers‘:  
‗…Nowadays, the analysis is quantitative, focused on the number of 
events and the number of people injured or dead; we do not focus on how 
to deal with it. The analysis of dealing with events could direct the 
preparations of schools, such as, some general deviant behaviour happens 
on campus, the reasons why it happened … it should provide a 
correlation, a figure which provides references for every unit to advance 
it. This thing [analysis information] has not been analyzed in depth …S1 
(A1)   
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Many trends and figures can be found within the annual reports. This quantitative data 
production would appear to achieve one of the routine goals of a hierarchical 
organization; however, it does not significantly improve prevention capabilities or 
reduce events at the level of practice. It seems that users at the operating level prefer a 
substantive example for reference more than figures and trends, because some similar 
case information not only gives direct guidance for imitating or learning but may also 
help to actually prevent events. For example:  
‗…the Ministry of Education Department published a report related to 
campus security events but the contents did not analyze the details, such as, 
what kind of place it may happen, what kind of events, which it could 
easily provide for staff to enhance it … actually we cannot deny it 
totally … such as it helps a lot on the renting of school buses for school … 
there was a case with a school bus accident on a crossing which caused the 
death of students … after the review of this case, they provided a sample in 
relation to contracts for renting buses … it provided basic information for 
staff … using it they will feel more empowered …D2 
It may be reasonably inferred that, in order to prevent some possible events, a clear and 
definite procedure or example may be more useful than the analysis figures or trends for 
operators serving at the bottom of organisations. The discussion above may explain 
some of the results explored in the previous chapter, where operators presented both 
positive and negative opinions towards the system‘s function. Some operators seem to 
use data passively. Some try to discern patterns or models from the historical 
information, to improve their prevention abilities regarding the reduction of events for 
organisations. Consequently, it is interesting to explore how operators extend and use 
the system‘s function with the help of historical information, to reduce events at school.  
6.4.3 Ways in which the organisation might use the information produced by the 
system 
As I argued above, in order to improve the reporting rate and motivate a reporting 
culture, there are some strategies that system designers/managers can apply to convince 
operators to use a system. As well as establishing regulations and invoking the law to 
discipline operators, it seems that designers/managers also considered and provided 
some inducements and benefits to persuade operators and administrative staff to 
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embrace their roles. Such methods probably not only improved the controlling and 
handling of events at the management centre but also empowered many staff at the 
educational institutions to deal with and resolve events. Evidence for this can be seen in 
the answer below:  
‗We provided support by focusing on schools. The benefits you get when 
you report events to us … I give a budget and manpower when you report 
an event … help you to evaluate without your money … help you evaluate 
the environment, including inside and outside of campus, in relation to the 
previous case … help you to find out and evaluate the problem … this 
function has reduced some cases in schools…‘S1 (A1) 
However, some operators argued that even if schools tried to prevent events there are 
still many potential sources of harm, particularly those emanating from students 
themselves. They tended to believe that nowadays in a pluralistic society, events may be 
influenced by familial education or social behaviour and these factors cannot be 
prevented or controlled by staff at school. The following account makes this explicit: 
‗…there are multiple categories and reasons causing events now. This may 
come from different levels. The concepts of familial education; even if 
schools undertook some prevention work, students may not follow the 
recommendations of staff. Some conditions may still be there.‘ M2 
Though there were some negative attitudes towards the prevention of events simply 
through recording information, it may be worth exploring whether some operators 
actually use the system information to prevent possible impacts on their school. 
According to the response from an interviewee presenting positive opinions, it may be 
concluded that there are three main methods for using the system information to prevent 
events. Firstly, staff may provide both positive and negative knowledge to students, 
educating them at the same time. Significantly, some operators seem to believe that 
schools should not only give accurate information to students but also foster in them a 
basic ability to judge events such as, the problem of drug abuse or teenage pregnancy. 
This in turn pre-establishes a psychological propensity to avoid events via influences 
such as pressure from peer groups. Staff tended to believe that in order to empower 
students‘ ability to avoid drug abuse, schools should not only provide positive 
knowledge to educate students but also highlight the negative aspects or how the 
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psychological construction of education may help them leave problems behind. Such 
concepts and opinions can be seen in the following excerpt:  
‗Nowadays, education tends to educate students about many positive but 
fewer negative concepts of events … We should provide negative 
information to them about things like drug abuse and gender relationships. 
In the past, people ignored such issues, even skipped the courses … which 
made students more curious … tried it by mistake … education with both 
positive and negative sides will help children make a reasoned judgment, 
and it would be more practical …‘ A2 
‗…You can pre-establish a psychological construction [some possible risks 
in particular weather or season] if you know a condition of this month. You 
will not influence students‘ emotions … A2 
Secondly, using and applying particular figures, trends and cases of events may 
empower both staff and raise student‘s awareness of and abilities to deal with or avoid 
events. In order to improve the multiple functions of system information, such data 
could be classified into five categories – including gender, figures (the number of event), 
characteristics (particular type of event), trends (the increase or reduce of event in a 
period of time), and the frequencies of events (frequency with weather, time or 
particular season). Initially, although each school may have their own unique problems 
with students, some operators seem to believe that most events can be separated by the 
factor of gender. They supposed that events may be prevented and alleviated by 
distinguishing the gender factor, if only they could get information about what kind of 
events are caused primarily by male or female students. This can be seen below:  
‗…it could easily be deduced what kind of events may happen to teenagers 
if we had the figures, but every school may be different, also it has to be 
separated by male and female, they will have different problems …F1 
As well as through the factor of gender, some events may be discovered by an increase 
of particular cases. For example, some events may be created by the socialization or 
drug abuse of students, which probably influences both their psychological and physical 
health but such events may not show a significant increase because such cases probable 
just occupied a small number of events if contrasted to the total number of events. 
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However, they may be demonstrated by some statistical results if divided from the 
overall events rate, for example:  
‗…such as the case of drug abuse, we provided the figures to schools … 
actually it has spread but no one can prove it ... then the cases rose from 5 
to 33 in 2007, now it is 41. There was eightfold increase in two years. This 
figure shows that there was more and more drug abuse at school …‘ B5 
Besides, some events may be reduced by classification of event‘s characteristics, 
especially if such events are caused by similar types/peculiarities of students or 
happened at a particular place or time. Therefore, some staff seem to believe that the 
abilities of junior or new staff to deal with events may improve by studying such 
recorded data and information. This is evident in the opinion below,  
‗…it can focus on a particular place, time or the tendency or characteristics 
of a particular group of students … it can help new staff to know how to 
deal with events … but it depends on the cases, for example, with the 
deviant behaviour of students or fights, I believe it can … if an event has a 
potential problem … like a student suicide is a kind of Latent [potential] 
event, so it may not … F2 
Moreover, the analysis of data is likely to point up events associated with a particular 
season and such information is kind of a signal, providing an early warning for 
managers and staff to take measures to prevent it. Indeed, some events may be 
influenced by natural factors, such events may increase with the change of weather 
conditions, for example, food poisoning and drowning may happen in summer more 
than winter. These trends may be presented through statistical results to remind staff:  
‗… I remember that the cases of drowning and car accidents may have a 
higher frequency around summer every year, as I know from analysis of 
the system. We will enhance it when disseminating to students … F8; V3 
Otherwise, the data not only provide some trends for preventing events but may also 
demonstrate the high frequency of events over a yearly period, which may enable 
managers to organize a long-term plan for managing events more effectively. Such plans 
may not only improve managers‘ ability to prevent events but may also provide some 
useful information for all staff to coordinate the management tasks with other 
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colleagues at their organizations. For example:  
‗…we can know that the more conflict events may happen at the start of a 
semester between teacher and student, it is stable in the middle of the 
semester, and gradually increases at the end of the semester … the 
characteristics may be different at each school …‘ A2; F7 
Finally, the data could help to establish the characteristics of events in relation to their 
causes and sharing this with students and staff. Significantly, preventing events before 
they happen may be one of the best ways of managing them. According to the responses, 
it seems that preventing events may be done by making staff and students more aware 
of the environmental characteristics and potential problems they may meet. 
Significantly, some managers appear to be not only using the data to prevent events but 
also sharing the information with their colleagues. For example, they may provide the 
analysis of events to staff or colleagues at school workshops or conferences. Such 
information sharing may improve prevention abilities for all staff but also provides 
some information and experiences for new staff to understand the characteristics of 
schools, which may help them to deal with and prevent events more easily. For 
example:  
‗…prevention early… I hope I can understand what types of events will 
happen … is violence, drugs or accidents at my school through the 
system … avoid events before they happen … controlled and handled the 
characteristics of the school …‘ C5 
‗…I think that man [staff and colleagues] is the first thing for risk 
management, the most important is a direct reflection … the turnover of 
staff is very high at school … I always communicates with new 
teachers … I will provide information to them … what is the most 
common event at school, at the city or country level for them to 
reference …‘ C3 
‗… I am the head of department. If I get the analysis of information it can 
remind teachers to pay attention to it. I can use it at the tutor‘s meeting, 
discipline committee and school affairs meeting … the president of the 
school will be concerned about it … you always provide some information. 
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The administrative staff does not know the point of the work if they do not 
get information …‘ C2 
The responses above highlight the fact that staff attitudes play an important role in 
managing events, particularly those of new staff and the president of the school. It may 
be reasonably inferred that if new staff can understand the characteristics of an 
organization early on, they may provide useful manpower with which to deal with an 
event; while, if they do not understand the problems of the organisation, they may make 
new problems when dealing with the original problems. Likewise, if the prevention 
function is taken seriously by the president of a school such modes may be easily 
executed. Some managers are more focused on the task of sharing of information with 
staff; some target students and tend to use symbolism to attract their attention, such as 
the name of the school or a particular event that happened at the school in the past. 
These aspects are discussed in the answers below:  
‗…such as if more traffic accidents happened this year we will exercise 
some prevention strategies and devise some response strategies …‘ D1 
‗…students may listen to it if the historical information uses the name of 
our school … it can provide an alert function ...‘ F3 
In addition, information relating to the characteristics of schools may improve the 
prevention of events, the factor of location being a likely influence over events and 
causing differences between rural and urban areas. It may be logically deduced that 
events can be influenced by the patterns and activities of society because such 
phenomena may be the primary or root causes of events at school as well. Therefore, in 
order to reduce events managers may have to understand the environmental 
characteristics of the area around the school. This is evident from the statistical results 
presented in Chapter Four but can also be found in one of the manager‘s answers:  
‗…I think that there is a limitation on areas … such as the difference 
between rural and urban. Drugs may be a problem at city schools but will 
not threaten our school in the county [rural area] ...‘ V2 
The discussion above suggests that the analysis information has some significant 
managing and prevention functions for both staff and schools. As can be seen, managers 
may develop a unique method to adapt their organization and to use the analysis 
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information from the system, although some managers are sceptical about its usefulness 
for schools. Broadly speaking, interviewees with more responsibilities are likely to have 
a more positive attitude than those with fewer responsibilities towards using the analysis 
information to prevent events. Obviously, using the system has improved the 
governmental organisation‘s abilities to handle and manage most of the events 
happening on campus. Consequently, it may be worth exploring whether the 
management level of the system makes policies based on the analysis of events, and 
how they use the reporting of events by governmental regimes. According to the 
responses, two types of event seem to be of most concern to the CSRC: frequent events 
and those events which, regardless of frequency, cause serious damage, according to the 
opinions of one system manager; and those events that attract the attention of the media 
and newspapers in particular. System managers not only have to deal with and handle 
events but may also try to avoid secondary impact or harm from the general public, 
media or societal reactions to an event. Such phenomena are highlighted by the 
following answer:  
‗…the minister participates in a public awareness meeting every day, it 
means that he will hold a conference if some events related to campus 
security are in the newspapers ...he will consider the event seriously… 
actually, we are concerned about different types of campus events. Firstly, 
if the quantity is large … Secondly, if it causes a serious level of damage 
regardless of the amount …‘ M1 
Indeed, one of the most important factors to consider when managing risk may be to 
prevent secondary harm from occurring; this may explain why the minister of the 
educational department seems to be more concerned about public sentiment than 
dealing with events. Furthermore, there are huge numbers of events recorded in the 
system over ten years and such data not only provides information on experiences and 
trends, which can be used for preventing events, but can also be used to make policy at 
government level. However, it seems that policy is made not just according to the 
analysis of events but may be the result of a single case, as the answer below illustrates:  
‗…as far as I know the Ministry of Education has not made any particular 
policy according to the data analysis … but it may be not the real situation 
actually … take an example, a case where two students renting a house 
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off-campus caused a fire because they were using electrical equipment 
improperly, and it caused their deaths … of course the story was reported 
by the media as big news … the Ministry of Education mobilized many 
people and was even rectified by the Control Tuan[which is a government 
department response for investigation the possible mistake of official 
department]. Therefore, a lot of strategies and functions were produced … 
to resolve the problem … we strengthened the work of visiting students 
who lived outside of campus and improved the environment …‘ M1 
It seems that a death may cause concern for both government and society but it would 
not influence the making of policy. Indeed, policy making must consider a more broad 
level of factors, not just students, staff or schools but also the influence of society. The 
following excerpt also throws light on policy making in government institutions,  
‗…to become policy it must be causing considerable harm, having a 
serious influence on or causing great concern for society … for example, I 
remember that the Ministry of Traffic or Police Politics Unit asked about 
reducing the age limit of the driving licence from 18 to 16 … this is an 
important policy… we disagreed with it, of course we considered the 
security factor … we were worried that the injury ratio by traffic accident 
events would rise if we changed it to 16 …‘ M1 
The case above shows a shared interest and task which crossed two departments at 
government level, where policy makers are not just concerned with an increase in the 
ratio of events but also evaluate the possible impact on society and the public. Some 
policies and strategies seem to improve the prevention of events significantly and such 
policies are likely to be focused on education about particular events such as drowning, 
traffic accidents and suicide or self-harming. Some events may be prevented by 
education or propaganda but it may not work for every event. Although the analysis of 
results, by highlighting some figures and trends, performs a warning function for 
students and managers they do not reveal the real reasons behind events. This problem 
can be seen in the excerpt from one of the system designers below:  
‗…policy making, for example, has helped significantly in three areas of 
education: drowning prevention, traffic security propaganda and suicide or 
self-harming prevention but it was not thorough enough … it did not 
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explore the reasons for events such as drug abuse amongst students, you 
analyse a number of student drug abusers, why they are using it, and how 
to restrain it finally… ‘ S1 (A1) 
Indeed, the ways in which the analysis of information was used depended on managers‘ 
attitudes towards its functions. It is difficult to distinguish all the factors influencing 
events, especially when handling and managing a mass of information. Consequently, 
there is probably a need for an analysis which not only highlights the underlying trends 
and statistics but also provides plausible strategies for dealing with events. However, 
producing this kind of information or devising strategies from the analysis information 
is not straightforward, as it can be seen from the answer below:  
‗Generally, a report just shows figures at most public institutions, a broad 
trends analysis just presenting some trends. If you really want to analyse 
whether it can provide specific strategy or policy solutions, actually you 
cannot see them …‘ S2 
Significantly, recording a massive amount of events and analysing the events 
information provided many possible factors and trends for staff and managers to prevent 
events at the educational regimes. However, these huge numbers may cause others 
problem because it is impossible to analyse the reasons behind every event. This section 
explored the interviewees‘ opinions towards the use and operation of the system, as well 
as their perceptions of analysis reporting. Some staff seems to be using the system 
information properly, because they believe that events ratios have significantly 
decreased at their schools as a result of the system. Some argued that the system is not 
only unhelpful but also increases the number of problems they have to dealing with 
when faced with an event. Such phenomena may explain why, even though an annual 
report has been published by the CSRC every year, the events ratio is still increasing 
and has not been reduced as managers expected. The discussion above shows that how 
people use the system may be influenced by their attitudes and responsibilities; 
managers are not only focused on dealing with or handling events but also may attempt 
to prevent potential threats coming from the extending of events at the highest 
management level. Following on from this point, in the next section I will explore the 
development and modification of the system in relation to the factor of cultural context, 
considering the potential problems that may exist in local organisational cultures which 
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may influence the functioning and operating of the system. 
6.5 The modification of a technical management system within a cultural context 
The system has been modified a few times, with some of the main categories being 
expanded and many sub-categories added, in an attempt to improve the system and meet 
new challenges. When attempting to make a technical system more useful or effective 
managers may have to consider how well it can be adapted to the multiple 
characteristics of an organisation at different times or in different places (Hughes 1989: 
67). In order to explore the process of modifying the system and the phenomena that 
potentially exist in local organisation cultures, four main issues are considered in this 
section: firstly, the reasons for modifying the system, which may show that managers 
changed the system‘s functions in line with the increase of events and social phenomena. 
Secondly, the discussion focuses on some potential problems and benefits of the system, 
exploring operators‘ subjective viewpoints of using the system for themselves and their 
organisations. Third, some debates uncovered in Chapter Five related to the withholding 
of events and colleague‘s hostile behaviour, are considered. Finally, there are some 
concerns in relation to the surveillance function of the system, privacy issues and the 
new risks stemming from the technical system itself.  
6.5.1 The modification of the system  
The fact that the events classification in the CSRS has changed a few times can be seen 
as evidence that technological systems do not always autonomously acquire the 
momentum needed to achieve the goals anticipated (ibid: 76). In practice, the 
consolidation of a system‘s functions relies on its operators using these functions 
appropriately and modifying them as necessary. Another factor is the development and 
improvement of technological performances. As one of the system designers pointed out, 
the system was developed by internal staff; therefore, the system safety may be 
dangerous or unstable because it is hard to evaluate all possible or potential impacts that 
may influence the system‘s utility function from individual point of view; moreover, the 
improvement of technical functions may also advance the modification of the system, 
such factors may explain why were the CSRS modified several times. Significantly, if a 
technical system does not provide ‗user-friendly‘ functions it will probably be destined 
to undergo changes in configuration or have its function modified again and again, as 
the answer below suggests:   
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‗…this case was designed and developed by our internal staff; therefore, it 
did not cost any budget for outsourcing; so, the system safety is 
threatened … however, if there is any modification we will request 
opinions from local users … we will make some design changes … 
gradually, when the functions of web-pages became more popular and 
improved a lot in society, more human interfaces appeared; this showed 
that parts of the system were not user-friendly. This was a big question.‘ S1 
(A1)  
As well as problems surrounding the upgrading of technological functions, an increase 
in certain kinds of social activities can also lead to the modification of a system. New 
types of events are almost inevitably created by an increase in these kinds of social 
activities or the dissemination of technology itself in a risk society; some of the 
resulting phenomena may confuse managers as to the causes of events, for example:  
‗…the first main modification was after around one and a half years, when 
we modified the event categories. The modification of event types was 
because we found that it was hard to determine which was the main or 
sub-event when users used it. This may cause confusion on the receiving 
end if the determination is not clear. Otherwise, of course the social events 
emerged in an endless stream, so we have to respond to the trends of 
modern society … actually it is a complex question to modify it ...‘ S2 
The issue of what kinds of events warrant modifications to the system is a controversial 
one because, as it was shown in the previous chapter, managers‘ interpretations of 
events sometimes differ according to their responsibilities and positions at the 
organisations they work for. Therefore, diversifying the classification scheme may be 
difficult from a managers‘ personal viewpoint. Consequently, an alternative way 
forward may be to examine attitudes in society or outside of organizations, as the 
answer below suggests: 
‗Talking about the event of suicide or bus accident on student trips, for 
example,… for us, if this kind of events becomes an issue for society, we 
will make the appropriate adjustments.‘ S2   
The system‘s categories may be changed with the increase of events or in line with the 
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concerns of society; however, it may be interesting to explore whether the level of 
events (in terms of perceived seriousness) also changes. We already know that the 
minister of the Ministry of Education Department will participate in a public sentiment 
meeting every day and that public opinion will influence the operating of a technical 
system in a hierarchical organisation; such impacts probably also created a gap between 
the viewpoints of management and system designers. For example, a system designer 
highlights that if a particular event increased significantly, such as suicide or drug use 
for example, it may be factored into the management or monitoring of the system, even 
if the level of the event does not change:  
‗the level will not change; we will consider, such as with the case of drugs 
we will pay attention … for example, if suicide and self-harming increase 
over a period of time, is it caused by imitation of the media … this will be 
taken into consideration …‘ S1(A1) 
However, this interpretation is challenged by one of the system managers, whose 
answer suggests that if an event is reported by the media – print print or electronic – the 
reporting procedure will upgrade the event to ―A‖ level. Obviously, the reporting of the 
media likely influenced the previous regulation of the system; it seems that in order to 
prevent secondary harm from the media, the system managers have to change the 
original concept of the system‘s design, which was to keep a stable operating procedure, 
to modifying the regulations as needed:  
‗…we introduced a regulation that considers an event ―A‖ level if it is 
reported by media … we think that media and public opinion will cause 
other influences … a simple event may create other influences after the 
reporting of media or debate amongst the general public … so we should 
face an event with caution and rigor; therefore, we changed the event level 
to ―A‖ level …‘ M1 
Along with the media and public opinion, which have caused changes to be made to the 
system‘s regulations, other factors also influence the operating of the system such as 
pressure from other associations outside of organisation. The following answers give an 
indication as to why the sub-category of suicide has been divided into three 
sub-categories because of the concerns of other governmental organisations, which in 
turn were under pressure from some non-profit organisations at society. As the result, 
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the classification of the event may have to be adjusted again. 
‗…such as suicide, the original classification was just suicide but this is 
managed by XXX Department. They asked that suicide be re-classified, for 
example, if they committed suicide together with their parents this might 
not be the personal volition of a student. Particularly, nowadays society in 
Taiwan, some families have got problems, parents commit suicide with 
their children by taking sleeping tablets or eating charcoal … such cases 
should be classified more clearly as suicide with children, avoiding the 
horror implicit in the results of why a small child would commit suicide … 
Such data may be a concern for some social welfare associations or 
women and children‘s associations … also such figures may cause 
misunderstanding in society… M1 
Obviously, both media and public sentiment played significant roles in the modification 
and adjustment of the system regulations because of the potential for additional or 
extended harm to the organisation. In order to avoid such threats to the system managers 
may have to change the original concept and regulation of a technical management 
system at the top of the managing framing. Consequently, it may be worth exploring 
some possible concerns within the opinions of operators at the bottom of the 
management framework. 
6.5.2 The potential problems and benefits of system  
As discussed in the previous chapter, operators presented both negative and positive 
attitudes towards using the system to manage events. Their opinions towards the 
system‘s functions may be classified according to the reasons they gave. Starting with 
the negative opinions, it seems that operators have four kinds of opinions towards using 
the system – increased workload, creates confusion, changing of attitudes with the 
increase of seniority and invading privacy. Firstly, some staff argued that the system has 
increased their workloads because they feel like everything has to be reported to the 
management centre, which makes the process of providing event information very time 
consuming:  
‗…actually it can help risk management for everything, just some people 
may feel its troublesome … they think that you increased my workload … 
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but I would not … maybe because I am head of department … I just need 
to talk but the staff have to write it down, which they need to spend some 
time on ... ‘ C2 
Secondly, some staff argued that the system is just a one-way information transfer 
function from schools to the management centre. This interchange of information may 
cause some interpretive gaps – because there is no face-to-face conversation involved – 
between school staff and managers at governmental level. As a result, the staff may 
have to pay more attention to the illustration of an event. For example:  
‗…for us the system is just for report [event], only the Department of 
Ministry of Education knows [event has happened]… particularly when 
they just know about parts of events with the objective cognition‘ C5 
Third, it is reasonable to assume that staff may change their attitudes towards some 
events as they accumulate more experience or come to understand the roles of their 
organisations better. Indeed, each organisation may have its own sub-culture or taboos, 
which may influence some senior staffs‘ attitudes towards whether to report an event or 
withhold it: 
‗…firstly, the chancellor, did he consider things seriously, this is I can feel 
which is from top to bottom. Second, it is from bottom to top, if I am a 
junior staff, I may be more concerned with something because I am afraid 
of making a mistake … but I am afraid that after a few years when I 
changed be senior staff, did I change to not care about the procedure of 
reporting events or the influence of other colleagues‘ attitudes that the 
reporting is not necessary from my perspective [persional attitude toward 
managing of events]…‘ V2 
Finally, although the system provides a control function for operators to prevent the 
expansion and deteriorating of potential threats, unavoidably the system may also cause 
secondary harm to clients if explored by media or staff as well. This not only causes 
harm to clients but also may be an invasion of privacy:  
‗…I think that this model has benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, it 
controlled the accidental events of students early on and provided help to 
prevent the expanding and deteriorating of events. One the other hand, the 
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privacy of clients may be explored by the media or another related 
department which may cause secondary harm to a client if the process 
creates new problems…‘ A4 
Despite these drawbacks, there are many benefits of using the system from a staff 
perspective. Firstly, a preventative function may be one of the significant features for 
managing and avoiding events at school. It may improve the prevention function on 
some frequency cases such as traffic accidents and some potential events, for example, a 
student running away from home with a ‗cyber friend‘. As the following answer,  
‗…firstly, we can react instantaneously; the second is the integration and 
analysis, which can also provide some prevention. It makes other units pay 
attention to it ...‘ S2  
‗…prevention before an event happened; such as after the first 
examination in October … accidents may happen … they ride motor 
bicycles … we can pre-propagandize ...‘ A5 
‗…we will remind teachers at the school affairs conference, that they have 
to give guidance on this aspect … if they have the support of some figures 
it may be better, such as how many cases of students running away from 
home after they met a cyber friend last year and this year, it shows that the 
trend is still there … also it can be used for propaganda [school 
activities/events during the term time] with students at the beginning and 
end of the semester ...‘ C2 
Secondly, integrating event information provides a way of exemplifying based on 
similar geological, social and cultural characteristics, which will attract the attention of 
students. Consequently, the warning function may be improved by the integration of 
information:  
‗…the analysis information came from the events of our city, which makes 
it more convincing. It can provide a warning function when events have 
happened at other schools but not at our school. So it may be more easily 
accepted by students ...‘ A3 
‗…students will listen to it if it is historical information using the name of 
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our school … it can provide an alert function ...‘ F3 
Finally, the system not only has a data collection function but also contributes to the 
task of providing information and resources. Particularly in relation to the laws of the 
country, for example, if an event contravenes national laws such as the ―Children and 
Youth Welfare Act‖ then system managers can provide guidance and direction to 
schools, which may not only avoid staff going against the regulations but also help them 
to deal with events properly:  
‗…it may firstly provide a function of guidance if a school has never had 
experience of dealing with the events … Secondly, it indicates a direction 
of transfer the case to actual institutions [according to the low such case 
should report to government regimes such as police or social welfare  
department]...‘ C1 
Both positive and negative opinions were presented by operators, depending on their 
attitudes towards and experiences of using system, whether it offered a bona fide 
prevention function or the reporting process simply increased their workloads. In order 
to explore the factors potentially causing the gap between different operators, it may be 
worth considering other potential problems within the organisational cultures of 
educational regimes.  
6.5.3 Potential problems in organisational culture  
As discussed in the previous chapter, when asked whether schools withhold events, 
most staff responded that such a phenomenon existed at their school although some staff 
disagreed with this suggestion. From the system designer‘s perspective, most of the 
events school withholds probably relate to problems involving obscure and 
unacceptable behaviour within educational culture. Such unacceptable events may not 
only impact the reputation of a school but probably also influence the enrolling of new 
students. For example,  
‗…the problem of discipline or sexual assault, the problem in relation to 
sex is more obscure, such events often cause mistakes in risk 
management … because the different values may have different functions 
to deal with it … of course our manager, the director of school … the 
manager deals with the event according to the regulations but the president 
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often considers the reputation of the school and their individual paranoid 
idea ...‘ S1A1 
Such unacceptable and obscure events may be classified as ―taboo‖ in a local culture 
depending on how serious the associated problems are for the school. Although such 
events may be different according to the characteristics of students or schools, they can 
be grouped into three main categories potentially causing debate amongst staff about 
whether to withhold an event: problems between teachers and students, events that may 
impact on schools‘ reputations and a sexual harassment or assault events: 
‗…a school asked not to explore the problems between teacher and student, 
the second is important for the school reputation. The third is clients who 
have experienced sexual harassment or sexual assault...‘ A2 
‗…some schools think about protecting their reputation … some events 
may involve teachers in relation to male-female relationships … Schools 
hope do not report events, they afraid it may influence the enrolling of new 
students … some schools have reacted to drug cases, for future students, 
the presidents hopefully do not report it … another belongs to sexual 
harassment; schools do not like to explore this kind of event‘ B1 
Obviously, problems between teachers and students are a concern for most schools 
because such problems not only expose the existence of troublemakers at a school but 
also indicate that there are problems between staff and teachers. Therefore, despite the 
issue of school reputation some events in relation to the discipline and ethical issues 
between student and staff at school may also influence staff attitudes. As can be seen 
below, schools are likely to (attempt to) cover-up such events:  
‗…a conflict event between teacher and student; many private schools 
have their own opinions about reporting campus events to the CSRC…‘ B3 
‗…it depends on the characteristics of the school, some schools even keep 
traffic accident events hidden … it is in relation to the attitude of school 
president, and the reputation of school because it may impact on the 
enrolling of new students … such as a school bus driver argued with 
student … the case was reported to the police station … it related to the 
reputation of school, the school refused to report it …‘ B2 
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In addition to conflicts between teachers and students, there is a second type of problem 
that may have an impact on a school‘s reputation. Generally speaking, there are three 
main causes of this type of problem. The first is drug abuse, which involves the law at 
national level and most schools will quite naturally want to avoid being labelled 
according to the illegal behaviour of a minority of students. For example:  
…the highest is drug abuse; of course every school tried to avoid that 
public think their school equal a drug divans.‘B5 
‗…the private school has a particular culture that they worry about the 
problem of enrolling new students…it may impact on the development of 
school….especially in the areas of drug abuse prevention …‘C4 
‗…it has happened a lot, a bullying and drug event on campus...but drugs 
less than bullying of students … reputation and avoiding reporting it are 
for superiors to deal with ...‘ A3 
A further problem is caused by deviant behaviours of students such as bullying, stealing, 
robbery and fighting. These events not only show that basic discipline at the school has 
been compromised but also send out the wrong impression about student behaviour to 
parents, who may worry about exposing their children to such an environment. As a 
result, these events may influence the aspirations of future students. For example,  
‗…something like a theft event at school harms the reputation of the 
school ...‘ A4 
‗…students involving thievery, because it may influence the right to 
study …‘C3 
‗…student robs, because the enrolling of new student is a problem at 
private school, also such case will influence the reputation of 
school …‘C1 
‗…I heard about some private schools, because the enrolling of new 
student… it has a negative influence on school reputation … otherwise, 
like groups of student fighting outside of campus, or drug abuse, but I am 
not sure about the actual situation …‘B4 
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‗…normally events that provoke a negative reaction from society, such as 
students attempting to sell illegal drugs or a serious fight event…‘V3 
These kinds of event can also be connected to family problems – including running 
away from home, domestic violence and traffic accidents causing death. These events 
not only affect students but also influenced by their families. Some events are covered 
by law, for example, domestic violence, is covered by the ―Children and Youth Welfare 
Act‖; some may be covered educational administrative regulations, for example, 
running away from home and not attending school for over three days; others may relate 
to parental aspirations:   
‗…student running away from home … the president decided … the less 
trouble the better … ‘ D4 
‗…a domestic violence case involving a student, it has reported by the 
counselling room … The President questioned why we had to report it but 
the counselling room had already reported the case …‘ F2 
The final category can be classified under ‗obscure events at school‘ and such events 
relate to the privacy of both client and offenders in particular. Although such events are 
covered by the ―Gender Equality in Employment Act‖, it seems that in order to protect 
the reputation of school and client, some schools still may withhold events:   
‗…sexual assault event, according to the decision from head of school … 
did not report and notify the superior, withhold the event … it is the 
superior‘s responsibility to make a decision …‘D2 
‗…sexual harassment, whether between teacher and student or student and 
student … the school will agree not to report it …‘ F6 
Events with unacceptable or obscure aspects that may affect the reputation of a school 
will probably be withheld because such events not only harm the invisible reputation of 
school in the present but also may influence the visible enrolling of new students in the 
future. Therefore, both factors may cause some schools to be conservative on the 
reporting of events. As well as some negative attitudes being presented by the directors 
or heads of school such opinions were also expressed by colleagues at school as well. 
Some staff denied that the phenomenon (school withhold event) existed; some claimed 
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to have experienced it and believed the situation existed at their current school; others 
were undecided because they had not experienced it directly.  
Those who denied the existence of the phenomenon presented a positive attitude with 
clear and absolute answers. They seem to believe that good communication internal to 
the school may alleviate some debates and concerns between them and colleagues at 
school. Otherwise, they are likely to believe that it is more effective to cooperate with 
other colleagues rather than dealing with events by themselves:  
 ‗…actually it is fine, most colleagues know that we do it for school. We 
will not assign the work to a person. We will communicate with school. 
We will deal with events with the director of student affairs and tutor…‘ F1 
Although sufficient communication and acting within proscribed roles may reduce 
hostile behaviour from colleagues, as I discussed in the previous chapter the seniority of 
staff in terms of time served may also influence the dynamic between system operators 
and their colleagues: 
‗…because I have been at this school a long time; therefore, they know I 
do it for the school. They may give the benefit of the doubt … they know 
that this is my personality … I think that I have good interpersonal 
relationships‘ C2 
There were some interviewees who could not confirm the situation of colleagues hostile 
behaviour exists in schools, as they had not personally experienced it. Even so, some of 
the answers given suggest a certain a degree of enmity in interactions that is influencing 
the overall dynamics of organisations. Significantly, some staff felt that their colleagues 
did not trust them; some had sensed hostility even though their colleagues had not 
voiced it: 
‗…there may still be this situation, but just heard about it, I did not meet 
with it actually…‘ B1 
‗…just a personal feeling, sometimes you may hear other heads of 
department saying that even though we disagree with you [the respondents 
are mostly military staff] we will still report the event ... just mistrust from 
their language … the system may cause some mistrust between us and the 
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heads of departments‘ D2 
‗…colleagues, staff and superiors do not directly tell you [the reporting of 
events is unacceptable by other colleagues] …‘ A5 
Indeed, sometimes colleagues may keep their thoughts to themselves in order to 
preserve their relationships with system operators; however, such considerations may 
not be so important for the presidents of schools. Some staff commented that some 
school presidents may treat system operators as ‗informants‘ when they report events to 
the government authorities: 
‗…it has happened, presidents may blame the staff if some schools‘ 
presidents hope you will not report it; however, based on the fact of events 
it is clear the president may still adopt a cautious attitude when asking to 
report the event … they think if they told you not to report the event then 
why does the Ministry of Education know about the event already…‘ A2 
‗…I am not, but my colleagues got annoyed because the president thinks 
that he is an informant. They will write a memo to the president if 
something bad happens at school … the president may ask whether the 
event has to be reported, they will consider the reputation of school … 
they hope they can withhold the event ...‘ F2 
As it can be seen, some school presidents and administrative staff believe that the 
process of reporting of events through the system is tantamount to informing, because 
the reporting task may touch or encroach upon unacceptable taboos existing at schools. 
For those colleagues with negative attitudes, the system may be regarded as a channel 
for informing the governmental management centre. They seem to doubt the system‘s 
function is simply to report events. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that some 
system operators are also worried about whether they are under surveillance from the 
management centre. Consequently, in the next section, I will explore whether system 
operators are concerned about surveillance by the CSRC.  
6.5.4 Possible debates and concerns about the system within organisations  
In order to explore the different attitudes expressed by interviewees towards the issue of 
surveillance, I will now examine the opinions of system managers and operators 
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according to their responsibilities and position in the management framing. Before 
exploring the opinions of operators, I will first examine the system designer/manager 
viewpoint on the surveillance function. The answers given provided some interesting 
results, and both assenting and dissenting opinions could be found within the comments 
of the system designers and managers:  
‗…there is no surveillance problem, otherwise, it does not matter, school 
can refuse to report in the normal procedure, report it or if not control it 
themselves …‘ S1A1 
‗…surveillance is not our purpose actually. For some presidents because 
they think that reputation is important, they will think that ―domestic 
shame should not be made public‖ … I think that those schools may 
believe we are monitoring them …‘ S2 
‗…the word ‗surveillance‘ has a negative connotation in Chinese but in 
English it can be simply supervisory … actually it is a surveillance system 
immediately from some points of view …‘ M1 
‗…it should not, because the main task is linking people in each workplace 
and does not do it [reporting procedure] according to personal preference 
and favouritism …‘ M2 
As one system designer points out, the decision to report is the operator‘s and the role of 
the management centre is to wait passively for event information to appear. However, 
another designer also makes the point that if a school adopts the attitude that ―domestic 
shame should not be made public‖ then it may see the system as a form of surveillance. 
Attitudes toward the system tend to differ depending on their position within the system, 
designer, manager or user, but clearly even system designers and managers can have 
different viewpoints on the controversial issue of surveillance. Likewise, it would be 
reasonable to expect managers at the local government level to be similarly ambivalent 
about the system in this respect. 
According to one head of city manager, the system has an information surveillance 
function that enables government to process and control events faster than the media, to 
prevent some of the secondary harm caused by media scandals or public outrage. At the 
same time, this means monitoring schools constantly, which can be interpreted as a form 
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of surveillance or simply control: 
‗…the CSRS has to be faster than the media; therefore, as surveillance, it 
has to monitor schools every second and minute ….indeed, it is monitored 
each school when serious campus security even happens. Understanding 
the information in relation to event before or after the media explored it. It 
is not surveillance but control and understanding …‘ A3 
Obviously, whilst most of the city and county managers welcomed the functions 
provided by the system for handling and controlling events, they tended to believe that 
the system was mainly a communication channel for schools to report events rather than 
a form of school surveillance. Although some managers seemed to be concerned that the 
system might be invasion of personal privacy, an issue which I will discuss later, most 
of them believed that the system improved the control and restraint function:  
‗I think that the question may be different for private and public schools, 
the attitude is probably different‘ B5 
‗This is not surveillance [from educational management regime to 
school] … it‘s just for immediate report and for appropriate control and 
restraint‘B3 
‗Personally, I think that it cannot be used as surveillance [from the CSRC 
to school], it is about handling the condition in each school immediately…‘ 
A4 
However, as one system designer argued above, some schools will be tempted to not 
report an event in order to protect the school‘s reputation and avoid the government 
intervening. Such phenomena may be distinguished in the following answer, and such 
behaviour may happen more often in private schools than public schools:  
‗I think that the question may be different for private and public schools, 
the attitude is probably different‘ B4 
The system clearly has a reporting function, channelling information from schools to the 
management centre. In most cases, if schools want to withhold an event then the CSRC 
will not get to hear about it, unless the event is reported by the media. This means that, 
from a government perspective, the system cannot be used as a surveillance tool, as 
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there is too much scope for schools to hide what goes on within campus environment. 
There are also legal and political constraints on the surveillance function. As one head 
of city managers puts it,  
‗Personally, I do not think the surveillance of schools is the main purpose 
of this system, but it seems that we could not exclude the function of 
surveillance. The major purpose of using of the system for the Ministry of 
Education is to control situations and collect information for providing 
recourses and helping to deal with the problem for schools. Nowadays, we 
live in a democratic society; in fact, all the systems in schools are 
normalized and legalized. No one can change or control it by 
surveillance.‘A2 
In the previous chapter I considered how city managers tend to collect and handle more 
information from schools because they have greater management responsibilities than 
school staff. The discussion above also provides some evidence to confirm this finding. 
Consequently, I will turn to examine the viewpoint of surveillance within school staff. 
Broadly speaking, school staff presented both positive and negative opinions towards 
the surveillance function of the system. Beginning with the positive opinions, some staff 
contrasted the system with their previous work experience, arguing that the system does 
not involve as much information collecting work as the military; some drew upon their 
personal experience or colleagues‘ feelings towards the system, because they sometimes 
felt under pressure when operating the system: 
‗…it is better than in the military; the military is more complex‘ F1 
‗I agree with it [the function of surveillance]…‘ C3 
‗…some managers may feel that they are under surveillance …‘ D2 
‗…I do not this thinking originally [original function was designed for 
surveillance]… but after I had served at school for a year … I felt that 
school‘s attitude is fine if the event was a small thing. If an event is a big 
case such as sexual harassment or sexual assault, the school‘s attitude 
may be stronger and resist … After that, I may think whether the Ministry 
of Education Department using the system for controlling or surveillance 
school ... ‘ F2 
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‗…I think that this is a good function [surveillance], because whether an 
organisation or course, each needs an effective function for risk 
management …‘ F3 
‗Basically, I take an affirmative attitude. It depended on how to define the 
meaning of surveillance … if something happens and requires the 
intervention of the government; it is a good intermediary ...‘ V3 
‗…I think that it limited a report time, made me feel a little under 
surveillance, actually I think that if you understand it more you may not 
have the feeling of surveillance …‘ F5 
However, for the interviewees with negative attitudes, the system provided an early 
warning function for schools; some argued that the system improved the function of risk 
management; others likely classified that the using of the system was just a regular 
administrative procedure for report events, for example,  
‗I do not think so … the Ministry of Education Department cannot 
constantly monitor what happens in schools … it is a form of help, 
providing an early warning system for schools …‘ C4 
‗I do not think that is surveillance; this is risk management …‘ C2 
‗…It is unlikely that it is surveillance. ‘ F6 
‗…I think that the system just reports the condition of schools, it belongs 
to a report system … I think that surveillance is not the main objective. ‘ 
F8 
‗…I do not think that this is a surveillance function….some system is good 
originally, despites you misinterpret it in purpose…‘ V2 
Significantly, managers may develop particular attitudes toward the system‘s functions 
according to their personal experience, organizational culture or position in the 
hierarchy. As one of the staff above argues, each system has its own unique or utility 
function when they designed for organization originally. It is possible for system 
designer and managers to control a technical system‘s functions or establish a standard 
procedure but it may be impossible to influence the system operators‘ or other 
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colleagues‘ attitudes if they tend to misinterpret, or interpret in a specific way, the 
system‘s purpose.  
Beyond the question of the system having a surveillance function, some people are 
concerned that reporting events means divulging personal information and an invasion 
of privacy. According to the response form system designers (see below), clients‘ rights 
and privacy issues have to be evaluated into the operation procedure. Otherwise, they 
seem to believe that reporting events not only enables the government to handle the 
situation but can also be used to provide help to the parties involved from relevant 
authorities through the transfer of information.  
‗…it has not considered this part ... it [the report] has not influenced the 
rights of the clients, if we report the case some of them may get financial 
support from the government ....if there is an influence, then it is only one 
that is of advantage to them S1 (A1); F5 
‗…I think that it is fine to notify the client if from the viewpoint of human 
right [personal privacy]… but the general procedure did not do it … we 
did not consider this issue … the report has considered an anonymous 
process … if from safety and policy viewpoints it is hard to give 
consideration everything … we can delete the name…‘ S2 
As one of the system designers argued above, when making policy to manage risk it is 
difficult to balance the needs of policy and clients. Therefore, in order to prevent 
unnecessary troubles or mistakes that may cause secondary harm to students, the 
reporting procedure asks to delete a client‘s name if the event might invade personal 
privacy. In general, these events may be classified as gender issues such as sexual 
assault and infringement of the ―Children and Youth Protection Act‖. Significantly, most 
of the staff complied with the regulations and showed a positive attitude towards the 
reporting procedure, for example,  
‗…we used a code or number or just showed the family name on the report, 
the whole management team has reached a common consensus on this part‘ 
A2; C3 
‗…it is possible; however, of course the priority is still to protect the party‘ 
B5 
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‗…we do not record the name; class, title only two items involved in the 
report, another record will not invade their privacy…‘ A3; D1; D3; F3 
‗…if we do not report truthfully and accurately to superiors, how can they 
handle the situation … it depends on case, for example, gender issues 
should be sent with skill, and for example, car accidents should be fine to 
send out…‘ A5 
‗Basically, the report to the court of youth protection, it will use OOO will 
not show their real name … we will prevent a minor case …‘ B1; M2; F2; 
F4; V3 
Some staff drew attention to the fact that it is impossible to report an event without 
permission and a password because reporters have to log-on to the system. The CSRS is 
a closed system, it is impossible for students or the general public to access it without a 
password:   
‗…to log-on to the system you must have a password, therefore, it is 
impossible for general students …‘ C2; F8 
Clearly, most of the staff thought that the event reporting procedures were sufficient to 
protect client rights and privacy; however, some of the staff were less convinced. One 
argued that if a retired member of staff, unsatisfied with the school or students and they 
got experience of operating the system, it would be easy for them to copy or revise data. 
As can be seen,  
‗…if I was a retired member staff unsatisfied with students, he knows how 
to log into the system to change some information, this may cause a 
reputation problem…‘ D5 
On the questions related to the rights and privacy of clients, there were some divergent 
opinions amongst the interviewees. Some had reservations about the system‘s ability to 
uphold human rights and maintain confidentiality. Others wanted more answers or 
guidance from the higher management level. There were also some who believed that 
the client has right to know the details of the reporting procedure and that it would be 
helpful to obtain the client‘s prior agreement to report. Such opinions are can be seen 
below in the following answers:  
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‗…of course, as I understand now; I am not clear about whether there is 
any conflict between this part and human rights … did the procedure  
contravene human rights, this part I do not understand … ‘M1 
‗…if the report is an invasion of privacy, they should ask the Ministry of 
Education Department to divide the responsibilities ….the execution is no 
problem…‘F6 
‗…this may discuss in related to the level of law; of course a party to the 
event has a right to understand how he will be dealt with. So, we may get 
an agreement from the party then deal with the following disposal…‘C4; 
F7 
Generally speaking, most staff agreed that the reporting procedure was set up in such a 
way as to maintain client confidentiality but some argued that it was possible to explore 
personal details and harm clients‘ privacy when through the system to transfer 
information. Practically, if an event involves a gender issue between teacher/staff and 
student, such as sexual assault, this puts the reporter under some pressure:   
‗…if it is a simple accident, I think that is fine; if it is a sentimental case, 
this may invade privacy of client such as sexual assault in related to 
teacher or student…‘C5 
‗…I think that more or less may have…for example, if a sexual assault 
event happened we may have some pressure if the reporting information is 
incorrect…‘ D2; A4; 
Although some staff expressed concerns about invasions of privacy, they probably still 
followed the regulations when reporting events – if only to avoid blame or punishment. 
This kind of hiding behind the rules is common in a hierarchical organization:   
‗…maybe, anyway the system is orders from superiors. If it really involved 
the problem of privacy and prosecution by the law, this is an administrative 
order and the responsibilities should be carried out at the highest 
management level. We are just executors, only there to execute the 
order…‘D4 
Overall, most of the school staff followed the discipline of the organization to execute 
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the reporting procedure; some seems to evaluate a boundary between the discipline of 
organisation and right of client; others may stand on the viewpoint of the school side. It 
is hard to judge what is right or wrong in this situation because to be an user of the 
system, they not only have to follow the regulations of the organization but also have to 
adapt to requirements of their local organisation culture. Indeed, the development of a 
technological system improves staff‘s abilities to handle and deal with existing types of 
events but new risks may accompany the use of new technologies as well. One of the 
issues discussed in the interviews was that of students recording teachers‘ behaviour on 
their mobile phones and posting it to educational management regimes or the media, a 
trend that creates new conflicts between teachers and students at school. On the one 
hand, technologies are convenient for managers empowering their abilities of 
prevention and prediction events; on the other hand, technologies also create some 
challenges for managers. Therefore, the system operators may have to modify their 
attitude and mindset as well. For example, 
 ‗I think that we have to accept it … this is the nature of technological 
progress … the impact of technology depends on whether you use it in a 
positive or negative way … technology is convenient for us, which is 
why we use it in the system. We use this convenience to compress the 
time of reflection and warning; so I do not think that it is a big 
problem …‘ S2 
When managers rely on technology to handle events they also have to accept the 
inconveniences that come along with it. Actually, technologies just provide some utility 
functions for people to manage or deal with events; but much depends on users‘ 
attitudes and concepts towards the technology‘s functions. As opinion respondent 
argued, 
‗…there is nothing wrong with mobile phones; the point is how to enhance 
users‘ attitudes and concepts. All technologies are good when they come 
out. The kind of attitudes toward it from users; I think that we should 
enhance it from this viewpoint … Firstly, how you manage it. Second, 
educating children when they use it … just how you use and manage it …‘ 
A2 
‗…there is an inevitable development … if relationships are not very 
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harmonious between teacher and students, the condition will happen  
certainly … sometimes a student may be right actually, sometimes the  
teacher‘s position is correct; however, whoever is right, they will probably 
have a conflict if they‘ve got different viewpoints. If conflicts happen, 
students have different reactions because everyone has different values …‘ 
V3 
Even though the system‘s designers developed a standard procedure for operators to 
report events, some potential factors may still impact on operators‘ attitudes and 
valuations towards particular events, especially the pressure coming from the presidents 
of local schools. As the opinions expressed above demonstrate, the system managers not 
only have to establish a management function for organizational culture as a whole but 
also have to consider the potential impacts of local cultural contexts. The system 
designers developed a utility technical system to manage risks, but managers may have 
to evaluate how to educate the operators when using it. Using a technological system to 
handle events is almost inevitable, particularly in a hierarchical organization. Although 
the system designers built some categories of events into the management of the system, 
the increase of events has forced them to modify the categories again and again. As can 
be seen, the increase in new events was not only caused by society and nature but also 
by the use of technology itself, the outcomes of which partly depends on users‘ values 
and reactions. Such values reflect different interests among users and it is these that (as 
SCOT shows) need to be addressed when shaping technology to manage risks in a risk 
society.  
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the interviewee‘s attitudes towards the system and the 
opinions of system designers and managers at the governmental level, as well as 
operators at the school level. It seems that in order to encourage a reporting culture, the 
system designers and managers not only considered how to help users evaluate potential 
threats at school e.g. making evaluation plans or providing funding for environmental 
improvements, but also devised sanctions for operators who refused to report events at 
schools. Such strategies seem to improve the information transfer ratio and have 
established a reporting culture within the overall hierarchical organisational framework. 
However, some conflicting results arise when we examine the differing attitudes 
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towards the functioning of the system and contrast the system managers to local 
operators. Such diverse results may reflect the personal preferences of operators or the 
ultra vires behaviour of directors at school; some of the differences in opinion are 
caused by organisational culture or the organisational dynamics between operators and 
their colleagues. Either way, it is necessary here to return to the questions first raised in 
the methodology chapter, where three key aspects of managers‘ or users‘ attitudes 
towards the system‘s functions were put forward for investigation. 
The first issue relates to how a governmental agency records the data of campus security 
events to monitor the potential risks present and the different expectations of managers 
and operators about information. The interviews suggest that system managers are more 
concerned with how to handle and control information than dealing with events; 
meanwhile, local operators are primarily focused on dealing with events, as opposed to 
providing information upwards through the system, in order to avoid attracting blame or 
punishment. The system designers and managers interviewed argued that predictable 
events, e.g. seasonal tragedies, can be reduced by instruction or prevention strategies; 
however, sometimes the historical recording and information analysis tasks undertaken 
may be nothing more than perfunctory, the routine work of a bureaucratic organisation, 
because the policymaking of other government departments is not necessarily based on 
the findings of the annual CSRS reports. As for the operators, they expressed both 
positive and negative opinions towards the use of the system information to reduce 
events. As we have seen, some operators argued that local schools do not have the 
capability to analyze data, although some seem to have reduced the frequency of certain 
events by relying on historical information and similar experiences, combined with an 
awareness of their organisational and social-cultural context.  
The second key issue for risk governance identified in Chapter Three was the 
relationship between organisational culture and campus risk. Here the data highlights 
how different organisations will be concerned with different kinds of risks, depending 
on how serious the potential harm of these risks is to the organisation. Judging by the 
interviews, the system managers seemed to be more focused on collecting and handling 
information for the minister of the department than the steps necessary to deal with 
events, their main concern being to avoid interrogation or blame from legislators, the 
media and/or society at large. Similarly, if the interviews are anything to go by, risk 
governance in schools often seems to be mostly about reducing the harm done to the 
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school and its reputation, particularly for private organisations. The main reason for 
withholding events at some private schools would appear to have little to do with 
protecting the privacy of students or preventing secondary harm to students, but rather 
avoiding potential harm to the school‘s reputation and the impact this might have on the 
enrolling of new students in the future. Even so, in general, most schools not only 
follow the reporting procedure to report events but also receive guidance from the 
system that may help them stay within the law and meet administrative regulations.  
The third and final issue is to do with the importance of judgement in the operating of a 
technological system to govern risk. Here the interviews suggest that there is a 
difference between government managers and local operators. The system designers and 
managers believe that establishing a standard operating procedure and reporting culture 
has improved the collection of information and reporting aspirations in local schools. 
However, they seem to realize that the initiative for reporting events is controlled by 
schools and some schools are likely to go against the regulations and refuse to report 
events. Some school operators will report events according to the standard operating 
procedure, particularly at public schools; they may be classified as a more standardised 
management organisation. Some seem to pay more attention to the attitude of their 
directors than their administrative role, violating the basic regulations of the system and 
withholding events for the sake of the school, particularly at private schools which may 
be grouped into the more individualised management culture.   
There is no doubt that the functioning of the CSRS has empowered system managers 
when it comes to controlling and handling events around the educational regimes. The 
system managers have had to modify the system function frequently in order to address 
an increasingly diverse range of events, student deviance and to avoid backlash from the 
media and wider society. Nevertheless, the functioning of the system not only allows 
operators to transfer event information, predict possible events and get resources or 
guidance from the higher management level but also provides schools with an 
alternative knowledge learning channel via the historical recording of data and similar 
experiences from their own or other organisations, although sometimes operators may 
have to endure the wrath of their directors or hostility of their colleagues because of 
their system role, as ‗informants‘. This influence of a system role also partly explains 
the contrasting attitudes towards the functioning of the system of designers and 
managers at government level to operators at school level. I have tried to capture these 
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general results in the models that appear in the charts below. These seek to establish the 
possible relationship and dynamic between the process of managing risk and the 
development of a technical system using the SCOT approach and applied to different 
groups of social actor across the system itself. 
To begin with, the opinions of government managers (see Diagram 6.6.1) suggest that 
four processes have been integrated and factored into the development programme of 
the system. As the highest context shows, the original management function seems to 
collapse, which means the information collecting task is likely to be obstructed by a 
natural disaster at the educational regimes. A regular administrative management 
function may be used in a normal situation without potential threats; however, such a 
process could not prevent a massive disaster caused by a shutdown of the power supply 
between the management centre and local schools. Therefore, the alternative function of 
―Sound direction‖ was used to and not only defused the crisis but also caused the 
reshuffle of risk command inside the organisation, which in turn gave birth to a new 
management system with technical functions. Such a change seems to have increased 
capabilities of collecting and handling events information from the highest 
governmental organisation to local schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 6.6.1 The functioning of risk management in the CSRC and its management: 
Government Manager 
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Secondly, although the system can help collect information and predict natural disasters, 
it may not be able to detect potential threats stemming from man-made ones. As the 
second step of the context highlights, three problems are unacceptable to the 
management centre, particularly when such problems may cause potential threats to the 
minister of the departments. As a system manager argued, if they cannot provide actual 
information to the minister, they may be vulnerable to blame from legislators, media or 
society; otherwise, the manager may have to face other pressures from outside of the 
organisation because the information recorded in the system is likely to be of interest or 
concern to ordinary citizens or NGOs. Therefore, managers may not only have to 
reclassify the events categories or regulations but also need to be aware of some 
potential threats from citizens and society when modifying the system‘s functions.  
Thirdly, it seems that other unpredictable factors also influence the modification of the 
system. As the third step of the context demonstrates, the ―Dark Figure‖ which is caused 
by the withholding of events in some schools may have an impact on the reliability of 
the system; also, the overreaction of the media to some events probably forced the 
system managers to change the original operating regulations of the system, because 
such concerns probably created potential threats to organisations or secondary harm to 
clients. Consequently, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the system function, 
managers not only changed the operational role of the system but also enhanced the 
analysis of historical information by introducing factors such as the characteristics of 
geological areas, communities or societies and culture.  
Fourthly, as the lowest level of the context suggests, more and more new risks are 
created and accompanied by multiple social activities, as well as by the use of 
technologies and even technology itself in a risk society. Such outcomes may enforce 
changes of configuration and re-modify the system very often and they may not stop; 
therefore, when the present system‘s functions cannot support or cover all the new risks, 
the system managers may have to re-establish or develop a new system to manage the 
risks of risk society.  
Having examined the managers‘ attitudes, it is now necessary to move the discussion in 
the other direction and review local operators‘ opinions (see Diagram 6.6.2). According 
to the top row, which details the development of the system, although the system allows 
high level managers to handle events, for some local operators, the system has increased 
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their workload and functions as a surveillance tool for the government. There are also 
the personal ultra vires attitudes of some directors, which may influence the 
management function in local schools. Therefore, in order to manage risks the local 
operators not only have to adapt to the sub-culture of local schools and follow their 
administrative role, even national law, to avoid possible sanctions but must also learn 
from the system records to prevent events with the similar events characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from this, there are some potential threats that may influence the task of 
managing risk if events are sensitive in nature or may impact the reputation of school. 
As the second row regarding the service of the system highlights, it seems that reporting 
events to government regimes may expose the lax discipline of schools and influence 
the enrolling of new students further. The potential threats will not be caused by events 
but from the action of reporting events to higher managing regimes. In order to avoid 
such phenomena the system may improve the function of reminding and notifying the 
operators; such a function would not only encourage and provide resources to operators 
but also keep them on the right side of the law, as well as making the system functions 
more acceptable to local schools.  
Diagram 6.6.2 The functioning of risk management at the CSRC and its management: 
Local Operators 
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Moreover, according to the third row, in relation to the function of modifying the system, 
some operators argued that the reporting of events not only wasted their time in a 
routine administrative process but also consumed school manpower (when dealing with 
events, having staff at the scene is sometimes more important than reporting the event 
upwards). Consequently, two functions may alleviate the concerns of local operators. 
Firstly, in order to reduce or prevent events the system may highlight some predictable 
events particularly focusing on events with frequency characteristics. Then, for 
enhancing the prevention function on events containing many unpredictable factors the 
system probably has to improve the inspection and give guidance or feedback 
immediately. By doing so, the tasks of evaluating risks may make some unpredictable 
events more predictable and manageable for local operators. 
Finally, as the lowest row in relation to the change of system configuration suggests, 
despite the system providing much support and resources to local schools, operators are 
still often classed by colleagues as ‗informers‘, especially junior staff. Moreover, most 
of the interviewees seem to agree that new risks accompany the use of technologies or 
emanate from the technology itself as well. Although technologies have increased the 
capability to handle and prevent events, sustainable risk governance requires the 
continual revision of technical management systems and their functions. Therefore, 
when using the technologies the system should not only enhance users‘ concepts and 
attitudes toward its function but must also provide ongoing training to reflect the 
changes in system regulations or roles and the increase of events, until the system 
function cannot support the tasks of risk management. At this point, the system might be 
discontinued and replaced by a new management system.  
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Chapter 7 Discussion and Conclusion  
7.1 Introduction  
This thesis has tried to explore and distinguish the interaction and dynamic of risk 
management through examining the development and operation of a socio-technical 
management system and observing its modification and revision process within a 
hierarchical organisation. Any organisation may develop some managerial functions or 
systems to monitor and manage unpredictable and unacceptable risks according to its 
unique culture, wider social expectations or regulatory demands of government. The 
aim of my thesis is not to judge, argue with or criticize risk management tasks within 
contemporary society, but to explore how, in practice, a technical management system 
works in a modern socio-technical society (in Taiwan); and within this context a society 
that regards technology as providing a means through which social ordering and the 
management of risk can be enabled. I focused on a socio-technical management system 
(the CSRS), which is designed by the government agency at the national level, relying 
on modern technology to identify, integrate and manage the phenomena of risks and 
‗accidents‘ occurring in the everyday life of schools and colleges in Taiwan.  
In this chapter, I present firstly a brief summary of each chapter, suggesting how these 
together explained the scope of risks which are created by everyday events causing 
different concepts and attitudes toward the functioning of risk management system in a 
hierarchical organisation between managers and operators, my results helping to answer 
the questions which are debated in the thesis. I then discuss risk management as a 
reflection of culture and social construction which shape the functioning of risk 
management processes in risk society. Also, I present some limitations which review 
some self-critical comments on the thesis for further researchers who are interested in 
similar topics. Finally, I make some comments which offer some general suggestions to 
risk managers and provide some suggestions reflecting on the management framing of 
the CSRS itself.  
7.2 Overview of the thesis 
The main purpose of my thesis is to examine the processes and problems of risk 
governance within the functioning of a socio-technical system in a hierarchical 
organization. The campus security events occurring in Taiwan may also be found 
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elsewhere. My thesis explores the viewpoint of operators across the CSRS which are 
collected from different levels of the system based upon the importance of seeing 
different interests and perspectives, as suggested by the SCOT approach. Bijker et al 
(1989: 28) highlight ‗the developmental process of a technological artifact is described 
as an alternation of variation and selection‘. The structure of the CSRS is built on an 
information technology (IT) system which relied on the IT system to link the 
relationships between the system designers/managers and operators/users. I explore the 
actual problems of operators of the CSRS and the solutions they deploy (part of the 
‗variation and selection‘ process) as different groups of people, which included the 
system designers, government managers, policy practitioners and regional/local 
operators. The CSRS was built by an educational system which could be classified as a 
hierarchical organisation which expresses a high grid/group culture because the 
management framing of the CSRS was established and constructed in a highly 
bureaucratic way, and as was seen, shaped by a reporting process that in both actual 
personnel terms and culture was somewhat militaristic. 
This thesis started from the exposition of risks management ideas, focused on the daily 
risks happening in schools precisely because they are ‗everyday‘, often quite mundane, 
yet potentially posing as much organisational challenge as major disasters, such as 
earthquakes, which can, quite literally, cause organisational collapse. To this extent, in 
chapter 2, I traced the concept of risk not only looking back to its original meaning but 
also explored its change through the evolution of social phenomena and activities; then I 
discussed its characteristic through the factors of scope, standard and evaluation; finally, 
the literature section examined it more theoretically discussing some theories in relation 
to the issue of ―risk governance‖ including Foucault‘s ―Governmentality‖ (Foucault: 
1978); Douglas‘ ―Culture Theory‖ (Douglas: 1992) and Beck‘s ―Risk Society‖ (Beck: 
1992). As Douglas (1966: XIX) suggests, the discussion of risk is likely to be a 
dilemmatic issue if the problem involved has both moral and political dimensions, 
because such debates may touch potential taboos or concerns that pose risks to 
organisation or society (Douglas 1978: 1). Significantly, most organisations or societies 
have their particular concerns of managing risks depending on how important the risk 
may be seen to be. Therefore, I particularly applied the concept of four types of social 
environment which is presented in Douglas‘ (1978: 7) ―Cultural Bias‖ to explore some 
possible differences existing in organisational culture. 
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Methodologically, I believe that it is crucial to understand the task of risk management 
by focusing on culture, knowledge and technology individually. In order to answer the 
research question I examined managing risks within the approach of SCOT. 
Consequently, I developed a three part case study to collect and explore the tasks of risk 
management (the CSRS) in a hierarchical organization – including the analysis of 
recorded data (over 5 years) in the system, examining the system operators‘ attitudes 
toward the use of the system with quantitative research and relying on qualitative 
methods (face to face interviews) to explore some potential problems and the dynamics 
of local organization, from the system designers/managers to local operators. Such 
methods not only examined the actual phenomena and situations of managing risks but 
also explored the interaction of organizational culture and sub-culture between operators 
at local school and managers at a government level. 
In Chapter 4, firstly, I explored the management framing, procedure, the classification 
function of risks, and the database of CSRS, then examining the annual report which is 
published by the CSRC at government level. Significantly, establishing a 
socio-technical management system not only improved the government abilities on 
governance and monitoring of risks but also constructed a communication channel 
between local schools and educational management regimes in Taiwan. Moreover, the 
system categories and sub-categories have been modified several times, showing that 
the using of a technological system may not only require some regulations or discipline 
from top-down management framing but the system managers or designers also have to 
consider the voices, experiences and potential problems from bottom-up within the 
organisation. Drawing on Douglas, the CSRS appears to contain a high grid/group 
relationship in educational management, an organisational structure (a form of 
‗solidarity‘) that seems to generate the huge volume of risk data loaded into the system. 
Indeed, the analysis of historical data not only demonstrated some significant trends and 
potential patterns of risks but also suggested that risks appeared at particular type of 
schools caused by the different expectations of individuals, organisation or the wider 
society. This suggests that a technical system improves the abilities of risk management, 
which could be supported by the analysis of historical data; however, some aspects of 
interaction across members within the organisational culture may influence the effects 
of managing risks between local school (sub-culture) and government (hierarchical 
culture).  
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In Chapter 5, I consequently examined the system operators‘ opinions and attitudes 
toward the system‘s utility, the organisational obligations and the right/privacy of clients 
with the help of statistical results from my questionnaire survey. I then explored some 
potential and possible problems which may influence organisational dynamics and 
managers‘ attitudes existing at the local level. The statistical results suggested that 
participants presented similar opinions toward the system function; however, when the 
discussion regarded some specific issues, such as the system surveillance function and 
privacy issues, they show different attitudes, contrasting the senior staff to junior ones 
especially. Such results seem to suggest that in a high grid/group organisational culture, 
as Douglas point outs, in order to reduce risks effectively the constructing of a 
socio-technical management system may not only have to establish some discipline and 
regulation but also has to accept and adopt sub-cultures, within the solution function of 
SCOT. By doing so, this can solve many potential problems behind the local 
organisation.  
In chapter 6, I examined the system operators‘ and managers‘ opinions and experiences 
toward the using of the system through qualitative interviews. In order to explore a 
wider interaction and dynamic across the whole management framing of risk, the 
interviewees included the system designer/managers in government, the city manager 
who is policy practitioner, and the system operators at local schools. The results 
highlight that participant attitudes toward the system function and the impact from risks 
to organisation may be different depending on how many responsibilities they carried 
when managing risks. Government managers tended to handle risks more than dealing 
with them; it seems that they were more concerned about potential interrogation and 
blame from legislators, media and society than risk itself. However, the system 
operators tended to not only deal with risks but also tried to avoid some potential harms 
which may affect schools‘ reputation and prevent some consequent side-effects which 
may influence the enrolling of new students. So, it seems that the functioning of the 
system may be different across groups depending on personal requirement and attitudes 
toward the using of the system to manage risks. 
7.3 Discussion  
In order to explore and distinguish the research questions discussed in the literature 
chapter some general findings and results are integrated through the comparison of the 
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material from the three parts of my overall case study. The first question explored the 
scope of risk which is created by these everyday events and how are they organized or 
sorted (Bowker and Starr, 1999) through a process of classification.  
The exploration of risks in relation to people‘s concepts of organising, sorting and 
classifying of risks shows the concept of risk is likely to be influenced by personal 
experiences, social perspectives and the perceived possibilities of potential threats from 
risks in the outside environment. This then is reflected in the way in which risks appear: 
if risks had some high frequency characteristics their boundary may be evaluated and 
calculated, such risks may appear on particular times of day or month (Lupton, 1990), 
some are linked to specific gender groups (see for example Beck 1992: 104-106); others 
seem to be created by special weather or environmental conditions (Kasperson and 
Kasperson, 1991), others tended to reflect wider culture (see for example Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1983). On the other hand, if risks were regarded as more uncertain most of 
the managers seem to present risks as hard to distinguish or track by studying the 
statistical figures; particularly, when such uncertainties were linked to sporadic and 
latent factors, not only be influenced by a single factor but resulting from the interaction 
of a number of social processes (see for example Webster 2007: 49), personal behaviour 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 18), or seen to be influenced by outside pressures like 
primary family, peer group and local culture (as Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990: 
179); others are created by the using of technologies (Beck, 1992) such as cyber crime 
or recorded conflict related to mobile phones.  
Moreover, examining the operation of the CSRS suggests that the classification of the 
risks was not only influenced by these perceived threats but also reflected the 
relationships within the system/organisation itself (see Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
For example, as explored in the CSRS, in order to handle risk, managers working at the 
governmental management level used the system not only as an administrative 
discipline but also to provide some local benefits which alleviated possible concerns 
about using the system (such as its impact on the reputation management of the school), 
through giving financial support or providing an environmental safety assessment and 
notification of laws relating to this. Moreover, the system managers might provide 
ongoing training to reflect changes in the system regulation especially when the system 
function cannot support the task of risk management, and when managers may consider 
replacing the old with a new management system.  
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To extend the concepts above, my second question asked whether the severities or 
seriousness of risks could be calculated and standardized by the organization. It is likely 
that the calculation and standardisation of risks may be influenced by managers‘ 
attitudes toward risks depending on how confident they are of acceptable or 
unacceptable risks to be taken by the organisation (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
Significantly, both quantitative and qualitative research results show that managers‘ 
attitudes toward the calculation of risks are likely not only to be influenced by the 
responsibilities of their working position at different management levels but also 
affected by the attitudes found within the local organisational culture (Morgan et al, 
2000). As the qualitative results present, managers serving at the highest administrative 
level are more likely to be concerned with handling risk than counting the number or 
seriousness of events. It seems that the priority of understanding risks focuses on 
controlling risk information abilities more than dealing with it (Douglas, 1985) because 
some potential threats from legislators, media and society to the organisation may cause 
more serious and unacceptable harm than risk itself to organisation (Beck, 1999). 
Therefore, the system managers may be more concerned with developing prevention 
strategies on reducing risks at the governmental management level; such phenomena 
may reflect the fact that although the analysis of results of the CSRS highlighted and 
calculated many potential trends and possible tendencies of risk-related events, events 
still increased gradually every year.  
Significantly, examining schools managers‘ opinions toward the calculation of risks 
shows that when they consider and assess the harm of risks to the organisation, staff 
adopt a variety of positions, confirming accounts in the wider, existing literature (Renn, 
2008; Douglas, 1985, 1992; Lupton, 1999). So for example, when exploring the process 
of reporting events to the CSRC, managers with higher status and longer seniority were 
more likely than junior staff with lower rank and less experience accepted by colleagues 
when they dealt with and reported event at local school. It seems that manager with 
sophisticate experiences likely more than junior one who are unfamiliar with 
sub-organisational culture accepted by other colleagues when dealing or handling risks 
at organisation because those senior staff likely more than junior one understand and 
adopt the dynamic and interaction between themselves and other colleagues of school. 
The results likely suggest that the calculation of risks could be achieved by the 
standardisation of regulation or procedure even law if the process of managing risks are 
acceptable by most organisation within hierarchical culture; however, if risks 
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management task contained some potential threats, or possible harm to local 
organisation those managing procedures probably are unacceptable by most 
organisation with an individualist culture.  
My third question explores whether the personal perceptions of risks by managers 
conform to or modify the formal meanings of risk as set down by the system. According 
to the results from exploring the CSRS, the categories of the system have been modified 
several times which achieved some flexibility in the system in terms of evaluating and 
governing risks (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982); indeed, as experiences using the 
system highlight that new types of risks not only increased through some multiple social 
activities or personal behaviour but also concerned with other diverse factors such 
multiple factors; some seem to be created within the organization, some may come from 
the pressure of society and media; others probably result from the change of policy 
making (Beck, 1992). In terms of reporting risk, most of the managers reported that a 
school tended to withhold events in order to protect the reputation of the school. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that standard reporting procedures depend on these 
interpretive judgements existing within the local sub-culture (Douglas, 1992); the 
phenomenon of the ―Dark Figure‖, as it was described, seems to support not only such a 
viewpoint but also highlights that the sub-culture truly influenced the validity of the 
evaluation of risks. Therefore, in order to improve the functioning of the management 
risks and achieve the effectiveness of evaluation risks cross the diversity of campus 
security events, the system managers not only tried to establish a risk governance 
culture with some coercion strategies, such as establishing a reporting culture and using 
sanctions according to law, but also had to understand local practices and concerns and 
consider some possible benefits derived from greater support and consultation with 
local staff.   
The final question focused on whether the management of risk reflects the wider context 
within these hierarchical organizations. As most of the system operators argue, risks 
may contain many characteristics with uncertainties; some are likely to be caused by 
environmental factors such as sporadic events like ‗food poisoning‘; some to do with 
the unforeseen behavior and potential threats such as ‗suicide‘ (Turner et al, 1990; 
Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007); others seems to be created by the using of 
technology to report conflict existing in the local culture (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982), for example, students using mobile phone recordings of a conflict event between 
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teacher and student at school. Therefore, if risks are involved with a wider range of 
uncertainty characteristics they may be hard to prevent, predict and alleviate with the 
help of analysis of the historical record or improvement of the system function, because 
risk may evolve from more and more complex threats and their interaction (Beck, 1986; 
Marjolein, 2000).  
In general, establishing a useful technical management system is expected to handle and 
control risks which may cause threats or create harm to organizations within a 
hierarchical culture. As I highlight in the literature review chapter, there are many 
theories that have provided useful and effective concepts and constructions to approach 
and explain risk management in the social science field such as ―risk governance‖, ―risk 
society‖, ―culture theory‖, and the ―SCOT‖ approach Among those theories, some 
explained risk via particular reference to an organization‘s culture; some explore the 
interactive shaping of risk via social action; others focus on the function of risk 
management itself. From a risk management perspective, in order to handle or manage 
the diversity risks that are likely to be met, the system managers may not only have to 
consider many possible standard processes but also establish some formal procedures 
that staff must follow to ensure the functioning of the system and the effective 
management of risks. This ‗disciplining‘ of behaviour and the governance it produces 
relates to Foucault‘s (1978) perspective on the ordering of behavior through forms of 
socio-technical control. In theory, therefore, the system operators have to report risks to 
the management centre without withholding any events, and through following quite 
specific rules and guidelines on reporting. Indeed, the analytical results of historical data 
presented many possible trends and patterns of risks with high levels of predictability, 
and such statistical results and the trends that they show would normally be regarded as 
the basis for a systematic revision of policy, where needed, to ensure that the risks could 
be disciplined and reduced in the future. 
However, in practice, as my empirical material demonstrates, the statistical results show 
that managers have quite different attitudes toward risks, and, as many of my 
respondents observed, local operators did not deal with such risks according to the 
expectations and requirements of the hierarchical management culture but were much 
more likely to deal with them through localized practices and conventions, contrasted 
especially between public and private schools, senior and junior staff or male staff to 
female ones. Overall, this suggests that it is important to consider not only forms of 
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governance, but how in practice risks are perceived and managed: one of the limitations 
of a Foucauldian position is that the identification of powerful discourses of risk does 
not explain the diverse interpretation of risk, nor the uncertainties surrounding it.   
The modification of the system categories was one way of coping with new risks with a 
degree of certainty. Obviously, a socio-technical system may adjust its function to be 
more flexible in the risk society, as Beck (1992) suggests, even though this itself may 
simply ‗manufacture‘ new risks. For example, the sub-category of ‗suicide‘ was 
subdivided into three sub-categories because of the concerns and pressures both internal 
and external to the organisation. However, the phenomenon of ―reputation management‖ 
seems unable to be classified into any categories of the system. It seems that the new 
type of risks were not only manufactured by the use of the technology or technology 
itself but also created by the users‘ attitudes and the wider organisational culture toward 
risks in risk society. 
The management framing of the CSRS could be classified as a high grid/group 
bureaucratic culture and the existence of a highly coordinated and cooperative form of 
‗solidarity‘, as Douglas (1978) might argue, which achieved the system‘s need to 
identify and manage many risks with both certainty and uncertainty characteristics. 
Obviously, exploring the operating and functioning of the CSRS reveals that as the 
actual meaning of risk involves cultural issues with many uncertainties, it is clear that 
the complex process of risk governance seems to be influenced by the interaction of 
people with and the dynamic of their organisational culture; therefore, the task of risk 
managing and the biases of culture may interact as what I see as a feedback loop. I 
argued that the managers in the CSRS are located within a high grid/group hierarchical 
culture, and so, perhaps, we should not be surprised that some are likely to be suspicious 
of the system‘s function to handle risks if they negatively impact on the reputation of 
the school: loss of reputation is the bigger risk, for it directly threatens the shared (high) 
group culture. At the same time, I also showed that managers may also worry about the 
reporting process where it is seen to invade client privacy or appear to be just used for 
the surveillance of the school or its staff. Here the limits of the group culture come to 
the surface. Such phenomena and concerns probably create many problematic and 
hesitant attitudes toward the use of the system to deal with risks which were evidenced 
by the arguments from both the system managers and operators. In general then, 
Douglas‘s culture theory provides an effective way to help us to understand risk in a 
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hierarchical organisational culture, and to explore the organisational culture toward risks; 
however, it seems unable to examine the whole process of dealing with risks and the 
development of a technical management system in a risk society. As the results of my 
thesis suggest, when faced or dealing with risks, peoples‘ attitudes may change 
depending on the responsibilities that they have and the coordinating effect of a group 
culture is therefore more limited. Therefore, my thesis seem to suggest that culture 
theory provides a useful path in regard to approaching risk governance but the high 
grid/group organisational concept has its limits if we try to explore and explain the 
social process through which risks are managed fully. Consequently, I argued we should 
adopt the concept and structure of the SCOT analysis that offers a complementary 
approach to help us to explore and construct the path of development of a technological 
management system especially in terms of its ‗variation‘ and ‗selection‘ of what is seen 
as more effective or acceptable responses to a subset of ‗problems‘ that different groups 
within the organisation experience.  
Overall, therefore, the results of my qualitative research seem to suggest that risk 
management could be improved by a standard operating procedure and systematic 
categorisation of risks; such tasks relied on a high grid/group organisation to establish a 
technical system with a standardised management function: as Loader (1998: 8) 
suggests, the use of technologies sometimes acts not only to define social or economic 
structure but also determines modes of human interaction. However, in order to develop 
an effective and functional system, the system designers not only have to establish a 
standard function for surveillance and governance risks but also need to understand 
some possible or potential impacts and concerns existing between the local and 
governmental levels; such factors, including the diversity of organisational function and 
variety of culture and practices across the organisation, if integrated effectively when 
creating or development a software or technical system, can lead to a more effective 
regime (see Pollock and Williams 2009: 32-33). 
7.4 Modelling risk management processes 
As I presented in the previous chapter, the purpose of my thesis is nether to develop a 
thoroughgoing critique of the contemporary social theories in relation to risk 
management nor to establish or develop a new theory but has tried, informed mainly by 
Douglas‘ grid/group theory and the SCOT approach, to explore and model the 
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functioning of risk management in a socio-technical system within the cultural context 
of Beck‘s ‗risk society‘. Consequently, in the following section I apply the concept of 
the SCOT to construct the possible modeling of using a technical system to manage risk 
management within a cultural context, drawing on my results to map the range of 
problems and provide some possible solutions function located at each stage of 
managing risks. According to the integration of my research results, my modeling of the 
functioning of risk governance tasks may be divided into four stages primarily those of 
what I call ‗pre-risk‘ which examines the function of risk management and condition of 
development of technology within a cultural context, ‗potential threats‘ which discusses 
the acceptable and unacceptable threats and the operating of a technical system within a 
cultural context, ‗current risk‘ which explores the evaluating of predictable and 
unpredictable risk and the function and modification of a technical system within a 
culture context and ‗post-risk‘ which explores the type of risk and the revision/removal 
of a technical system within a cultural context . I now outline the model in the following 
section. 
Pre-risk 
In the pre-risk stage, firstly the interaction of risk management and the dynamic of 
development of a socio-technical management system can be understood in terms of 
two types of culture – including individualist and hierarchical (see Diagram 7.1). I begin 
with the problem related to the standardisation of risk management in a hierarchical 
organisational culture (see bottom left of the diagram). It seems that three offending 
issues are likely to affect the task of risk management in risk society, for instance, new 
risks may cause a failure in the original management system which reduces the 
effectiveness of managing risk; also, the using of the system is likely to become a 
routine administrative task which weakens the system‘s function of reducing risk; and 
finally the turnover of staff means that new staff are unfamiliar with the system. In order 
to avoid such potential compromises to risk management, the management centre may 
provide some possible strategies and establish the standardisation management function 
to reduce the impact of risks, such as, developing a standard operating procedure (SOP) 
which given a guidelines for manager to deal with risk, or establishing a operating 
culture which helped to communicate and transfer information of event in order to 
distribute the managing construction and centralize the information to handle risks.  
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I then focused on risk management from an individual perspective (see the top left of 
the diagram). As can be seen, examining the tasks of risk management from this 
viewpoint, some people seem to believe that the technical management system has 
probably increased their workload and created more confusion when they deal with 
risks. Some argued that managing risks normally belongs to part of staff responsibilities 
elsewhere in the organisation. Others highlighted that sometimes the ultra vires attitude 
of directors may create a dilemma toward managing risks between manager‘s judgment 
and leaders‘ power. Therefore, in order to alleviate such potential problem existing, 
managers may not only follow administrative regulation to avoid possible sanctions by 
law but also try to adopt local cultural understandings within the dynamic of 
organisation and the leadership of the department because the interaction and dynamic 
of local organisation likely standing a significantly role when dealing with risks. In 
doing so, managers can try to extend the system function from simply using it to 
learning experience and knowledge from it. 
There were other problems identified in my fieldwork relating to managing risks (see 
bottom right of diagram). As can be seen, governmental regimes seem to ignore failure 
to reduce or handle risks. Consequently, in order to manage risks effectively, a 
hierarchical organisation will not only develop a socio-technical management system 
but also have to consider other alternative ways, which is kind of backup plan such as 
the function of ‗sound direction‘ when the original reporting system failure causing by 
natural disaster, for managing risks which improves the system by reducing human 
participation, and moving towards a more automatic recording of risk.  
In addition, the development of a technological management system seems also to 
create some doubts among users (see top right of diagram) particularly if managers 
argue that a technical management system was designed for surveillance of the local 
risk managers within schools. As some of my respondents also observed, they may 
either report events passively or believe that reporting events is just for higher 
administrative managers to monitor risks but not utilized properly for future action. 
Therefore, in order to solve such concerns designing a socio-technical management 
system not only has to consider the collecting of information but also ought to support 
some possible resources, provide training and share experiences to end users as much as 
possible. Moreover, the system managers may try to alleviate some possible doubts 
which caused users concern, such as, focusing on establishing a communication channel 
277 
 
rather than developing a surveillance approach to framing the management of risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential threats 
Here I am interested in possible or potential threats and their likely influence on the 
operating of a technical system to manage risks (see Diagram 7.2). According to the 
model (see the bottom left of diagram), it seems that some potential threats are 
unacceptable which may not only relate to handle of event but also regard to the 
reputation protection on both organisation and managers/director in a hierarchical 
organisation if they affect the organisation‘s overall ability to manage risk. For example, 
if the management centre is unable to collect and provide information about possible 
future threats, this may lead to criticism and blame placed on senior staff by legislators, 
media and society. Besides this, the system managers may have to bear some potential 
pressure in trying to anticipate unknown side-effects from risks. In order to reduce and 
solve such unacceptable factors the risk management tasks will not only involve having 
to enhance management‘s ability to anticipate risks – such routine goals likely can be 
achieved by analysis of historical data which distinguished some potential risks with the 
prediction of events frequency or trends – but also to respond to the possible concerns 
 
Diagram 7.1 The functioning of risk governance in the development of a 
socio-technical management system within a cultural context in pre-risk stage 
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from wider society and even to deal with the media which avoided the second harm 
from society or media.  
Moreover, some potential threats and their likely side-effect are unacceptable if the risks 
concerned impact on the reputation and so the financial status of the organisation (see 
top left of diagram). A good example was that many schools tended to withhold 
information about some risks in order to avoid some possible impacts not only on the 
schools‘ reputation but also the enrolling of new students because new students are the 
source of income for schools. In order to prevent such potential threats, one of the 
effective ways may be to establish an operating procedure that may not only notify and 
help users to follow the standard procedure in using the system - to give them an ―early 
warning‖ – but also to identify those risks that must be reported upwards as a legal 
requirement. Given the strong military culture (as noted in Chapter 6) informing the 
Taiwanese case, this may be easier to do than might be true elsewhere. 
Other unacceptable threats may impact the functioning of the technical system if there is 
‗risk overload‘ generated by the very system itself through the advance of technologies 
or new types of risks (see bottom right of diagram). Indeed, some system users argued 
that the system was unable to deliver or provide a ―user-friendly‖ environment for them. 
In order to solve such potential threats, a technological system may not only have to 
reclassify/re-examine the classification of risks or change the regulation of the report 
process but also ought to simplify the actual procedure of reporting risks. The 
modification of tasks depends on the frequency with which new risks may happen and 
the advance of technology itself. 
Finally, other unacceptable threats relate to the perceived surveillance function of the 
system, not itself an explicit objective when first established (see the top right of 
diagram). As can be seen, some system operators might have to accept or endure a 
hostile attitude and behaviour from colleagues because operating the system may be 
regarded as informing of other users/staff with a negative impact on collaboration in the 
organisation. In order to avert such a threat the system managers may not only have to 
encourage or provide/support resources to users but also to share the experiences and 
information of dealing with similar risk over organisation management framing within 
the system in order to improve the managers‘ abilities of handling risk in the 
organisation.  
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Current risks 
Third, in the current risk stage, some problems may not only have an impact on risk 
evaluation but also influence the modification of a technical management system within 
its cultural context (see Diagram 7.3 below). Beginning with the problems in relation to 
risk evaluation (see bottom left of diagram) evidence shows the analysis or evaluation 
of risks is likely to be routine or perfunctory and simply a bureaucratic procedure. 
Furthermore, as a system designer argues, the ―Dark Figure‖ of unforeseen current risk 
may impact on the reliability of the system because it is hard to determine how many 
risks have been hidden across the local organisation. Such phenomenon may also 
influence the prevention capabilities of reducing events at the level of practice. Also, 
government managers may find it hard to determine an effective approach to the 
analysis information through the system because it was primarily designed to record and 
manage risks rather than evaluate the effectiveness of the results. Moreover, current 
risks may be difficult to classify and deal with in terms of identifying trends as they may 
reflect clients‘ individual family or social circumstances. Otherwise, it can be difficult to 
determine which was the main-event and sub-event when manager used the system. In 
Diagram 7.2 The functioning of risk governance in the operating of a socio-technical 
management system within a cultural context in potential threat stage 
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order to improve the task of risk evaluation, system managers would need to analyse the 
characteristics of current risks but also ought to understand the cause of risks with the 
help of historical data. Moreover, risk managers might not only integrate the range of 
risk information more effectively but also provide examples to users with similar 
environmental, social and culture characteristics across the organisation such as provide 
both positive and negative knowledge to student, using and applying particular figures, 
trends and cases to empower both managers and students abilities of awareness or 
avoiding events, and establishing the characteristic of event in related to the cause and 
sharing this to staff and students.  
In light of this, as the exploration of the CSRS suggests, some possible patterns and 
trends may be presented and distinguished by the analysis of historical data; however, 
while such statistical results seem to highlight some figures they are unable to suggest 
or provide actual strategies for reducing risks (see top left of diagram). In response, a 
technical system manager might not only have to inspect the analysis of information and 
highlight/predict risks with specific frequency characteristics – such as focuses on 
frequency risk and those risks which, regardless of frequency, cause serious damage – 
but also ought to give feedback and guidance for users as quickly as possible.  
Other problems relating to current risk management come from outside of the 
organisation and influence the operation of the technical system such as the concerns of 
citizens, media or society (see bottom right of diagram). As can be seen, when risks are 
caused by the media or public concern, some of the classification will need to be 
changed to capture this. In order to avoid any destabilising impacts a technical 
management system may not only have to modify regulations and operation procedures 
with the increase of new risks but also ought to upgrade its evaluation and management 
functions frequently.  
Furthermore, managers‘ personal knowledge of the cultural context (see top right of 
diagram) might affect their perception of risk-reporting itself and the demands it has. As 
I showed, some system users argued that the operating of a technical system squanders 
the manpower and time of the sub-organisation when dealing with risks. Some were 
also concerned that the using of a technical management system may unavoidably 
invade clients‘ privacy. In order to alleviate such doubts, the modification of a technical 
system should not only seek to simplify the operating processes and develop more rapid 
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response procedures but also ought to improve the data security relating to privacy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-risk 
Finally, in the post-risk stage (that is how lessons are learned from risk events), risk may 
be classified into two types depending on people‘s attitude considering risks as certainty 
or uncertainty (see as Diagram 7.4). As the exploration of the functioning of the CSRS 
suggests, in a high group/grid organisational culture (see bottom left of diagram), when 
risks contain high levels of uncertainty the task of risk management is more likely to be 
focused on the largest number of risks that are likely to cause serious harm to the 
organisation. Policies are likely to be focused on those risks seen as most significant and 
predictable such that management are more concerned with controlling such risks than 
considering risks in general. In addition, the managers may be given greater 
administrative rights which allowed managers making decision at event scene to handle 
risks of this type. Also, the highest managers may provide and develop some plausible 
strategies to deal with risks.  
Moreover, sometimes risks may create consequent side-effects for an organisation (see 
Diagram 7.3 The functioning of risk governance in the modification of a socio-technical 
management system within a cultural context in current risk stage 
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the top left of diagram); they are not only caused by the using of technology but also 
may be created by the technology itself. For example, student may record a conflict and 
post it to YouTube or send to media between staff and student. Such conditions seem to 
generate more uncertainties about handling risks. Consequently, in order to solve and 
avoid this, system designers are likely not only to seek to improve the users‘ attitudes 
toward the use of the system but also to educate them to deal with risks in a certain way 
and avoid the creation of new risk in the future. Otherwise, one of the best ways may be 
considered some long-term plan for managing risks more effectively. 
In regard to the operation of a technical system to manage post-risk (see bottom right of 
diagram), as the diagram shows risk management could be improved by the 
modification of or change in the configuration of a technical management system which 
extended the system function be more flexible to cover or handle the increase of 
diversity events; however, some elements are unable to be easily integrated into the 
system if they contain many less controllable or contingent processes because 
technological system do not autonomously acquire the momentum needed to achieved 
the goals anticipated depending on operator‘s attitude toward the system function, such 
as users sharing information or experience. Consequently, in order to address such a 
problem the senior managers/designers may need to re-modify and re-examine the 
configuration of the system frequently or re-establish a completely new – and so 
socially plausible and workable – management system.  
Finally, other issues likely to cause concern among operators using the system (see top 
right of the diagram) include the pace at which reporting has to be done while actually 
dealing with the scene of the risk-event at the same time. In order to avoid such 
concerns, the senior management centre may have to improve both data collection and 
level of resource and support to local or sub-organisational users which given more 
information and resources for operators to understand or predict many uncertainty 
condition be certainty when dealing with risk. By doing so, they may not only achieve 
the acceptability and safety of the system but also cause the system‘s function to be 
more valued and acceptable by managers and operators at both the management centre 
and sub-organisation.  
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Integrating the findings and results of the general account above, the interaction of the 
functioning of risk governance and the dynamic of developing a socio-technical 
management system appears to work at a number of different levels where distinct 
problems and solutions are deployed in respect to the process of management risk, 
within a specific cultural context and across the four stages described above, this is 
modelled in Diagram 7.5 below. As the Diagram shows, the four stages of risk are 
represented on the left side of the diagram, while, their relation to the use of a technical 
system shown on the right side. The main theoretical issues shaping my thesis appear on 
the bottom of the diagram – including risk governance, culture theory and SCOT which 
involved investigating the process of risk management, locating this in its cultural 
context and the more specific process of the development a technical system (from left 
to right). Significantly, as the model suggests (see the top row), establishing a 
standardisation procedure of dealing with risky events to operate a technical 
management system is likely to provide some effective function to manage and avoid 
risks because it helps and give a guideline and direction for managers to deal with risks 
but the tasks of risk management are more complex, and reflect the different 
characteristics of risks as well as the need to distinguish the potential gaps between an 
Diagram 7.4 The functioning of risk governance in the change of a socio-technical 
management system within a cultural context in post-risk stage 
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individualist/local and hierarchical organisational culture. In addition, a technical 
management system may be unable to handle or control every potential threat in a risk 
society because the acceptability and unacceptability of potential threats may be 
different to that presumed by the organisational management framing depending on the 
attitude of those working within a specific organisational culture (see the second row). 
Consequently, a socio-technical management system not only has to contain some 
flexibility and be open to modification but also ought to assess the acceptability of 
potential threats that are accepted or unaccepted by all those involved. Moreover, when 
evaluating risks whether predictable or unpredictable, the tasks seem to be influenced 
by the knowledge and consent of users within the organisation‘s culture depending on 
the seriousness of the risks (see the third row); thus, a technical management system 
may not only have to upgrade the system function but also may change or revise the 
operational procedures with the increase of unpredictable risks as well. Finally, in 
managing a post-risk strategy (see the lowest row), a technical management system may 
have to revise its configuration again and again until it is able to control or handle 
potential new risks, or if not, be replaced by a completely new management system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5 Limitations of the model 
This thesis not only examined the historical record data in the CSRS,Limitations of the  
 
Diagram 7.5 The interaction of the functioning of risk governance and the development 
of a socio-technical management system within a cultural context 
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7.5 Limitations of the model 
This thesis not only examined the historical record data in the CSRS, the operators‘ 
opinions toward the utility of a socio-technical management system but also interviewed 
managers and staff members of a hierarchical management structure found within the 
educational regime in Taiwan. Drawing on Douglas, I have argued that the management 
framing of the CSRS is kind of a high grid/group organisation because it is not only 
operated by managers from a similar (military) background but also uses a bureaucratic 
management organisation which may be one of the factors empowering the system‘s 
utility to handle risks because of the level of value integration and decision-making this 
form of grid/group fosters. However, as Douglas also argues, organisations may have 
their own sub-cultures depending on the targets and goals which those in power expect 
the organisation to achieve. This partly explains the behaviour of withholding 
information about events, evidence of the influence of risk management existing at the 
local level. Consequently, for the model to be valid, it would need to ensure that this 
issue is properly addressed.  
Firstly, examining the historical record data in the CSRS obviously highlights many 
potential patterns and trends which likely could empower managers‘ abilities to prevent 
and predict risks further, such as, according to the particular time, season, weather and 
city. However, the statistical results seem unable to account and explain the ―Dark 
Figure‖ of risk information, which ignored the regulation of the system and withhold 
events by some schools, that is withheld by users in the local school because such 
events may create potential threats to the organisation.  
Secondly, in the quantitative survey the results show that the participants had a similar 
background with military training which may explain why they accepted to respond and 
answer my questions, leading to a very high return ratio of the questionnaire. On the one 
hand, the similar background of participants provided the basis for a significant 
comparison between staff based on gender, working position, seniority or status. On the 
other hand, the similarity of the background of the managers and operators in the CSRS 
may contrast with other hierarchical organisation which may mean that the experiences 
and results are hard to transfer and generalise to other organisations completely because 
the managers of the CSRS were come from military background but worked at school 
which may not find out at other organisation.  
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Finally, the qualitative survey seems to indicate that a technical management system can 
be used not only for reporting events but also to gain knowledge and experiential 
learning, provide opportunities for trend analysis, and so on. However, as I pointed out 
in the methodology chapter, the CSRS was established by the peculiarities of the 
educational regime within the Taiwanese government which caused by some potential 
problems from both national and natural threats so the results may not transfer to other 
organisations whose cultural characteristics may be different from organisation to 
organisation, city to city, even country to country. However, the architecture of the 
model in general could be deployed as a tool in many different setting because it may be 
found some similar patterns if examines the concept of finding risk within culture and 
explores the function of dealing with within SCOT context.  
7.6 Final comment 
The theoretical perspectives discussed earlier in the thesis contained many useful 
concepts to explore risk management; however, they seem unable to distinguish 
between different forms of risk or if those risks contained many uncertainties. Therefore, 
I focused not only on the concept of culture theory to explore the interaction of risk 
management existing across an organisational culture but also relied on the ideas of the 
SCOT approach to distinguish some possible phenomena and dynamic of managing 
daily risks in a hierarchical organisation. Although some limitations may affect the 
validity of the thesis, some survey results and findings may be worth noting for other 
researchers who are interested in similar research for academic or policy reasons in 
developing strategies to manage risks in a risk society. The main areas to focus on are: 
 Explore how unpredictable risks are managed 
 Examine the ways in which systems are modified in response to changing risk 
 Examine the ways in which managers and users interact and how hierarchical 
and local cultural practices work together or in different directions 
 Examine what are seen as hard to control risks and how these are reported 
 Examine the play of groups and their interests in shaping the system and how 
problems are dealt with 
 Examine the relationship between leaders/designers and users of the system and 
how this shapes the acceptability of risk. 
To conclude, some recommendations and references in relation to the managing of risk 
287 
 
at the government management level may be worth suggesting and so contributing to 
the management centre of the CSRC. Begin with the examination of using a 
socio-technical system to manage risks, while the standardisation of risk governance 
should be based around efficiency and should treat every managing process and 
function completely and so establish a standard hierarchical organisation management 
culture. However, this can be very impersonal and as a result ignore the range of 
perspectives found in the sub-organisational culture. Indeed, in order to manage, handle 
and reduce risks the government managers should not only try to improve the operators‘ 
confidence toward the using of technological system to manage risks but also have to 
empower users‘ abilities in regard to the prevention of risks. Such abilities particularly 
may focus on the transfer of experiences and knowledge top-down because the 
management centre controls more resources than the sub-organisation; at the same time, 
the system designers and senior staff have to understand and consider some potential 
bottom-up problems which are hidden within the local organisation.  
Moreover, the acceptability of potential threats is dependent upon the acceptability of 
the harm from threats to the organisation and so a system should empower every staff to 
understand the balance and limitation of threats as objectively as possible between 
acceptable and unacceptable threats to the hierarchical organisation. As can be seen, in 
theory, the analysis of the longitudinal data (in Chapter 4) highlights many possible 
trends and provides useful recommends for preventing risk; however, in practice, the 
policymaking of other government departments may mean that effective use of this 
information is limited. In addition, in order to operate a socio-technical management 
system effectively government managers not only have to consider establishing a 
reporting culture which may be established by sanction or discipline in a hierarchical 
organisation culture but also ought to consider how to provide benefit and help to 
encourage the acceptability of such a reporting culture for those in the sub-organisation.  
After that, evaluating risk is based on the effective evaluation of every potential threat 
and seeking to make unpredictable risks more predictable. However, this cannot be done 
by ignoring the multiple forms of local knowledge and securing consent toward the 
evaluation of risks existing locally. Nor can it ignore the way in which more prediction 
can in itself generate new, unforeseen risks. Consequently, the evaluation of risks may 
be different from government to local school, because each organisation may be more 
concerned about different impacts or side-effects from risks to the organisation than 
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understand the causality of risks. As my interviewees suggest, in light of this, the 
establishing of a reporting culture may have to construct an automatic reporting and 
operating procedure or algorithm which is as rigorous as possible rather than discipline 
staff by the use of sanctions or punishment.  
Finally, it seems that in order to ensure the effective prevention risks, senior 
management not only has to analyse the historical data and explore some potential 
factors which may create risks but also ought to develop some solution functions for the 
sub-organisation, according to some risk characteristics such as, frequency, geographic 
areas, culture, society and technology. As my survey results suggest, the CSRC 
published the annual reports every year; however, many managers were unable or never 
received it even though the report was posted on the website. Moreover, staff within the 
education department with the power to make policies seem to ignore the contributions 
and value of annual reports which meant the report was somewhat ritualistic; as a result, 
it cannot empower the prevention functions effectively. It seems that management not 
only have to transfer the results more effectively from government to local organisations 
but also consider policy making about risk management according to the report.  
In my literature chapter, I argued that risks involve and contain different perspectives 
from the past to present society; its meaning involves both danger and opportunity, for 
example, in Chinese. I integrated some theories to examine the functioning of a 
technical management system which handles daily risks in schools and colleges across 
Taiwan. Indeed, while a technical system improves managers‘ abilities to handle and 
manage risk in the first place, new risks will actually accompany the very process of 
managing, either through the use of technology or from the interaction – the feedback 
loop – of an organisation‘s culture and risk itself; as a result, the managing process and 
so risk governance are made more uncertain. My thesis seems to suggest that if 
managers ignore the factor of culture to manage risk, even with the help of technology, 
they may experience the reduplication of risk; therefore, dealing with the process, which 
assumes it is an opportunity for control, may create new risks for an organisation or 
manager once again. In order to avoid such unacceptable phenomena when governing 
risk one of the possible ways may be to rely on the lessons of SCOT as a process that 
can be actively embraced beyond its purely theoretical contribution; by doing so, this 
would probably effectively empower the socio-technical system‘s ability to manage risk 
in a more socially robust way in risk society.  
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Appendix I Three levels of campus security events 
 
Level of event 
Main categories A Level B Level C Level 
I. Accident 
Event 
1. An accident causes staff or student near (or 
certain) death on the campus or out of campus. 
2. A group of people (over 3) injured or poisoned 
sent to the hospital. 
3. Mountain climbing accident. 
4. A chemical material in a laboratory accident 
causes people injury. 
5. An event may cause  mass media attention. 
1. An accident caused serious 
injury for staff or student in the 
campus or out of campus. 
2. A person commits suicide or 
self harm not immediately 
danger of life.  
3. An accidental event such as 
slight poisoning or laboratory. 
1. An accident causes 
people slight injury.   
2. An event may cause staff 
or student slight injury. 
3. An accident not handled 
immediately does not 
cause side-effects. 
II. Secure 
Preserve Event 
1. Man-made disaster cause staff or student near 
(or certain) death on the campus or off campus. 
2. An accident causes serious damage for campus 
facilities or property (over NT1, 000,000). 
3. A fire alarm causes injury on the campus. 
4. A explosion on the campus. 
5. A kidnap/extortion, or violent and brutal event 
for staff or student.  
6. These event may create mass media concern. 
1. Man-made disaster causes 
harm to staff or students in the 
campus or out of campus. 
2. An accident causes serious 
damage to campus facilities or 
property (over NT100, 000 to 
fewer than 1,000,000). 
3. A hacker invades the campus 
computer system. 
1. Slight injury of staff. 
2. An accident causes slight 
damage for campus 
facilities or property 
(under NT100,000). 
3. A dispute dealt with by a 
school. 
III. Violence & 
Deviant 
Behaviour 
1. Violence or deviant behavior cause staff or 
student near (or certain) death.  
2. Staff or student the violence or deviance 
behavior cause serious damage for campus 
facilities or property (over NT1, 000,000). 
3. Staff or student to partake in group (over 3 
people) crime or cause injured. 
4. Staff or student to partake in serious or to 
offend. 
5. Staff or student engage in offenses against 
sexual autonomy or indecent exposure. 
6. The other violence or deviant behavior may 
cause media concern. 
1. Staff or student the violence or 
deviance behavior cause 
serious damage for campus 
facilities or property (over 
NT100, 000 and under 
1,000,000). 
2. Staff or student to partake in 
illegal case and interview by a 
public procurator. 
3. Staff or student sexual assault 
the other people but did not 
causes injury. 
1. Staff or student violence 
or deviant behavior 
cause slight damage of 
NT100,000). 
2. Deviant behavior causes 
controversy. 
IV. Counseling 
Conflict Event 
1. A counseling conflict event cause staff or 
student near (or certain) death. 
2. A serious conflict and against event could to 
influence the student learning and may cause 
media or society concerned and disturbed. 
3. Some outside force or influence to intervene 
the student movement or against event. 
4. The other counseling conflict event may cause 
media to concern. 
1. A counseling conflict event 
caused heavy hurt for staff or 
student.  
2. A conflict and against event has 
to subside would not to 
influence the student learn and 
cause society and media 
concerned. 
1. A conflict causes people 
slight injury. 
2. A conflict causes a civil 
dispute. 
V. Illegal Event 
for Children & 
Teenager 
(Under 18) 
1. An infringe to incur the student near (or 
certain) death. 
2. A family or crime event could cause 
psychology trauma for student. 
3. The other illegal event for children & teenager 
may cause media concerned. 
1. An event caused heavy hurt for 
student. 
2. A family or crime event. 
The other individual event 
match the low requests 
should promulgate the 
social policy agency 
VI. Natural 
Disaster Event 
1.A natural disaster (such as strong winds、
floods and earthquake) cause staff or student 
near (or certain) death. 
2.An event cause serious damage for campus 
facilities or property (over NT1, 000,000) need 
emerge to succor.  
3. The other natural disaster event may cause 
media concerned. 
1.A natural disaster (such as 
strong winds、floods and 
earthquake) causes harm for 
staff or student.  
2. An event cause serious damage 
for campus facilities or 
property (over NT100, 000 and 
fewer than 1,000,000). 
1.A natural disaster (such 
as strong winds、floods 
and earthquake) cause 
slight harm for staff or 
student. 
2. An event cause slight 
damage for campus 
facilities for property 
(under NT100, 000). 
VII. Other 
Campus Event 
1. A school administrative event could to 
influence the student learning and may cause 
media or society concerned and disturbed. 
2. Another event cause staff or student near (or 
certain) death. 
3. Another event may cause media concerned. 
1. A school administrative event 
has to subside would not to 
influence the student learn and 
may cause media or society 
concerned and disturbed. 
2. Another event may cause heavy 
hurt for student and staff. 
1. School administrative 
event has to handle 
immediately do not 
cause side-effect.  
2. Another event may cause 
slight hurt for student 
and staff. 
VIII. Disease 
Event 
1. An infectious disease of statutory. 
2. Anything may concerned by media. 
1. A group of people (over 10) to 
infect an infectious disease. 
Student or staff to infect 
disease sent to hospital 
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Appendix II The result of pilot test of the quantitative survey 
                                                                              N=20 
  number %   number % 
A. Rank lieutenant 0 0 E. Period in 
Position 
Under 1 year      13 0.65 
captain 2 0.10 1 to under 3 
years 
2 0.10 
major 10 0.50 3 to under 5 
years 
1 0.05 
Lieutenant 
colonel 
5 0.25 over 5 years 4 0.20 
No response 3 0.15 F. Academic 
Qualification 
University 12 0.60 
B. Gender Male 8 0.40 Master 8 0.40 
Female 6 0.30 PhD 0 0 
No response 6 0.30 G. Military 
Background 
Basic training 1 0.05 
C. Position 
in 
Department 
General staff  
(under 2 
years) 
4 0.20 Intermediate 
commander 
training   
16 0.80 
General staff 
(over and 
include 2 year) 
7 0.35 Advance 
commander 
training   
3 0.15 
Supervisor of 
department 
5 0.25 Summit 
training 
0 0 
Head of 
department 
4 0.20  
D. Type of 
the school 
High School 8 0.40 
Vocational 
high school 
6 0.30 
Complete 
school 
0 0 
Liaison office 2 0.10 
University 4 0.20 
 
 
B:Personal experience about the student accident report system. 
 
 Yes (%) No (%) 
f. Do you have any experience of operating any other similar systems? 7(35) 13(65) 
g. Did you get any training from school before you first operated  this 
system? 
15(75) 5(25) 
h. Did you get any information about why the Minister of Education 
designed this system? 
15(75) 5(25) 
i. Do you believe the effect of this system is helping schools to manage  
risk events? 
16(80) 4(20) 
j. Do you think that schools are responsible to students‘ personal 
privacy when an accident happens to them? 
18(90) 2(10) 
k. Do you think that reporting the accident which happened in schools 
is one of the ways for the Minister of Education to montor schools? 
13(65) 7(35) 
l. Did you get any analysis report or result about the student accident 
  event from the Minister of Education? 
15(75) 2(25) 
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C. Personal opinion about the Student Accident Report System 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
agree Neither disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
m. This system is useful for  
schools to manage students‘ 
accidents? 
2(10) 11(55) 6(30) 1(5) 0 
n. This system provides a good 
communication function in 
managing risk for education 
system? 
3(15) 11(55) 5(25) 1(5) 0 
o. Student security is  
sometimes more important 
than study in school? 
12(60) 8(40) 0 0 0 
p. This system provides useful 
information for the prevention 
of risk? 
2(10) 16(80) 1(5) 1(5) 0 
q. The operating training provides 
enough knowledge for you to 
operate this system? 
4(20) 13(65) 2(10) 1(5) 0 
 
D. Personal opinion about the organisational culture 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
agree Neither disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
r. This system is used for 
 the Minister of Education to 
 monitor schools? 
1(5) 4(20) 9(45) 5(25) 1(5) 
s. This system may invade 
students‘ or staffs‘ privacy. 
0 7(35) 4(20) 8(40) 1(5) 
t. The database analysis is a 
 part of the school‘s obligation to 
anticipate and prevent other 
accidents  
happening to students? 
5(25) 12(60) 2(10) 1(5) 0 
u. The database analysis is one 
of the responsibilities of the 
Minister of Education? 
6(30) 10(50) 3(15) 1(5) 0 
v. The operating training 
 provides enough 
knowledge(for you) to  
operate this system? 
5(25) 10(50) 3(15) 2(10) 0 
 
E. Personal experience about the student accident event 
According to the experience from the past which event(s) were more common in your school.  
( Multi-choice) 
 
Accident Event 19(95) Illegal Event for Children & Teenager 4(20) 
Secure Preserve Event 8(40) Natural Disaster Event 1(5) 
Violence & Deviance Behavior 9(45) Other Campus Event 1(5) 
Counseling & Conflict Event 7(350 Disease Event 11(55) 
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Appendix III The interview questions with the system operators  
A. Personal background 
1. Job title and description. 
2. Educational background 
B. Personal knowledge of background to the system 
3. What is the purpose do you think for the Minister of Education to design this 
system? 
Probe for: a. what is the concept come from? 
          b. do you think the system functions effectively with respect to school 
management? 
C. System operator experience and suggestion 
4. Have you had any similar experience elsewhere before operating (managing) this 
system? If so, Could you describe the experience? 
5. Did you take any training before operating (managing) this system? 
6. Do you find any problems when operating this system? 
7. Do you have any suggestions about this system for the system manager ? 
D. Personal opinion towards the System’s function for the organisation 
8. Do you think this system helps organizations with risk management? 
9. How does it provide the function for risk management? 
10. What is your opinion of the data management of campus accident events by the 
Ministry of Education for long-term risk surveillance? 
E. Use of information from the system for organisation 
11. Did your school (or department) analyse the historical record of accident reporting 
from the system database? 
 Probe for: a. what is the purpose?        
b. how do you use the analysis result? 
c. what is the effect of using this result? 
12. Do you know that the Ministry of Education analyses the database from this 
system each year?  
Probe for: a. If so, do you think what is the function of the analysis report could            
provide for risk management at school? 
13. Do you think the analysis document is useful for preventing student accidents?  
Probe for: a. how does it happen?        
b. can you provide any examples? 
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F. Personal opinion towards the other potential problems in system 
14. Do you think one of the functions of this system is the surveillance to schools for 
the Ministry of Education? 
15. Do you think reporting the campus security event may invade personal privacy? 
   Probe for: How do you think to avoid it? 
G. Personal opinion toward the procedure of campus security events and the right 
of client 
16. Do you think the system will change the reporting regulations because of the 
concern in some events from media? What do you think? 
17. Do you think schools should notify the client the event will be sent to the Campus 
Security Centre when dealing with the event? Why? 
18. Do you think schools should notify the clients‘ legal guidance immediately when 
dealing with the event? If so, why? 
H. Personal experience of dealing with campus accident event  
19. Have you ever been required to temporarily keep secret for any events to protect 
the reputation of a school? If so, what were these events and what did you do? Was 
this information ever made public later on? 
20. Do you think reporting campus security events may generate hostility towards you 
from your colleagues who might regard you as working too closely with senior 
management? 
21. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are sporadic 
events and hard to control? How do you think this condition could be improved? 
22. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are happening 
with frequency and why are they hard to reduce?  
How do you think this condition could be improved? 
23. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are latent ones 
and hard to predict? How do you think this condition could be improved? 
I. The other 
 24. In a technological society, schools rely on technology to help with campus security 
management; however, sometimes students also use technology to cause some 
events for campus management, for instance: recording counseling conflict events 
with mobile phone, posting an undue behavioral video on internet or recklessly 
send an e-mail to the minster of the Ministry of Education etc. 
 What is your opinion on this phenomenon? 
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Appendix IV The interview questions with the system designer/manager  
 
A. Personal background 
1. Job title and description. 
2. Educational background 
B. Designed concept and operator system from personal point of view 
3. What is the major purpose of design (manage) this system? 
4. Did you have any similar experience before designing the campus accident report 
system? 
Probe for: a. how does this system work and what is its overall objective or aim? 
            b. can you provide any examples? 
5. Has the system had to be modified after it has been in use for a few years? 
Probe for: a. why was it changed? 
           b. what impacts have such changes had? 
C. The function of risk management for organization from designer point of view 
6. What function do you think the system serves for the risk management of the 
organization? 
7. What kinds of help in risk management has it provided for policy-making? 
D. Training and education for system operator 
8. What kinds of the training the manager has provided for operators? 
9. How do managers examine the local operators‘ ability in use of this system to 
confirm the system provided it function? 
10. Do you provide any suggestion for school to make the campus security plan 
according to the issue of ‗how to use the campus security management system to 
improve the risk management‘?   
E. Management and effect of system database 
11. How does your department management use the database from every school? 
12. What are the actual and anticipative effects? 
13. What are the causes, if there are any gaps of the anticipation? What is the remedy 
plan? 
F. Manage the Campus security event from manager level point of view  
14. Do you think one of the functions of this system is the surveillance to schools for 
the Ministry of Education? Have any schools reflected this question? 
15. Do you think reporting the campus security event may invade personal privacy? 
How do you think to avoid it? 
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16. Do you think schools should notify the client the event will be sent to the Campus 
Security Centre when dealing with the event? Why? 
 17. Have you ever changed any reporting regulations or policies for some special 
events? 
Probe for: a. how did you change it? 
              b. can you provide any examples? 
 18. What sort of common events would you regard as acceptable, or to be tolerated 
without the need for any significant action on the part of the management in the 
school? 
18. If common accident events increase in frequency, do they then get redefined as 
being more serious? 
19. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are sporadic 
events and hard to control? How do you think this condition could be improved? 
20. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are happened 
with frequency are hard to reduce? How do you think this condition could be 
improved? 
21. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are latent ones 
and hard to predict? How do you think this condition could be improved? 
22. From a manager‘s point of view, what kinds of event may cause serious problems 
for risk management? What may be the reason? 
23. From a policy management point of view, what kinds of event may cause real 
policy change? 
I. The other 
 24. In a technological society, schools rely on technology to help with campus security 
management; however, sometimes students also use technology to cause some 
events for campus management, for instance: recording counseling conflict events 
with mobile phone, posting an undue behavioral video on internet or recklessly 
send an e-mail to the minister of the Ministry of Education etc. 
 What is your opinion on this phenomenon? 
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Appendix V The questionnaire used for the quantitative survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Personal information 
1.  Rank: 
□1. Lieutenant □2. Captain 
□3. Major □4. Lieutenant Colonel 
2.  Gender: 
□1. Male □2. Female 
3.  Position in Department:      
□1. General staff (under 2 years) □2. General staff (over and include 2 years) 
□3. Supervisor of department □4. Head of department 
4.  Your work Place (Type of School):  
□1. High School □2. Vocational High School 
□3. Complete School □4. Liaison Office 
5.  The period of time you have been working for the Military Training Officer:  
□1. Under 2 years □2. 2 to under 5 years 
□3. 5 to under 10 years □4. over 10 years 
6.  The period of time you have been working in this school: 
□1. Under 2 years □2. 2 to under 5 years 
□3. 5 to under 10 years □4. over 10 years 
7.  Academic Qualification:  
□1. University/college □2. Master 
□3. PhD  
8.  Military training background:  
□1. Basic training □2. Intermediate commander training 
□3. Advance commander  
training 
□4. Summit training 
Thank you for accepting to participate in our questionnaire survey. I am a PhD 
student at the University of York. The purpose of this survey is to try to investigate 
the function of the Student Accident Report System which was designed by the 
Minister of Education. All the data will only be used in the analysis of the research 
so any personal information will be kept confidentially and anonymised in any 
published document. This research has been approved by the Department of Military 
Training Education. If you have any queries about the questionnaire, please send 
them to e-mail:bh528@york.ac.uk. Please return it before 16
th
 September.  
Thank you for your help. 
PhD student Bao-chuang Huang 
Supervisor Prof. Andrew Webster 
Department of Sociology, University of York 
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9.  Is campus security one of your currently job at school. 
□1. Yes □2. No 
B: Personal experience about the campus security report system 
10. Have you have any experience of operating any other similar systems 
elsewhere before operating this system? If yes, please answer question 11; if 
no, please move on to question 12. 
□ Yes  □ No 
11. Was that similar security report system used in the military? □ Yes  □ No 
12. Did you get any training from school before you first operated this system? □ Yes  □ No 
13. Did you get any information about why the Minister of Education designed 
this system? □ Yes  □ No 
14. Did you get any analysis report or result about ‗campus accident event‘ from 
the Minister of Education? □ Yes  □ No 
C. Personal opinion about the Campus security Report System 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
15. The reporting procedures are simple and 
easy to operate? □ □ □ □ □ 
16. This system is effective for schools to 
manage risk events. □ □ □ □ □ 
17. This system provides a good 
communication channel in managing risk 
for the education system. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
18. In some situations, such as risk to 
personal health/injury, student security is 
more important than study at school. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
19. The operating training provides enough 
knowledge for you to operate this 
system. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
20. The classification of the event by the 
system is clear and includes every event. □ □ □ □ □  
21. The system may change the regulations 
because of the interest in some events 
from media. (for example, upgrade the 
event level ) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
D. Personal opinion about the organisational management culture 
 Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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22. A school has an obligation to deal with 
any events which happen to students and 
staff. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
23. A school has an obligation to protect 
personal privacy when accidents happen 
to students or staff. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
24. This system may invade students‘ or 
staff‘s privacy when transferring 
personal information. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
25. Asking a school to report an accident is 
one of the functions of surveillance for 
the Minister of Education to monitor 
schools. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
26. It is a school‘s obligation to anticipate 
and prevent other accidents with the help 
of historical database analysis. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
27. It is an obligation of the Minister of 
Education to analyze the historical 
database. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
28. Sharing information about campus 
security events which happen at other 
schools could help a school prevent 
similar events. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
29. To protect the reputation of a school, 
sometimes the administrative manager 
may temporarily withhold information 
about specific events. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
30. Reporting school accident events may 
make colleagues hostile towards you 
because this may be seen as being too 
ready to please management. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
E. Personal experience about the campus security event 
 Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
31. Accident events usually happen to 
particular types or groups of student. □ □ □ □ □ 
32. Schools should notify the client that the 
event will be sent to the Campus 
Security Centre when dealing with the 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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event. 
33. Schools should notify the clients‘ about 
any legal guidance immediately when 
dealing with the event 
□ □ □ □ □ 
34. Client and his/her legal guardians have 
the right to know how a school reports 
the event. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
35. Sporadic events which involve 
multiple-factors such as ‗food poisoning‘ 
are hard to control. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
36. Some events happen with high frequency 
such as ‗car accidents‘, so they are hard 
to reduce. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
37Latent events such as ‗suicide‘ are hard to 
anticipate and to manage. □ □ □ □ □ 
38. While technology may help with risk 
event management, sometimes it also 
causes some new problems, for instance: 
recording counseling conflict events with 
mobile phone, posting an undue 
behavioral video on internet or sending 
an e-mail to the minister of the Ministry 
of Education etc. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
39. According to your experience from the past, which event(s) were more common in your school? 
(Multi-choice) 
□ Accident Event □ 
Counseling & Conflict 
Event 
□ Other Campus Event 
□ Secure Preserve Event □ 
Illegal Event for 
Children & Teenager 
□ Disease Event 
□ 
Violence & Deviance 
Behavior 
□ Natural Disaster Event □ 
 
40. According to the pilot test of this survey, both accidents and natural disasters are more common. Is 
this situation similar to your personal experience in the past? If so, could you explain the reason? If 
not, according to your experience, what kind of the event may be more common at your school and 
why?    
 
 
I would like to do some follow-up interviews: can you indicate whether you would be available to do this, 
and if you would like to accept the interview please e-mail me independently of the survey. 
 
300 
 
Appendix VI  The official document approving the research from the Ministry of 
Education Department  
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Appendix VII The interview consent from  
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
My name is Bao Chuang Huang 
I am doing research on a project entitled: 
Risk governance: the management of socio-technological risk in the different cultures 
and contexts 
My tutor/supervisor Prof. Andrew Webster is directing the project and can be contacted 
at: 
Department of Sociology  
Wentworth College 
University of York 
Heslington 
YORK 
YO10 5DD 
                                                                            
Tel: (0)1904 434740 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this project. Before we start, I would like to 
emphasise that: 
 Your participation is entirely voluntary 
 You are free to refuse to answer any question 
 You are free to withdraw at any time 
  
The interview will be tape-recorded, but the data will be kept strictly confidential and 
will be available only to members of the research team. Excerpts from the results may 
be made part of the final research report, but under no circumstances will your name or 
any identifying characteristics be included in the report. 
Please sign this form to show that I have read the contents to you. 
 (signed)  
 (printed) 
 (date) 
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Appendix VIII The main and sub-categories of the campus security event in 2008 
 
I. Accident Event II. Security-related Event III. Violence & Deviant Behavior 
IV. Counseling 
Conflict Event 
V. Illegal Event involving Children 
& Teenagers (Under 18) 
VI. Natural 
Disasters 
VII. Other Campus 
Event 
VIII. Disease  
1. Traffic accident on 
the campus. 
2. Traffic accident 
outside of campus 
teaching. 
3. Traffic accident out 
of campus. 
4.Drowning  
5. Poisoning. 
6.Injury from sport or 
general horseplay 
7. Fall from building 
(not suicide). 
8. Mountain accident. 
9.Injury received 
during  laboratory 
or practical training 
10.A suicide or 
self-harm event 
11Injury from 
re-establishment. 
12. Injury by building 
collapse. 
13.Other accident 
event 
14. Injury from 
part-time work 
place. 
15. Other material 
causes of poisoning. 
16 Chemical material 
in laboratory 
causing poisoning  
17. Suicide with child 
18. Student suicide or 
self-harm 
19. Staff suicide or 
self-harm 
1. A fire on campus. 
2. A fire outside of campus. 
3. Facilities destroyed by 
someone on campus. 
4. An explode event on the 
campus. 
5. A dispute event from rant 
house. 
6. A dispute event from 
bargains. 
7. People from outside to 
pose risk to teachers and 
students. 
8. Campus facilities or 
equipment lost through 
theft. 
9. The property loss by theft. 
10. Swindling 
11. Injury 
12. Robbery  
13. A threaten and extort 
event. 
14. Suspect be kidnap 
15. The other violent event. 
16. Sexual assault or 
obscene behaviour (over 
18). 
17. Sexual harassment (over 
18). 
18.Other campus 
security-related event  
19 A dispute event from 
internet 
20 A hacker attack on the 
network system 
21 Staff swindle through the 
network 
1. Student to fight with weapons between 
groups of people. 
2. A faction to have a fight. 
3. Normal fighting event. 
4. Suspect involved in killer event. 
5. Suspect involved in robber event. 
6. Suspect involved in threaten event. 
7. Suspect involved in kidnap event. 
8. Suspect involved in steal event. 
9. Suspect involved in gamble event. 
10. Suspect l involved in sexual assault or 
indecent attitude event. 
11. Suspect involved to sex harassment event. 
12. Suspect involved to illegal to possess 
firearms.  
13. Suspect involved to against the drugs 
prevention and cure low. 
14. Suspect involved to hinder the Low 、
order and official business. 
15 The other violence & deviance behavior in 
the campus. 
16 Suspect involved to arson and to destroy 
17 Illegal car racing 
18 The other illegal event. 
19 Run-away from home and did not go to 
school (under senior high school). 
20 A faction to intervene the campus. 
21 Suspect to do sex business. 
22 Student to harass the ceremony event. 
23 A swindle event from internet 
24 A hacker to invade the network system. 
25 Suspect involved in hinder families. 
26 Student to harass the teaching. 
27 Group of students to cheat. 
1. A conflict event 
between student 
and teacher. 
2. A conflict event 
between parent 
and teacher 
(staff). 
3. A punishment or 
abuse event. 
4. A resist event 
from student. 
5. A conflict event 
between student 
and staff. 
6. A conflict event 
between parent 
and staff. 
7. The other related 
conflict event. 
1. Student to drift. 
2. Student in to the illegitimate 
place. 
3. Run-away from home in three 
days. 
4. Protect client from illegal event 
for children & teenager. 
5 An abandonment case. 
6 The other children and teenager 
protect case. 
7 Adult to compel children or 
teenager to marry. 
8 Illegal to utilize children or 
teenager. 
9 Kidnap or sell children or 
teenager. 
10 To force children or teenager 
sexual assault or indecent 
attitude. 
11 To use harmful drug or illegal 
medical for children and teenager 
12 Children and teenager suspect 
involved the sex business. 
13 An abuse event 
14 The other against Child and 
Youth Sexual Transaction 
Prevention Act  
15 Sexual assault or obscene 
(under 18) 
16 Sex harassment (under 18) 
17 To take or provide noxious tapes 
or books for children and 
teenager. 
18 Sexual assault causes pregnancy 
(under 18). 
19 High risk family 
1. Windstorm 
disaster 
2. floods 
3. earthquake 
4. Landslip and 
mudflows  
5. To be struck by 
lightning. 
6. Solenopsis 
ivicta Buren. 
7. The other 
disaster. 
1. A conflict even 
between staff and 
staff. 
2. A problem of 
general. 
administration 
3. A problem of 
personnel 
matters. 
4. A problem of 
administration. 
5. A problem of 
educational 
administration. 
6. The other 
problem. 
1. A generally disease 
event 
2. Statutory disease  
(Swinepox) 
3. Statutory disease  
(Scarlet fever) 
4. Statutory disease 
(Dengue fever) 
5. Statutory disease  
(Tuberculosis) 
6. Statutory disease 
(Enterovirus)  
7 Statutory disease 
(Pertussis) 
8 Statutory disease  
(the other) 
9 Statutory disease  
(SARS) 
10 Statutory disease 
(Swine flu cause 
severe illness) 
11 Statutory disease 
(flu cause severe 
illness) 
12. A generally disease 
(flu) 
13. A generally disease 
(H1N1) 
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Appendix IX The main and sub-categories of the campus security event in 2010 
 
I. Accident Event II. Security-related Event III. Violence & Deviant Behavior 
IV. Counseling Conflict 
Event 
V. Illegal Event involving Children 
& Teenagers (Under 18) 
VI. Natural Disasters 
VII. Other Campus 
Event 
VIII. Disease  
(Traffic accident) 
1. Traffic accident in the 
campus. 
2. Traffic accident of out of 
campus teaching. 
3. Traffic accident out of 
campus. 
(Poisoning) 
4. Food poisoning. 
5. Poisoning in the 
laboratory. 
6. Other poisoning. 
(Suicide or self-harm) 
7. Suicide with child. 
8. Student suicide or 
self-harm. 
9. Staff suicide or self-harm. 
(Sport or leisure-related 
event) 
10. Drowning 
11. Injury from sport or 
general horseplay. 
12. Fall from building (non 
suicide).  
13. Mountain accident. 
(Laboratory, practical 
training and 
environmental facility 
event) 
14. Injured received during 
laboratory or practical 
training. 
15. Injury from 
re-establishment. 
16. Injury by building 
collapse. 
17. Injury from part-time 
work place. 
Other accident event 
18. Other accident event. 
(Fire event) 
1. A fire on campus. 
2. A fire outside of campus 
(Artificial disturb event) 
4. Campus facilities or equipment to suffer 
loss  
(Stealing the theft) 
5. Campus facilities or equipment lost 
through theft. 
6. The property loss by theft. 
(A dispute event) 
7. A dispute event from rant house. 
8. A dispute event from bargains. 
9. A dispute event from internet. 
(Staff or student attacked by outsider 
10. Injury 
11. Robbery 
12. Extortion 
13. Kidnapping 
14. Other violent event. 
15. People from outsider to pose risk to 
teacher and student. 
( Information security event) 
16. A hacker attack on the network system. 
A swindle event 
17. A swindle event. 
18. Staff swindle by the network. 
Other campus security event 
19. The other campus safety protect event. 
A sexual assault event (over 18) 
20. A sexual assault event regarded to 
enforcement rules of the Gender Equality 
in Employment Act. 
21 A sexual assault event not regarded to 
enforcement rules of the Gender Equality 
in Employment Act. 
A sex harassment event 
22. A sexual harassment event regarded to 
enforcement rules of the Gender Equality 
in Employment Act. 
23. A sexual harassment event not regarded 
to enforcement rules of the Gender 
Equality in Employment Act.  
(Violence & Deviance Behavior) 
1. Student to fight with weapons between 
groups of people. 
2. A faction to have a fight. 
3. Normal fighting event. 
4. Illegal car racing. 
5. Suspect involved in sex business. 
(Suspect involved in illegal event) 
6. Suspect involved in killer event. 
7. Suspect involved in robber event. 
8. Suspect involved in threaten event. 
9. Suspect involved in kidnap event. 
10. Suspect involved in steal event. 
11. Suspect involved in gamble event. 
12. Suspect involved to illegal to possess 
firearms.  
13. Suspect involved to hinder the Low 、
order and official business. 
14. Suspect involved in hinder families. 
15. Suspect involved to arson and to destroy. 
16. A swindle event from internet. 
17. The other illegal event. 
(Illegal used Drugs) 
18. Suspect involved to against the drugs 
prevention and cure low. 
(The harass of campus security and 
administration event) 
19. Student to harass the ceremony event. 
20. Student to harass the teaching. 
21. Hack or destroy the school information 
system. 
22. Group of students to cheat. 
23. Run-away from home and did not go to 
school (under senior high school). 
(Bullying event) 
24. Body bullying. 
25. Relationship bullying. 
26. Internet bullying. 
27. Language bullying. 
28. Counterattacking bullying. 
(The other Violence & Deviance Behavior) 
29. The other violence & deviance behavior in 
the campus. 
30. Gangster intervene the campus. 
( A conflict between teacher 
and student) 
1. A conflict event between 
student and teacher. 
2. A conflict event between 
parent and teacher (staff). 
3. A punishment or abuse 
event. 
4. A resist event from 
student. 
(A conflict event in the 
administrational 
management) 
5. A conflict event between 
student and staff. 
6. A conflict event between 
parent and staff. 
(The other counseling 
conflict Event) 
7. The other counseling 
conflict Event  
The statutory event for children and 
teenage 
1. An abuse event. 
2. An abandonment case. 
3. Deprive the educational freedom from 
children or teenager. 
4. The other harm event to children. 
5. Children may explore in danger 
condition. 
6. Working in illegal shop. 
A sexual assault event  
7. A sexual assault event regarded to 
enforcement rules of the Gender 
Equality in Employment Act. 
8 A sexual assault event not regarded to 
enforcement rules of the Gender 
Equality in Employment Act. 
A sex harassment event 
9. A sexual harassment event regarded 
to enforcement rules of the Gender 
Equality in Employment Act. 
10. A sexual harassment event not 
regarded to enforcement rules of the 
Gender Equality in Employment Act. 
Suspect involved in the sex business 
11. An event against the Children and 
Teenage Prostitution Prevention 
Statute. 
High risk family 
12. High risk family. 
Illegal used drug 
13. An event regarded the drug or 
medication protect act. 
The other children and teenager 
protect case 
14. Student to drift. 
15. Student in to the illegitimate place. 
16. Run-away from home in three days. 
17. The other children and teenager 
protect case. 
General natural 
disaster 
1. Windstorm disaster 
2. floods 
3. earthquake 
4. Landslip and 
mudflows  
5. To be struck by 
lightning. 
Environmental 
disaster  
6. Solenopsis ivicta 
Buren. 
The other disaster 
7. The other disaster. 
An administrative 
event 
1. A conflict even 
between staff and 
staff. 
2. A problem of 
general. 
administration 
3. A problem of 
personnel matters. 
4. A problem of 
administration. 
5. A problem of 
educational 
administration. 
The other problem. 
6. The other problem. 
General disease 
event 
1. A generally 
disease event 
2. Ophthalmia 
3. Influenza 
4. A generally 
disease 
(H1N1). 
The statutory 
disease 
5. Enterovirus 
6. Tuberculosis 
7. Scarlet fever 
8. Pertussis 
9. Swinepox 
10. Dengue fever 
11. SARS 
12. A concurrent 
disease from 
statutory. 
13. The other 
statutory 
disease  
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Appendix X The translation of interview response with the manager of the CSRS 
Respondent: Head of city manager  
A. Personal background 
1. Job title and description (personal job experience) 
2. Educational background 
A. My name is XXX. I have been servicing at the Military Officer since 1997. I was at 
a senior high school as a military officer for one year, as a supervisor for two years 
and head of the department for three years. Then I serviced at the Ministry of 
Education office for one year and three months, and was transferred to Taitung City 
to be the head of the Liaison Office of Taitung City for two years and nine months; 
after that, I have been the head of Liaison Office of Taichung City since 16
th
 August 
2007. 
Can you describe the detail of your current work? 
A. The apartment I service is the Liaison Office of Taichung City, managed by the 
Ministry of Education, also known as ―Counseling and Guidance Committee of 
Student Life outside the Campus in Taichung City‖. There are two majority works 
for us. The Liaison Office manages are responsible for providing training courses, 
including personal, educational and logistical courses, for military staff serving at 
the high schools in Taichung City. Another main work which contains the 
management of all schools, from primary schools to high schools, is the 
responsibility of the ―Taichung City Counseling and Guidance Committee of 
Student Life outside the Campus‖. And in this few years, there are some extensions 
to this part of work – including the promotion of ‗National Defense Education‘, and 
the management and counseling for the staff of ―Existing alternative Education‖. 
The work mainly focuses on the high schools, and assists the management of the 
primary and secondary schools in Taichung City.  
2. Educational background 
A. I was a reserve officer graduating in 1984, and ever did a research in the Fu Hsing 
Kang College in 1997. The background of my regular education was ‗Institute of 
Public Affairs Regional Policy Course‘ in National University of Taitung.  
B. Personal knowledge of background to the system 
 3. What is the purpose do you think for the Minister of Education to design this 
system? 
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A1.Personally, I think one of the functions of the system is to report events to the 
CSRC immediately. As we know that schools are located in different cities/counties 
over the country. In order to control the safety condition of students in different 
areas, it is very urgent for educational managers to establish a management system 
to help understand what events happened to students, where they happened, what 
side-effects may be caused and how schools dealt with them. With the help of the 
reporting system, the chief of the highest educational institution can receive the 
latest information and gives some guides or supports to local schools immediately. 
Probe for: a. what is the concept from? 
A1. I think the concept of system may be from the military, because most of the 
military staff comes from military. This system (CSRS) may be the extension of 
reporting system and spirit from the intelligence and information system of war in 
the military to schools 
b. do you think the system functions effectively with respect to school management? 
A1. I think the system may say that firstly, it provides the condition of problem of 
campus event at school which can be classified as risk management. In fact, the 
detail of event has described on the report clearly, some events can be the 
reference cases for school and it provided some experience for pass events such as 
fire, traffic accident event, earthquake, or other serious campus events. Because of 
the dealing function of every administrative staff is different from person to 
person, through the system can provide some experience for staff who is working 
at the educational administrative institution without experiences to deal with event. 
I think that it is a good function for them. 
C. System operator experience and suggestion 
4. Have you had any similar experience elsewhere before operating (managing) this 
system? If so, Could you describe the experience? 
A1. Before servicing at the educational department, I had no experience of operating 
the system. But I‘ve got experience of operating similar reporting system in the 
military. I felt that they are similar. 
5. Did you take any training before operating (managing) this system? 
A1. We (city manager centre) provide a basic course including training and 
demonstration of the system for new staff when they report for duty. We also 
arrange regular training course about operating the campus security reporting 
system for our staff once or twice a year. 
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6. Do you find any problems when operating this system? 
Probe: is it easy for you to classify events according to the categories in the system? 
 Probe: any new categories for new types of risk? 
A1. From the operator point of view, the system and hardware are ok. The problem is 
sometime schools‘ president may withhold or refuse to report the events that may 
influence the reputation of schools or cause secondary injury to clients/schools. 
Dealing with such a situation, we will instruct the military officer to report the 
condition by telephone, a kind of verbal mode.  
7. Do you have any suggestions about this system for the system manager (at higher 
level)? 
A1. To simplify the procedure is the most important. According to the reporting 
procedure, reporters will get a number as a code of the event when they report the 
event through the CSRS. And they should use the code to input the following 
information, which is the most frequent mistake in the following reporting 
procedure. The code is easy to be ignored, which result in the mistake that the 
following report becomes a new event in the system. However, reporters cannot 
delete the record because they are not allowed to cancel any information at their 
managing level. Therefore, the same case may be regarded as two events in the 
system. Of course, such situation may be improved with enhancement of the 
training and operation for operators. Otherwise, such phenomena have improved a 
lot now. Originally, staff has to report the event with complete and correct 
information, which takes a lot of time and may result in loss of opportune moment. 
The reporting procedure has been slightly improved. Managers can report the 
event first and describe the detail later.   
D. Personal opinion towards the System’s function for the organisation 
8. Do you think this system helps organizations with risk management? 
8a) Are there other types of risk that are present in the school which are not covered by 
the categories available to you? If so, what are these other risks? 
A1. I believe that the system absolutely provides a function for risk management to 
organization has some practical significance.. Events may have some side-effects 
or consequent problem which is not the responsibility of schools. Therefore, the 
system help transmit correct information for higher level of management authority 
to make correct decision or provide resource to deal with event actually. It also 
help administrative agency reply to the Representative interrogation. Without 
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immediate report, we may lose the timing to deal some time-sensitive events, and 
make them worse. 
9. How does it provide the function for risk management? 
A1. It can be said that the system can timely provide information about the school that 
the event happened in. For example, gas pipes were broken during the regular 
maintenance of road around a primary school, and the spreading gas made some 
students feel dizzy even vomit. After receiving the report, the Ministry of 
Education (Campus Security Report Center) assigned the military staff from 
school which is near the scene of event to coordinate other governmental agencies 
to deal with this event together. So it provides information for the Ministry of 
Education to coordinate related resources to deal with the event. 
10. What is your opinion of the data management of campus accident events by the 
Ministry of Education for long-term risk surveillance? 
A1. Actually, I think that I will give a positive attitude to support the system function 
in reporting events. A persecution is about the reputation of school. In fact, such 
problem has been reduced by keeping communicating with schools, because the 
system indeed provide positive help to the whole education institutions. 
E. Use of information from the system for organisation 
11. Did your school (or department) analyse the historical record of accident reporting 
from the system database? 
Probe for:  
a. if so, what is the purpose?        
A1. Yes, we do both monthly analysis and yearly analysis. The former produce an 
analytical table with all the events happened within this month and their 
percentages. After finishing the analysis, we share the result with schools with our 
recommend and suggestions as reference. The latter is done at the end of the year. It 
includes the frequent events in each month; for example, more traffic accidents and 
drowning events happen in July and August. And the analyses results will be 
provided to schools as reference for making precaution plan. Most students tend to 
stay outside longer during summer vacation; therefore, the target of ―Counseling 
and Guidance Committee of Student Life outside the Campus in Taichung City‖ 
will focus on outdoor activities. For example, in order to reduce the accident events, 
we have a special scheme called ―Youth Project‖ in the summer holiday to enhance 
the patrol outside the campus such as dangerous water areas. 
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How did you think about the effective of the information? 
School will pay more attention on the prevention work when we provide the 
information to them. Most of student will stay outside longer especially on the 
summer holiday; therefore, managers will focus the points on outdoor activities. 
For example, we have a special effort called ―Youth Project‖ in the summer holiday, 
the project especially enhanced the patrol on the outside of campus such as 
examined the dangerous areas of water which may reduce the accident events. 
c. what is the effect of using this result?  
     The analysis data have improved the function for managing and preventing 
events. 
12. Do you know that the Ministry of Education analyses the database from this 
system each year?  
A1. Yes I know. 
Probe for: a. If so, what the function does the analysis result provide for risk 
management to schools? 
 A1. The data can be used as reference for making plans (of campus security). Actually, 
most schools may not get the ability to analyze the data but they do know the 
peak period of each problem. According to the analysis by the Minister of 
Education, they may know that conflicts between students and teachers frequently 
happen at the beginning of new semester. Some schools caring about it may take 
some preventive measures while some may just ignore it. It depends on the 
characteristics of schools. 
13. Do you think the analysis document is useful for preventing campus security 
events?  
Probe for: a. how does it happen?        
b. can you provide any examples? 
A1. For example, more conflicts between teachers and students happen in every 
September due to the hair issue. Although the hair restriction has been abolished 
by the Ministry of Education, the discipline of hair is still demanded by some 
private school managers. Actually, we have explained the policies of hair issue 
and communicated with school managers in the conference at the end of August or 
the beginning of September. Otherwise, we will focus on particular problems 
according to the analysis result of system data. For instance, according to the 
analysis data, during the graduation season, from May to June, some students are 
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easy to get impetuous. Therefore, we have reminded the school staff to enhance 
the emotional management, which could help reduce conflicts between the staff 
and students.  
So, you think that the system not only provide the prevention of event for 
manager but also reference for the psychological preparation.  
Psychological construction of student events for the staff may keep them from 
being influenced by the students‘ emotion. 
F. Personal opinion towards the other potential problems in system 
14. Do you think one of the functions of this system is the surveillance to schools for 
the Ministry of Education? 
 A1. Personally, I do not think the surveillance to school is the main purpose of this 
system, but it doesn‘t seem that we could exclude the function of surveillance. 
The major purpose of using of the system for the Ministry of Education is to 
control situation and correct information for providing recourses and helping 
deal with the problem for schools. Nowadays, it is a democracy society; in fact, 
all the systems in schools are normalized and legalized. No one can change or 
control it by surveillance. The point is focused on how to get the correct 
information, what appropriate assistance should be provided and whether 
schools deal with the events. Besides, the community is concerned about 
whether educational authority take any actions to deal with even to prevent the 
events happened to students. For educational authority, how schools deal with 
the events and what assistance it can provide is more important. 
15. Do you think reporting the campus security event may invade personal privacy? 
   Probe for: How do you think to avoid it? 
 A1. We have concerned about the issue all the time. We replace the t real name of 
client with code or number or just his/her family name in the report of events 
relating to particular cases such as sexual assault, harassment and venereal disease 
events or events which could cause secondary injury to client. This is a consensus 
concept over the system managers. With regard to the general campus events 
which may not cause significant impact on the client, sometime the name of the 
client is already shown and published on the media. The whole system has 
enhanced the protection of client. 
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G. Personal opinion toward the procedure of campus security events and the right 
of client 
16. Do you think the system will change the reporting regulations because of the 
concern in some events from media? What is your opinion on this situation? 
 A1. Yes. Generally speaking, there are three levels of categories in the CSRS. Events 
classified into A level are heavy casualties and should be reported to the CSRC 
within fifteen minutes. Events of B level belong to the middle level of accidents; 
some of them are inter school. General events such as falling injury belong to C 
level. However, the level of events might be upgraded once reported by the media. 
So the concert from media will change the reporting procedure of the system.   
17. Do you think schools should notify the client that the event will be sent to the 
Campus Security Centre when dealing with the event? Why? 
 A1. Normally, we may not notice the client that the event has reported to the Campus 
security centre and simply follow the reporting procedure in administration 
system without the permission of the client of their parents. Whether the client 
and their parents should be notified before the event is reported is different from 
person to person. After events happened, the Minister of the Education hope to 
help deal with the event by controlling related information and providing 
appropriate assistance. It may be necessary to notify the client and their parents in 
a democracy society, but there might be some problems in administrative 
management if the client‘s parents don‘t agree with the reporting of event. So it 
needs more discussion on this issue. 
 18. Do you think schools should notify the client‘s legal guidance when dealing with 
the event? If so, why? 
 A1. I think it is a good thing to notify the client. But I think that most schools simply 
follow the administrational procedure to report the event and do what they should 
do to deal with the event under the guidance of regulation; therefore, schools will 
contact the clients and their parents but not necessarily notify them about the 
reporting of the event, because the event already happened. The dealing with 
event and controlling the follow condition are more important than the notifying 
of the client. Of course, actually as we know that school will contact the student 
legal guidance or the client. Therefore, school just follows the administrative 
process to operate the event which illustrate and report according to the regulation 
of administrative system. So, I do not think it is urgent to notify the client or their 
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legal guidance about everything since dealing with the event is the most important 
at the moment. 
H. Personal experience of dealing with campus accident event  
19. Have you ever been required to temporarily withhold any events to protect the 
reputation of a school? If so, what were these events and what did you do? Was this 
information ever made public later on? 
 A1. Yes, the first thing school ask to withhold is the problem between teachers and 
students; the second is the event which may influence the reputation of schools; 
and the third is sexual assault or sexual harassment. Especially about the 
problems between teachers and students, schools always ask for complete 
investigation before they are reported. In fact, it may delay the timing of 
reporting event. – These reputational issues (the first two especially) seem to me 
to pose a challenge to the hierarchical grid/group character of the college 
security system/college organization precisely because they imply that the 
college system is weak/lacks discipline. This may partly explain the desire to 
keep this hidden as much as possible  
What did you do when schools ask you to withhold from reporting?  
 A1. Liaison office (City management centre) and the school staff reach an agreement 
that when dealing with such events, the school staff will report the event by 
telephone. At least high level managers know that there is such an event. Even 
some parents ask for withholding sexual assault or sexual harassment events. 
After the event has been investigated completely, we will suggest that school 
finish the report procedure. 
  So, event still will be reported when the investigation finished.  
Yes, event will be report eventually. We have a consensus of reporting such 
events by phone. For example, in a physical examination, AIDS positivity was 
observed in the result of a military school student. The client denied having sex 
with the third person. Of course, the result may not be caused by sex but by 
blood transfusion or misuse of the needle. School hoped to withhold the event 
and retest the result. The result of re- examination of blood which was done one 
week later showed that the previous test was an error. This case was first 
reported verbally and the whole event was reported through the system after it 
had been completely investigated.  
20. Do you think reporting campus security events may generate hostility towards you 
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from your colleagues who might regard you as working too closely with senior 
management? 
 A1. It has happened that the president of the school intolerant of the military staff 
who reported the event to the Ministry of Education. We have been 
communicating with presidents of schools every time we have meeting with them. 
We told them clearly that those events are unpredictable and hard to control by 
man power; therefore, it is not their fault when such events happen and they won‘t 
be blamed on them. However, if school refuses to report, the president may take 
the responsibility in law or administrative system. So, we have provides the 
concept to the president of school. Therefore, as can be said that the acceptability 
of report the event are accepted by the president of school. The concept has 
gradually changed in Taichung City this year. 
21. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are sporadic 
events and hard to control? How do you think this condition could be improved? 
A1. For example, car accident is more common. Sometimes there are slight collisions 
with other cars and sometimes there are traffic accidents caused by driving 
without a licence. The sporadic events normal are more than other event and hard 
to control. Otherwise, like the event of sex harassment, because it is hard to define. 
Although we educate the student continually, the problem is the defining of events 
which causes the uncomfortable feeling to student. It might be normal contact 
when students were in love but became sex harassment when they broke up. So it 
is hard to control. 
   How to improve it? 
Firstly, enhance the education training and propaganda for students, especially in 
notion. For sporadic events which are under our control, we do our best to educate 
student with correct concept; while for those are not under our control such as 
nature disaster, we teach student how to handle it and how to protect your-self when 
it happens.  
Nowadays, education tends to educate students many positive but less negative 
concepts of event. We should also give negative cases as a kind of opportunity 
education. If students are just given the positive concepts of event, they are 
probably unable to deal with a contingency they meet. We should provide negative 
information to them such as drugs abuses and gender relationship. In the past, 
people ignored such issues, even skipped the course of gender relationship, which 
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made students more curious about that; therefore, some students tried it without 
contraception, which resulted in pregnancy and caused more problems to society 
and family. Moreover, we did not educate the knowledge of drug to students in the 
past; therefore, some students tried it by mistake. Nowadays, we give a concept to 
student which shows that it is poisonous, what it looks like and the sequel after 
taking it. Therefore, I believe that educations with both positive and negative sides 
will help children make a proper judgment, and it would be more practical.   
22. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are happening 
with frequency and why are they hard to reduce? How do you think this condition 
could be improved? 
 A1. At this moment the most injure for students is from traffic accidents. More than 
one thousand of students were injured in traffic accidents every year. Public 
transportation in some remote areas is not so convenient; therefore, some students 
might have no choice but to go to schools by motorcycle without a license. 
Students are too young to get a driving license and they haven‘t been trained, so if 
accidents happen to them, they are usually serious injured. It is really hard to 
prevent. 
So, you think that the car accident which happened by illegal driving of student caused 
by both the factors of environment and social welfare. 
   Because of nowadays the law are different than the environment. 
So, you think that the low is disconnected from environment. 
   Yes, it has the condition really.  
What function did you think to improve it? 
   I think that it is hard to improve it, but we still have to do it. Firstly, the 
government can provide the subsidy to remote areas or establish the traffic system. 
For example, there is no school bus and less of public bus service in some school 
but both parents have work and cannot provide the transportation vehicle for them. 
The simple way is bicycle but it cannot reach the far distance. Therefore, the riding 
motorcycle may be the alternative way for them. We hope that the law can modify 
and improve the support on the remote areas. Even provide the subsidy to some 
school without school bus, or provide the public transportation for student. The 
government may provide some funding or signing the contract with local bus 
company which provide the service for student. Nowadays, the targets of public 
transportation which belong to the private company are focused on the profit. They 
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will close the service for public if they think it is no profit for them. I think that it 
is the responsibilities of government. By doing so, it can reduce the car accident of 
student. Otherwise, the educations also have to focus on education of student and 
family education of parents together.   
23. According to personal experience, what kinds of event do you think are latent ones 
and hard to predict? How do you think this condition could be improved? 
 A1. Some latent events can be classified into sporadic events. Generally speaking, the 
categories of campus event can be control clearly through the annual analysis. 
Latent events usually related to the factor of environment of schools which 
surround school, such as old facilities or defective enclosing walls.  
Do you think that the environment of community around the school may cause the 
potential crisis event to students? 
  Yes, latent events caused by communities around schools are hard to find out but 
most of events can be predicted and prevented. 
 What kind of crisis do you think are created by the environment of school? 
For example, some sport facilities are so old or in a dilapidated condition that 
students may get injured when using them. Otherwise, strangers may invade the 
campus with damaged hedge. The Ministry of Education once promoted a ―no 
fence policy‖ in Taichung City before. But it happened that a student in special 
education school was raped by a stranger from off-campus. We cannot expect that 
the criminal have normal attitude or behaviour as a general person. It is a good 
thing that school has no hedge, but it also provides a good chance for criminal and 
offender. Such event is unpredictable. 
How to improve it?  
Actually, school should do some environment assessment and take some 
precautionary measures. The environment assessment could be looser if the school 
is located in a safe and sparsely-populated area. Also, school should maintain and 
repair the facilities frequently. 
I. The other 
 24. In a technological society, schools rely on technology to help with campus security 
management; however, sometimes students also use technology to cause some 
events for campus management, for instance: recording counseling conflict events 
with mobile phone, posting an undue behavioral video on internet or recklessly 
send an e-mail to the minster of the Ministry of Education etc. 
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 What is your opinion on this phenomenon? 
 A1. I think that it can be focused on a few viewpoints. Firstly, about the ban of using 
mobile phone at schools, t was easier to do when the mobile phone was unpopular 
in the early time. But now schools have to formulate a regulation for managing the 
using of mobile phone at schools, including the timing, the place etc; and they 
should be set on mute or vibration model in class. On one hand using the mobile 
phone to record voice or take photography will absolutely cause harm to teachers 
On the other hand it might help stop some inappropriate teachings. Every 
technical product is good. What is the most important thing is how to enhance the 
attitude of user.  
     Firstly, school should manage it. Then schools have to educate student the timing 
they use it, which is the same as internet. The using of internet also is kind of 
education which help student establish the concept of law. Some information can 
be posted to internet, some may not. Users are responsible for their behaviour and 
all the duty in law. If education focus on this issue and accompany a proper 
management, the problem could be reduced. The conflict between teacher and 
student cannot be improved by blindly banning the use of mobile phone at school 
but get worse. That student using the mobile phone at school may cause harm to 
school, but also may cause a vigilant function to teacher, so it may not just of 
negative effects. Mobile phones challenge the social discipline/hierarchy of the 
school 
  So, you think that such behaviour from students may change teachers‘ attitudes?  
Yes, it does. The key point is the concept and attitude of students doing such a 
thing. If they just want to play a practical joke on teachers or ask for troubles, of 
course, it may cause harm to schools and teachers. However, if the problem comes 
from the inappropriate teaching of teacher, the posting of even may force teachers 
to change their attitude on the management of students.  
  So, you think that technology is helpful for manager? 
     Yes, but it depends on how you use and manage it.  
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Appendix XI The sample of translation from multilingual background of 
researchers 
Do you think the system functions effectively with respect to school management? 
b.你認為此系統可有效提供學校哪些危機管理功能 
這系統我覺得應該是說，第一個他所謂的危機管理是說這個系統除了說可以當時
表達說這個學校的校安問題之外，事實上他處理的過程還有經過，都會在上面做
一個很詳細的描述，那這些有一些可以做為學校的案例，在危機管理上面是可以
提供一些經驗，比如說火災事件、車禍事件、地震、或者是一些重大的校安事件，
因為每個學校的行政人員要教育人員他處理的方式不盡相同，那可以藉由校安的
整個過程當中提供一些寶貴的經驗給一些曾經甚至沒有處理過這樣的教育行政人
員能夠有一個寶貴的參考，這是我覺得一個滿好的地方。 
I think the system may, say, firstly about risk management, not only show the specific 
problem of a campus event but in fact it also describes the details of the event and the 
process of dealing with it at the school. Those cases can also be the reference for 
school providing some experience for the management of risks, such as fire, traffic 
accident events, earthquake, or other serious campus events, because it is the function 
of every administrative staff to deal with events that could be different. Through the 
process, the campus system can provide some experience for staff who are working at 
the educational administrative level of the institution who do not have experience to 
deal with the event. I think that it is a good function for them. 
N 2 MA in Teaching in Chinese   
I think the system may say that firstly, it provides the condition of problem of campus 
event at school which can be classified as risk management. In fact, the detail of event 
has described on the report clearly, some events can be the reference cases for school 
and it provided some experience for pass events such as fire, traffic accident event, 
earthquake, or other serious campus events. Because of the dealing function of every 
administrative staff is different from person to person, through the system can provide 
some experience for staff who is working at the educational administrative institution 
without experiences to deal with event. I think that it is a good function for them. 
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L 3 MA in Language Learning and Education 
What are some crisis-managing functions that the system can provide the school?  
First of all, the system can not only narrate the security problems of a school but also 
describe the process of crisis management. Here are some previous cases, such as fire, 
car accidents, earthquakes or other major security incidents. Due to the fact that not 
every staff of the administration has the same way of dealing with crisis or that some 
even do not have any experience, the administration may have some reference, which is 
an advantage of the system. 
C4 Doctor in Sociology 
Firstly, I think in the management of risks，the system is able to provide the up-to-date 
information about school security problems, elaborating the problems in detail when 
occurred. In other words, the system is able to manage risks by recording the whole 
process and then reporting the problems in full description. Considering this, the 
information about the process of risk occurrence and the description of security 
problems would be taken as references to provide school for the management of risks, 
for instance, fire, car accident, earthquake or important incidents that are associated 
with school securities. In school, administrators may use different strategies or 
approaches to educating their staff to manage risks. The security system would provide 
precious information for the staff who are new to learn about the management of risks 
or who do not have similar experience to cope with risks previously. Regarding this, I 
think it is rather a good point.  
J5 MA in Media  
In my opinion the risk management system can first of all shows not just the campus 
events in this school but actually through the process and procedures of dealing with the 
event they report a detail description of the event. These can become references for the 
school and provide experience for risk management, such as fires, car accidents, 
earthquake or even more serious campus events; because each school‘s administrative 
and teaching staff‘s way of dealing will be different. So, through the whole process of 
dealing with the event, those administrative staffs who have no experiences gain a 
valuable frame of reference. This, I think, is quite a good aspect of the system.   
 
318 
 
S5 Steve Harlow, Department of Language and Linguistic Science University of York 
What crisis management functions do you think this system might effectively offer to 
schools? 
I think one should say, firstly, what is meant by this system‘s crisis management means 
that the system, apart from saying it can immediately express this school‘s security 
issues,  can also act as a case study for the school, and can offer some lessons as far as 
crisis management is concerned, such as fire, traffic accidents, earthquakes, or other 
significant school safety issues, because the way in which it deals with a school‘s 
administrative officers and teaching staff is not exactly the same, it can through the 
whole process of school security offer valuable lessons for educational administrators 
with no previous dealt experience, providing them with a valuable resource, which I feel 
is a splendid contribution. 
A6 Andrew Watson was appointed as The Ford Foundation Representative for China in 
July of 1999. From 1991 to 1999, he was Professor of Asian Studies of the Center for 
Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide and a Co-Director of the University‘s 
Chinese Economies Research Center. He was a member of the Board of the Australia 
China Council under the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, from 1994 
to 1999.  
What crisis management functions do you think this system can effectively provide for 
schools? 
In the first place, I feel it must be said that, apart from right away expressing issues of 
school security, this system‘s reference to crisis management really means that it has a 
method for the process of resolving issues. They can all be explained in detail in it.  So, 
some of this can be used as case studies for the school. It can provide some experience 
for crisis management, such as fires, car accidents, earthquakes or major school security 
incidents. Since its ways of dealing with each of the school‘s administrative and 
educational staff is similar, it can be used to provide some valuable experience for the 
entire process of school security and a valuable reference for administrative and 
educational staff with no previous experience. I think this is an excellent aspect. 
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